Essays on Islamic Assets by Jahromi, Maria
Copyright and use of this thesis
This thesis must be used in accordance with the 
provisions of the Copyright Act 1968.
Reproduction of material protected by copyright 
may be an infringement of copyright and 
copyright owners may be entitled to take 
legal action against persons who infringe their 
copyright.
Section 51 (2) of the Copyright Act permits 
an authorized officer of a university library or 
archives to provide a copy (by communication 
or otherwise) of an unpublished thesis kept in 
the library or archives, to a person who satisfies 
the authorized officer that he or she requires 
the reproduction for the purposes of research 
or study. 
The Copyright Act grants the creator of a work 
a number of moral rights, specifically the right of 
attribution, the right against false attribution and 
the right of integrity. 
You may infringe the author’s moral rights if you:
-  fail to acknowledge the author of this thesis if 
you quote sections from the work 
- attribute this thesis to another author 
-  subject this thesis to derogatory treatment 
which may prejudice the author’s reputation
For further information contact the University’s 
Director of Copyright Services
sydney.edu.au/copyright
  
Essays on Islamic Assets 
 
Maria Jahromi 
 
 
 
A thesis submitted in fulfilment  
of the requirements for the degree of  
Doctor of Philosophy 
 
 
Discipline of Finance 
Business School 
University of Sydney 
2014 
 
 
ii 
 
Statement of Originality 
 
This is to certify that to the best of my knowledge, the content of this thesis is my own work. 
This thesis has not been submitted for any degree or other purposes. 
I certify that the intellectual content of this thesis is the product of my own work and that all 
the assistance received in preparing this thesis and sources have been acknowledged. 
 
 
 
____________________________________________ 
Maria Jahromi 
17
th
 December 2014 
  
iii 
 
 
 
Acknowledgements 
 
 
First and foremost, I wish to thank my supervisors, Dr Shumi Akhtar, Professor Tom Smith and 
Associate Professor Barry Oliver for their support, guidance and encouragement throughout my 
PhD studies. I would also like to thank Professor Tom Smith and Professor Doug Foster for their 
inspiring lectures that contributed to the development of my thesis proposal and to methodologies 
that I employed in this thesis. I appreciate all feedback, ideas and programming assistance that I 
have received from fellow students and colleagues throughout my PhD. Further, I thank Larry 
Shepherd from Quant Shop for providing Malaysian bond data that forms part of the third and 
fourth chapters of this thesis. In addition, I thankfully acknowledge the University of Sydney 
Business School for providing financial assistance with thesis production costs. Parts of this 
thesis were edited by Elite Editing, and editorial intervention was restricted to Standards D and E 
of the Australian Standards for Editing Practice. I also wish to thank my family and friends for 
their patience, encouragement, and continuous support. In particular, I would like to express my 
sincerest gratitude to Hesam Rohi Jahromi and Alina Rohi Jahromi. 
 
 
 
 
 
  
iv 
 
 
Abstract 
 
 
This thesis consists of three quantitative studies of Islamic and conventional assets in Islamic 
and non-Islamic countries. The studies explore the performance characteristics as well as the 
impact of macroeconomic news surprises and the Global Financial Crisis (GFC) on these 
assets. First, I use a unique Malaysian dataset to identify individual Islamic and non-Islamic 
stocks and find that Islamic stocks provide similar returns at a lower risk than non-Islamic 
stocks. As such, the Islamic portfolio is closer to the mean-variance efficient frontier and the 
minimum variance portfolio, relative to the non-Islamic portfolio. These results are driven by 
financial ratio screens, which exclude firms with large debt or income from interest from 
Islamic stock portfolios. Second, using a dataset which covers macroeconomic data and stock 
and bond indices in three Islamic and eight non-Islamic countries, macroeconomic surprises 
have a similar impact on the returns and volatility of both Islamic and conventional stocks 
and bonds. Third, in a sample of stock and bond indices in 11 Islamic and eight non-Islamic 
countries the GFC has a negative impact on most stock returns, but not on bond returns. 
There are benefits of Islamic assets during the GFC, particularly during the early stage of the 
crisis, because Islamic institutions are prohibited from holding sub-prime mortgage securities 
and derivatives. The strongest benefits are in the UK and US. This thesis adds to the 
emerging body of quantitative research on Islamic assets and suggests that there are potential 
benefits of risk reduction and stability for Islamic assets, particularly during a financial crisis. 
However, Islamic assets react to macroeconomic surprises in a similar way to conventional 
assets, and are not immune to economic recessions. 
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- 1 - 
INTRODUCTION 
 
 
This thesis consists of three quantitative studies of Islamic and conventional stock and bond 
assets that explore their performance characteristics as well as the impact of macroeconomic 
news surprises and financial crises on these assets. The main characteristic of Islamic finance 
or Shari’ah-compliant finance is that it requires compliance with Islamic law (Shari’ah).1 
Islamic law prohibits interest or usury (riba), transactions involving unnecessary uncertainty 
(gharar), and gambling (maysir), which includes short selling, arbitrage, betting and 
speculation (Abdul Aziz and Gintzburger 2009). Instead, financial arrangements are based on 
the profit-and-loss sharing principle, and there is a strong emphasis on the link between the 
real and the financial sectors. In practice, Islamic stock indices apply business activity and 
financial ratio screens to a universe of stocks to ensure compliance with the Shari’ah. 
Examples of non-compliant business activities that are excluded are alcohol, tobacco, 
conventional banks and insurance companies, gambling and pornography. Financial ratio 
screens exclude companies that are involved in interest (riba), either through significant 
income from interest or through excessive leverage. Islamic bonds (sukuk) must be supported 
by tangible assets, and are based on financial arrangements such as profit-and-loss sharing 
(e.g., partnership) or leasing principles to avoid interest. 
Global Islamic financial assets were $1.7 trillion in 2013 and they are forecast to grow to $3.4 
trillion by 2018 (Ernst & Young 2013). Islamic assets have been growing at a substantial 
average annual growth of 17.6 per cent over 2008–2012, increasing 50 per cent faster than the 
                                                          
1
 Compliance with the Shari’ah is based on the Quran, Hadith (narrative records of the actions and saying of the 
prophet Mohammed) and Ijtihad (the derivation and formulation of Shari’ah laws or guidelines by qualified 
scholars to deduce further knowledge from the Quran and Hadith) (Derigs and Marzban, 2009). 
2 
 
overall banking sector (Ernst & Young, 2012; 2013). As the Australian Government is 
working to position Australia as a leading financial services centre in the Asia Pacific region, 
it recognises the importance of supporting the growth of Islamic finance in Australia as 
having a great potential for creating jobs and wealth for Australians (Australian Trade 
Commission 2010; Sherry 2010).
2
 In this context, this study is well positioned to contribute 
to the scarce body of quantitative research on Islamic financial products. The results from this 
study may help local and international investors to have a better understanding of their 
investment and portfolio management strategies that involve Islamic assets. This research can 
also contribute to the Government’s aim to “focus on deepening Islamic finance skills—
education, training, attainment of relevant qualifications”, which is among the key 
government policies supporting the growth of Islamic finance in Australia (Australian Trade 
Commission 2010: 6). 
The first project uses a unique dataset provided by the Shariah Advisory Council of Malaysia 
and a screen-based methodology to identify Islamic, or Shari’ah-compliant, stocks in 
Malaysia and contrast their performance characteristics with non-Islamic stocks, which are 
stocks that fail to comply with the Shari’ah. By applying statistical tests and graphical 
analysis, this project finds that in Malaysia Islamic and non-Islamic stocks have equal 
returns, and that the Islamic stock portfolio return has an annualised standard deviation that is 
on average 3.43–3.78 percentage points lower than the non-Islamic stock portfolio, 
suggesting that it is closer to the minimum variance portfolio. This project provides some 
evidence that the lower variance of Islamic stock returns is due to financial ratio screens that 
exclude firms with high debt, cash holdings and accounts receivable. I also explore the 
                                                          
2
 The following are examples of how Australia supports the development of Islamic banking. The Australian 
Government is reviewing the tax regulation system to remove existing impediments to Islamic financial 
products. In February 2010 Westpac was the first Australian bank to offer an investment product developed for 
Islamic financial institutions and Macquarie Group has announced plans for an Islamic finance joint venture 
with the Bahrain-based Gulf Finance House. La Trobe University has launched a Masters Degree in Islamic 
Banking. Islamic financial product institutions have been established including the Muslim Community 
Cooperative (Australia) (MCCA) (Sherry 2010). 
3 
 
characteristics of Islamic and non-Islamic firms and find that Islamic firms on average hold 
about a quarter the level of total debt that non-Islamic firms hold. Islamic firms hold 
approximately half the cash and interest-bearing securities of non-Islamic firms, they hold 
about a quarter to a half the level of accounts receivable of non-Islamic firms, and they tend 
to be smaller than non-Islamic firms. 
The second project examines how the impact of macroeconomic news surprises on stock and 
bond returns and their volatility differs between Islamic and conventional assets in 11 
countries: Australia, Canada, France, Germany, Indonesia, Italy, Japan, Malaysia, Turkey, the 
United Kingdom (UK) and the United States (US). Analysing the impact of macroeconomic 
news surprises on the performance of stocks and bonds may reveal information about how the 
mechanisms of price formation differ for Islamic assets compared to conventional assets. I 
select eight macroeconomic variables that may represent shocks in the real economy 
(unemployment, payrolls, industrial production, retail sales and Gross Domestic Product 
[GDP]), as well as interest rates and inflation (Consumer Price Index [CPI] and Producer 
Price Index [PPI]). The findings from this study suggest that—with only few exceptions—
new information is incorporated into the price of Islamic stocks and bonds in the same way as 
it is incorporated into the price of conventional assets. At the same time, there are significant 
differences in the impact of macroeconomic news surprises on assets across country, variable 
and asset types (i.e., stocks or bonds). 
The third project uses panel regression and other approaches to analyse whether the Global 
Financial Crisis of 2007–2009 (GFC) has affected Islamic stocks and bonds to a smaller 
extent than conventional assets in 11 Islamic countries (Bahrain, Egypt, Indonesia, Iran, 
Malaysia, Morocco, Pakistan, Qatar, Saudi Arabia, Turkey and the United Arab Emirates 
[UAE]) and eight non-Islamic countries (Australia, Canada, France, Germany, Italy, Japan, 
UK and US). The findings from this study suggest that Islamic stocks enjoyed considerable 
4 
 
protection during the first stage of the crisis, which is probably due to the exclusion of sub-
prime mortgage securities and derivatives that contributed to the crisis. The greatest benefits 
were found in countries that had a large exposure to sub-prime mortgage investments, such as 
the US and UK. However, during the second stage of the crisis, when the crisis spread to the 
global economy and to financial markets, Islamic stocks fell in market value alongside 
conventional stocks, although often to a smaller extent. 
The thesis is structured as follows. Project 1 on the risk, return and mean-variance of Islamic 
and non-Islamic stocks is presented in Chapter 2, while Project 2 on the impact of 
macroeconomic announcements on Islamic and conventional stocks and bonds follows in 
Chapter 3. Project 3 on the impact of the GFC on Islamic and conventional stocks and bonds 
is covered in Chapter 4. These three projects are then followed by conclusions in Chapter 5. 
  
5 
 
- 2 - 
RISK, RETURN, AND MEAN-VARIANCE-
EFFICIENCY OF ISLAMIC AND NON-ISLAMIC 
STOCKS 
 
2.1 INTRODUCTION 
This chapter tests for difference in returns, risk and mean-variance efficiency between 
Islamic and non-Islamic stock portfolios, with an emphasis on the factors that drive these 
differences. First, I identify Islamic, or Shari’ah-compliant, stocks and contrast their 
performance characteristics with non-Islamic stocks, which are stocks that fail to comply 
with the Shari’ah.3 Then, I use statistical tests and graphical analysis to examine whether the 
Islamic, non-Islamic or market portfolios are mean-variance efficient. Finally, I explore what 
factors drive the difference in performance and efficiency between Islamic and non-Islamic 
stocks by applying selected Islamic screens at a time. 
I use Malaysia as a case study of Islamic and non-Islamic stock markets for two reasons. 
First, Malaysia has one of the most strongly established Islamic financial sectors in the world 
with a vast potential for continued growth (Australian Trade Commission 2010; Ernst & 
Young 2012). According to The Banker (2009), $65.1bn, or 25.1 per cent of total financial 
assets in Malaysia are Islamic. This accounts to 10.5 per cent of global Islamic financial 
assets as of 2009 (The Banker 2009). Relative to the Middle East, Malaysia is a highly 
sophisticated market with well-developed infrastructure, and the country is a leader in terms 
                                                          
3
 Islamic stocks are stocks that comply with the Islamic law (Shari’ah) and are sometimes referred to as 
Shari’ah-compliant stocks. Stocks that do not comply with the Islamic law are referred to as non-Islamic stocks. 
The criteria and screens for a stock to be considered Islamic are discussed in sections 2.3.1 and 2.3.2 of this 
chapter. Further, the combination of Islamic and non-Islamic stocks is referred to as the market or as 
conventional stocks. 
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of Islamic finance innovation, due to its more liberal Shari’ah interpretation (The Banker, 
2009). 
Second, I use Malaysia because of its unique data on Islamic stocks. While many countries 
have Islamic stock indices, Malaysia is the only country with comprehensive data on 
individual stocks that are considered Islamic by the Shari’ah Advisory Council of Malaysia, 
who have provided semi-annual lists of all Malaysian Islamic firms since 1997. The 
advantage of using individual stock data rather than indices to test for the performance of 
Islamic stocks is that I have a large sample of stocks with price data over a longer time period 
than Islamic stock indices are usually available. This also means that I can identify the 
remaining non-Islamic stocks that fail the Islamic screens. Both the Islamic portfolio and the 
non-Islamic portfolio are large and diversified portfolios. 
Further, I develop a heuristic to create an alternative Malaysian dataset, where I apply Islamic 
business activity and financial ratio screens to identify Islamic versus non-Islamic stocks. 
This methodology helps us to understand the characteristics of Islamic versus non-Islamic 
firms and, most importantly, it explains what particular business activity or financial ratio 
screens affect the performance of Islamic and non-Islamic stocks. 
The study in this chapter finds that Islamic stocks are closer to the mean-variance efficient 
frontier than non-Islamic stocks. While the portfolios have approximately equal returns, the 
Islamic portfolio has an annualised standard deviation that is on average 3.43–3.78 
percentage points lower than the non-Islamic portfolio, so it is closer to the minimum 
variance portfolio. I argue that the lower variance of Islamic stocks is due to financial ratio 
screens that exclude firms with high debt, cash holdings and accounts receivable. The 
alternative dataset shows that financial and business screens affect performance in opposite 
ways: while stocks that fail business activity screens have higher returns and comparable 
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standard deviations to Islamic stocks, stocks that fail financial ratio screens have comparable 
returns and higher standard deviations than Islamic stocks. Therefore, financial ratio screens 
exclusively drive the lower variance of Islamic stocks. Secondly, the financial ratio screens 
dominate results, because 65.12 per cent of total firms are excluded from the Islamic portfolio 
due to failure to comply with financial ratio screens. Only 6.98 per cent are excluded due to 
failure to meet both screens and 4.02 per cent are excluded due to business activity screens 
only. 
I also explore the characteristics of Islamic and non-Islamic firms and find that Islamic firms 
on average hold about a quarter the level of total debt that non-Islamic firms hold. Islamic 
firms hold approximately half the cash and interest-bearing securities of non-Islamic firms, 
they hold about a quarter to a half the level of accounts receivable of non-Islamic firms and 
they tend to be smaller than non-Islamic firms are. 
The remainder of this chapter is structured as follows. Section 2.2 develops three hypotheses, 
Section 2.3 describes the data sources and the portfolio construction and Section 2.4 presents 
the methodology used to test the hypotheses. Sections 2.5 and 2.6 provide descriptive 
statistics and results, and Section 2.7 concludes the chapter.   
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2.2 HYPOTHESIS DEVELOPMENT 
This section investigates three hypotheses about the properties of Islamic and non-Islamic 
stocks. The first research question examines the risk and return characteristics of an Islamic 
stock portfolio relative to a non-Islamic portfolio or the market. The second research question 
tests the hypothesis whether in the Malaysian stock market, the Islamic and non-Islamic stock 
portfolios are on the mean-variance efficient frontier. The third research question explores the 
effects that the screening process of Islamic stocks has on the risk and return characteristics 
of the Islamic and non-Islamic stock portfolios.  
2.2.1 Hypothesis 1: Risk and Return Characteristics of Islamic and non-
Islamic Stocks 
The first research question tests the hypothesis that Islamic stock portfolios perform 
differently to non-Islamic portfolios in terms of risk and return. I measure returns as the 
average annualised percentage return and risk as the return variance, which are the first two 
moments of a stock return distribution. I expect that Islamic stocks have less than or equal 
returns to non-Islamic stocks. This is because an Islamic portfolio excludes stocks which 
have been shown to have high returns, such as “sin stocks” which are defined in Hong and 
Kacperczyk (2009) as publicly traded companies directly involved in or associated with 
alcohol, tobacco, and gaming. There is, however, a major difference between non-Islamic 
stocks and “sin stocks”, as non-Islamic stocks also include other business sectors prohibited 
by Shari’ah such as conventional banks and insurance companies, as well as firms with high 
levels of debt, cash and interest-bearing securities or receivables. 
Hong and Kacperczyk (2009) argue that “sin stocks” have higher expected returns than 
otherwise comparable stocks, as they are neglected by institutional investors because of 
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social norms, regulatory scrutiny and litigation risk. This means those stocks experience 
limited risk sharing and higher idiosyncratic risk, and this is compensated by higher average 
returns (Merton 1987). Hong and Kacperczyk’s (2009) finding also supports Heinkel, Kraus 
and Zechner’s (2001) argument that the drop in demand for the stock of companies that are 
perceived as irresponsible should lead to a premium in their returns. Fabozzi, Ma and 
Oliphant (2008) also find that a “sin portfolio” (consisting of firms involved in alcohol, adult 
services, gaming, tobacco, weapons and biotech alternatives) outperforms the market on a 
total return and risk-adjusted basis. They explain these positive excess returns through sin 
companies being costly to establish, so that surviving companies may earn high monopolistic 
returns. As well, sin stocks avoid the cost of applying social standards. Liston and Soydemir 
(2010) investigate relative portfolio performance between sin stock returns and faith-based 
returns and use Jensen’s alpha and other methodologies to show that the sin portfolio 
outperforms the faith-based portfolio relative to the market.
4 
In practice, empirical studies on Islamic stocks suggest there may be no significant difference 
in performance between an Islamic stock index and a conventional index (Hakim and 
Rashidian 2004; Hussein 2004; Hassan and Antoniou 2007; Girard and Hassan 2005; Hashim 
2008; Shubbar 2010; Albaity and Ahmad 2011; Dharani and Natarajan 2011). However, most 
of these studies focus on risk-adjusted measures of performance, such as the Sharpe ratio, or 
on abnormal returns. Only Albaity and Ahmad (2011) and Dharani and Natarajan (2011) 
explicitly test for a statistical difference in mean returns of an Islamic and a conventional 
stock index and conclude that mean returns are equal. Except for one study on Indian stocks 
(Dharani and Natarajan 2011), all these studies use global, US or UK Islamic stock indices 
that are supplied by Dow Jones or FTSE. Some studies suggest that Islamic stocks tend to 
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 The faith-based portfolio in Liston and Soydemir’s (2010) is made up of the Dow Jones Islamic index and the 
Ave Maria Fund, while their sin portfolio includes stocks in the tobacco, alcohol and gaming industries These 
categories are almost identical to those of Hong and Kacperczyk (2009). 
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outperform conventional stock indices, although all of those studies use risk-adjusted 
measures such as the Sharpe ratio to assess performance (Hassan, Antoniou and Paudyal 
2005; Hussein and Omran 2005; Alam and Rajjaque 2010; Beer, Estes and Munte 2011). 
This project is different from previous studies on Islamic stocks because I use individual 
stock data rather than the aggregate stock indices (for which constituent data is considered 
confidential by index providers). Using individual stock data is made possible by the Shariah 
Advisory Council which specifies which Malaysian stocks are Islamic, so that this approach 
is unique to Malaysia. Further, previous studies focus on Islamic versus conventional stock 
indices, whereas I test for a difference in mean returns between Islamic and non-Islamic 
stocks. It is possible that the absence of a difference in returns between the Islamic index and 
the market index in previous studies is due to the high proportion of Islamic stocks in the 
market index, so that finding a distinction between the Islamic index and the market index is 
difficult. If this is the case, a comparison of Islamic versus non-Islamic stocks will give a 
clearer picture of the effects of Islamic screening, in line with this hypothesis. 
In terms of risk I expect Islamic stocks to have lower variance compared to non-Islamic 
stocks or conventional stocks. There are several reasons why the risk profile of Islamic stocks 
might differ. First, this is because the principles of Islamic finance aim at minimising 
uncertainty (gharar shaghir) (Sukmana and Kholid 2010) so it would be expected that 
Islamic stocks would have a lower variance, obtained by avoiding industries and firms with 
high risk and uncertainty. Hypothesis 3 in Section 2.2.3 will explore how the industry 
composition and the financial ratio screens of Islamic stocks might affect the variance of 
returns between Islamic and non-Islamic stocks. Further, there are empirical studies 
suggesting that the volatility of Islamic stocks is lower than the market, such as Al-Zoubi and 
Maghyereh (2007), Dharani and Natarajan (2010) and Shubbar (2010). One of the 
explanations suggested for the lower risk of Islamic stocks relative to the market is the profit-
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and-loss sharing (PLS) principle in Islamic finance which substitutes for interest earning 
under conventional finance (Al-Zoubi and Maghyereh 2007). Under PLS, banks either share 
the profit and bear losses (Mudarabah) or share both profits and losses (Musharaka) with the 
firm. Therefore, in good times, an Islamic firm will share its profit with the financier which 
usually provides higher returns for the financier than interest rates and therefore the firm 
experiences lower returns than the shareholders of a non-Islamic firm. In bad times, when the 
Islamic firm bears a loss, the financier will bear the whole or part of the loss and therefore 
provides higher returns for shareholders in comparison to a non-Islamic firm (Al-Zoubi and 
Maghyereh 2007). Akhtar, Jahromi and John (2013) also find that Islamic stocks and bonds 
have lower volatility linkages than conventional stocks and bonds because there is a smaller 
set of common information and lower cross-market hedging activity in Islamic markets. 
However, there are also empirical studies with the opposite findings: Using US data for 
1998–2008, Beer, Estes and Munte (2011) find that the Dow Jones Islamic Market Index 
(DJIM) had higher mean returns and a higher standard deviation (0.0507) than the S&P500 
(0.0436) and a beta of 1.08193. The Sharpe ratio of the DJIM was 0.01945 compared to the 
S&P500 index which was -0.03918. The authors mention that these results might be unusual 
due to their sample period, which included periods of high volatility, uncertainty and 
financial crises, such as the “dot-com bubble”, September 11 and the GFC (Beer, Estes and 
Munte 2011).
5
 Charles, Darné and Pop (2012) also use seven Dow Jones Islamic indices to 
show that for most sub-periods over 1996–2009 there is no difference in the variance with the 
conventional Dow Jones indices, although there are instances when the Islamic indices 
exhibit slightly higher volatilities than their conventional counterparts.
6
 They argue that the 
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 This thesis uses Malaysian data for 1986–2012, which includes periods of financial crisis. As a sensitivity 
analysis, I examine the effect of the crisis periods by repeating the tests after excluding observations from the 
financial crises. 
6
 One limitation of Dow Jones indices is that they focus on stocks of large firms which might behave differently 
to the universe of all stocks and they are more likely subject to sample bias or under-diversification. 
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higher volatility could be due to the screening process which tends to exclude large firms so 
that the remaining eligible firms in the Islamic indices are smaller and more volatile, either 
due to under-diversification of the Islamic indices or to deficiencies in the application of the 
financial ratio screens which are subject to manipulation. The following are the hypotheses 
used to test whether Islamic stocks have a different mean and variance of returns relative to 
non-Islamic stocks: 
HA,0: There is no difference in mean returns between Islamic and non-Islamic stocks. 
HA,1: There is a significant difference in mean returns between Islamic and non-Islamic 
stocks. 
HB,0: There is no difference in the variance of Islamic versus non-Islamic stock returns. 
HB,1: There is a significant difference in the variance of Islamic versus non-Islamic stock 
returns. 
2.2.2 Hypothesis 2: Mean-Variance Efficiency of Islamic, non-Islamic and 
Market Portfolios 
The aim of the second hypothesis is to examine whether the Islamic, non-Islamic and market 
portfolios in Malaysia are mean-variance efficient relative to the Sharpe-Lintner CAPM and 
the Black CAPM. This is done by statistical tests of the mean-variance efficiency of the 
Islamic portfolio, as well as a graphical representation of the market, Islamic and non-Islamic 
portfolios on the ex-post mean-variance efficient frontier. 
I refer to a given portfolio as mean-variance efficient if it minimises variance for a given 
level of expected return so that it lies on the mean-variance frontier as defined in Cochrane 
(2000: 80): 
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The mean-variance frontier of a given set of assets is the boundary of the set of 
means and variances of the returns on all portfolios of the given assets. One can 
find or define this boundary by minimizing return variance for a given mean 
return. 
This thesis applies two sets of statistical tests to examine the mean-variance efficiency of a 
given stock portfolio. The first test is based on the multivariate test of ex-ante mean-variance 
efficiency in Gibbons, Ross and Shanken (1989). The advantage of using a multivariate test 
over a univariate test is that there are scenarios where the multivariate F-test rejects even 
though none of the univariate statistics seem to be significant, while it is also possible that the 
multivariate test fails to reject even though there are many significant univariate statistics 
(Gibbons, Ross and Shanken 1989). This can happen when the univariate statistics are highly 
dependent, which can be attributed to the pattern of correlations of the residuals. 
However, the multivariate F-test makes distributional assumptions, such as market-model 
residuals having a multivariate normal distribution. While Gibbons, Ross and Shanken (1989) 
argue that the normality assumption has been generally viewed as providing a “good working 
approximation” to the distribution of monthly stock returns,7 there is evidence that this 
assumption does not hold. Richardson and Smith (1993) developed a test based on 
Generalised Method of Moments (GMM) for testing whether stock returns have a 
multivariate normal distribution. They find that both the marginal and joint distributions of 
stock returns and market-model residuals are non-normal, using US data for 1926–1990. 
Moreover, MacKinlay and Richardson (1991: 517) argue that “one empirical stylized fact 
from the distribution of returns literature is that returns have fatter tails and are more peaked 
than one would expect from a normal distribution”. Particularly in emerging markets, such as 
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 For example, simulation evidence by MacKinlay (1985) and Affileck-Graves and McDonald (1989) suggests 
that the F-test is fairly robust to deviations from normality. However, MacKinlay and Richardson (1991: 511) 
note that “these studies focus on 5-year test periods with twenty and more portfolios”. 
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Malaysia, the normality assumption is likely to be violated (Bekaert and Harvey, 2002). This 
has been confirmed by empirical studies, such as Harvey (1995) and Bekaert and Harvey 
(1997), and Bekaert et al. (1998). 
To account for the likely violation of the normality assumption, I use a second test in GMM 
which still imposes the distributional assumption that asset returns are linear to the market 
return, but avoids the normality assumption of the market-model residuals. This test is based 
on MacKinlay and Richardson (1991) who employ GMM to test whether a portfolio is 
unconditionally mean-variance efficient. The advantage of the GMM based tests is that they 
do not make strong assumptions about the market-model residuals and are therefore valid 
under much weaker distributional assumptions than most previous tests. In fact, GMM is 
robust to departures from normality
8
 and the market-model residuals can be both serially 
dependent and conditionally heteroscedastic (MacKinlay and Richardson 1991). 
MacKinlay and Richardson (1991) find that mis-specified distributional assumptions can 
significantly affect the conclusions from statistical tests. Using US data for 1926–1988, they 
find that the Wald and F statistics can result in different statistical inferences from the GMM 
statistic. In their empirical analysis, they find that the Wald and F statistics cannot reject the 
mean-variance efficiency of both the equal-weighted index and the value-weighted index at 
the 5 per cent level, whereas the GMM statistic does reject. Faff and Lau (1997) who use an 
extension of the GMM test in MacKinlay and Richardson (1991) also find that the test rejects 
mean-variance efficiency of their market proxies in Australia. 
This hypothesis will test the following null and alternative hypothesis for portfolio i, where i 
stands for the Islamic, the non-Islamic or the market portfolio: 
                                                          
8
 MacKinlay and Richardson (1991) argue that the normality assumption is not necessary from a theoretical 
perspective to derive the models. Rather, the normality assumption is adopted for statistical convenience. 
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HC,0: portfolio i is mean-variance efficient. 
HC,1: portfolio i is not mean-variance efficient. 
2.2.3 Hypothesis 3: Factors that can Explain the Risk and Return 
Characteristics of Islamic and non-Islamic Stocks 
This section extends the previous analysis by exploring the factors that could explain the risk 
and return characteristics of Islamic and non-Islamic stocks. A number of business activity 
and financial ratio screens distinguish Islamic from non-Islamic stocks, but there is limited 
knowledge of the effect of individual screens on the risk and return of an Islamic stock 
portfolio. A certain business screen might exclude stocks within an industry that is 
characterised by particularly high or low returns and/or variance. Alternately, financial ratios 
affect the level of debt, cash and accounts receivable of the remaining firms. 
A variety of business activity screens can be applied to Islamic stock indices. These screens 
vary across index providers, but for the purpose of this study, they include alcohol, tobacco, 
pork, conventional financial services (e.g., banks and insurance companies with the exception 
of Islamic financial institutions), as well as weapons and defence and entertainment.
9
 There is 
an overlap between the business activity screens and socially responsible stocks screens, as 
the Social Investment Forum (2007) defines the screening criteria used to determine socially 
responsible investments as alcohol, tobacco, gambling, defence/weapons, animal testing, 
product/services, environment, human rights, labour relations, equal employment and 
community investment. Therefore, literature on socially responsible investments might help 
in understanding the impact of business screens on stock performance. For example, Lee et 
al. (2010) find that screening intensity for socially responsible investment has no effect on 
raw (unadjusted) performance, but it reduces total risk as measured by the standard deviation 
                                                          
9
 These business activity screens are based on the methodology of Dow Jones (2011). 
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of returns.
10
 As suggested in Hypothesis 1 of Section 2.2.1, there is evidence that sin stocks, 
which are included as non-Islamic stocks, might have a strong performance relative to 
otherwise comparable stocks. Further, under Islamic stock screens, financial institutions are 
excluded and this sector performed poorly during the GFC. For example, Beltratti and Stulz 
(2009) find an average buy-and-hold dollar return of -54.43 per cent between July 2007 and 
December 2008 for 98 financial institutions from 20 countries, which they see as the greatest 
destruction of bank wealth since the Great Depression. 
Islamic stocks should also pass financial ratio screens to exclude firms with high leverage, 
cash and interest-bearing securities and accounts receivable.
11
 Some studies suggest that there 
could be a link between a firm’s leverage or cash holdings and its performance. There is 
evidence to suggest that profitability is negatively correlated with leverage (Rajan and 
Zingales 1995; Fama and French 2002). The performance of highly levered firms is also 
more likely to perform poorly during crisis periods, due to the significance of indirect costs of 
financial distress (Fahlenbrach, Prilmeier and Stulz 2012; Opler and Titman 1994; Tan 2012). 
The null and alternative hypotheses examine the effect of each screen on the risk and return 
performance of Islamic versus non-Islamic stocks, where the screens include six business 
activity screens (alcohol, tobacco, pork, conventional financial services, weapons and 
defence, and entertainment) and three financial ratio screens (the ratio of total debt over 
trailing 24-month average market capitalisation is less than 33 per cent, the ratio of the sum 
of a company’s cash and interest-bearing securities over trailing 24-month average market 
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 They also divide their screens into different types of screens and find that the type of screen does not affect 
the performance of funds, but the standard deviation (as a measure for total risk) is higher for gambling and 
community investment screens, while it is lower for tobacco, weapons and human rights screens (Lee et al. 
2010). 
11
 This study uses the following ratios based on the methodology of Islamic stocks of Dow Jones (2011): 
leverage compliance ((total debt divided by trailing 24-month average market capitalisation) < 33 per cent) and 
cash compliance ((the sum of a company’s cash and interest-bearing securities divided by trailing 24-month 
average market capitalisation) < 33 per cent and (accounts receivable divided by trailing 24-month average 
market capitalisation) < 33 per cent). 
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capitalisation is less than 33 per cent and the ratio of accounts receivable over trailing 24-
month average market capitalisation is less than 33 per cent. A more detailed description of 
the screen combinations and the corresponding ICB codes that I use to apply those screens is 
presented in the methodology section 2.4.3. 
HD,0: Screen j does not affect the risk and return performance of Islamic versus non-Islamic 
stocks 
HD,1: Screen j affects the risk and return performance of Islamic versus non-Islamic stocks 
In interpreting the results for tests of these hypotheses, I address the following questions. 
First, are stocks excluded from the Islamic stock portfolio predominantly because of business 
activity screens or financial ratio screens? Second, are there specific screens that dominate or 
drive the results? Third, how are Islamic and non-Islamic stocks distinct in their performance 
from socially responsible stocks and sin stocks? 
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2.3 DATA AND PORTFOLIO CONSTRUCTION 
This section introduces the datasets that are used to construct the portfolios of Islamic 
(Shari’ah-compliant) and non-Islamic (Shari’ah non-compliant) stocks in Malaysia. Previous 
studies on Islamic studies use aggregate stock indices, whereas I collect data on individual 
stocks and their characteristics and then identify them as either Islamic or non-Islamic. I use 
two approaches to sort stocks into the Islamic and non-Islamic portfolios which are detailed 
in section 2.3.1 and 2.3.2. The first approach involves lists provided by the Shariah Advisory 
Council (SAC) of Malaysia which specifies which Malaysian stocks are Islamic (i.e. 
Shari’ah-compliant). The advantage of this dataset is its being comprehensive in that it 
covers the whole Malaysian stock market and that the lists are created by a Shari’ah authority 
and are binding on investors who invest on Shari’ah principles. This dataset is used to test 
hypotheses 1 and 2 of this chapter. The second approach complements the first approach as it 
applies commonly used screens for Islamic stocks to a set of stocks and can therefore be 
applied to any time period or country. Another advantage of the second approach is that it can 
apply selective screens and thus enables me to test hypothesis 3 of this chapter. Then, section 
2.3.3 discusses the choice of currency and section 2.3.4 shows how I compute the value-
weight portfolio returns. 
2.3.1 Dataset Based on Shariah Advisory Council Reports  
In Malaysia, the Shariah Advisory Council (SAC)
12
 provides lists of all Shari’ah-compliant 
(i.e. Islamic) securities listed in Malaysia since December 1997 on a semi-annual basis. These 
lists are binding on investors who invest on Shariah principles, which means that the SAC 
advises those investors to dispose of any Shariah non-compliant stocks within a month of 
                                                          
12
 The Shariah Advisory Council (SAC) was established in May 1997 as the highest Shariah authority in Islamic 
finance in Malaysia. It is supervised and regulated by Bank Negara Malaysia: 
http://www.bnm.gov.my/index.php?ch=7&pg=715&ac=802  
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knowing the Shari’ah status of the securities (Securities Commission Malaysia 2011).13 The 
same applies to stocks that are considered Shari’ah-compliant and their status is subsequently 
changed to Shari’ah non-compliant,14 except that capital gains up to the announcement day 
can be kept (Securities Commission Malaysia 2011).    
The SAC lists are based on information from financial reports, surveys and inquiries made to 
the respective company’s management (Securities Commission Malaysia 2011). Shari’ah-
compliant stocks are those whose activities are not contrary to the Shari’ah principles. Their 
core activities should not include financial services based on riba (interest); gambling and 
gaming; manufacture or sale of non-halal products or related products; conventional 
insurance; entertainment activities that are non-permissible according to Shari’ah; 
manufacture or sale of tobacco-based products or related products; stockbroking or share 
trading in Shari’ah non-compliant securities; and other activities deemed non-permissible 
according to Shari’ah (Securities Commission Malaysia 2011). Other criteria for a Shari’ah -
compliant stock is the level of interest income received by the company from conventional 
fixed deposits or other interest bearing financial instruments towards turnover and profit 
before tax, as well as dividends received from investment in Shari’ah non-compliant 
securities (Securities Commission Malaysia 2011). 
Special rules apply to companies which are involved in a combination of permissible and 
non-permissible activities. First, the SAC considers the company’s public perception or 
image, as well as the importance and benefit of the core activities of the company (Securities 
Commission Malaysia 2011). Second, there are several benchmarks which allow a company 
                                                          
13
 The investor can retain only the original investment cost (this may include brokerage cost or other transaction 
cost), but all capital gain or dividends received during or after the disposal of the securities has to be given to 
charitable bodies or baitulmal (Securities Commission Malaysia 2011). 
14
 However, if the market price of the stock is below the original investment costs, the investors may keep the 
stock and dividends received during the holding period until such time when the total amount of dividends 
received and the market value of the Shariah non-compliant stock equal the original investment cost (Securities 
Commission Malaysia 2011). 
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with minimal levels of non-permissible activities to be considered Shari’ah-compliant. These 
benchmarks range from five-percent to 25-percent for the proportion of the non-permissible 
activity out of total turnover and profit before tax. The five-percent benchmark is applied to 
activities that are clearly prohibited such as interest-based companies like conventional 
banks, gambling, alcohol and pork; the 10-percent benchmark is used for activities that 
involve a prohibited element which affects most people and is difficult to avoid, such as the 
interest income from fixed deposits in conventional banks or tobacco-related activities; the 
20-percent benchmark is used for mixed rental payment from Shari’ah non-compliant 
activities such as the rental payment from the premise that is involved in gambling, sale of 
liquor; and the 25-percent benchmark is applied to activities that are generally permissible 
according to Shari’ah, but there are elements that may be deemed non-permissible according 
to the Shari’ah, such as hotel and resort operations, share trading, stockbroking and others 
(Securities Commission Malaysia 2011). 
According to the SAC report on November 2011 there are 946 firms in total listed on Bursa 
Malaysia. Out of a total of 1242 active and dead firms in our sample, there are 460 firms that 
were always Shari’ah-compliant and 125 firms that were always Shari’ah non-compliant 
throughout the sample period, while 657 firms change their status at least once. I use the SAC 
reports up to November 2011 to identify the Shari’ah-compliant firms and create the Islamic 
portfolio for stocks that are listed in Malaysia. I rebalance these portfolios semi-annually in 
line with the updated lists of Shari’ah-compliant firms by the SAC. This data is manually 
merged with the Malaysian stock data from Datastream by separating firms into two 
portfolios: one with only Shari’ah-compliant firms that appear on the SAC lists, and another 
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with Shari’ah non-compliant firms, which are all remaining firms that are listed on the 
Malaysian stock exchange but do not appear on the list of Shari’ah-compliant firms.15  
Prior to 2006 the SAC reports only list the names of Shari’ah-compliant firms, so the datasets 
are merged based on the firm name. However, from 2006 onwards the local code of the firm 
is also included in the reports which can be directly matched with the codes in Datastream. 
Overall, there are about 300 instances where a firm changes its name throughout the 14 years 
of my sample. As those name changes do not appear on the SAC reports, I track them from 
the announcements on the Bursa Malaysia exchange, Bloomberg and other sources such as 
the firm’s financial statements and websites. Throughout all sample period, only 4 firms that 
are listed on the SAC reports could not be matched with the Datastream stock data and 
another 11 firms had missing data items on Datastream and were therefore excluded from the 
analysis.  
2.3.2 Dataset Based on Business Activity and Financial Ratio Screens 
As a second approach I construct Islamic and non-Islamic stock indices by applying Islamic 
business activity and financial ratio screens to identify what stocks comply with the Shari’ah 
law. To do so, I first obtain all individual equities in Malaysia from DataStream and 
Worldscope, including their total return index, market cap, their sector and industry codes 
(e.g. ICB and SIC codes) and various firm characteristics including their total assets, total 
debt, cash and interest-bearing securities, accounts receivable and others. These variables are 
available for most Malaysian stocks starting from 1986, so I download them for 31 January 
1986 – 31 March 2012 in US dollars and Malaysian Ringgit in monthly frequency.  
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 Some of the SAC reports also note when new stocks have taken over Islamic delisted stocks that have not 
been accorded Shari’ah status, as well as the stocks of companies that have been classified as Shari’ah-
compliant at IPO stage. This study classifies the former as non-Islamic and the latter as Islamic stocks. 
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I follow the methodology of Dow Jones (2011) to classify firms as Islamic.
16,17
 There are two 
sets of screens that a firm has to pass to be considered Shari’ah-compliant. First, there are 
business screens which exclude firms from the following sectors that are identified by their 
four digit ICB sector codes: Alcohol (3533 Brewers, 3535 Distillers & Vintners, 5757 
Restaurants & Bars), Tobacco (3785 Tobacco), Pork (3577 Food Products, 5337 Food 
Retailers & Wholesalers), Conventional financial services (8355 Banks, 8532 Full Line 
Insurance, 8534 Insurance Brokers, 8536 Property & Casualty Insurance, 8538 Reinsurance, 
8575 Life Insurance, 8773 Consumer Finance, 8775 Specialty Finance, 8777 Investment 
Services, 8779 Mortgage Finance) except for financial companies (8000) that are 
incorporated as an Islamic Financial Institution, such as Islamic Banks or Takaful Insurance 
Companies
18
, Weapons and Defence (2717 Defence), and Entertainment (5752 Gambling, 
5753 Hotels, 3745 Recreational Products, 5553 Broadcasting & Entertainment, 5555 Media 
Agencies, 5755 Recreational Services) (Dow Jones 2011). 
The second set of screens are financial ratios: Leverage compliance (Total debt divided by 
trailing 24-month average market capitalisation < 33%), Cash Compliance (The sum of a 
company’s cash and interest-bearing securities divided by trailing 24-month average market 
capitalisation < 33% and accounts receivables divided by trailing 24-month average market 
capitalisation < 33%) (Dow Jones 2011). Whenever some data items that are required for 
calculating the ratios are missing, I exclude the respective stock from the analysis. The 
advantage of this approach is that I can apply individual screens or use different combinations 
of screens and cut-off values to create Islamic stock portfolios. This approach can be applied 
to any data period and any Islamic or non-Islamic country.  
                                                          
16 
See S&P Dow Jones (2013) for a more recent publication following the merger of Dow Jones and S&P. 
17
 I follow the methodology as closely as possible, but there are some limitations, e.g. the rule that income from 
prohibited activities cannot exceed 5% of revenue (S&P Dow Jones 2013). I exclude all firms whose core 
business is based on prohibited activities. However, I cannot apply the 5% rule due to data limitations, as I do 
not have the individual firms’ revenue items, details of subsidiaries or cross-ownership.  
18
 Islamic financial institutions are considered Shari’ah-compliant and are exempt from financial ratio screens. 
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2.3.3 Choice of Currency 
The main analysis is conducted in US dollars which corresponds to assessing the risk and 
return in the Malaysian stock market from the perspective of a US dollar-based investor (as 
the marginal investor). Throughout the main analysis I assume that the US dollar-based 
investor is hedged against exchange rate risk. This assumption is necessary because there is 
evidence that exchange rate risk is priced (Dumas and Solnik 1995; De Santis and Gérard 
1998). Therefore, if the US dollar-based investor were unhedged against exchange rate risk it 
would imply that the US dollar return compounds the expected return on the portfolio of 
underlying assets with the expected change in exchange rates (Ostdiek 1998).  
In a sensitivity test I use Malaysian Ringgit-denominated returns to assess whether results are 
affected by a potential violation of the assumption that the US dollar-based investor is hedged 
against exchange rate risk. The Malaysian Ringgit-denominated returns are free of direct 
exchange rate exposures and can therefore be used to assess the returns of the underlying 
assets alone (Ostdiek 1998). Another advantage of comparing US dollar and local currency 
returns is that in the presence of high inflation there can be a large difference between US 
dollar and local currency returns (Harvey 1995).  
2.3.4 Portfolio Returns Calculation 
I obtain the total return index and market cap for all individual stocks in US dollars and 
Malaysian Ringgit from DataStream. The data is in monthly frequency
19
 (end of month) 
beginning with 31 January 1986 to 31 March 2012. The total return index (RI) that 
Datastream provides for stocks includes dividends and is adjusted for splits, bonus issues, 
rights issues and spin-offs. Further, I exclude extreme outliers (measured as three standard 
                                                          
19
 The advantage of monthly frequency as opposed to higher frequency data is that it mitigates potential biases 
of infrequent trading of the underlying stocks (see, for example, Harvey 1995). 
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deviations from the sample mean (Ruppert 2011) for each stock. I do this adjustment to 
increase the reliability and accuracy of the dataset and to reduce the possibility of data errors 
or high leverage points having unduly large influence on the estimation results, particularly 
since there are occasional data errors on Datastream for Malaysian stock returns.
20
 In total 
there are 3975 outliers (on average 3.18 per stock). This is about 2% of the data. In a 
sensitivity test I examine the dataset without excluding outliers to confirm that this 
adjustment does not affect overall results. Then, I sort stocks into an Islamic and a non-
Islamic portfolio and for each portfolio I calculate the time series of value-weight returns. I 
create the market portfolio as a value-weight portfolio that consists of all stocks in the 
Malaysian market and is the combination of all Islamic and non-Islamic stocks. Finally, I 
construct the return series for each portfolio as the log of price relatives, 𝑟𝑖,𝑡 = ln⁡(
𝑃𝑖,𝑡
𝑃𝑖,𝑡−1
).  
When calculating the return series I do not include the observations when a stock changes its 
Shari’ah status from one period to the next in order to keep a clear and accurate distinction 
between purely Islamic and non-Islamic stock returns. In practice, I create indicator variables 
that denote what stocks are considered Shari’ah-compliant at which point in time: 1 denotes 
an Islamic stock, 2 is a non-Islamic stock, 3 is the transition from Islamic to non-Islamic 
status, and 4 is the transition from non-Islamic to Islamic. The return series of the Islamic 
stock portfolio only includes stocks that are classified as 1 at that point in time, while the 
return series of the non-Islamic stock portfolio only includes stocks that are classified as 2.  
To calculate the excess returns for hypothesis 2, I obtain proxies for the risk-free rates which 
I then subtract from the stock returns. I subtract the proxy for a US risk-free rate from US 
dollar-denominated returns and the proxy for a Malaysian risk-free rate from Malaysian 
                                                          
20
 See Andersen et al. (2013) for an example where a single leverage point (outlier of an independent variable) 
makes insignificant coefficients appear to be statistically significant by reducing the reported standard error of 
that coefficient. 
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Ringgit-denominated returns. The proxy for the US risk-free rate is the 1 month T-bill return 
from Ibbotson and Associates.
21
 For the sensitivity where I use Malaysian Ringgit I download 
the Malaysia T-Bill interest rate for 1997 to 2012 from Datastream (Datastream code 
MYTBB04(IB)). Finally, since the US and Malaysian interest rates are quoted as an annual 
rate in per cent and the analysis is conducted in monthly frequency, I divide the annual rate 
by 1200 to get the final series of monthly risk-free rate. 
To reduce potential survivorship bias I use all active and dead stocks that are available on 
Datastream. Since Datastream gives the data for dead stocks even after their delisting date, I 
identify the delisting date and manually delete those observations after that date. I also reduce 
the possibility of sample bias by including all stocks irrespective of their size or liquidity. 
  
 
  
                                                          
21
 This T-bill return is available on Kenneth R. French’s website at 
http://mba.tuck.dartmouth.edu/pages/faculty/ken.french/data_library.html#Research. 
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2.4 METHODOLOGY 
2.4.1 T-Test and F-Test to Test Hypothesis 1 
The first hypothesis seeks to discover a difference in performance between Islamic and non-
Islamic stock portfolios. First, to test for a difference in mean returns between Islamic and 
non-Islamic stocks, I use a t-test for paired data. Then I apply an F-test for equal variance to 
test whether the variance of Islamic stocks is significantly different from non-Islamic stocks. 
I also verify the results of the t-test and F-test by running stacked regressions, which I 
estimate in Ordinary Least Squared (OLS) with Heteroscedasticity and Autocorrelation 
Consistent (HAC) robust standard errors. The dependent variable is either the stacked returns 
of the Islamic and non-Islamic portfolios, or the stacked variance of Islamic and non-Islamic 
portfolios as measured by (𝑅𝑖 − ?̅?𝑖)
2, where 𝑅𝑖 = returns on portfolio i, ?̅?𝑖 = sample mean of 
portfolio i, and i is either the Islamic (IS) or non-Islamic (NIS) portfolio. The two regressions 
are given in equations 2.1 and 2.2 where D is an Islamic dummy variable equal to 1 when the 
return and variance is for the Islamic portfolio and equal to 0 for the non-Islamic portfolio. 
[
𝑅𝐼𝑆
𝑅𝑁𝐼𝑆
] = 𝛽0 + 𝛽1𝐷 + 𝑒 (2.1) 
[
(𝑅𝐼𝑆 − ?̅?𝐼𝑆)
2
(𝑅𝑁𝐼𝑆 − ?̅?𝑁𝐼𝑆)
2] = 𝛾0 + 𝛾1𝐷 + 𝑢 (2.2) 
2.4.2 Statistical Tests and Graphical Analysis to Test Hypothesis 2 
The second hypothesis involves a test for the mean-variance efficiency of a particular 
portfolio: the Islamic, non-Islamic and market portfolios, respectively. I approach this 
question in several different ways: as two statistical tests, a multivariate F-test from Gibbons, 
Ross and Shanken (1989) and on GMM; graphical analysis of the mean-variance frontier on 
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which I plot the portfolios of interest; as well as a comparison between theoretical 
correlations calculated for mean-variance efficient portfolios and the actual Pearson 
correlations between the Islamic, non-Islamic and market portfolios. I conduct all of the 
analysis in this section with 10 portfolios 𝑖, which are constructed as five Islamic portfolios 
sorted by size, and five non-Islamic portfolios sorted by size. 
2.4.2.1 Multivariate F-Test  
Gibbons, Ross and Shanken (1989) derive a multivariate F-test statistic for judging the 
efficiency of a given portfolio.  They derive the null hypothesis of a mean-variance efficient 
portfolio as follows: First, they make distributional assumptions for the following 
multivariate linear regression where a risk-free asset exists: 
𝑟𝑖𝑡 = 𝛼𝑖𝑝 + 𝛽𝑖𝑝𝑟𝑝𝑡 + 𝜀𝑖𝑡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡∀𝑖 = 1,… ,𝑁,                                                                        (2.3) 
where 𝑟𝑖𝑡 = the excess return on asset i= 1,… ,10 in time period t; 
⁡𝛽𝑖𝑝 =
𝑐𝑜𝑣(𝑟𝑖𝑡,𝑟𝑝𝑡)
𝑣𝑎𝑟(𝑟𝑝𝑡)
;   
𝑟𝑝𝑡 = the excess return on the portfolio whose efficiency is being tested (i.e. Islamic 
portfolio, non-Islamic portfolio or the market) in time period t; and  
𝜀𝑖𝑡 = the disturbance term for asset i in time period t.  
Excess returns are computed by subtracting the risk-free rate, 𝑅𝑓𝑡, from the total rates of 
return. Gibbons, Ross and Shanken (1989) make the following assumptions about the 
disturbance term 𝜀𝑖𝑡:  
(1) it has a jointly normal distribution in each period with mean zero and non-singular 
covariance matrix ∑, conditional on the excess returns for portfolio p;  
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(2) independence of the disturbances over time; and  
(3) linear independence of 𝑟𝑝𝑡 and the N left-hand side assets in order that ∑ be non-singular. 
Next, Gibbons, Ross and Shanken (1989) combine the distributional assumptions in equation 
2.3 with the first-order condition for the portfolio p to be mean-variance efficient, to obtain:  
𝐸(𝑟𝑖𝑡) = 𝛽𝑖𝑝𝐸(𝑟𝑝𝑡),⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡∀𝑖 = 1,… ,𝑁.⁡                                            (2.4) 
This yields the following testable restriction, defining the null hypothesis under which the 
particular portfolio is mean-variance efficient: 
𝐻0:⁡𝛼𝑖𝑝 = 0,⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡∀𝑖 = 1, … ,𝑁.⁡                             (2.5) 
Instead of testing this hypothesis on a univariate basis for each asset i, i.e. N univariate t 
statistics based on each equation, Gibbons, Ross and Shanken (1989) test the null hypothesis 
jointly for all  𝛼𝑖𝑝 by using a multivariate F-test.
22
 
This framework can be extended to test mean-variance efficiency relative to the Black CAPM 
where a risk-free rate does not exist. To derive the restriction the linearity assumption from 
equation 2.3 can be expressed in raw returns: 
𝑅𝑖𝑡 = 𝛼𝑖𝑝 + 𝛽𝑖𝑝𝑅𝑝𝑡 + 𝜀𝑖𝑡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡∀𝑖 = 1,… ,𝑁,                                                             (2.6) 
where 𝑅𝑖𝑡  is the raw return on asset i in period t; 
⁡𝛽𝑖𝑝 =
𝑐𝑜𝑣(𝑅𝑖𝑡,𝑅𝑝𝑡)
𝑣𝑎𝑟(𝑅𝑝𝑡)
;   
𝑅𝑝𝑡 = the raw return on the portfolio whose efficiency is being tested (i.e. Islamic 
portfolio, non-Islamic portfolio or the market); and 
                                                          
22
 See Gibbons, Ross and Shanken (1989) for the derivation and properties of the test statistic. 
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 𝜀𝑖𝑡 = the disturbance term for asset i in period t. 
This distributional assumption is combined with the Black zero-beta CAPM: 
𝐸(𝑅𝑖𝑡) = 𝐸(𝑅𝑧𝑡) + 𝛽𝑖𝑝𝐸[𝑅𝑝𝑡 − 𝑅𝑧𝑡].⁡                              (2.7) 
where 𝑅𝑧𝑡 is the raw return on the zero-beta portfolio. Equating the equations 2.6 and 2.7 
yields the following restriction and null hypothesis under which the particular portfolio is 
mean-variance efficient in the framework of the zero-beta CAPM: 
𝛼𝑖𝑝 = (1 − 𝛽𝑖)𝛾,⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡∀𝑖 = 1,… ,𝑁,                 (2.8) 
where 𝛾 = 𝐸(𝑅𝑧𝑡) is the expected return on the zero-beta portfolio and N = 10 as I have 10 
portfolios sorted by size and Islamic or non-Islamic status. 
2.4.2.2 GMM  
The test in GMM is based on MacKinlay and Richardson (1991). To test whether a portfolio 
is unconditionally mean-variance efficient the test in GMM still imposes the distribution 
assumption but avoids the normality assumption, so that the disturbance term 𝜀𝑖𝑡 in equation 
2.3 has an unspecified distribution.
23
 Here equation 2.3 is also combined with the condition 
of a mean-variance efficient portfolio in equation 2.4 which yields the null hypothesis that all 
intercept terms 𝛼𝑖𝑝⁡are zero, as in equation 2.5. Then, the following moment conditions are 
developed, first in an unrestricted system and then in a restricted system where 𝛼𝑖𝑝 = 0, ∀𝑖 =
1, … , 𝑁, where N = 10. The unrestricted system is given as 
                                                          
23
 Additional assumptions are that excess asset returns, rit, are stationary and ergodic with finite fourth moments 
(MacKinlay and Richardson, 1991). For further details and properties of this GMM test see MacKinlay and 
Richardson (1991). 
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𝑔𝑇 =
1
𝑇
∑
[
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
𝑟1 − 𝛼1 − 𝛽1𝑟𝑝
(𝑟1 − 𝛼1 − 𝛽1𝑟𝑝)𝑟𝑝
𝑟2 − 𝛼2 − 𝛽2𝑟𝑝
(𝑟2 − 𝛼2 − 𝛽2𝑟𝑝)𝑟𝑝
⋮
𝑟10 − 𝛼10 − 𝛽10𝑟𝑝
(𝑟10 − 𝛼10 − 𝛽10𝑟𝑝)𝑟𝑝]
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
𝑇
𝑡=1 = 0                                        (2.9) 
and the restricted system is 
𝑔𝑇 =
1
𝑇
∑
[
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
𝑟1 − 𝛽1𝑟𝑝
(𝑟1 − 𝛽1𝑟𝑝)𝑟𝑝
𝑟2 − 𝛽2𝑟𝑝
(𝑟2 − 𝛽2𝑟𝑝)𝑟𝑝
⋮
𝑟10 − 𝛽10𝑟𝑝
(𝑟10 − 𝛽10𝑟𝑝)𝑟𝑝]
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
𝑇
𝑡=1 = 0                (2.10) 
The system has 20 equations with 10 unknown parameters (𝛽𝑖, 𝑖 = 1, …10), so the system is 
overidentified. Under the null hypothesis, the overidentifying restrictions statistic, 𝐽𝑇, is 
asymptotically distributed as a chi-square with 2𝑁 − 𝑁 = 10 degrees of freedom,  𝐽𝑇 =
𝑇𝑔𝑇(𝜃𝑇)
′
𝑆0
−1𝑔𝑇(𝜃𝑇)~𝜒10
2 . We can reject the restrictions imposed by the model (𝛼𝑖𝑝 = 0) if 
the statistic is higher than the chi-squared value at a reasonable level of significance.  
This framework is then extended to test mean-variance efficiency in GMM relative to the 
Black CAPM (see Faff and Lau, 1997). The moment conditions in GMM are first expressed 
in an unrestricted system and then in a restricted system where the restriction of equation 2.8 
is applied that 𝛼𝑖𝑝 = (1 − 𝛽𝑖)𝛾, ∀𝑖 = 1,… ,𝑁 where N = 10. Equations 2.11 and 2.12 are the 
unrestricted and restricted systems, respectively:  
31 
 
𝑔𝑇 =
1
𝑇
∑
[
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
𝑅1 − 𝛼1 − 𝛽1𝑅𝑝
(𝑅1 − 𝛼1 − 𝛽1𝑅𝑝)𝑅𝑝
𝑅2 − 𝛼2 − 𝛽2𝑅𝑝
(𝑅2 − 𝛼2 − 𝛽2𝑅𝑝)𝑅𝑝
⋮
𝑅10 − 𝛼10 − 𝛽10𝑅𝑝
(𝑅10 − 𝛼10 − 𝛽10𝑅𝑝)𝑅𝑝]
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
𝑇
𝑡=1 = 0              (2.11) 
𝑔𝑇 =
1
𝑇
∑
[
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
𝑅1 − 𝛾 − 𝛽1[𝑅𝑝 − 𝛾]
(𝑅1 − 𝛾 − 𝛽1[𝑅𝑝 − 𝛾])𝑅𝑝
𝑅2 − 𝛾 − 𝛽2[𝑅𝑝 − 𝛾]
(𝑅2 − 𝛾 − 𝛽2[𝑅𝑝 − 𝛾])𝑅𝑝
⋮
𝑅10 − 𝛾 − 𝛽10[𝑅𝑝 − 𝛾]
(𝑅10 − 𝛾 − 𝛽10[𝑅𝑝 − 𝛾])𝑅𝑝]
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
𝑇
𝑡=1 = 0             (2.12) 
There are 20 equations and 11 unknown parameters (𝛾;⁡𝛽𝑖, 𝑖 = 1,… 10)⁡, so the 
overidentifying restrictions statistic, 𝐽𝑇, is asymptotically distributed as a chi-square with 
2𝑁 − (𝑁 + 1) = 9 degrees of freedom. 
2.4.2.3 Graphical Analysis 
The graphical analysis involves drawing the mean-variance frontier of all the assets in the 
Malaysian stock market. The mean-variance frontier is a hyperbola in standard deviation, 
expected return space (see Huang and Litzenberger (1988) or Ingersoll (1987)). I derive the 
equation of the mean-variance frontier from equation 2.13 which is the equation for the 
variance of a frontier portfolio p. This equation is based on one of the results in Huang and 
Litzenberger (1988) who derive it from the Markowitz (1952) framework. 
𝜎𝑝
2 =
𝐶
𝐷
[𝐸[𝑅𝑝] −
𝐴
𝐶
]
2
+
1
𝐶
                (2.13) 
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As defined in Huang and Litzenberger (1988), 𝐸(𝑅𝑝) = expected return on portfolio p, σ = 
standard deviation of portfolio p, and the scalars A, B, C and D are 
𝐴 ≡ 𝑒′𝑉−11 
𝐵 ≡ 𝑒′𝑉−1𝑒 
𝐶 ≡ 1′𝑉−11 
𝐷 ≡ 𝐵𝐶 − 𝐴2 
where e is an 𝑁 × 1 vector of expected returns on assets 𝑖 = 1,… ,𝑁, 1 is an 𝑁 × 1 vector of 
ones, and V is an 𝑁 × 𝑁 variance-covariance matrix. 
Huang and Litzenberger (1988) show that equation 2.11 implies that the mean-variance 
frontier is a hyperbola with centre (0, 
𝐴
𝐶
) and asymptotes 𝐸[𝑅𝑝] =
𝐴
𝐶
± √
𝐷
𝐶
𝜎𝑝. To plot the 
hyperbola I solve equation 2.13 for expected returns to trace out the equation of the mean-
variance frontier given in equation 2.14, where solutions exist for 𝜎𝑝
2 ≥
1
𝐶
: 
𝐸(𝑅𝑝) =
𝐴
𝐶
± √
𝐷
𝐶
𝜎𝑝2 −
𝐷
𝐶2
                (2.14) 
Then, I plot the market portfolio, the Islamic portfolio and the non-Islamic stock portfolio on 
the graph of the mean-variance frontier. The graphical analysis complements the statistical 
tests from sections 2.4.2.1 and 2.4.2.2 and shows graphically how far the three portfolios fall 
from the mean-variance efficient frontier. 
2.4.2.4 Theoretical Versus Actual Correlations 
This section is based on one of the results in Huang and Litzenberger (1988) which says that 
the covariance between two arbitrary frontier portfolios, 𝑥𝑝 and 𝑥𝑞, is given by 
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𝑐𝑜𝑣(𝑅𝑝, 𝑅𝑞) =
𝐶
𝐷
[𝐸[𝑅𝑝] −
𝐴
𝐶
] [𝐸[𝑅𝑞] −
𝐴
𝐶
] +
1
𝐶
             (2.15) 
If the market portfolio, the Islamic and non-Islamic portfolios are on the mean-variance 
frontier then the correlation between any combination (i.e. market and Islamic, market and 
non-Islamic or Islamic and non-Islamic portfolios) can be described in equation 2.16, which 
combines equations 2.13 and 2.15: 
𝜌𝑝,𝑞 =
𝑐𝑜𝑣(𝑅𝑝,𝑅𝑞)
𝜎𝑝×𝜎𝑞
=
𝐶
𝐷
[𝐸[𝑅𝑝]−
𝐴
𝐶
][𝐸[𝑅𝑞]−
𝐴
𝐶
]+
1
𝐶
√𝐶
𝐷
[𝐸[𝑅𝑝]−
𝐴
𝐶
]
2
+
1
𝐶
×√
𝐶
𝐷
[𝐸[𝑅𝑞]−
𝐴
𝐶
]
2
+
1
𝐶
              (2.16) 
The correlations in equation 2.16 are the “theoretical” correlations if portfolios p and q are 
frontier portfolios. I also estimate the actual Pearson correlations between the three 
combinations of portfolios and compare the estimates to the theoretical correlations. If the 
three portfolios (Islamic, non-Islamic and market) are close to the efficient frontier, I expect 
their theoretical and actual correlations to be close. 
2.4.3 T-Test and F-Test for Individual Screens to Test Hypothesis 3 
The third hypothesis is an extension of the first hypothesis which tests for the difference in 
performance between Islamic and non-Islamic stock portfolios but this time the portfolios are 
constructed with selected individual screens. First, the Islamic portfolio is constructed by 
using all 6 business activity screens; secondly, the Islamic portfolio is constructed with 3 
financial ratio screens; thirdly, the Islamic portfolio is created by applying only one screen at 
a time: (1) alcohol (ICB 3533, 3535 and 5757), (2) tobacco (ICB 3785), (3) pork (ICB 3577 
and 5337), (4) conventional financial services (ICB 8355, 8532, 8534, 8536, 8538, 8575, 
8773, 8775, 8777 and 8779), (5) weapons and defence (ICB 2717), (6) entertainment (ICB 
5752, 5753, 3745, 5553, 5555, 5755), (7) leverage compliance (total debt divided by trailing 
24-month average market capitalisation < 33%), (8) cash compliance (the sum of a 
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company’s cash and interest-bearing securities divided by trailing 24-month average market 
capitalisation < 33% and accounts receivable divided by trailing 24-month average market 
capitalisation < 33%, as well as the last two items for cash compliance separately. Fourthly, I 
use selected business activity screens that most closely resemble the definition of sin stocks 
to create a sin stock portfolio and a non-sin stock portfolio to draw comparisons between 
Islamic finance and the literature on sin stocks. Those screens include alcohol, tobacco and 
gambling with the following ICB codes: 3533 Brewers, 3535 Distillers & Vintners, 5757 
Restaurants & Bars, 3785 Tobacco and 5752 Gambling. All of these portfolios are calculated 
on value-weight basis and for consistency all of them are based on the same sample of stocks, 
so stocks with missing accounting data are excluded even if that data is not needed to apply a 
particular screen. For each of the above portfolios I apply the same t-test and F-test as in 
hypothesis 1 to test for a difference in the mean and variance of returns between Islamic and 
non-Islamic portfolios.  
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2.5 DESCRIPTIVE STATISTICS  
2.5.1 SAC-based Dataset 1997-2012 
According to the SAC reports, the number of Malaysian stocks has fluctuated between 702 
and 1036 within the 1997-2011 period and the number of Islamic stocks has been between 
476 and 886 as shown in Figure 2.1. Overall, there is a trend towards a higher percentage of 
Islamic stocks in Malaysia, starting at 72.94% in 1997 and increasing to 88.69% by 2011. 
Figure 2.1: Number of Total Stocks and Islamic Stocks in Malaysia 
 
The annualised mean, median, maximum, minimum and standard deviation, as well as the 
coefficients of skewness and kurtosis and a Jarque-Bera test of normality for the Islamic, 
non-Islamic and the market portfolio returns are summarised in Table 2.1. Panels A and B 
show statistics for the monthly value-weight portfolio returns and for the number of stocks in 
each portfolio. During the sample period the Islamic portfolio has a lower annualised average 
return and standard deviation than the non-Islamic portfolio. The average return of the 
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Islamic portfolio is 12.22% and the standard deviation is 24.58% whereas the non-Islamic 
portfolio has an average return of 12.74% and standard deviation of 28.34%. The market 
portfolio has an average return of 12.47% and standard deviation of 25.85%. According to 
the Jarque-Bera test of normality none of the portfolio returns have a normal distribution.  
Table 2.1: Descriptive Statistics of Portfolio Returns (SAC-based dataset) 
Portfolio Type Islamic Non-Islamic Market 
Panel A: Portfolio returns 
 Annualised mean (in %) 12.22 12.74 12.47 
 Annualised median (in %) 15.34 15.18 14.73 
 Annualised maximum (in %) 296.48 358.29 299.32 
 Annualised minimum (in %) -304.26 -316.89 -310.36 
 Annualised std. dev. (in %) 24.58 28.34 25.85 
 Skewness -0.07 0.04 -0.02 
 Kurtosis 4.91 4.90 4.93 
    
 Jarque-Bera 26.37 25.94 26.63 
 P-value 0.00 0.00 0.00 
    
Panel B: Number of Stocks 
 Mean 710 165 875 
 Median 766 166 922 
 Maximum 877 228 1027 
 Minimum 206 95 301 
 Std. Dev. 142 30 124 
 
I also examine the number of stocks that are added or removed from the Islamic stock 
portfolio. Table 2.2 presents statistics about the number of stocks that are removed or added, 
as well as the percentage of stocks out of the total number of stocks at the respective point of 
time. Panel A shows the statistics which are calculated semi-annually in line with the time of 
publication of the SAC reports, while Panel B provides the same statistics per calendar year. 
Table 2.2 finds that during 1997-2011, there are on average 17 stocks that are removed and 
54 stocks that are added per year. Relative to the total number of Malaysian stocks at the 
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respective point of time that is an average of 1.95% of firms removed and 6.18% of firms 
added to the Islamic lists.  
Table 2.2: Stocks Added or Removed from the Islamic Lists (SAC-based dataset) 
Panel A: number and percentage of stocks (semi-annual) 
 Stocks 
removed 
Stocks 
added 
Percentage of firms 
removed 
Percentage of  firms 
added 
Average 9 28 1.0613 3.4217 
Median 8 22 1.0246 2.3109 
Maximum 25 61 3.6603 7.9389 
Minimum 0 7 0 0.7338 
     
Panel B: number and percentage of stocks (annual) 
 Stocks 
removed 
Stocks 
added 
Percentage of firms 
removed 
Percentage of  firms 
added 
Average 17 54 1.9534 6.1796 
Median 20 52 2.0143 5.7929 
Maximum 40 114 5.1216 12.6761 
Minimum 1 14 0.1379 1.4478 
 
As firms from certain business sectors are excluded from the Islamic portfolio (e.g. alcohol, 
pork and conventional banks), I also show a breakup of the number of firms and market value 
per industry. Such an industry distribution can help interpret results if the Islamic and non-
Islamic portfolios are dominated by certain industries with unique return and risk 
characteristics. Table 2.3 provides an industry distribution within 10 broad industries as 
classified by ICB codes into Oil & Gas (0001), Basic Materials (1000), Industrials (2000), 
Consumer Goods (3000), Health Care (4000), Consumer Services (5000), 
Telecommunications (6000), Utilities (7000), Financials (8000) and Technology (9000). 
Panel A shows the statistics for the number of firms per industry and Panel B focuses on the 
market value of firms in each industry. Within each Panel I provide the following statistics: I 
calculate the average number of firms (market value) across 1997-2012 for the Islamic (IS), 
non-Islamic (NIS) and the market (M) portfolios, as well as across each industry for each of 
the three portfolios. I also present the average percentage of firms (market value) per industry 
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within each of the Islamic, non-Islamic and market portfolios, respectively. This shows, 
whether in percentage terms, the portfolios are dominated by a certain industry. Finally, I 
include the average proportion of Islamic firms to the market (Islamic market value to total 
market value) which I calculate at each point of time and then take an average.  
First of all, the majority of firms are Islamic, with an average of 710 Islamic versus 165 non-
Islamic firms and an average market value of US$ 93.24 million for Islamic vs. US$ 63.32 
million for non-Islamic firms. Therefore, on average there are about 4 times more Islamic 
firms than non-Islamic firms in the Malaysian stock market, and their market value is about 
1.5 times bigger than that of non-Islamic firms. There are also some differences across 
industries. The proportion of Islamic to total number of firms ranges from 71.38-88.08% for 
most industries, but Islamic firms are only about half of the firms in the Consumer Services, 
Telecommunications and Financials industries (40.77-56.28%). In terms of market value, the 
average proportion of Islamic market value to the market ranges from 66.95-77.16% for most 
industries except for Oil & Gas which is dominated by Islamic firms in terms of market value 
(96.56%), while Consumer Services and Financials are dominated by non-Islamic firms 
(15.69-16.61%). 
Further, Table 2.3 shows that about half of the Malaysian stock market (M) consists of 
Industrials (33% of firms), Consumer Goods (22% of firms) and Financials (16% of firms). 
The Islamic portfolio (IS) has a smaller percentage of Consumer Services and Financials than 
the market, but it has a strong emphasis on Industrials (37% of firms) and Consumer Goods 
(24% of firms). On the other hand, the non-Islamic portfolio (NIS) has a small percentage of 
firms in most industries and is largely dominated by Industrials (19% of firms), Consumer 
Services (19% of firms) and Financials (42% of firms). Based on these findings there is a   
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Table 2.3: Industry Distribution of Number of Firms and Market Value (SAC-based dataset) 
Panel A: Industry Distribution (number of firms) 
 All 
Industries 
0001 Oil 
& Gas  
1000 Basic 
Materials 
2000 
Industrials 
3000 Consumer 
Goods 
4000 Health 
Care 
5000 Consumer 
Services 
6000 Tele-
communications 
7000 
Utilities 
8000 
Financials 
9000 
Technology 
Average no. of firms per industry 
IS 710 18 67 260 172 14 33 5 12 74 54 
NIS 165 1 5 31 19 1 32 1 2 69 4 
M 875 19 72 291 191 15 65 6 14 143 58 
Average % of firms in a portfolio 
IS 100 3 9 37 24 2 5 1 2 10 8 
NIS 100 1 3 19 11 1 19 1 1 42 3 
M 100 2 8 33 22 2 7 1 2 16 7 
Average proportion of Islamic firms to Market (in %) 
IS / M 80.36 88.08 83.46 76.82 86.12 79.84 40.77 56.28 71.38 45.19 77.67 
            
Panel B: Industry Distribution (market value in millions of US$) 
 All 
Industries 
0001 Oil & 
Gas  
1000 Basic 
Materials 
2000 
Industrials 
3000 Consumer 
Goods 
4000 Health 
Care 
5000 Consumer 
Services 
6000 Tele-
communications 
7000 
Utilities 
8000 
Financials 
9000 
Technology 
Average MV  
IS 93.24 6.61 5.31 23.86 19.54 0.96 3.43 12.67 12.77 5.95 2.15 
NIS 63.32 0.06 0.95 7.68 5.41 0.22 16.07 0.57 1.05 30.72 0.59 
M 156.56 6.67 6.25 31.54 24.95 1.18 19.49 13.25 13.82 36.67 2.74 
Average % MV in a portfolio 
IS 100 7.09 5.69 25.59 20.95 1.03 3.68 13.59 13.69 6.38 2.30 
NIS 100 0.10 1.49 12.13 8.54 0.35 25.37 0.91 1.66 48.51 0.93 
M 100 4.26 3.99 20.15 15.93 0.75 12.45 8.46 8.82 23.42 1.75 
Average proportion of Islamic MV to Market MV (in %) 
IS / M 55.80 96.56 77.16 68.51 76.71 66.95 15.69 76.61 74.95 16.61 73.18 
 
40 
 
 
Table 2.4: Characteristics of Stocks in the Islamic, non-Islamic and Market Portfolios (SAC-based dataset) 
 Debt / Assets Debt / Avrg MV Total Debt ($m) Total Assets ($m) MV ($m) Cash and IBS ($m) Receivables ($m) No of Firms 
Average 
          
 Islamic  0.27                           0.84              75.35              249.56           167.85           29.67           30.74  710 
 Non-Islamic 0.37                      1.34           391.23          2,244.15           480.30           72.56           52.36  165 
 Market  0.32                           0.94           131.83              652.27           218.80           37.17           35.24  875 
          
Differences 
IS - NIS Difference -0.09 -0.50 -315.88 -1994.59 -312.45 -42.89 -21.62 545 
 T-stat -9.20 -13.59 -29.90 -20.92 -17.56 -20.02 -21.13 43.51 
 P-value (2 tail) 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 
IS - M Difference -0.04 -0.10 -56.48 -402.70 -50.96 -7.50 -4.50 -165 
 T-stat -11.15 -16.01 -53.33 -39.23 -25.80 -27.75 -17.35 -71.61 
 P-value (2 tail) 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 
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different representation of industries in the Islamic versus non-Islamic portfolios that could 
affect their risk and return characteristics. 
In addition to differences in the industry distribution between Islamic and non-Islamic stocks, 
it is also likely that the characteristics of stocks differ across those portfolios. Table 2.4 
presents the following average characteristics of stocks in the Islamic, non-Islamic and 
market portfolios: total debt (measured as debt over assets, debt over the average 24-month 
trailing market value, or total debt), the size (measured by total assets or market value), cash 
and interest-bearing securities, receivables and the number of firms. I also test whether there 
is a statistically significant difference in those characteristics between Islamic and the non-
Islamic portfolios, as well as between the Islamic and the market portfolios. This table is 
based on average values across 172 monthly observations (1997-2012). 
For each of the characteristics in Table 2.4, I find a highly statistical difference between the 
Islamic and the non-Islamic, as well as between the Islamic and the market portfolios. The p-
value is equal to 0 in all cases. The debt levels are significantly lower in the Islamic portfolio, 
e.g. total debt is on average US$ 75.35 million for the Islamic portfolio, US$ 391.23 million 
for the non-Islamic portfolio and US$ 131.83 million for the market portfolio. Islamic firms 
are smaller than non-Islamic firms with lower values of assets and market value, e.g. average 
total assets are US$ 249.56 million for the Islamic portfolio, US$ 2,244.15 million for the 
non-Islamic portfolio and US$ 652.27 million for the market portfolio. Cash and interest-
bearing securities as well as receivables are also lower for Islamic than non-Islamic firms. 
Overall, these findings indicate that there are strong differences between the Islamic and non-
Islamic portfolios. 
  
42 
 
2.5.2 Screen-based Dataset 1986-2012 
This section presents the descriptive statistics of the screen-based dataset for 1986-2012 (313 
monthly observations), which I use in Hypotheses 1 through 3. Table 2.5 shows the 
descriptive statistics of portfolios in Malaysia, with the annualised value-weight returns in 
Panel A and the number of stocks in Panel B. Like the SAC dataset, this method uses all 
stocks listed in Malaysia which are then classified as either Islamic or non-Islamic. However, 
there are two major differences to the SAC-data dataset: First, this method uses a more 
conservative definition of Islamic stocks which reduces the proportion of Islamic stocks by a 
substantial amount, such that out of an average of 441 stocks, 98 are Islamic and 343 are non-
Islamic. Secondly, whenever data items, which are essential for classifying stocks as Islamic 
stocks, are missing the respective observation is excluded, which results in a smaller sample. 
Just as in section 2.5.1 the Islamic portfolio has lower annualised mean (5.60%) and median 
(6.87%) returns as well as lower standard deviation (23.15%) compared to the non-Islamic 
mean (8.31%), median (10.71%) and standard deviation (26.52%).
24
 At the 5% level of 
significance the Jarque-Bera test for normality indicates that none of the three portfolio 
returns has a normal distribution.  
  
                                                          
24
 As a comparison I also calculate the descriptive statistics for the screen-based dataset using the same time 
period as the SAC-based dataset (1997-2012). These statistics are not included here but available upon request. 
They confirm that the mean and standard deviation of Islamic stocks is lower than non-Islamic stocks, with 
annualised average return 3.81%, 3.29% and 3.66% for the Islamic, non-Islamic and market portfolios and an 
annualised standard deviation 22.20%, 25.67% and 24.40% respectively. A major difference, though, is that all 
returns are consistently lower than in section 2.5.1. 
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Table 2.5: Descriptive Statistics of Portfolio Returns (screen-based dataset) 
Portfolio Type Islamic Non-Islamic Total 
Panel A: Portfolio returns  
 Annualised mean (in %) 5.60 8.31 6.72 
 Annualised median (in %) 6.87 10.71 10.58 
 Annualised maximum (in %) 249.10 275.23 256.35 
 Annualised minimum (in %) -243.38 -282.04 -268.28 
 Annualised std. dev. (in %) 23.15 26.52 24.68 
 Skewness -0.18 -0.36 -0.39 
 Kurtosis 3.68 3.78 3.70 
    
 Jarque-Bera 7.58 14.68 14.27 
 P-value 0.02 0.00 0.00 
    
Panel B: Number of Stocks 
Average  98 343 442 
Median 112 237 375.5 
Maximum 192 742 867 
Minimum 2 2 2 
Std Dev 50 263 298 
 
As in section 2.5.1 I examine the number of stocks that are added or removed from the 
Islamic stock portfolio in Table 2.6. Panel A shows the statistics which are calculated 
monthly which is when I rebalance the portfolios, while Panel B provides the same statistics 
per calendar year. Table 6 finds that during 1986-2011, there are on average 46 stocks that 
are removed and 39 stocks that are added per year. Relative to the total number of Malaysian 
stocks at the respective point of time that is an average of 14.92% of stocks removed and 
15.81% of stocks added to the Islamic lists.
 25
 This is a higher proportion than in the SAC-
based dataset. Another difference is that the number of stocks being removed and added is 
about equal in the screen-based dataset, whereas the SAC-based dataset of Table 2 had about 
the triple number of stocks being added than those being removed. 
                                                          
25
 As a comparison, the monthly (annual) statistics for the screen-based dataset in 1997-2012 are: 6 (69) stocks 
removed, 5 (53) stocks added, 1.0543% (11.0843%) percentage of firms removed and 0.7413% (8.0617%) of 
firms added. A table with these statistics is not included here but is available upon request.  
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Table 2.6: Stocks Added or Removed from the Islamic Lists (screen-based dataset) 
Panel A: number and percentage of stocks (monthly) 
 Stocks 
removed 
Stocks 
added 
Percentage of firms removed Percentage of  firms added 
Average 4 3 1.5631 1.3729 
Median 2 2 0.4290 0.5060 
Maximum 32 42 50 40 
Minimum 0 0 0 0 
     
Panel B: number and percentage of stocks (annual) 
 Stocks 
removed 
Stocks 
added 
Percentage of firms removed Percentage of  firms added 
Average 46 39 14.9208 15.8071 
Median 35 34 9.3298 8.9136 
Maximum 180 94 80 81.8182 
Minimum 3 3 0.8929 0.8929 
 
Then Table 2.7 presents an industry distribution of the number of firms and market value 
which is structured like Table 2.3 from section 2.5.1. The proportion of Islamic firms to the 
market (28.91% measured by number of firms) is much lower compared to the SAC-based 
dataset (80.36%). However, this time the proportion is similar whether it is measured as an 
average proportion of Islamic firms to market (28.91%) in Panel A or as an average 
proportion of Islamic market value to market (31.03%) in Panel B. Like in the SAC-based 
dataset, the Malaysian stock market is dominated by Industrials (2000), Consumer Goods 
(3000) and Financials (8000) with a combined 74% of total firms or 60.88% of total market 
value. In terms of number of firms (Panel A), the Islamic and non-Islamic portfolios both 
follow this emphasis on those three industries, although in terms of market value (Panel B), 
the Islamic portfolio has less Financials but includes more Telecommunications (6000) in 
addition to Industrials and Consumer Goods, while the non-Islamic portfolio focuses on 
Industrials, Consumer Goods, Consumer Services and Financials. In terms of number of 
firms there are fewer differences in industry distribution compared to the SAC-based dataset. 
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This could be due to the emphasis on financial ratio screens under the screen-based dataset 
which applies across all industries. 
The characteristics of stocks in the Islamic versus non-Islamic portfolios that are shown in 
Table 8 are similar to the findings in the SAC-based dataset. Islamic stocks have lower debt, 
lower cash and interest-bearing securities and receivables. In particular the difference in debt 
is large with the ratio of total debt over average market value being only 8.65% for Islamic 
stocks and 93.51% for non-Islamic stocks. Islamic stocks only have 28.16% the total debt 
that non-Islamic stocks have. However, in terms of size only the total assets are smaller for 
Islamic stocks, whereas the market value is higher. This is likely due to the construction of 
screens by which debt, cash and interest-bearing securities and receivables are scaled by the 
average 24-month trailing market value. High ratios (i.e. those where market value tends to 
be low) are excluded. All of the differences in asset characteristics are statistically significant 
with p-values equal to zero. 
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Table 2.7: Industry Distribution of Number of Firms and Market Value (screen-based dataset) 
Panel A: Industry Distribution (number of firms)  
 All 
Industries 
0001 Oil 
& Gas  
1000 Basic 
Materials 
2000 
Industrials 
3000 Consumer 
Goods 
4000 Health 
Care 
5000 Consumer 
Services 
6000 Tele-
communications 
7000 
Utilities 
8000 
Financials 
9000 
Technology 
Average no. of firms per industry 
IS 98 2 9 25 27 2 6 1 2 16 8 
NIS 343 5 26 110 72 5 33 1 6 72 14 
M 441 7 35 135 99 7 38 2 8 87 21 
Average % of firms in a portfolio 
 
IS 100 2 9 26 27 2 6 1 2 16 8 
NIS 100 1 8 32 21 1 10 0 2 21 4 
M 100 2 8 31 23 2 9 1 2 20 5 
Average proportion of Islamic firms to Market (in %) 
IS / M 28.91 50.32 42.76 29.42 34.67 45.29 13.93 73.54 33.38 19.13 44.59 
            
Panel B: Industry Distribution (market value in millions of US$) 
 All 
Industries 
0001 Oil 
& Gas  
1000 Basic 
Materials 
2000 
Industrials 
3000 Consumer 
Goods 
4000 Health 
Care 
5000 
Consumer 
Services 
6000 Tele-
communications 
7000 
Utilities 
8000 
Financials 
9000 
Technology 
Average MV  
IS 36.61 3.25 2.09 9.25 9.61 0.51 1.36 5.93 1.05 2.68 0.88 
NIS 89.97 1.60 2.24 13.24 12.01 0.43 16.30 2.35 10.40 30.28 1.13 
M 126.58 4.85 4.33 22.49 21.61 0.94 17.66 8.28 11.45 32.96 2.02 
Average % MV in a portfolio 
IS 100 8.87 5.70 25.27 26.24 1.39 3.72 16.19 2.87 7.33 2.41 
NIS 100 1.78 2.49 14.72 13.34 0.48 18.12 2.61 11.56 33.65 1.26 
M 100 3.83 3.42 17.77 17.07 0.74 13.95 6.54 9.05 26.04 1.59 
Average proportion of Islamic MV to Market MV 
IS / M 31.03 78.49 56.18 44.85 40.37 45.29 08.10 73.30 21.92 10.40 49.70 
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Table 2.8: Characteristics of Stocks in the Islamic, non-Islamic and Market Portfolios (screen-based dataset) 
  Debt / Assets Debt / Avrg MV Total Debt 
($m) 
Total Assets 
($m) 
MV ($m) Cash and IBS 
($m) 
Receivables 
($m) 
No of Firms 
Average 
 Islamic 0.10 0.09 37.35 171.61 343.69 28.79 16.74 98 
 Non-Islamic 0.31 0.94 132.61 412.71 262.44 53.68 65.29 343 
 Market 0.25 0.72 98.35 243.97 269.65 43.63 35.98 442 
          
Differences 
IS - NIS Difference -0.21 -0.85 -95.26 -241.10 81.26 -24.88 -48.54 -245 
 T-stat -28.53 -29.46 -21.37 -25.83 8.26 -24.07 -28.57 -18.70 
 P-value (2 tail) 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 
IS - M Difference -0.15 -0.63 -61.00 -72.36 74.05 -14.84 -19.23 -344 
 T-stat -24.09 -24.02 -25.22 -15.26 9.58 -28.17 -17.97 -23.15 
 P-value (2 tail) 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 
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 2.6 ANALYSIS AND RESULTS  
This section provides the analysis and results for the three hypotheses and sensitivity tests 
which examine the robustness of results to the choice of currency, to crisis periods and to an 
adjustment for outliers. I use the SAC-based dataset for hypotheses 1 and 2 and all sensitivity 
tests, while I use the screen-based dataset for hypotheses 1-3. 
2.6.1 Hypothesis 1: Mean and Variance  
2.6.1.1 SAC-based Dataset 1997-2012 
First, I use the SAC-based dataset for 1997-2012 to test the first hypothesis about equal mean 
and variance of returns between the Islamic and non-Islamic portfolios. Table 2.9 shows the 
paired two-tail t-tests for equal means, a Wilcoxon signed rank test for equal medians and an 
F-test for equal variance between two pairs of portfolios: first, between the Islamic portfolio 
and the non-Islamic portfolio, and secondly, between the Islamic portfolio and the market 
portfolio. Under the null hypothesis HA,0 there is no significant difference in mean returns 
between Islamic and non-Islamic stocks. I find that with a t-statistic of -0.2207 and a p-value 
of 0.8256 I cannot reject the null hypothesis and conclude that there is no statistically 
significant difference between the mean returns of Islamic and non-Islamic stocks. In fact, the 
difference in the (monthly) sample mean (1.02% and 1.06%) and median (1.28% and 1.27%) 
returns is very small. This is also confirmed by the inability to reject equal median returns at 
a p-value of 0.9638. There is, however, evidence that Islamic stocks have a lower variance 
(0.0050) relative to non-Islamic stocks (0.0067). The F-statistic is 0.7523 with a p-value of 
0.0318 so the null hypothesis HB,0, stating that there is no difference between the variance of 
returns, can be rejected at the 5% level of significance. 
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Table 2.9: Test for Equal Mean, Median and Variance of Returns (SAC-based dataset) 
Portfolio Type Islamic Non-Islamic Islamic Market 
Mean 0.0102 0.0106 0.0102 0.0104 
Median 0.0128 0.0127 0.0128 0.0123 
Variance 0.0050 0.0067 0.0050 0.0056 
Observations 172 172 172 172 
     
T-statistic -0.2207  -0.2543  
P-value (equal mean) 0.8256  0.7995  
     
Wilcoxon signed rank value 0.0619  0.1307  
P-value (equal median) 0.9506  0.8960  
     
F-statistic 0.7523  0.9040  
P-value (equal variance) 0.0318  0.2551  
F Critical one-tail 0.7770   0.7770   
 
The results from the HAC robust standard errors regressions confirm that the mean returns 
are not significantly different, as the Islamic dummy variable has a t-statistic -0.2207 and p-
value 0.8254. However, the variance of Islamic stock returns is -0.0016 lower than non-
Islamic stocks which is significant with a t-statistic -3.8226 and p-value 0.0002. Results for 
both regressions are given in Table A.1 of Appendix A. The graphical representation of the 
regression results is given in Figure 2.2. When Islamic stock returns are subtracted from non-
Islamic returns there is no trend of positive or negative difference. However, when the 
variance (𝑅𝐼𝑆 − ?̅?𝐼𝑆)
2 of Islamic returns is subtracted from the variance of non-Islamic 
returns, then the majority of differences are positive which shows that the variance of non-
Islamic stocks tends to be higher than the variance of Islamic stocks.   
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Figure 2.2: Subtraction of Islamic from non-Islamic Stock Returns and Variance (SAC-
based dataset) 
 
To assess the risk-adjusted performance of the portfolios I calculate their Sharpe ratios 
(𝑆 =
?̅?𝑖−𝑟𝑓
𝑠𝑖
), where 𝑟𝑓 is the average monthly US risk-free rate over 1997-2012 which is equal 
to 0.002167, ?̅?𝑖 and 𝑠𝑖 are the sample mean and standard deviation for portfolio i (Islamic, 
non-Islamic or market). I find that all three portfolios had a positive Sharpe ratio during 
1997-2012, with the Islamic portfolio having the highest Sharpe ratio (0.1130), followed by 
the market (0.1102) and the non-Islamic portfolio (0.1033). 
2.6.1.2 Screen-based Dataset 1986-2012 
I also use the screen-based dataset where I extend the sample period to 1986-2012 and test 
hypothesis 1 that mean returns between Islamic and non-Islamic portfolios are equal and that 
the variance is lower for Islamic than non-Islamic portfolios. Table 2.10 shows the tests for 
equal mean, median and variance of returns for the extended time period.  
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Table 2.10: Test for Equal Mean, Median and Variance of Returns (screen-based 
dataset) 
Portfolio Type Islamic Non-Islamic Islamic Market 
Mean 0.0047 0.0070 0.0047 0.0057 
Median 0.0057 0.0089 0.0057 0.0088 
Variance 0.0045 0.0059 0.0045 0.0051 
Observations 313 313 313 313 
     
T-statistic -1.1424  -0.7742  
P-value (equal mean) 0.2542  0.4394  
     
Wilcoxon signed rank value 1.1620  1.1514  
P-value (equal median) 0.2452  0.2496  
     
F-statistic 0.7598  0.8769  
P-value (equal variance) 0.0078  0.1233  
F Critical one-tail 0.8298   0.8298   
 
The results of the statistical tests for the extended time period are the same as in hypothesis 1 
using the SAC-based dataset.
26
 The mean returns of Islamic and non-Islamic stocks are equal 
with a t-statistic of -0.1424 and a p-value of 0.2542, while the variance of Islamic stocks is 
lower than non-Islamic stocks (F-statistic 0.7598, p-value 0.0078). I also calculate Sharpe 
ratios with the average US monthly risk-free rate for 1986-2012 being 0.0032. I find that the 
Islamic Sharpe ratio is 0.0219, the non-Islamic is 0.0496 and the market is 0.0345. While all 
three Sharpe ratios are positive they are lower in magnitude compared to the Sharpe ratios of 
the SAC-based dataset. This time the non-Islamic portfolio outperforms on a risk-adjusted 
basis whereas in the SAC-based dataset the Islamic portfolio has the highest Sharpe ratio. To 
find out whether this difference is due to the different dataset or different sample period I 
calculate the Sharpe ratios with the screen-based dataset but using the same time period as the 
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 Repeating the statistical tests for the screen-based dataset with the same time period as the SAC-based dataset 
(1997-2012) confirms the results from Hypothesis 1. Tests for equal mean fail to reject a difference between 
Islamic and non-Islamic (t-statistic 0.2125, p-value 0.8320) or between Islamic and market (t-statistic 0.0834, p-
value 0.9336). And I reject equal variance between Islamic and non-Islamic (F-statistic 0.7483, p-value 0.0294) 
whereas I fail to reject equal variance between Islamic and market (F-statistic 0.8281, p-value 0.1092). 
52 
 
-.16
-.12
-.08
-.04
.00
.04
.08
.12
.16
.20
.24
86 88 90 92 94 96 98 00 02 04 06 08 10
RETURNS
-.04
-.03
-.02
-.01
.00
.01
.02
.03
.04
86 88 90 92 94 96 98 00 02 04 06 08 10
VARIANCE
main analysis (1997-2012). I use the average US monthly risk-free rate for 1997-2012 which 
is 0.0022. This time the Islamic Sharpe ratio is 0.0157, the non-Islamic Sharpe ratio is 0.0078 
and the market Sharpe ratio is 0.0125. Therefore, the Islamic portfolio outperforms during 
1997-2012 using either dataset, but it underperforms during 1986-2012. This shows that 
although the overall results for hypothesis 1 are robust to the sample period, the risk-adjusted 
performance is sensitive to the selected time period. 
The results from the HAC robust standard errors regressions confirm that the mean returns 
are not significantly different, as the Islamic dummy variable has a t-statistic -0.0023 and p-
value 0.6846. However, the variance of Islamic stock returns is -0.0014 lower than non-
Islamic stocks which is significant with a t-statistic -2.0387 and p-value 0.0419. Results for 
both regressions are given in Table A.2 of Appendix A. Figure 2.3 shows the graphical 
representation of the regression results. As in Figure 2.2, there is no trend of positive or 
negative difference between Islamic and non-Islamic stock returns but the variance of non-
Islamic stocks tends to be higher than the variance of Islamic stocks as more differences are 
positive.   
Figure 2.3: Subtraction of Islamic from non-Islamic Stock Returns and Variance 
(screen-based dataset) 
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The findings about risk and return of Islamic and non-Islamic stocks are consistent across 
datasets in section 2.6.1.1 and 2.6.1.2. They show that results from the previous literature on 
Islamic and conventional stock indices can only be applied to Islamic and non-Islamic stock 
portfolios in terms of returns but not variance. In fact, whether the Islamic stock portfolio is 
compared to a non-Islamic stock portfolio or the market (i.e. a conventional stock index), 
there is no difference in mean returns. However, in terms of risk, the Islamic stock portfolio 
only has a significantly lower variance than the non-Islamic stock portfolio, while it has 
about the same variance as the market (i.e. a conventional stock index). According to 
previous empirical studies it is controversial whether Islamic stocks are more or less risky 
than the market (e.g. Al-Zoubi and Maghyereh (2007), Dharani and Natarajan (2010), 
Shubbar (2010) and Akhtar, Jahromi and John (2013) find that Islamic stocks are less risky 
than the conventional stock index, while Beer, Estes and Munte (2011) Charles, Darné and 
Pop (2012) suggest that Islamic stocks are more risky than the conventional stock index). The 
findings from this study suggest that there is little difference in the variance of the Islamic 
and conventional stock index, but there is a significant difference when Islamic stocks are 
compared to non-Islamic stocks. 
2.6.2 Hypothesis 2: Mean-Variance Efficiency  
2.6.2.1 SAC-based Dataset 1997-2012 
The second hypothesis examines whether the Islamic, non-Islamic and market portfolios are 
on the efficient frontier. First, I use the SAC-based dataset for 1997-2012 which gives 172 
monthly time series observations. The results for the two statistical tests based on Gibbons, 
Ross and Shanken (1989) and GMM are shown in Table 2.11. Panel A and B refer to the 
Gibbons-Ross and Shanken (1989) test and the GMM test respectively. Each test is run in 
both the Sharpe-Lintner CAPM framework and the Black zero-beta CAPM framework. Three  
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Table 2.11: Test for Mean-Variance Efficiency (SAC-based dataset) 
 Market Islamic Non-Islamic 
Panel A: GRS test    
Sharpe-Lintner CAPM framework    
Wilks' Lambda 0.9126 0.9108 0.9082 
F-statistic 1.54 1.58 1.63 
P-value 0.1287 0.118 0.103 
Number of univariate tests rejected at α=5% 2 1 1 
    
Black zero-beta CAPM framework    
Wilks' Lambda 0.9075 0.9063 0.9018 
F-statistic 1.64 1.66 1.75 
P-value 0.0996 0.0935 0.0731 
Number of univariate tests rejected at α=5% 3 3 1 
    
Panel B: GMM test    
Sharpe-Lintner CAPM framework    
J-Statistic (test for overidentifying restrictions) 16.8810 18.2588 17.3088 
P-value 0.0770 0.0508 0.0678 
Number of univariate tests rejected at α=5% 2 2 1 
    
Black zero-beta CAPM framework    
J-Statistic (test for overidentifying restrictions) 8.7600 8.2028 10.2948 
P-value 0.4597 0.5138 0.3272 
Number of univariate tests rejected at α=5% 3 2 1 
 
columns indicate the results for the market, Islamic and non-Islamic portfolios. The results 
are consistent across all 4 methods with all p-values higher than 5%. This suggests that the 
null hypothesis HC,0 that portfolio i is mean-variance efficient cannot be rejected at the 5% 
level of significance. Therefore, all three portfolios can be considered to be close to the 
efficient frontier. 
Figure 2.4 illustrates the mean-variance frontier with three portfolios: the Islamic portfolio 
(IS), the non-Islamic portfolio (NIS) and the market (M). The frontier is given by equation 12 
with the following values: 
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 𝐸(𝑅𝑝) =
𝐴
𝐶
± √
𝐷
𝐶
𝜎2 −
𝐷
𝐶2
= 0.0135 ± √0.0742⁡𝜎2 − 0.0002, 
where 𝜎𝑝
2 ≥
1
𝐶
, A = 3.5699, B = 0.1226, C = 263.5796 and D = 19.5751. The descriptive 
statistics of the decile portfolios that I used to calculate the equation of the hyperbola are in 
Table A.3 of Appendix A.  
Figure 2.4: Mean-Variance Frontier (SAC-based dataset 1997-2012) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
All three portfolios are close to the global minimum of the mean-variance frontier and they 
line up at a similar level of mean returns but different levels of standard deviation. In 
particular, the Islamic portfolio is the closest to the mean-variance frontier and to the global 
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minimum. For a given level of return the Islamic portfolio reduces risk and has the lowest 
standard deviation relative to the other two portfolios. Figure 2.4 also confirms graphically 
the results from Hypothesis 1 that the mean returns between the Islamic, non-Islamic and 
market portfolios are not significantly different, whereas the variance of the Islamic portfolio 
is statistically significantly lower than that of the non-Islamic portfolio.  
Table 2.11 shows the theoretical correlations of the Islamic (IS), non-Islamic (NIS) and 
market (M) portfolios if they were frontier portfolios and compares those values to the actual 
Pearson correlations. The theoretical correlations are all close to 100%, whereas the actual 
Pearson correlations are slightly lower and range between 95.32% and 99.08%. 
Table 2.12: Theoretical and Actual Correlations (SAC-based dataset) 
 Theoretical correlations Actual Pearson correlations 
Correl (M, IS) 99.9931 99.0825 
Correl (M, NIS) 99.9913 98.4918 
Correl (IS, NIS) 99.9690 95.3154 
 
2.6.2.2 Screen-based Dataset 1989-2012 
I also use the screen-based dataset to test Hypothesis 2. I reduce the original time period 
(1986-2012) to 1989-2012 because the number of stocks prior to 1989 is too low to construct 
diversified decile portfolios. This gives 279 monthly observations. Table 2.13 presents results 
for the two statistical tests with the Gibbons, Ross and Shanken (1989) test in Panel A and the 
GMM test in Panel B. Each test is run in both the Sharpe-Lintner CAPM and the Black 
CAPM frameworks. Columns indicate the results for the market, Islamic and non-Islamic 
portfolios. The Gibbons, Ross and Shanken (1989) test shows that at a 5% level of 
significance, mean-variance efficiency of the market and the Islamic portfolio cannot be 
rejected, although it rejects mean-variance efficiency of the non-Islamic portfolio. There is no  
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Table 2.13: Test for Mean-Variance Efficiency (screen-based dataset 1989-2012) 
 Market Islamic Non-Islamic 
Panel A: GRS test    
Sharpe-Lintner CAPM framework    
Wilks' lambda 0.9361 0.9364 0.9323 
F-statistic 1.83 1.82 1.95 
P-value 0.0556 0.0571 0.0394 
Number of univariate tests rejected at α=5% 7 4 7 
    
Black CAPM framework    
Wilks' lambda 0.9357 0.9352 0.9328 
F-statistic 1.84 1.86 1.93 
P-value 0.0539 0.0512 0.0415 
Number of univariate tests rejected at α=5% 7 3 7 
    
Panel B: GMM test    
Sharpe-Lintner CAPM framework    
J-statistic (test for overidentifying restrictions) 19.9957 19.2018 20.2714 
P-value 0.0293 0.0378 0.0268 
Number of univariate tests rejected at α=5% 7 4 7 
    
Black CAPM framework    
J-statistic (test for overidentifying restrictions) 19.9713 18.4460 20.2621 
P-value 0.0181 0.0303 0.0164 
Number of univariate tests rejected at α=5% 7 4 7 
 
difference between the Sharpe-Lintner and the Black CAPM frameworks in respect to the 
statistical results, even though the Black-CAPM framework might be more appropriate to 
interpret the results for the Islamic portfolio since the risk-free rate is not acceptable in 
Islamic finance (Hanif 2011). However, under the GMM test none of the three portfolios are 
mean-variance efficient. The Islamic portfolio has the lowest J-statistic so it is closest to the 
frontier (J-statistic 18.4460, p-value 0.0303) compared to the market (J-statistic 19.9713, p-
value 0.0181) or the non-Islamic portfolio (J-statistic 20.2621, p-value 0.0164). The 
difference in results between the Gibbons, Ross and Shanken (1989) and the GMM tests is 
likely due to misspecified distributional assumptions under the former test. Both MacKinlay 
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and Richardson (1991) and Faff and Lau (1997) find that F-statistics may fail to reject mean-
variance efficiency while the GMM statistic does reject. This can be confirmed by the 
descriptive statistics from section 2.5 which indicate that returns do not follow a normal 
distribution, so the GMM method may be more accurate for the Malaysian data.  
Figure 2.5: Mean-Variance Frontier (screen-based dataset 1989-2012) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 2.5 illustrates the mean-variance frontier with three portfolios: the Islamic portfolio 
(IS), the non-Islamic portfolio (NIS) and the market (M). The frontier is given by equation 12 
with the following values: 
 𝐸(𝑅𝑝) =
𝐴
𝐶
± √
𝐷
𝐶
𝜎2 −
𝐷
𝐶2
= 0.0029 ± √0.0678⁡𝜎2 − 0.0002, 
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where⁡𝜎𝑝
2 ≥
1
𝐶
, A = 0.8918, B = 0.0704, C = 303.8128 and D = 20.5932. The descriptive 
statistics of the decile portfolios that I used to calculate the equation of the hyperbola are in 
Table A.4 of Appendix A.  
All three portfolios line up at a similar level of mean returns but different levels of standard 
deviation. In particular, the Islamic portfolio is the closest to the mean-variance frontier and 
to the global minimum. Figure 2.5 confirms graphically the results from Hypothesis 1 that the 
mean returns between the Islamic, non-Islamic and market portfolios are not significantly 
different, whereas the variance of the Islamic portfolio is statistically significantly lower than 
that of the non-Islamic portfolio. The difference to the SAC-based dataset is that here the 
three portfolios are relatively further away from the frontier so only the Islamic portfolio is 
borderline mean-variance efficient.  
Table 2.14 shows the theoretical correlations of the Islamic (IS), non-Islamic (NIS) and 
market (M) portfolios if they were frontier portfolios and compares them to the actual 
Pearson correlations. As in Table 2.11, the theoretical correlations are all close to 100%, 
whereas the actual Pearson correlations are slightly lower and range between 93.64% and 
99.32%. 
Table 2.14: Theoretical and Actual Correlations (screen-based dataset 1989-2012) 
 Theoretical correlations Actual Pearson correlations 
Correl (M, IS) 99.71203 96.76910 
Correl (M, NIS) 99.84942 99.31725 
Correl (IS, NIS) 99.14587 93.63994 
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2.6.3 Hypothesis 3: Impact of the Screening Process (Screen-based Dataset 
1989-2012) 
The third hypothesis explores the impact of the screening process and repeats tests for equal 
mean and variance of returns with one or selected screens at a time. I use the screen-based 
dataset as it allows me to apply one screen at a time. Table 2.15 presents the descriptive 
statistics of different screen combinations which shows how many stocks are excluded and 
why. All values are averages across the 279 monthly time series.  
Table 2.15 looks at the following screen combinations: all screens, which are separated into 
business and financial ratio screens, 5 individual screens which together form the business 
screens (alcohol, tobacco, pork, financials and entertainment)
27
, sin stocks which are used for 
the purpose of comparison, and screens that form the financial ratio screens (debt ratio and 
cash compliance, the latter being further separated into cash and interest-bearing securities, 
and into accounts receivable). See methodology section 2.4.3 for a more detailed description 
of the individual screens and screen combinations including the respective ICB codes. 
The descriptive statistics show that most stocks are excluded due to financial ratio screens as 
opposed to business activity screens. On average there are 473 stocks in total, 113 of which 
are Islamic and 360 are non-Islamic. Out of the 360 non-Islamic stocks 52 were excluded 
from the Islamic portfolio due to business activity screens and 341 were excluded due to 
financial ratio screens. This means that 65.12% of total firms are excluded from the Islamic 
portfolio due to failure to comply with financial ratio screens, while only 6.98% are excluded 
due to failure of both screens and 4.02% are excluded due to business activity screens. Under 
the business activity screens there are on average 4 stocks excluded due to their involvement 
in the alcohol sector, 2 in tobacco, 17 in pork, 14 in financials and 16 in entertainment. The 
                                                          
27
 There is a 6th screen for weapons and defence, but no firm within my sample falls under this screen.  
61 
 
firms excluded under the financial ratio screens mostly have excessive debt (252) and/or fail 
the cash compliance criterion (272).  
Table 2.16 presents results for the tests whether a given screen or screen combination affects 
the mean and variance of returns between Islamic and non-Islamic stocks. This explains what 
drives the results found under hypothesis 1 where means between Islamic and non-Islamic 
stock returns are equal while the variance of Islamic stock returns is statistically significantly 
lower than the non-Islamic stock returns. I find that those returns are driven by financial ratio 
screens. First, as shown in Table 2.15, the majority of non-Islamic stocks is excluded due to 
financial ratio screens rather than business activity screens.  
Secondly, Table 2.16 shows that the results of equal means are driven by the financial ratio 
screens because the Islamic and non-Islamic stock portfolios under the financial ratio screens 
have equal means (t-statistic 1.3546, p-value 0.1766), whereas business screens have lower 
returns for the non-Islamic than the Islamic stock portfolio (t-statistic -4.7877, p-value 0). It 
appears that the small number of stocks that drop out due to the business activity screens (52) 
is not enough to cause an overall significant difference between Islamic and non-Islamic 
stock portfolios. 
Thirdly, the results that the variance of Islamic stocks is lower than that of non-Islamic stocks 
is also driven by the financial ratio screens because the monthly variance of Islamic stocks is 
lower by 0.0017 than that of non-Islamic stocks under all screens (F-statistic 0.7120, p-value 
0.0024), it is lower by 0.0032 under all financial ratio screens (F-statistic 0.5482, p-value 
0.0000) and it is lower under every single screen within the financial ratio screens (all p-value 
are 0.0000). On the other hand, there is no statistically significant difference between the 
variance of Islamic and non-Islamic stocks when only business activity screens are applied 
(F-statistic 1.0441, p-value 0.3596).  
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Table 2.15: Descriptive Statistics of Different Screen Combinations (screen-based dataset 1989-2012) 
 Screen Type All   Business Financial 
Ratio 
Alcohol  Tobacco  Pork Financials Entertainment Sin 
Stocks 
Debt Ratio Cash 
Compliance 
Cash 
and IBS 
Accounts 
Receivable 
Islamic annualised returns (in %)     
 observations (avrg no of 
stocks across time) 
113  420 131 469 471 456 459 457 462 221 200 352 242 
 average 2.88  1.44 5.04 3.36 3.12 3.12 3.48 2.40 2.88 6.00 2.64 2.16 3.84 
 median 8.28  6.00 9.24 8.64 8.28 8.64 9.48 8.52 7.32 12.00 8.28 8.28 8.52 
 standard deviation 22.52  24.91 21.75 24.63 24.77 24.84 24.42 24.21 24.73 22.24 23.24 24.01 23.52 
 maximum  228.72  252.60 242.40 254.88 255.24 257.64 253.56 245.52 252.00 240.72 246.60 251.28 248.04 
 minimum -243.36  -282.12 -221.40 -267.48 -268.08 -269.28 -265.56 -273.72 -273.00 -225.36 -262.32 -267.96 -264.36 
Non-Islamic annualised returns (in %)     
 observations (avrg no of 
stocks across time) 
360  52 341 4 2 17 14 16 11 252 272 120 231 
 average 4.20  10.68 1.68 11.52 17.16 13.56 2.52 11.28 10.56 -0.36 4.32 10.32 -0.12 
 median 7.20  10.44 6.96 10.56 12.12 13.92 2.88 11.04 18.60 3.84 8.52 14.76 3.24 
 standard deviation 26.71  24.39 29.38 20.33 23.97 18.95 34.85 30.31 23.83 29.83 30.17 30.73 31.42 
 maximum  277.08  258.24 295.68 262.08 315.00 195.00 384.24 309.12 285.12 302.88 316.32 328.08 310.92 
 minimum -298.68  -220.68 -345.84 -284.88 -321.12 -179.64 -334.32 -273.00 -319.08 -345.72 -340.80 -397.20 -338.40 
Market annualised returns (in %)     
 observations (avrg no of 
stocks across time) 
473  473 473 473 473 473 473 473 473 473 473 473 473 
 average 3.36  3.36 3.36 3.36 3.36 3.36 3.36 3.36 3.36 3.36 3.36 3.36 3.36 
 median 9.12  9.12 9.12 9.12 9.12 9.12 9.12 9.12 9.12 9.12 9.12 9.12 9.12 
 standard deviation 24.53  24.53 24.53 24.53 24.53 24.53 24.53 24.53 24.53 24.53 24.53 24.53 24.53 
 maximum  253.68  253.68 253.68 253.68 253.68 253.68 253.68 253.68 253.68 253.68 253.68 253.68 253.68 
 minimum -266.04  -266.04 -266.04 -266.04 -266.04 -266.04 -266.04 -266.04 -266.04 -266.04 -266.04 -266.04 -266.04 
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Table 2.16: Tests for Significant Mean and Variance of Different Screen Combinations 
Difference in Means (monthly frequency) 
 Screen 
Type 
All  Business Financial 
Ratio 
Alcohol  Tobacco  Pork Finan-
cials 
Entertain-
ment 
Sin Stocks Debt 
Ratio 
Cash 
Compliance 
Cash and 
IBS 
Accounts 
Receivable 
IS - NIS 
 Difference -0.0011 -0.0077 0.0029 -0.0068 -0.0118 -0.0087 0.0007 -0.0074 -0.0064 0.0053 -0.0014 -0.0069 0.0033 
 T-Stat -0.6345 -4.7877 1.3546 -2.3234 -2.9639 -3.8320 0.2346 -2.9952 -3.0324 2.5884 -0.7132 -3.3113 1.5080 
 P-Value (2-
tail) 
0.5263 0.0000 0.1766 0.0209 0.0033 0.0002 0.8147 0.0030 0.0027 0.0101 0.4763 0.0011 0.1327 
IS - M 
 Difference -0.0004 -0.0017 0.0014 -0.0001 -0.0003 -0.0003 0.0000 -0.0009 -0.0004 0.0021 -0.0007 -0.0011 0.0004 
 T-Stat -0.4121 -4.8874 1.4661 -1.1269 -2.4984 -2.9537 0.3490 -2.9962 -2.8522 2.8158 -1.2409 -3.9010 0.9158 
 P-Value (2-
tail) 
0.6806 0.0000 0.1437 0.2608 0.0131 0.0034 0.7274 0.0030 0.0047 0.0052 0.2157 0.0001 0.3606 
Difference in Variance (monthly frequency) 
 Screen 
Type 
All  Business Financial 
Ratio 
Alcohol  Tobacco  Pork Finan-
cials 
Entertain-
ment 
Sin Stocks Debt 
Ratio 
Cash 
Compliance 
Cash and 
IBS 
Accounts 
Receivable 
IS - NIS 
               
 Difference -0.0017 0.0002 -0.0032 0.0016 0.0003 0.0022 -0.0052 -0.0028 0.0004 -0.0033 -0.0031 -0.0031 -0.0036 
 F-Stat 0.7120 1.0441 0.5482 1.4659 1.0676 1.7183 0.4910 0.6377 1.0778 0.5564 0.5942 0.6095 0.5603 
 P-Value 0.0024 0.3596 0.0000 0.0007 0.2928 0.0000 0.0000 0.0001 0.2664 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 
IS - M 
 Difference -0.0008 0.0002 -0.0011 0.0000 0.0001 0.0001 0.0000 -0.0001 0.0001 -0.0009 -0.0005 -0.0002 -0.0004 
 F-Stat 0.8446 1.0319 0.7871 1.0098 1.0214 1.0269 0.9922 0.9743 1.0191 0.8240 0.8992 0.9578 0.9199 
 P-Value 0.0799 0.3969 0.0232 0.4676 0.4299 0.4126 0.4741 0.4140 0.4375 0.0535 0.1882 0.3599 0.2436 
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Overall, returns are higher when only debt ratio screens are applied, while returns are lower 
when business screens (in particular alcohol, tobacco, pork and entertainment) or cash and 
interest-bearing securities screens are applied. The variance of the Islamic portfolio increases 
when alcohol and pork sectors are excluded, while it decreases when financial ratios are 
applied or when financials and entertainment sectors are excluded. The most beneficial 
screen is the financial ratio screen (with the debt ratio and accounts receivable sub-screens) 
because the returns are higher (although this difference is not statistically significant) and the 
variance is lower for stocks that fall under this screen relatively to those that fail this screen. 
This could be related to the anomaly that low-beta and low-volatility stocks outperform high-
beta and high-volatility stocks. Baker, Bradley and Wurgler (2011) present two explanations 
for this anomaly. First, an irrational preference and demand for high-volatility stocks could 
be caused by market participants having a preference for lotteries and being subject to 
representativeness and overconfidence biases. Second, institutional investors can be subject 
to a fixed-benchmark which deters them from investing in low-volatility stocks and could 
therefore restrict arbitrage. 
Table 2.17: Sharpe Ratios for Different Screen Combinations 
Screen Type Islamic Non-Islamic Market 
All  -0.0090 0.0063 -0.0023 
Business -0.0257 0.0832 -0.0023 
Financial Ratio 0.0196 -0.0192 -0.0023 
Alcohol  -0.0030 0.1115 -0.0023 
Tobacco  -0.0061 0.1635 -0.0023 
Pork -0.0060 0.1508 -0.0023 
Financials -0.0020 -0.0086 -0.0023 
Entertainment -0.0147 0.0734 -0.0023 
Sin Stocks -0.0083 0.0844 -0.0023 
Debt Ratio 0.0308 -0.0384 -0.0023 
Cash Compliance -0.0123 0.0066 -0.0023 
Cash and IBS -0.0179 0.0633 -0.0023 
Accounts Receivable 0.0032 -0.0342 -0.0023 
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Further, Table 2.17 shows the Sharpe ratios for different screen combinations to evaluate 
their risk-adjusted performance. I use the average monthly US risk-free rate over 1989-2012 
which is 0.0030. The market has a negative Sharpe ratio (-0.0023) as the sample mean of the 
market return (0.0028) is slightly lower than the average risk-free rate, so an investor would 
be better off investing in a risk-free investment rather than the Malaysian market. As the 
Islamic portfolio has slightly lower returns it also has a negative Sharpe ratio (-0.0090) 
whereas the non-Islamic has a positive Sharpe ratio (0.0063). When only business screens are 
applied the non-Islamic portfolio outperforms the Islamic and market portfolios with a Sharpe 
ratio of 0.0832, but when financial ratios are applied the Islamic portfolio outperforms the 
non-Islamic and market portfolios with a Sharpe ratio of 0.0196. 
It is interesting to see from Tables 2.15 to 2.17 that there is a large difference between the 
financial ratio and busines screens. While stocks that fail business activity screens have 
higher returns and equal standard deviation to Islamic stocks, stocks that fail financial ratio 
screens have equal returns and higher standard deviation than Islamic stocks. Figures 2.6 to 
2.8 illustrate these results graphically by plotting the Islamic, non-Islamic and market 
portfolios under different screens on the mean-variance frontier. These figures can be 
compared to the main results in Figure 2.5 which has the same hyperbola but the portfolios 
are constructed using all screens. Figure 2.5 shows that the non-Islamic portfolio has slightly 
higher returns and a higher standard deviation compared to the Islamic and market portfolios. 
The Islamic portfolio has the lowest standard deviation among the three portfolios and is the 
closest to the minimum variance portfolio. 
Figure 2.6 plots the portfolios when only financial ratio screens are applied. In contrast to 
Figure 2.5, the Islamic portfolio has a higher return and lower standard deviation than the 
non-Islamic and market portfolios and is closer to the efficient frontier than the non-Islamic 
portfolio. When only business activity screens are applied (Figure 2.7) the opposite can be 
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seen, with the non-Islamic portfolio having higher returns and lower standard deviation than 
the Islamic portfolio. All three portfolios have similar levels of risk but the non-Islamic 
portfolio has the highest returns.    
Figure 2.6: Mean-Variance Frontier – Portfolios with Financial Ratio Screens (screen-
based dataset 1989-2012) 
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Figure 2.7: Mean-Variance Frontier – Portfolios with Business Activity Screens (screen-
based dataset 1989-2012) 
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Figure 2.8: Mean-Variance Frontier – Sin Stock Portfolios (screen-based dataset 1989-
2012) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 2.8 plots the portfolios that are constructed using the sin stock criteria. It is very 
similar to the business screens from Figure 2.7 as sin stocks also have higher returns and 
lower standard deviation than the non-sin or market portfolios. Findings from Tables 2.15 to 
2.17 confirm that sin stocks are similar to non-Islamic stocks when only business activity 
screens are applied, although they form a small subset (11 stocks) out of non-Islamic stocks 
(52 stocks with business screens). They have a significantly higher mean than the non-sin or 
the market portfolios (t-statistic -3.0324, p-value 0.0027) while they have a similar level of 
variance (F-statistic 1.0778, p-value 0.2664). This confirms findings from literature on sin 
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stocks which have been shown to outperform the market, comparable stocks, or faith-based 
portfolios (Fabozzi, Ma and Oliphant 2008; Hong and Kacperczyk 2009; Liston and 
Soydemir 2010). However, the performance of sin stocks is much different to the non-Islamic 
stocks in general (see Figure 2.5) despite some overlaps in the screens between sin stocks and 
non-Islamic stocks. This is mainly due to the dominance of financial ratio screens which are 
based on the prohibition of interest (riba) in Islamic finance.  
2.6.4 Sensitivity 1: Malaysian Ringgit (SAC-based Dataset 1997-2012) 
As a sensitivity test I repeat the tests of the first hypothesis using Malaysian Ringgit, the local 
currency of Malaysia, instead of US dollar-denominated returns. I present the descriptive 
statistics of the SAC-based dataset in Malaysian Ringgit in Table 2.18. The statistics include 
annualised mean, median, maximum, minimum and standard deviation, as well as the 
coefficients of skewness and kurtosis and a Jarque-Bera test of normality for the Islamic, 
non-Islamic and the market portfolio returns. Panels A and B show the statistics for the value-
weight portfolio returns and for the number of stocks in each portfolio. All portfolio return 
statistics are lower than in US-dollar denominated returns (see Table 2.1). For example, the 
mean returns in Malaysian Ringgit are 10.80%, 11.76% and 11.16% for the Islamic, non-
Islamic and market portfolios, whereas they are 12.22%, 12.74% and 12.47% in US-dollars. 
Likewise, the standard deviation for the Islamic, non-Islamic and market returns are 19.61%, 
23.73% and 20.99% in Malaysian Ringgit and 24.58%, 28.34% and 25.85% in US-dollars. 
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Table 2.18: Descriptive Statistics in Malaysian Ringgit (SAC-based dataset) 
Portfolio Type Islamic Non-Islamic Total 
Panel A: Portfolio returns 
 Annualised mean (in %) 10.80 11.76 11.16 
 Annualised median (in %) 16.32 14.88 14.52 
 Annualised maximum (in %) 227.88 327.84 266.88 
 Annualised minimum (in %) -157.92 -199.56 -167.04 
 Annualised std. dev. (in %) 19.61 23.73 20.99 
 Skewness 0.12 0.21 0.17 
 Kurtosis 4.09 4.85 4.40 
     
 Jarque-Bera 8.92 25.73 14.92 
 P-value 0.01 0.00 0.00 
        
Panel B: Number of Stocks 
 Mean 698 162 860 
 Median 755 160 907 
 Maximum 862 225 1010 
 Minimum 285 114 419 
 Std. Dev. 138 29 118 
 
Then I repeat tests for hypothesis 1 with results shown in Table 2.19. I confirm the results 
found in the above sections that the mean returns between Islamic and non-Islamic portfolios 
are equal (t-statistic -0.4177, p-value 0.6767), while the Islamic portfolio has a significantly 
lower variance than the non-Islamic portfolio (F-statistic 0.6822, p-value 0.0064). I also 
calculate the Sharpe ratios where I use the average of the monthly Malaysian risk-free rate 
which is 0.0025 over 1997-2012. I find that the Islamic Sharpe ratio is 0.1141, the non-
Islamic Sharpe ratio is 0.1058 and the market Sharpe ratio is 0.1121. These are very similar 
values to those found in section 2.6.1 using US dollar returns (Sharpe ratios are 0.1130 for 
the Islamic, 0.1033 for the non-Islamic and 0.1102 for the market portfolios). In both cases 
the Islamic portfolio slightly outperforms the market portfolio. 
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Table 2.19: Test for Equal Mean, Median and Variance of Returns (SAC-based dataset 
in Malaysian Ringgit) 
Portfolio Type Islamic Non-Islamic Islamic Market 
Mean 0.0090 0.0098 0.0090 0.0093 
Median 0.0136 0.0124 0.0136 0.0121 
Variance 0.0032 0.0047 0.0032 0.0037 
Observations 172 172 172 172 
     
T-statistic -0.4177  -0.4295  
P-value (equal mean) 0.6767  0.6681  
     
Wilcoxon signed rank value 0.1873  0.2393  
P-value (equal median) 0.8514  0.8109  
     
F-statistic 0.6822  0.8738  
P-value (equal variance) 0.0064  0.1893  
F Critical one-tail 0.7770   0.7770   
 
2.6.5 Sensitivity 2: Crisis Periods Excluded (SAC-based Dataset 1997-2012) 
During the sample period 1997-2012 there have been at least two major crises that have 
affected the Malaysian stock market: the Asian financial crisis and the Global Financial 
Crisis. To see whether those crises may drive the results I exclude observations from those 
crises. While there are different opinions about the exact date of the onset and end of the 
Asian financial crisis, I have used the definition of Mitton (2002) where it is July 1997 to 
August 1998 inclusive. Mitton (2002) argues that July 1997 marks the beginning of the crisis 
because it corresponds to the devaluation of the Thai baht, while August 1998 corresponds to 
the date on which 5 East Asian stock market indices (including Malaysia) began a sustained 
upward trend. Then, I exclude March 2008 to March 2009 inclusive which fall under the 
Global Financial Crisis according to Manda’s (2010) definition. Manda (2010) argues that 
March 17
th
 2008 is the date on which US Investment Bank Bear Stearns & Co was taken over 
by JP Morgan, and March 31
st
 2009 corresponds to the S&P 500 index rebounding well from 
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its lowest value by the end of March. There is also evidence that domestic demand conditions 
in Malaysia began to stabilise in the second quarter of 2009 (Athukorala 2010).  
Table 2.20 shows descriptive statistics of the data from which crisis periods are excluded. 
After excluding the crisis periods the mean returns increase from 12.22 to 21.89% (Islamic), 
from 12.74 to 24.71% (non-Islamic) and from 12.47 to 23.07% (market). At the same time, 
the standard deviations drop from 24.58 to 21.94% (Islamic), from 28.34 to 25.46% (non-
Islamic) and from 25.85 to 23.15% (market). Then I test whether the results from hypothesis 
are sensitive to excluding the crisis periods and show the results in Table 21. Results from 
hypothesis 1 hold even after excluding crisis periods, as the hypothesis of equal means 
between Islamic and non-Islamic portfolios cannot be rejected with a t-statistic -1.2235 and a 
p-value 0.2231 and the variance of the Islamic portfolio is significantly lower than the non-
Islamic portfolio with an F-statistic 0.7424 and p-value 0.0350. 
Table 2.20: Descriptive Statistics Excluding Crisis (SAC-based dataset) 
Portfolio Type Islamic Non-Islamic Total 
Panel A: Portfolio returns 
Mean 21.89 24.71 23.07 
Median 22.08 22.75 22.63 
Maximum 257.04 358.29 296.10 
Minimum -304.26 -316.90 -310.36 
Std. Dev. 21.94 25.46 23.15 
Skewness  -0.03 0.26 0.09 
Kurtosis 5.55 5.58 5.59 
    
Jarque-Bera 31.00 32.94 32.08 
P-value 0.00 0.00 0.00 
    
Panel B: Number of Stocks 
Mean 716 166 882 
Median 760 169 917 
Maximum 877 228 1027 
Minimum 335 117 499 
Std. Dev. 130 30 109 
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Table 2.21: Test for Equal Mean, Median and Variance of Returns Excluding Crisis 
(SAC-based dataset) 
Portfolio Type Islamic Non-Islamic Islamic Market 
Mean 0.0164 0.0193 0.0164 0.0176 
Median 0.0175 0.0174 0.0175 0.0179 
Variance 0.0034 0.0047 0.0034 0.0038 
Observations 154 154 154 154 
     
T-statistic -1.4468  -1.4461  
P-value (equal mean) 0.1500  0.1502  
     
Wilcoxon signed rank value 1.0769  1.1328  
P-value (equal median) 0.2815  0.2573  
     
F-statistic 0.7211  0.8918  
P-value (equal variance) 0.0220  0.2398  
F Critical one-tail 0.7658   0.7658   
 
As in Section 2.6.1.1, I calculate the Sharpe ratios for the three portfolios when crisis periods 
are excluded. The average monthly risk-free rate becomes 0.0028 after excluding crisis 
periods, and the Sharpe ratios are 0.2438 (Islamic), 0.2420 (non-Islamic) and 0.2457 
(market). As expected, these Sharpe ratios are much higher than those in Section 2.6.1.1 due 
to higher means and lower standard deviation of the remaining data. The performance of all 
three portfolios is very close on a risk-adjusted basis. 
2.6.6 Sensitivity 3: Data with Outliers (SAC-based Dataset 1997-2012) 
As I excluded outliers to remove data errors and increase the accuracy of the remaining data I 
examine whether this adjustment has affected results. Therefore, I repeat a test of Hypothesis 
1 with the SAC-based dataset in which I do not exclude outliers. Table 2.22 presents the 
descriptive statistics and Table 2.23 the tests for equal means and variance.  
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Table 2.22: Descriptive Statistics with Outliers (SAC-based dataset) 
Portfolio Type Islamic Non-Islamic Total 
Panel A: Portfolio returns 
Mean 14.86 15.64 15.25 
Median 15.07 16.08 17.09 
Maximum 479.43 607.00 537.31 
Minimum -346.09 -337.43 -342.49 
Std. Dev. 29.24 33.26 30.69 
Skewness  0.4445 0.9263 0.7108 
Kurtosis 7.6773 8.5062 8.2167 
    
Jarque-Bera 162.4493 241.8788 209.5183 
Probability 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 
    
Panel B: Number of Stocks 
Mean 722 169 899 
Median 773 170 953 
Maximum 134 32 108 
Minimum 883 245 1036 
Std. Dev. 461 117 692 
 
Table 2.23: Test for Equal Mean, Median and Variance of Returns with Outliers (SAC-
based dataset) 
Portfolio Type Islamic Non-Islamic Islamic Market 
Mean 0.0124 0.0130 0.0124 0.0127 
Median 0.0126 0.0134 0.0126 0.0114 
Variance 0.0071 0.0092 0.0071 0.0079 
Observations 172 172 172 172 
T-statistic -0.3096  -0.3681  
P-value (equal mean) 0.7572  0.7133  
     
Wilcoxon signed rank value 0.2209  0.2102  
P-value (equal median) 0.8251  0.8335  
     
F-statistic 0.7729  0.9077  
P-value (equal variance) 0.0465  0.2635  
F Critical one-tail 0.7770  0.7770  
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Tables 2.22 and 2.23 confirm the main results from section 2.6.1.1 that there is no statistically 
significant difference between Islamic and non-Islamic stock returns (t-statistic -0.3096, p-
value 0.7572) but the variance of Islamic stocks is significantly lower than the variance of 
non-Islamic stocks (F-statistic 0.7729, p-value 0.0465). Further, the following are the Sharpe 
ratios using the same average monthly US risk-free rate as in section 2.6.1.1 (0.0022): 0.1211 
(Islamic), 0.1132 (non-Islamic) and 0.1190 (market).  
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2.7 CONCLUSION 
This chapter has analysed Islamic and non-Islamic stocks in Malaysia with respect to their 
risk, return and mean-variance efficiency. I have used two datasets and various 
methodologies to find that there are several differences between Islamic and non-Islamic 
stocks. First, Islamic stocks provide similar returns at a lower risk than non-Islamic stocks, as 
the standard deviation of returns on Islamic stocks is on average 3.43–3.78 percentage points 
lower than the standard deviation of returns on non-Islamic stocks. Second, the Islamic 
portfolio is closer to the mean-variance efficient frontier and the minimum variance portfolio 
relative to the non-Islamic portfolio, because it reduces risk for a similar level of expected 
returns. These results are robust to the choice of dataset, sample period or currency, to 
financial crises and to adjusting the data for outliers.  
I argue that these results are driven by financial ratio screens that exclude firms with high 
income from interest and highly leveraged firms from Islamic stock portfolios. This is 
because the majority (65.12 per cent) of non-Islamic firms have been excluded due to 
financial ratio screens as opposed to business activity screens (4.02 per cent) or both screens 
(6.98 per cent). Further, I find that there is a large difference between financial ratio screens 
and business activity screens. When I apply only financial ratio screens then the Islamic 
portfolio has the same returns and lower variance than the non-Islamic portfolio, which is 
consistent with the main results. However, when I apply business activity screens then the 
Islamic portfolio has lower returns than and the same variance as the non-Islamic portfolio. 
This project adds to the previous literature by applying two unique and comprehensive 
datasets of individual Islamic and non-Islamic stocks, instead of examining aggregate Islamic 
and conventional stock indices. Using individual stock data is made possible by combining 
stock data with the Shariah Advisory Council reports that specify which Malaysian stocks are 
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Islamic, so that this approach is unique to Malaysia. Another contribution of this project is 
that it explores the screening methods that are used to select Islamic stocks from a universe of 
stocks. While I confirm findings from previous studies according to which business activity 
screens and sin stocks tend to have an adverse impact on returns of the remaining stocks, I 
show that this adverse impact can be compensated by the effect of financial ratio screens 
which reduce the variance of the remaining stocks. In Malaysia, financial ratio screens 
outweigh the business activity screens and hence the overall effect on the Islamic stock 
portfolio is lower risk relative to non-Islamic stocks. However, in other stock markets the 
relative importance of financial ratio screens versus business activity screens might differ and 
this will in turn determine the performance of Islamic stocks in that market.   
The implications of the findings are important in view of the increasing popularity of Islamic 
finance even beyond Islamic countries. This research is relevant to all investors because an 
investment in Islamic stocks provides benefits in terms of risk reduction. Understanding the 
risk and return characteristics of Islamic and non-Islamic stocks is important for risk 
management and portfolio selection. Those who are not concerned about unethical business 
activities might consider only applying financial ratio screens to obtain higher returns and 
lower risk. 
This research is also useful for Muslim investors who are concerned about the religious 
compliance and the performance of their investments. This chapter has found that Islamic 
screens are beneficial to the performance of Islamic stocks by reducing the portfolio risk. In 
terms of religious compliance, Islamic screens ensure that Islamic stocks comply with 
Shari’ah by excluding firms that are involved in business activities that are prohibited under 
Shari’ah and firms with high involvement in interest generation (riba). I have found that 
Islamic stocks also achieve another principle of Islamic finance. By reducing the risk for the 
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same level of returns, Islamic stocks follow the Islamic principle of avoiding unnecessary risk 
and uncertainty (gharar). 
One extension of this project might be a comparative analysis the performance of Islamic 
versus non-Islamic stocks in different countries. The SAC dataset is limited to Malaysia, but 
the screen-based method can be applied to any country and time period where stock data 
(such as returns, market capitalisation and accounting variables) are available. Future 
research might also apply the screen-based method to explain other findings from the 
literature on Islamic finance, such as the lower volatility linkages between Islamic stocks and 
bonds relative to conventional stocks and bonds. 
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- 3 - 
IMPACT OF MACROECONOMIC NEWS SURPRISES 
ON ISLAMIC AND CONVENTIONAL STOCKS AND 
BONDS 
 
3.1 INTRODUCTION 
This chapter examines how the impact of macroeconomic news surprises on stock and bond 
returns and their volatility differs between Islamic and conventional assets. Islamic and 
conventional assets can be affected differently by macroeconomic news surprises because 
Islamic stock indices and Islamic bonds (sukuk) are structured according to the unique 
characteristics of Islamic law. Islamic stock indices exclude certain “unethical” sectors and 
firms that either pay or receive large amounts of interest (through cash holdings or leverage). 
Therefore, Islamic stock indices may be influenced by different variables than conventional 
indices because they comprise a different sample of industries and firms. To avoid interest, 
Islamic bonds (sukuk) are based on financial arrangements such as profit-and-loss sharing 
(e.g., partnership) or leasing principles. Further, Islamic bonds must represent ownership of a 
tangible asset. 
Analysing the impact of macroeconomic news announcements on the performance of Islamic 
assets can reveal information about how the mechanisms of price formation differ with 
Islamic assets and conventional assets. This work has applications of practical interest to 
practitioners who are involved or interested in Islamic financial assets. Asset characteristics, 
such as return and volatility, as well as the mechanisms by which new information is 
incorporated into the price of stock and bond assets, are important considerations for 
investors, portfolio managers and policy makers in their investment decisions, including their 
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portfolio allocation and risk management strategies. There could be a diversification benefit 
for all investors if Islamic assets are driven by different factors than conventional assets. 
This study will contribute to research on the impact of macroeconomic news announcements 
that is currently limited to conventional financial markets, such as Brenner, Pasquariello and 
Subrahmanyam (2009). Characterising price dynamics in Islamic financial markets during or 
following periods of market uncertainty, such as macroeconomic announcements, is also 
important from a financial system perspective, where the promotion of efficient and resilient 
financial markets is an objective of policy makers. 
I select eight macroeconomic surprise variables and use GARCH(1,1) and panel regressions 
to examine how those macroeconomic surprises affect the return and volatility of stock and 
bond assets in 11 countries: Australia, Canada, France, Germany, Indonesia, Italy, Japan, 
Malaysia, Turkey, UK and US. I group the macroeconomic surprise variables into three 
categories: (1) variables representing the real economy, which includes unemployment, 
payrolls, industrial production, retail sales and GDP, (2) interest rates, and (3) inflation which 
I proxy by either the Consumer Price Index (CPI) or the Producer Price Index (PPI). 
As my first hypothesis, I test whether variables that represent the real economy have a 
stronger impact on Islamic assets than conventional assets, since Islamic finance places an 
emphasis on creating a close link between the real and financial sectors. However, I do not 
find significant differences in most countries for the impact of macroeconomic variables on 
Islamic and on conventional assets. I only find evidence for a stronger impact of 
macroeconomic surprises on Islamic stock indices in Canada (unemployment surprises), 
Japan (retail sales surprises), Turkey (industrial production), UK (retail sales surprises) and 
US (GDP surprises), which confirms my hypothesis in a few cases. However, I find a weaker 
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impact of macroeconomic surprises on Islamic assets in Indonesia (GDP surprises) and US 
(retail sales surprises). 
Second, I test whether interest rate surprises have a weaker, or possibly even no, impact on 
Islamic assets relative to conventional assets. However, I find that the opposite is the case. 
Out of 15 stock asset pairs in 11 countries, interest rate surprises have no impact on any stock 
index for six asset pairs, they have an equal impact on both Islamic and conventional stock 
indices for three asset pairs and they have a stronger impact on Islamic indices than 
conventional stock indices for seven asset pairs. Out of three bond asset pairs in Malaysia, 
interest rate surprises have a stronger impact on Islamic bonds for two asset pairs and a 
slightly stronger impact on conventional bonds for one asset pair. 
Third, I test whether inflation surprises have a lower impact on Islamic assets than 
conventional assets. However, I find that in most countries inflation surprises do not have a 
significant impact on either Islamic or conventional stocks and bonds. Exceptions are 
Germany, Indonesia and Italy, in which CPI surprises have a stronger impact on Islamic 
stocks than conventional stocks, and Germany and Italy, in which PPI surprises have an equal 
impact on Islamic and conventional stocks. 
The findings from this study suggest that – with only few exceptions – new information is 
impounded into the price of Islamic stocks and bonds in the same way as it is impounded into 
the price of conventional assets, despite the different structures of Islamic assets to avoid 
explicit interest rates (riba) and unnecessary uncertainty (gharar). In fact, there are more 
differences in the impact of macroeconomic news surprises on assets across country, variable 
and asset type (i.e., stock or bond) than between Islamic and conventional assets. This finding 
supports El-Gamal’s (2006) argument that contemporary Islamic financial products are only 
loosely derived from the traditional Islamic financial contracts and Islamic law, and instead, 
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have been created to replicate conventional financial products with only slight modifications 
where it has been necessary to avoid prohibitions (such as riba and gharar) under the 
Shari’ah law. 
The remainder of this chapter is structured as follows. Section 3.2 gives an overview of the 
literature on the impact of macroeconomic surprises on stocks and bonds, Section 3.3 
develops three hypotheses, Section 3.4 presents the methodology used to test the hypotheses 
and Section 3.5 describes the data sources and the data adjustments. Then, Sections 3.6 and 
3.7 provide descriptive statistics and results, and Section 3.8 concludes the chapter. 
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3.2 LITERATURE REVIEW 
This section begins with a brief review of the literature on the impact of macroeconomic 
news announcements on stocks and bonds, with particular reference to the macroeconomic 
variables that I choose to study. Then, I put the findings from the literature into the context of 
Islamic finance in section 3.2.2.  
3.2.1 Overview of Macroeconomic News Announcements 
Studying the impact of macroeconomic news announcements on financial markets is 
important because it sheds new light on the mechanisms by which new information is 
impounded into asset prices, which is one of the central questions to economics and finance 
theory (Andersen et al. 2007; Andritzky et al. 2007; Brenner, Pasquariello and 
Subrahmanyam 2009). There is an extensive body of literature on the impact of 
macroeconomic news announcements on stocks and bonds, which vary in their choice of 
news announcements, the moments of the return distribution and the statistical methodology. 
However, the majority of the literature focuses on the US.
28
 When global financial markets 
are considered previous studies tend to examine the impact of US (as opposed to local) 
macroeconomic announcements on global financial markets
29
 and if they do include 
macroeconomic announcements other than for the US, those are usually limited to a small 
number of (mostly developed) countries.
30
  
                                                          
28
 See for example, Jones, Lamont and Lumsdaine (1998), Li and Engle (1998), Fleming and Remolona (1999), 
Bomfim and Reinhart (2000), Balduzzi, Elton and Green (2001), Kuttner (2001), Flannery and Protopapadakis 
(2002), Andersen et al. (2003), Bomfim (2003), Bernanke and Kuttner (2005), Boyd, Hu and Jagannathan 
(2005), Brenner, Pasquariello and Subrahmanyam (2009), Gilbert et al. (2010), Rangel (2011). 
29
 See Nikkinen et al. (2006), Andersen et al. (2007), Hayo, Kutan and Neuenkirch (2009), Özatay, Özmen and 
Şahinbeyoğlu (2009), Wogswan (2009), Harju and Hussain (2011).  
30
 For literature on developed markets see, for example, Kim and Sheen (2000) who examine international 
linkages and macroeconomic news effects between Australia and the US, Connolly and Wang (2003) who 
include local announcements of the U.K. and Japan in their analysis of international equity market comovement, 
Ehrmann, Fratzscher and Rigobon (2011) who estimate the financial transmission between money, bond and 
equity markets and exchange rates within and between the US and the Euro area, and Jiang, Konstantinidi and 
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Overall, those studies provide evidence that macroeconomic announcements have significant 
effects on financial markets and these effects vary across markets and types of news 
(Andritzky, Bannister and Tamirisa 2007). This confirms the notion of market efficiency 
under which relevant new information should be immediately impounded into asset prices 
and drive their dynamics (Brenner, Pasquariello and Subrahmanyam 2009).  
However, there are different opinions about the impact of macroeconomic announcement on 
the volatility of stocks and bonds. On one hand, volatility could decline before 
macroeconomic announcements are made which is referred as the “calm-before-the-storm” 
effect (Jones, Lamont and Lumsdaine 1998; Andritzky, Bannister and Tamirisa 2007). Then, 
if an announcement reveals relevant new information, volatility tends to rise on the 
announcement day, as markets adjust their positions in response (Harvey and Huang 1991; 
Andritzky, Bannister and Tamirisa). This can be explained with the models of Ross (1989) 
who argues that the volatility of prices is related to the arrival of information in an efficient 
market, as well as the models in Foster and Viswanathan (1993) and Pasquariello and Vega 
(2007) who show that the arrival of unexpected public information increases price volatility 
and trading volume.
31
 For example, in their empirical study of US markets, Brenner, 
Pasquariello and Subrahmanyam (2009) find that conditional stock return volatility falls 
initially but increases significantly the day the surprise macroeconomic news is released.   
                                                                                                                                                                                    
Skiadopoulos (2010) who investigate the impact of news announcements on volatility spillovers within 
European markets and across US and European ones. Limited literature on emerging markets include 
Wongswan (2005) who investigates the transmission of information across international equity markets 
including the US, Japan, Korea and Thailand, Andritzky, Bannister and Tamirisa (2007) who examine how 12 
emerging countries’ bonds react to local macroeconomic announcements, and Nowak et al. (2011) who 
investigate volatility dynamics of emerging bond markets and include the US, Germany, Brazil, Mexico, Russia 
and Turkey. 
31
 Both Foster and Viswanathan (1993) and Pasquariello and Vega (2007) build on the speculative trading model 
of Kyle (1985). Foster and Viswanathan (1993) extend the model of Kyle (1985) by modeling the beliefs of 
perfectly informed traders and employing elliptically contoured distributions (such as the multivariate t 
distribution) instead of the normal distribution, while Pasquariello and Vega (2007) introduce two market 
frictions: information heterogeneity and imperfect competition among informed traders 
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On the other hand, some announcements might reduce volatility (Andritzky, Bannister and 
Tamirisa 2007; Brenner, Pasquariello and Subrahmanyam 2009). Volatility could be higher 
before the news event and lower afterwards if the arrival of information leads to resolution of 
uncertainty and/or disagreement among market participants (Kim, McKenzie and Faff 2004; 
Pasquariello 2007; Brenner, Pasquariello and Subrahmanyam 2009). For example, Brenner, 
Pasquariello and Subrahmanyam (2009) show that while conditional return volatility of US 
bonds first rises as there is higher uncertainty among bond market participants in anticipation 
of the release of macroeconomic news, it then declines as this news partly reduces 
uncertainty and/or disagreement among bond market participants. Likewise, Andritzky, 
Bannister and Tamirisa (2007) show that macroeconomic data and policy announcements 
reduce uncertainty and stabilize spreads of bonds in 12 emerging countries, although they 
also find that rating actions cause greater volatility in the bond markets. 
I study the impact of 8 types of macroeconomic surprises: interest rate announcements, 
inflation (using either Consumer Price Index (CPI) or the Producer Price Index (PPI) as a 
proxy), GDP, retail sales, industrial production, unemployment rate and payrolls. I select the 
macroeconomic data based on a trade-off between data availability across countries and their 
relevance to my hypotheses which require several macroeconomic variables in the real sector 
(unemployment, retail sales, industrial production, GDP) as well as in the inflation (CPI and 
PPI) and interest rates. Another criterion is the economy-wide relevance based on the 
literature on macroeconomic announcements. Brenner, Pasquariello and Subrahmanyam 
(2009) only use 4 variables (Nonfarm Payroll Employment, Unemployment Rate, Total 
Consumer Price Index and the Target Fed Funds rate) as they argue that financial markets are 
most sensitive to direct news about unemployment and inflation (Fleming and Remolona 
1999; Krueger 2003; Boyd, Hu and Jagannathan 2005; Pasquariello and Vega 2007) as 
opposed to the impact of indirect announcements about unemployment and inflation (such as 
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Retail Sales or Consumer Confidence) which tend to weaken the significance of the results 
(Brenner, Pasquariello and Subrahmanyam 2009). I select those 4 variables as the main 
variables of interest but also include another 4 variables in the panel regressions to enhance 
my analysis which focuses on distinguishing the impact of various macroeconomic variables 
on Islamic versus conventional stocks and bonds. All of the 8 variables I have selected have 
also been used in previous studies on macroeconomic announcements such as in Fleming and 
Remolona (1999), Balduzzi, Elton and Green (2001), Boyd, Hu and Jagannathan (2005), 
Wongswan (2005), Andersen et al. (2007) and Nowak et al. (2011). 
3.2.2 Macroeconomic News Announcements in the Context of Islamic 
Finance 
To date there have been no empirical studies on the impact of macroeconomic 
announcements on Islamic financial markets which would explicitly test hypotheses 
regarding differences between Islamic and conventional stocks and bonds.
32
 However, there 
is a limited number of studies that consider the co-integrating relationship between 
macroeconomic factors and stock prices in Muslim countries, although they do not employ 
Islamic stocks or bonds and they do not focus on the macroeconomic news surprises. 
Generally, they confirm findings from literature on Western markets.  
For example, Ibrahim (2003) applies cointegration and VAR modeling to evaluate the long-
term relationship and dynamic interactions between the Malaysian equity market, 
                                                          
32
 There are some studies that explore the impact of interest rates on Islamic versus conventional banks. Ergeç 
and Arslan (2013) apply a VAR methodology to monthly data between 2005 and 2009 to examine how interest 
rates affect deposits and loans at Islamic and conventional banks in Turkey. They find that Islamic and 
conventional banks are both affected by interest rates. An increase in interest rates has a negative impact on 
conventional bank loans, while it has a positive impact on Islamic bank loans. Further, the increase in interest 
rates encourages depositors to shift their deposits from Islamic banks to conventional banks, so that the impact 
is positive on conventional bank deposits and negative on Islamic bank deposits. Another study by Kassim, 
Majid and Yusof (2009) studies the impact of monetary policy shocks on Islamic and conventional banks in 
Malaysia over 1999 to 2006. They also use a VAR methodology and the impulse response function and find that 
balance sheet items of Islamic banks are more sensitive to monetary policy changes than items of conventional 
banks.  
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macroeconomic variables, and the US and Japanese equity markets. He finds that economic 
variables, particularly the money supply, have a dominant influence on Malaysian equity 
prices. Rahman et al. (2009) explore the macroeconomic determinants of the Malaysian stock 
market by using a VAR framework. They find that the Malaysian stock market has a stronger 
co-integrating relationship with reserves and the industrial production index as opposed to 
money supply, interest rate, and exchange rate. Rahman and Mohsin (2011) analyse the 
impact of monetary policy announcement on stock returns in Pakistan and find a relationship 
between interest rates and stock returns by using the Engle-Granger co-integration test. Al-
Tamimi, Alwan and Abdel Rahman (2011) analyse factors that affect stocks of 17 companies 
in the UAE and find a statistically significant impact of earnings per share and the consumer 
price index on stock prices, whereas money supply, GDP and interest rates are statistically 
insignificant.  
It is also interesting to relate empirical studies on Islamic stocks and bonds even though they 
do not study macroeconomic announcements. Generally, there is evidence that Islamic assets 
differ from conventional ones and that they might be influenced by different factors. For 
example, Mohd Yusof and Majid (2007) explore the extent to which the volatilities of both 
conventional and Islamic stock markets in Malaysia are related to the volatility of monetary 
policy variables. The study finds that interest rate volatility affects the conventional stock 
market volatility but not the Islamic stock market volatility. Akhtar et al. (2013) have 
conducted further research about how volatility linkages between the stock and bond market 
may differ in Islamic markets from conventional ones. They find that characteristics of 
Islamic finance, such as a smaller set of shared information and a lower degree of cross-
market hedging, reduce volatility linkages (correlations) between Islamic and conventional 
stocks, bonds and bills. Volatility linkages involving at least one Islamic asset are lower than 
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those between conventional assets by up to 7.17 percentage points, after controlling for 
country and asset specific characteristics. 
This study builds on and extends the previous literature in the following ways. First, this is 
the first study to include Islamic stocks and bonds in addition to conventional assets and to 
test hypotheses regarding differences between Islamic and conventional assets’ reaction to 
macroeconomic news surprises. Second, in addition to the US announcements, consensus 
forecasts and financial markets I include a total of 11 developed and emerging countries. To 
the best of my knowledge this is the first study that examines the impact of macroeconomic 
news surprises on both Islamic and conventional stocks and bonds in a global setting of 
developed and emerging countries.  
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3.3 HYPOTHESIS DEVELOPMENT 
This section states three hypotheses about the impact of macroeconomic news 
announcements on Islamic versus conventional assets. It is possible that the impact of 
macroeconomic announcements on the level and volatility of assets’ returns differs between 
Islamic and non-Islamic stocks and bonds because of the unique characteristics of Islamic 
finance.
33
 Islamic law prohibits interest or usury (riba), transactions involving unnecessary 
uncertainty or a deliberate lack of transparency (gharar), and gambling (qimar / maysir), which 
covers short selling, arbitrage, betting and speculation (Abdul Aziz and Gintzburger 2009). 
Instead, Islamic financial arrangements are based on profit-and-loss sharing, leasing, and 
other structures. There is also a strong emphasis on the link between the real and the financial 
sectors which means that, in theory, the expansion of the financial sector is fully determined 
by real growth in the economy and not by speculative finance or money creation by financial 
institutions (Mirakhor 2009). For example, interest cannot be paid to compensate for the 
opportunity costs of money, but money has to be put into a real economic activity in order to 
gain profit (Abdul Aziz and Gintzburger 2009). Further, to align the rate of return to the 
financial sector with the profit rate in the real sector of the economy, Islamic banks operate 
under a 100% reserve requirement, so they cannot create money through lending as under 
conventional fractional reserve banking. Instead, Islamic banks have to be directly involved 
in trade and investment operations, and assume direct ownership of real assets (Mirakhor 
2009).  
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 Previous research shows that there are differences in price formation between Islamic and conventional 
financial assets. For instance, Hakim and Rashidian (2002) find that the Dow Jones Islamic market index has no 
stable link with the Wilshire 5000 Index or the T-bill rate, even though the Islamic index has a 100% 
composition of US stocks. This may be because the Islamic index is affected by different factors, such as 
personal income for Shari’ah-conscientious investors, while being unaffected by interest rates. Similarly, Mohd 
Yusof and Majid (2007) show that interest rate volatility affects conventional stock volatility but not the Islamic 
stock volatility in Malaysia; and Akhtar, Jahromi and John (2013) find that volatility linkages between stock and 
bond indices are weaker when at least one Islamic asset is involved relative to volatility linkages between 
conventional stock and bond indices. 
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In practice, Islamic stock indices apply business activity and financial ratio screens to exclude 
certain “unethical” sectors and firms that either pay or receive large amounts of interest 
(through cash holdings or leverage). For example, Dow Jones (2011) excludes firms when at 
least one of the following three financial ratios exceed one third: total debt over market cap
34
; 
sum of a company’s cash and interest-bearing securities over market cap; and company’s 
accounts receivable over market cap. Therefore, Islamic stock indices comprise a different 
sample of industries and firms, featuring lower financial leverage and cash holdings and 
different risk profiles. 
Islamic bonds (Sukuk) need to be structured carefully so as to avoid explicit interest. Sukuk 
differ from conventional bonds in that they are asset-based (rather than asset-backed) 
securities, with a tangible underlying asset that is Shari’ah-compliant in its nature and use.35 
These assets can then be used to derive income based on leasing (Ijara), partnership 
(Murabahah), and other Islamic arrangements. Sukuk holders might be responsible for asset-
related expenses, and the sale of Sukuk results in the sale of a share of an asset. Bonds, in 
contrast, are pure debt obligations and their value rests on the creditworthiness of the issuer, 
whereas Sukuk prices vary both with the creditworthiness of the issuer and the market value 
of the underlying asset (Godlewski, Turk-Ariss and Weill 2010). 
3.3.1 Hypothesis 1 
First, I explore whether the link between the real (macroeconomic) and the financial sectors 
(i.e. stock and bond markets) which has been emphasised by Islamic finance scholars (e.g. 
Usmani, 2002, Iqbal and Mirakhor 2011) can be seen empirically. There are many ways that 
attempt to link the real and financial sectors under Islamic finance. For example, interest 
                                                          
34
 Market cap is calculated as the trailing 24-month average market capitalization. 
35
 An eligible asset needs to be an existing or a well-defined asset, service, or project for which ownership can 
be recorded in some form, whereas Sukuk cannot be issued on receivables or intangible assets (Godlewski, Turk-
Ariss and Weill 2010). 
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cannot be paid to compensate for the opportunity costs of money, but money has to be put 
into a real economic activity in order to gain profit (Abdul Aziz and Gintzburger 2009). 
Further, to align the rate of return to the financial sector with the profit rate in the real sector 
of the economy, Islamic banks have a 100% reserve requirement that prevents them from 
creating money beyond the growth of the real economy. Instead, Islamic banks should be 
“based on the principle of profit and loss sharing through two-tier silent partnership 
(mudaraba) in place of the ribawi deposit/loan-based commercial banking” (El-Gamal 2006: 
138). Islamic banks have to be directly involved in trade and investment operations (such as 
agriculture, infrastructure, construction and others), and assume direct ownership of real 
assets. Mirakhor (2009) argues that this means that the expansion of the financial sector is 
fully determined by real growth in the economy and not by speculative finance or money 
creation by financial institutions. Only Islamic banks are included in the Islamic stock 
indices, while conventional banks are excluded. Therefore, stronger ties between the financial 
sector and the macro economy could be found in the Islamic stock indices.  
Islamic bonds are also structured to link the financial sector to the macro economy. For 
example, there is a requirement of an Islamic bond to be based on a tangible asset. The profit 
rates of Islamic bonds are often flexible, as some are based on profit and loss sharing 
partnership contracts, under which the actual profit varies by macroeconomic condition and 
the success of the business. Further, one of the most common Islamic bond structures is the 
leasing (ijara) arrangement, under which the investor receives rental payments which are 
often flexible and can be tied to some measure of national output such as gross domestic 
product (GDP) or possibly indexed to gold (Mirakhor 2009). In practice, however, those 
rental payments are usually tied to conventional interest rates, such as LIBOR or EURIBOR 
(El-Gamal 2006). Therefore, the profit rate of Islamic bonds (sukuk) may be closely related to 
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the state of the economy, which I proxy with unemployment, payrolls, GDP, industrial 
production and retail sales.  
The first hypothesis tests whether there is a stronger impact of real economic announcements 
(using the unemployment, payrolls, GDP, industrial production and retail sales as a proxy) on 
Islamic stocks and bonds relative to their conventional counterparts.  
HA,0: Real sector announcements (unemployment, payrolls, GDP, industrial production and 
retail sales) do not have a stronger impact on Islamic assets than conventional assets. 
HA,1: Real sector announcements (unemployment, payrolls, GDP, industrial production and 
retail sales) have a stronger impact on Islamic than conventional assets. 
3.3.2 Hypothesis 2 
Second, I examine whether the prohibition of explicit interest rates implies that 
announcements about interest rate decisions have a lower impact on Islamic assets. This is 
because Islamic stock indices exclude firms that either pay or receive large amounts of 
interest (through cash holdings or leverage), while Islamic bonds are structured to avoid 
explicit interest rates. The idea that Islamic stocks and bonds are independent of interest rate 
movements would be in line with previous literature in Islamic markets and countries such as 
Mohd Yusof and Majid (2007), Rahman et al. (2009) and Al-Tamimi, Alwan and Abdel 
Rahman (2011). The following is my second hypothesis: 
HB,0: Interest rate announcements do not have a smaller impact on Islamic than conventional 
assets. 
HB,1: Interest rate announcements have a smaller (or no) impact on Islamic than conventional 
assets. 
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3.3.3 Hypothesis 3 
Third, I am interested in whether inflation surprises (CPI or PPI) have a lower impact on 
Islamic stocks and bonds. Islamic assets may be considered less sensitive to inflation due to 
the prohibition of interest rates as they are therefore based on profit rates which are usually 
flexible and are meant to adjust for inflation. For example, under a partnership arrangement, 
the investor in an Islamic asset would receive a predetermined proportion of the realised 
profit (e.g. 50%) which would already incorporate any increases in inflation. This is in 
contrast to a conventional loan with at fixed interest rate which is arranged based on the 
expected future interest rate, and if there are inflation surprises over that period, then the 
investor will not be compensated for the rise in inflation but will receive the same fixed 
interest rate.
36
 Further, Islamic bonds may be less affected by inflation than conventional 
bonds because Islamic bonds are structured under partnership and leasing arrangements and 
they are based on tangible assets which help protect against inflation. My third hypothesis 
tests whether the impact of inflation announcements is stronger on conventional than Islamic 
stocks and bonds. 
HC,0: Inflation (CPI or PPI) announcements do not have a smaller impact on Islamic than 
conventional assets. 
HC,1: Inflation (CPI or PPI) announcements have a smaller impact on Islamic than 
conventional assets. 
  
                                                          
36
 However, there are conventional loans based on a variable interest rate rather than a fixed interest rate which 
could also be included in bond indices. At the same time, there are some Islamic loans (murabaha) with fixed or 
predetermined interest rates (El-Gamal 2006).  
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3.4 METHODOLOGY 
I use extensions of a GARCH model and panel regressions to test my three hypotheses 
regarding the differences in the impact of macroeconomic announcements on the return and 
volatility of Islamic and conventional stocks and bonds. The advantage of a GARCH model is 
that it accounts for the change in volatility over time that is typical for stocks (volatility 
clustering), it allows the volatility to be determined endogenously and thus avoids the 
measurement errors associated with volatility proxies, while it is also more parsimonious than 
ARCH models (Brenner, Pasquariello and Subrahmanyam 2009). Therefore, I begin my 
analysis with an extension of a GARCH (1,1) model as in Brenner, Pasquariello and 
Subrahmanyam (2009). The following GARCH(1,1) model describes the daily excess 
holding-period asset returns on asset i, ri.  
𝑟𝑖,𝑡 = 𝜇𝑖
𝑒 + 𝜌𝑖
𝑒𝑟𝑡−1
𝑖 + 𝛾𝑖
𝑒(0)⁡𝐼𝑡
𝑒(0)⁡𝑆𝑡
𝑒(0) +⁡𝜀𝑡
𝑖                                   (3.1)            
𝜀𝑡
𝑖 = √ℎ𝑡
𝑖𝑒𝑡
𝑖⁡, 𝑤ℎ𝑒𝑟𝑒⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡ℎ𝑡
𝑖 = 𝑠𝑡
𝑖 [𝜔𝑖
𝑒 + 𝛼𝑖
𝑒(𝑒𝑡−1
𝑖 )
2
+ 𝛽𝑖
𝑒ℎ𝑡−1
𝑖 ] ⁡𝑎𝑛𝑑⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡𝑒𝑡
𝑖|𝐹𝑡−1~⁡𝑁(0,1)  (3.2) 
𝑠𝑡
𝑖 = 1 + ∑ 𝛿𝑖
𝑒(𝑘)⁡𝐼𝑡
𝑒(𝑘)|𝑆𝑡
𝑒(𝑘)|⁡+1𝑘=−1                                 (3.3) 
 
Ft-1 denotes the information set and 𝑆𝑡
𝑒 are news surprises
37
 standardised by their sample 
standard deviation to control for differences in units of measurement across announcements 
(Balduzzi, Elton and Green 2001; Brenner, Pasquariello and Subrahmanyam 2009). Further, 
𝐼𝑡
𝑒(𝑘) is an event dummy equal to 1 if a surprise macroeconomic event of type e (i.e. interest 
rate, CPI, PPI, GDP, unemployment, payrolls, industrial production or retail sales 
announcements) is made on day 𝑡 + 𝑘 and zero otherwise. The coefficients 𝛾𝑖
𝑒(0) and 𝛿𝑖
𝑒(𝑘) 
                                                          
37
 News surprises are the absolute difference between the news announcement and the median forecast of the 
respective variable. 
95 
 
capture the average impact of a surprise announcement on the mean excess return and the 
conditional return variance, respectively.
38
 I estimate those GARCH(1,1) models for each 
asset within each country. This enables me to see patterns of the impact of macroeconomic 
surprises on the conditional return and volatility of assets across time, asset type, 
macroeconomic variables and countries.  
To test whether there is a significant difference between the impact of macroeconomic 
announcements on Islamic versus conventional asset returns I run panel regressions that 
include an interaction term with an additional Islamic asset variable. Islamic asset is a 
dummy variable that takes the value of 1 when the asset is Islamic and 0 when it is a 
conventional asset, and it is part of the interaction term with the macroeconomic news 
surprise that allows to distinguish between the impact on Islamic versus conventional assets. 
Equation 3.4 shows the panel regression,
39
 where the dependent variable, 𝑟𝑖,𝑡 ,
40
 is the excess 
return (return * 100 minus the risk-free rate): 
𝑟𝑖,𝑡 = 𝜇𝑖
𝑒 + 𝜌𝑖
𝑒𝑟𝑡−1
𝑖 + 𝛾𝑖
𝑒(0)⁡𝐼𝑡
𝑒(0)⁡𝑆𝑡
𝑒(0) + 𝛽1,𝑖
𝑒 (0)⁡𝐼𝑠𝑙𝑎𝑚𝑖𝑐⁡𝑎𝑠𝑠𝑒𝑡⁡𝐼𝑡
𝑒(0)⁡𝑆𝑡
𝑒(0) +⁡𝜀𝑡
𝑖        (3.4) 
I estimate this regression for each variable separately, e.g. one panel regression for interest 
rate surprises, another for CPI surprises, and so on. First, I run those panel regressions for one 
asset pair at a time. I define an asset pair as two assets – one Islamic and one conventional – 
that are matched by time period (i.e. the longest time period for which both asset returns are 
available), the same asset type (either both are stocks or they are bonds), the same country, 
and the same data provider (e.g. both are MSCI stock indices). This approach enables me to 
                                                          
38
 𝛿𝑖
𝑒(1), 𝛿𝑖
𝑒(0) and 𝛿𝑖
𝑒(−1) are the anticipated, contemporaneous and persistent percentage impact of the 
release of a unit absolute news surprise of type e on the conditional variance of the excess return (Brenner, 
Pasquariello and Subrahmanyam 2009). As such, the above GARCH model allows for both the arrival and the 
extent of macroeconomic news surprises to affect the conditional mean and conventional variance of excess 
returns (Brenner, Pasquariello and Subrahmanyam 2009). 
39
 In unreported analysis I include an Islamic country dummy variable, fixed effects or asset pair dummies, but 
those are mostly insignificant and do not affect the results. 
40
 Subscript i refers to the asset and t refers to time. 
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hold everything constant except for the asset being either Islamic or conventional. The benefit 
of this approach is that it can disentangle the different ways that the macroeconomic surprises 
may impact assets across countries and variables, as the GARCH(1,1) regressions (in section 
3.7.1) suggest that the impact of macroeconomic surprises on assets is very sensitive to the 
countries and macroeconomic variable. The results for those panel regressions are in 
Appendix C. 
Second, I estimate those panel regressions in equation (3.4) where I include all countries that 
have available data for a given macroeconomic variable. This includes the panels for stock 
indices (sections 3.7.2.1 for balanced panels and 3.7.2.2 for unbalanced panel) and then for 
bond indices (section 3.7.2.3 for balanced panels). All panels are estimated by using white 
cross-section standard errors and covariance. 
The unbalanced panel regression in section 3.7.2.2 includes all the data that is available 
across all countries for all stocks. This means that some data series start in 2003 while others 
start only in 2011. There is the possibility of a bias if there is a systematic reason why certain 
stocks (or countries) have shorter time series. However, it is difficult to argue why countries 
like Italy and France have complete macroeconomic forecast data from 2003 onwards while 
UK only has complete forecast data starting in 2011. One factor, however, is the availability 
of macroeconomic announcement and consensus forecast data in the Bloomberg database. 
This database does not cover any Islamic country and therefore I have used an alternative 
database (Financial Times) to obtain the macroeconomic announcement and forecast data for 
Malaysia, Turkey and Indonesia. Since that database only provides forecasts from 2011 
onwards I have short sample periods for the 3 Islamic countries. To control for those Islamic 
countries coming from a different database I include in unreported analysis an Islamic 
country dummy variable (which would also be a database dummy) in the panel regression. 
However, the dummy variable is not significant and does not affect any of the results. 
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3.4.1 Hypothesis Tests 
The first coefficient of interest in equation 3.4 is 𝛾𝑖
𝑒 which shows the impact of a standardised 
unit of macroeconomic surprise e (either interest rate decisions, unemployment, CPI, payroll, 
PPI, industrial production, retail sales or GDP) on the conventional stock (or bond) returns. 
Further, 𝛾𝑖
𝑒 + 𝛽1,𝑖
𝑒  shows the impact of a standardised unit of surprise e (either interest rate 
decisions, unemployment, CPI, payroll, PPI, industrial production, retail sales or GDP) on the 
Islamic stock (or bond) returns.  
Table 3.1 shows all possible outcomes of my analysis: (1) that there is no difference between 
the impact of macroeconomic surprises on Islamic versus conventional assets, (2) that the 
impact on conventional assets is greater, or (3) that the impact on Islamic assets is greater. 
Under hypothesis 1 (HA) I expect to find that the impact of macroeconomic surprises 
representing the macro economy (unemployment, payroll, industrial production, retail sales 
or GDP) have a stronger impact on Islamic assets, i.e. I expect to find outcome (3). Under 
hypotheses 2 and 3 (HB, HC) I expect that the impact of inflation and interest rate surprises 
have a stronger impact on conventional assets, i.e. I expect to find outcome (2). The table 
specifies all possible combinations of coefficients 𝛾𝑖
𝑒
 and 𝛽1,𝑖
𝑒  that will support or contradict 
my hypotheses.  
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Table 3.1: Combinations of Coefficients and Hypothesis Tests 
Impact Coefficients Combinations of coefficients (distinguishing positive and negative impact) 
1. There is the 
same impact on 
C & IS assets 
|𝛾𝑖
𝑒 + 𝛽𝑖
𝑒| = |𝛾𝑖
𝑒| 
1a. No impact on C assets, 𝛾𝑖
𝑒 = 0, and no impact on IS assets,  |𝛾𝑖
𝑒 + 𝛽𝑖
𝑒| = 𝛽𝑖
𝑒 = 0. 
1b. Positive impact on C & IS assets, 𝛾𝑖
𝑒 > 0, and 𝛽𝑖
𝑒 = 0. 
1c.  Negative impact on C & IS assets, 𝛾𝑖
𝑒 < 0, and 𝛽𝑖
𝑒 = 0. 
2. The impact 
on C assets is 
bigger than on 
IS assets  
[HB, HC] 
|𝛾𝑖
𝑒 + 𝛽𝑖
𝑒| < |𝛾𝑖
𝑒| 2a. Positive impact on C assets,  𝛾𝑖
𝑒 > 0, and no impact on IS assets, 𝛽𝑖
𝑒 = −𝛾𝑖
𝑒, so that |𝛾𝑖
𝑒 + 𝛽𝑖
𝑒| = 0. 
2b. Negative impact on C assets, 𝛾𝑖
𝑒 < 0, and no impact on IS assets 𝛽𝑖
𝑒 = −𝛾𝑖
𝑒, so that |𝛾𝑖
𝑒 + 𝛽𝑖
𝑒| = 0. 
2c. Positive impact on C assets, 𝛾𝑖
𝑒 > 0, and positive impact on IS assets,  𝛾𝑖
𝑒 + 𝛽𝑖
𝑒 > 0, i.e. 𝛽𝑖
𝑒 > −𝛾𝑖
𝑒. The impact 
on C assets is bigger, so that  |𝛾𝑖
𝑒 + 𝛽𝑖
𝑒| < |𝛾𝑖
𝑒| = ⁡ 𝛾𝑖
𝑒 + 𝛽𝑖
𝑒 < 𝛾𝑖
𝑒, i.e. 𝛽𝑖
𝑒 < 0. 
2d. Negative impact on C assets, 𝛾𝑖
𝑒 < 0, and negative impact on IS assets, 𝛾𝑖
𝑒 + 𝛽𝑖
𝑒 < 0, i.e. 𝛽𝑖
𝑒 < −𝛾𝑖
𝑒. The absolute 
impact on C assets is bigger, so that |𝛾𝑖
𝑒 + 𝛽𝑖
𝑒| < |𝛾𝑖
𝑒| = 𝛾𝑖
𝑒 + 𝛽𝑖
𝑒 > 𝛾𝑖
𝑒, i.e. 𝛽𝑖
𝑒 > 0. 
2e. Positive impact on C assets, 𝛾𝑖
𝑒 > 0, and negative impact on IS assets, 𝛾𝑖
𝑒 + 𝛽𝑖
𝑒 < 0, i.e. 𝛽𝑖
𝑒 < −𝛾𝑖
𝑒. The absolute 
impact on C assets is bigger, so that |𝛾𝑖
𝑒 + 𝛽𝑖
𝑒| < |𝛾𝑖
𝑒| = ⁡ |𝛾𝑖
𝑒 + 𝛽𝑖
𝑒| < 𝛾𝑖
𝑒, i.e.  −2𝛾𝑖
𝑒 <⁡𝛽𝑖
𝑒 < 0.41  
2f. Negative impact on C assets, 𝛾𝑖
𝑒 < 0, and positive impact on IS assets, 𝛾𝑖
𝑒 + 𝛽𝑖
𝑒 > 0, i.e.⁡𝛽𝑖
𝑒 > −𝛾𝑖
𝑒. The absolute 
impact on C assets is bigger, so that |𝛾𝑖
𝑒 + 𝛽𝑖
𝑒| < |𝛾𝑖
𝑒| = ⁡ |𝛾𝑖
𝑒 + 𝛽𝑖
𝑒| < −𝛾𝑖
𝑒, i.e. 0 < ⁡𝛽𝑖
𝑒 < −2𝛾𝑖
𝑒.
42
 
                                                          
41 |𝛾𝑖
𝑒 + 𝛽𝑖
𝑒| < 𝛾𝑖
𝑒 means that either 𝛾𝑖
𝑒 + 𝛽𝑖
𝑒 < 𝛾𝑖
𝑒, so that  𝛽𝑖
𝑒 < 0, or −𝛾𝑖
𝑒 − 𝛽𝑖
𝑒 < 𝛾𝑖
𝑒, so that 𝛽𝑖
𝑒 > −2𝛾𝑖
𝑒 
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3. The impact 
on IS assets is 
bigger than on C 
assets  
[HA] 
|𝛾𝑖
𝑒 + 𝛽𝑖
𝑒| > |𝛾𝑖
𝑒| 3a. No impact on C assets, 𝛾𝑖
𝑒 = 0, and positive impact on IS assets, 𝛽𝑖
𝑒 > 0. 
3b. No impact on C assets, 𝛾𝑖
𝑒 = 0, and negative impact on IS assets, 𝛽𝑖
𝑒 < 0. 
3c. Positive impact on C assets, 𝛾𝑖
𝑒 > 0, and positive impact on IS assets,  𝛾𝑖
𝑒 + 𝛽𝑖
𝑒 > 0, i.e. 𝛽𝑖
𝑒 > −𝛾𝑖
𝑒. The impact 
on IS assets is bigger, so that |𝛾𝑖
𝑒 + 𝛽𝑖
𝑒| > |𝛾𝑖
𝑒| =  𝛾𝑖
𝑒 + 𝛽𝑖
𝑒 > 𝛾𝑖
𝑒, i.e. 𝛽𝑖
𝑒 > 0. 
3d. Negative impact on C assets, 𝛾𝑖
𝑒 < 0, and negative impact on IS assets, 𝛾𝑖
𝑒 + 𝛽𝑖
𝑒 < 0, i.e. ⁡𝛽𝑖
𝑒 < −𝛾𝑖
𝑒. The 
absolute impact on IS assets is bigger, so that |𝛾𝑖
𝑒 + 𝛽𝑖
𝑒| > |𝛾𝑖
𝑒| = ⁡ 𝛾𝑖
𝑒 + 𝛽𝑖
𝑒 < 𝛾𝑖
𝑒, i.e. 𝛽𝑖
𝑒 < 0. 
3e. Positive impact on C assets, 𝛾𝑖
𝑒 > 0, and negative impact on IS assets, 𝛾𝑖
𝑒 + 𝛽𝑖
𝑒 < 0, i.e. 𝛽𝑖
𝑒 < −𝛾𝑖
𝑒. The absolute 
impact on IS assets is bigger, so that|𝛾𝑖
𝑒 + 𝛽𝑖
𝑒| > |𝛾𝑖
𝑒| =  |𝛾𝑖
𝑒 + 𝛽𝑖
𝑒| > 𝛾𝑖
𝑒, i.e. 0 < ⁡𝛽𝑖
𝑒 < −2𝛾𝑖
𝑒.
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 3f. Negative impact on C assets, 𝛾𝑖
𝑒 < 0, and positive impact on IS assets, 𝛾𝑖
𝑒 + 𝛽𝑖
𝑒 > 0, i.e. 𝛽𝑖
𝑒 > −𝛾𝑖
𝑒. The absolute 
impact on IS assets is bigger, so that |𝛾𝑖
𝑒 + 𝛽𝑖
𝑒| > |𝛾𝑖
𝑒| =  |𝛾𝑖
𝑒 + 𝛽𝑖
𝑒| > |𝛾𝑖
𝑒|, i.e. −2𝛾𝑖
𝑒 <⁡𝛽𝑖
𝑒 < 0.44 
 
  
                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                      
42
 |𝛾𝑖
𝑒 + 𝛽𝑖
𝑒| < |𝛾𝑖
𝑒| where 𝛾𝑖
𝑒 < 0, means that either 𝛾𝑖
𝑒 + 𝛽𝑖
𝑒 < −𝛾𝑖
𝑒, so that  𝛽𝑖
𝑒 < −2𝛾𝑖
𝑒, or −𝛾𝑖
𝑒 − 𝛽𝑖
𝑒 < −𝛾𝑖
𝑒, so that 𝛽𝑖
𝑒 > 0 
43
  |𝛾𝑖
𝑒 + 𝛽𝑖
𝑒| > 𝛾𝑖
𝑒 means that either 𝛾𝑖
𝑒 + 𝛽𝑖
𝑒 > 𝛾𝑖
𝑒, so that 𝛽𝑖
𝑒 > 0, or −𝛾𝑖
𝑒 − 𝛽𝑖
𝑒 > 𝛾𝑖
𝑒, so that 𝛽𝑖
𝑒 < −2𝛾𝑖
𝑒 
44
 |𝛾𝑖
𝑒 + 𝛽𝑖
𝑒| > |𝛾𝑖
𝑒| where 𝛾𝑖
𝑒 < 0, means that either 𝛾𝑖
𝑒 + 𝛽𝑖
𝑒 > −𝛾𝑖
𝑒, so that  𝛽𝑖
𝑒 > −2𝛾𝑖
𝑒, or −𝛾𝑖
𝑒 − 𝛽𝑖
𝑒 > −𝛾𝑖
𝑒, so that 𝛽𝑖
𝑒 < 0 
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3.5 DATA 
3.5.1 Stock and Bond Data 
The daily stock and bond returns are in US dollars for 8 Western countries (US, Germany, 
Italy, UK, Japan, France, Canada and Australia) and 3 Muslim countries (Indonesia, Malaysia 
and Turkey). The Islamic and conventional stock returns are mostly from MSCI and are 
available for all above countries since 11 August 2006 although some countries have data 
from 30 December 1999 (Islamic and conventional Dow Jones indices for the US, UK and 
Canada) or from 31 May 2005 (FTSE Bursa Malaysia Hijrah Shariah Index for Malaysia).
45
 
The Islamic bond indices (sukuk) are limited to Malaysia (31 May 2005), whereas 
conventional bond indices are available for all the above countries from JPM, FTSE, 
Barclays and other providers.
46
 The choice of sample period is to cover the longest period 
over which data on Islamic assets and on macroeconomic announcements and consensus 
forecasts is available because the focus of my thesis is on the difference between the Islamic 
and conventional stocks and bonds and I need macroeconomic data to test those hypotheses. 
Due to the limitation in the availability of macroeconomic announcement and consensus 
expectation data (with their exact release day and time) I need to reduce the sample period to 
January 2003 until 30 August 2013 for three countries (US, France and Italy) and shorter 
sample periods for countries where consensus forecast data starts after that (another 2 
countries from 2007 onwards, 2 countries from 2008 onwards and 4 countries from 2011 
onwards).  
The choice of sample countries is also guided by the limited availability of reliable consensus 
forecasts for macroeconomic announcements, which are central to this study. I include all 
                                                          
45
 For the names, sources and sample period of the individual stock indices see Appendix B.1. 
46
 For the names, sources and sample period of the individual bond indices see Appendix B.2. 
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Western and Muslim countries for which comprehensive consensus forecasts are available 
(see Section 3.5.3, and Sub-section 3.5.3.1, in particular). Malaysia, Indonesia and Turkey 
have large Muslim populations where Islamic finance plays a significant role. Malaysia, the 
UK and Turkey are in the Top 10 countries by value of Shari’ah-compliant assets as of 2009 
(The Banker, 2009), while Malaysia, Indonesia and Turkey are in the Top 7 countries by 
Sukuk issuance as of 2012 where Malaysia is leading globally with 74% of a global $109.1bn 
of Sukuk issuance (Bahru, 2013). Among countries with a smaller proportion of Muslim 
population, the UK Government is promoting London as a ‘Western’ Islamic financial centre, 
and the Japanese Government focuses on Islamic finance through international Islamic 
finance transactions to attract “oil-money investments” (Australian Trade Commission, 
2010). 
I use continuously compounded excess holding-period returns over the US one-month 
Treasury bill rate from Ibbotson Associates,
47
 such that the return series for each index k is 
)ln(
1,
,
,


tk
tk
tk
P
P
r .  
3.5.2 Macroeconomic Variables 
I use 8 macroeconomic announcement variables for the US which include the change in 
Nonfarm Payroll, the Unemployment Rate, PPI, CPI, Retail Sales, Industrial Production, 
GDP and the Fed Funds rate. For the remaining countries I use subsets of these 8 variables 
subject to data availability.
48
 These macroeconomic announcements are reported as real-time 
announcements (with the exact day and time of the announcement) as reported in the original 
press releases on Bloomberg (US, Germany, Italy, UK, Japan, France, Canada and Australia), 
                                                          
47
 This data is available from Kenneth French’s website 
http://mba.tuck.dartmouth.edu/pages/faculty/ken.french/Data_Library/f-f_factors.html. 
48
 For the names, sources, sample period and frequency of the individual macroeconomic announcements see 
Table B.3 in Appendix B. 
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on Financial Times (Indonesia, Malaysia and Turkey) or Bank Negara Malaysia (Malaysia). 
Since the day and time of the macroeconomic announcement are reported according to US 
Eastern Standard Time (EST) I convert them into local time to be able to match them with the 
end of trading day of stocks, bonds and futures. Occasionally, the announcement is released 
after the exchange is closed and then I select the following day as the announcement day. 
Most of the macroeconomic announcement are reported as changes (monthly, quarterly or 
yearly), while a few macroeconomic announcements are shown as a level figure and in that 
case I manually convert the time series into changes. 
3.5.3 Macroeconomic News Surprises 
I examine the impact of macroeconomic news surprises as opposed to the actual 
macroeconomic announcements which is in line with common practice in the literature,
49
 
according to which markets react to the unexpected component of macroeconomic 
announcements rather than the data releases per se. To measure a news surprise associated 
with macroeconomic indicator k at time t I first calculate the difference between the actual 
announcement of macroeconomic variable k (𝐴𝑐𝑡𝑢𝑎𝑙𝑘,𝑡) and the corresponding median 
market’s expectation (𝐸𝑥𝑝𝑒𝑐𝑡𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛𝑘,𝑡 ) which I proxy by the consensus forecasts or futures 
algorithm for interest rate surprises (see sections 3.5.3.1 and 3.5.3.2). Second, as in Brenner, 
Pasquariello and Subrahmanyam (2009) I define a surprise if the absolute difference of the 
actual announcement for variable k with respect to the market’s expectation50 of k is “large”, 
i.e., greater than a predetermined threshold. As in Brenner, Pasquariello and Subrahmanyam 
                                                          
49
 See, for example, Urich and Wachtel (1984); Pearce and Roley (1985); McQueen and Roley (1993); Li and 
Engle (1998); Balduzzi, Elton and Green (2001); Kuttner (2001); Flannery and Protopapadakis (2002); 
Andersen et al. (2003;2007); Bomfim (2003); Connolly and Wang (2003); Boyd, Hu and Jagannathan (2005); 
Vähämaa, Watzka and Äijö (2005); Wongswan (2006; 2009); Andritzky, Bannister and Tamirisa (2007); 
Brenner, Pasquariello and Subrahmanyam (2009); Özayat et al. (2011); Harju and Hussein (2011); Nowak et al. 
(2011); Rangel (2011). 
50 In line with Brenner, Pasquariello and Subrahmanyam (2009) I assume that the expectation data represent 
unbiased estimates of the anticipated portion of the respective macroeconomic announcements. 
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(2009) I use a threshold of 20000 jobs for Payrolls and 5 basis points for all other variables.
51
 
Third, I standardise the surprises to allow for comparisons across macroeconomic surprises 
that have different units of measurement. The approach of using standardised surprises was 
first applied by Balduzzi, Elton and Green (2001) and was then followed by other studies, 
such as Andersen et al. (2003; 2007); Vähämaa, Watzka and Äijö (2005); Brenner, 
Pasquariello and Subrahmanyam (2009); Özatay, Özmen and Şahinbeyoğlu (2009); Harju 
and Hussain (2011) and Nowak et al. (2011)). According to this definition the standardised 
surprise associated with macroeconomic variable k at time t is 𝑆𝑘,𝑡 =
𝐴𝑐𝑡𝑢𝑎𝑙𝑘,𝑡−𝐸𝑥𝑝𝑒𝑐𝑡𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛𝑘,𝑡
?̂?𝑘
, 
where ?̂?𝑘 is the sample standard deviation of surprises (𝐴𝑐𝑡𝑢𝑎𝑙𝑘,𝑡 − 𝐸𝑥𝑝𝑒𝑐𝑡𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛𝑘,𝑡) for each 
macroeconomic variable k.
 52
 
The data availability on the actual and expected announcements with their exact day and 
time, which I need to calculate the surprises, is limited to few countries. Previous studies tend 
to favour consensus forecasts based on surveys, so I follow this approach for all variables 
(see section 3.5.3.1) except for interest rate announcements for which I use a futures 
algorithm as this is the preferred approach in the literature (see section 3.5.3.2).  
3.5.3.1 Consensus Forecasts from Bloomberg and Financial Times 
I choose the median forecast from Bloomberg and Financial Times surveys as a proxy for the 
market’s expectation for the respective macroeconomic announcement which has been used 
in Vähämaa, Watzka and Äijö (2005), Andritzky, Bannister and Tamirisa (2007), Jiang et al. 
(2009) and Jiang, Konstantinidi and Skiadopoulos (2010).The survey forecasts on Bloomberg 
                                                          
51
 Brenner, Pasquariello and Subrahmanyam (2009) verify that the results are hardly affected by alternative 
thresholds because most expected announcements occur at or very close to the median forecast. 
52
 In regressions of asset returns on standardised surprises the regression coefficient can be interpreted as the 
change in return for a one standard deviation change in surprise (Balduzzi, Elton and Green 2001). As the 
sample standard deviation is constant across all the observations for each of macroeconomic variable, this 
standardisation does not affect the statistical properties of the estimators or the fit of the regressions (Balduzzi, 
Elton and Green 2001). 
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begin in 2001 for the US and in 2003 or later for Germany, EU, Italy, UK, Japan, France, 
Canada and Australia.
53
 Every Friday, Bloomberg conducts surveys of financial institutions 
(mainly investment banks) for their forecasts regarding the values of economic variables that 
will be released within the next week (Vähämaa, Watzka and Äijö 2005; Nowak et al. 2011). 
This methodology follows closely the one of Money Market Services (MMS) International
54
 
whose median forecast data has been widely used for US data (Urich and Wachtel (1984); 
Pearce and Roley (1985); McQueen and Roley (1993); Li and Engle (1998); Balduzzi, Elton 
and Green (2001); Flannery and Protopapadakis (2002); Andersen et al. (2003); Wongswan 
(2005); Goeij and Marquering (2006); Andersen et al. (2007); Pasquariello and Vega (2007); 
Brenner, Pasquariello and Subrahmanyam (2009); Rangel (2011)). As I would like to include 
Muslim countries in my sample but those are not available in the Bloomberg database I 
obtain announcement and forecast data from the Financial Times database for all Muslim 
countries for which that data is available (i.e. Indonesia, Malaysia and Turkey). I do not use 
the survey data from MMS because it is only available up to 2002, whereas most of my data 
on Islamic stocks and bonds starts after 2005 and includes a wide range of countries in 
addition to the US.  
There are several advantages of using survey forecasts.
55
 First, consensus, or group, forecasts 
such as Bloomberg and MMS surveys are considered to improve the accuracy of the forecasts 
as opposed to any individual forecast (Batchelor 2000; Blix et al. 2001; Novotny and Rakova 
2010). Pearce and Roley (1985) and McQueen and Roley (1993) show that MMS surveys 
                                                          
53
 Bloomberg also covers Switzerland, India, China and New Zealand but their time series of forecast data are 
limited and incomplete which is why I do not include those countries in my sample.  
54
 Between 1977 and 2002 MMS surveyed economists and money managers for their forecasts on 
macroeconomic variables. MMS conducted surveys via telephone every last Friday prior to each news 
announcement, and the resulting median forecasts were released during the following week (Balduzzi, Elton and 
Green 2001; Brenner, Pasquariello and Subrahmanyam 2009). 
55
 As an alternative, I have considered making my own forecasts based on ARMA and VAR models, however I 
found that those forecasts differ significantly from the consensus forecasts on Bloomberg and Financial Times 
and would therefore affect the accuracy of results in my study. Therefore, I do not include those forecasts in my 
analysis. Another issue with forecasts from ARMA and VAR models is that they add noise to the regressions 
(see Murphy and Topel 1985). 
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have lower mean squared errors and are therefore more accurate than forecasts from standard 
autoregressive time-series models. Further, Urich and Wachtel (1984) show that MMS 
expectations are rational, i.e. based on all available relevant information, which they examine 
with tests for the unbiasedness and efficiency of the forecasts. There is little evidence of 
expectations revision between the time of the MMS survey and the time the macroeconomic 
announcement is released (Balduzzi, Elton and Green 2001).  
3.5.3.2 Futures Data for Interest Rate Surprises 
In line with the literature on the impact of monetary policy surprises I estimate the 
unexpected component of interest rate announcements using futures data (Kuttner 2001; 
Bomfim 2003; Bernanke and Kuttner 2005; Brenner, Pasquariello and Subrahmanyam 2009; 
Wongswan 2009; Chuliá, Martens and Dijk 2010; Kurov 2010; Rangel 2011). The federal 
funds futures rate (“30 Day Federal Funds Futures” contract traded on the Chicago Board of 
Trade (CBOT)) has been used in the above literature to infer the market expectations of the 
FOMC (Federal Open Market Committee) target rate announcements and has been shown to 
represent more efficient predictors of FOMC’s target rate changes.56 Therefore I derive the 
unexpected (“surprise”) component of the federal funds target rate, which I denote Sit, from 
the change in the futures rate relative to the day prior to the FOMC announcement. This 
approach follows Kuttner (2001) and other studies which calculate the surprise change in the 
target Federal funds rate Sit, from the change in the rate implied by the current-month futures 
contract proportional to the number of days affected by the change, such that 
𝑆𝑖𝑡 =
𝐷
(𝐷−𝑑)
(𝑓𝑚,𝑑
0 − 𝑓𝑚,𝑑−1
0 ),                  (3.5) 
                                                          
56 For example, Gürkaynak et al. (2007) find that the federal funds futures provide superior forecasts of the 
federal funds rate relative to other financial market instruments and standard time series models, such as a 
Bayesian VAR.  
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where D is the number of days in a month, d is the day of the month the FOMC 
announcement is made, 𝑓𝑚,𝑑
0  and 𝑓𝑚,𝑑−1
0 ⁡are the rates of the current month’s futures contract 
on day d (the day of the announcement) and day 𝑑 − 1 (the day before the announcement), 
respectively. The reason that the change in the futures rate is scaled is that the settlement 
price of the futures contract is based on the average daily Federal funds rate over the calendar 
month specified in the contract, so that the adjustment is made to identify the number of days 
in the month that are affected by the change in the target fed funds rate (Bernanke and 
Kuttner, 2005).  
As in Bernanke and Kuttner (2005), I make two slight changes to the algorithm in equation 
3.5 in the following circumstances: (1) when the announcement falls on one of the last 3 days 
of the month, I use the unscaled change in the 1-month futures rate to calculate the funds rate 
surprise, which aims at minimising the effect of any month-end noise in the effective funds 
rate, and (2) when the rate change occurs on the first day of the month, I use the 1-month 
futures rate from the last day of the previous month, 𝑓𝑚−1,𝐷
1  instead of 𝑓𝑚,𝑑−1
0 . 
I use this approach for all countries where relevant futures data is available, i.e. for Australia, 
Canada, EU, Japan, Malaysia and the UK.
57
 I use the same futures algorithm as in equation 
3.5 for Australia and Canada. However, in the EU, Japan, Malaysia and the UK the 
settlement price is based on the interest rate on the last trading day instead of the average 
interest rate over the calendar month specified in the contract. Therefore, I modify the futures 
algorithm of equation 3.5 for those 4 countries by not scaling the change in the futures rate, 
i.e. 𝑆𝑖𝑡 = 𝑓𝑚,𝑑
0 − 𝑓𝑚,𝑑−1
0 . 
 
                                                          
57
 For the details of futures contracts for each country and the datasets that I use for specifying the 
announcement day see Table B.3 in Appendix B. 
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3.6 DESCRIPTIVE STATISTICS  
3.6.1 Descriptive Statistics of Asset Returns  
Tables C.1 to C.30 in Appendix C show the descriptive statistics of daily excess returns (in 
%) for stock and bond indices in all 11 countries over 4 different sample period: 2003-2013 
for 3 countries, 2007-2013 for 5 countries, 2008-2013 for 7 countries and 2011-2013 for all 
11 countries. The stocks are denoted by c_s1 (conventional stock 1) and is_s1 (Islamic stock 
1), which together form an asset pair (usually indices provided by MSCI), by c_s2 
(conventional stock 2) and is_s2 (Islamic stock 2), which are available for some countries and 
may come from Dow Jones, S&P or other index providers.
58
 Bond indices include corporate 
bonds (c_corp) and government bonds (c_govt) which are all conventional bonds except for 
Malaysia where both conventional and Islamic bond indices are available. Those additional 
Malaysian bonds come from Quantshop database and are denoted by q_c_bonds (all 
conventional bonds), q_is_bonds (all Islamic bonds), q_c_corp (conventional corporate 
bonds), q_is_corp (Islamic corporate bonds), q_c_govt (conventional government bonds), 
q_is_govt (Islamic government bonds), q_total_corp (all corporate bonds which includes 
conventional and Islamic bonds), and q_total_govt (all government bonds).
59
 
3.6.1.1 Sample 2003 
Tables C.1 to C.3 show the descriptive statistics of daily excess returns (in %) for stock and 
bond indices in the USA, France and Italy over 2003-2013. In the US all stock and 
government bond returns are positive, whereas the corporate bond return is negative. 
Likewise, in France and Italy all stock returns and government bond returns are positive 
                                                          
58
 For the abbreviated indices see Table B.1 in Appendix B for the corresponding stock indices, data providers, 
source and sample period. 
59
 For the abbreviated indices see Table B.2 in Appendix B for the corresponding bond indices, data providers, 
source and sample period. 
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(there are no available corporate bonds). Over this time period the only Islamic asset 
available is in the US, the Dow Jones Islamic stock index (is_s2), which has a slightly lower 
return and slightly lower standard deviation than its counterpart, the conventional Dow Jones 
stock index (c_s2). Across all countries the bond indices have a lower standard deviation and 
a lower return (except for Italy) than the stock indices. None of the asset returns are normally 
distributed.   
3.6.1.2 Sample 2007 
Tables C.4 to C.8 show the descriptive statistics of asset returns in the USA, France, Italy, 
Australia and Germany over 2007-2013. There are MSCI Islamic and conventional stock 
indices (is_s1 and c_s1) for each country, and there is a Dow Jones Islamic and conventional 
stock index (is_s2 and c_s2) for the USA. Comparing the descriptive statistics of Islamic 
versus conventional stocks gives different results across countries. In the US and in France, 
the Islamic stocks outperform their conventional counterparts with higher returns and lower 
standard deviation, whereas in Australia the Islamic stocks underperform with lower returns 
and higher standard deviation than their conventional counterparts. On the other hand, in Italy 
and Germany, the Islamic stocks have a higher return but also a higher standard deviation 
relative to their conventional counterparts. 
3.6.1.3 Sample 2008 
Tables C.9 to C.15 show the descriptive statistics of asset returns in the USA, France, Italy, 
Australia, Germany, Canada and Japan over 2008-2013. Like in the previous section, the 
relative performance of Islamic stock indices differs across countries. This time, only the two 
Islamic indices in France and one of the two Islamic indices in Japan outperform their 
conventional counterpart with higher returns and lower standard deviation. The Islamic stock 
index in Australia, as well as one of the two Islamic indices in Germany, both indices in 
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Canada and one of the two Islamic indices in Japan underperform the conventional 
counterpart with lower returns and higher standard deviation. In the remaining countries, the 
Islamic stock indices have either about the same or lower returns and lower standard 
deviation than the conventional stock indices (USA) or higher returns and a higher standard 
deviation (Italy and one of the two indices in Germany).  
3.6.1.4 Sample 2011 
Tables C.16 to C.26 show the descriptive statistics of asset returns in the USA, France, Italy, 
Australia, Germany, Canada, Japan, Indonesia, Turkey, UK and Malaysia over 2011-2013. 
These descriptive statistics are similar to those for the longer time periods. There is 
considerable variation in the relative returns and standard deviation of Islamic versus 
conventional assets across countries, and to a smaller extent, across time. Both Islamic stock 
indices in France have consistently outperformed their counterparts across time, with higher 
returns and lower standard deviation. In addition, this time the Islamic stock index in Italy 
and one of the Islamic indices in Germany, as well as the Islamic stock index in Turkey have 
outperformed their conventional counterparts. Again, consistent with the findings from longer 
time periods, the Islamic stock index in Australia and both Islamic stock indices in Canada 
have underperformed, having lower returns and lower standard deviation than their 
conventional counterparts. In addition, both Islamic stock indices in the UK have also 
underperformed. The remaining countries in the 2011-2013 sample have Islamic indices with 
either lower returns and lower standard deviation relative to their counterparts (USA is_s1 
and is_s2, Germany is_s1, Japan is_s1 and is_s2) or the opposite, higher returns and higher 
standard deviation (Indonesia is_s1, Malaysia is_s1 and is_s3). 
The data for the 2011-2013 period enables us to look at Malaysia which has three pairs of 
Islamic and conventional bonds: Islamic and conventional bonds (which includes corporate 
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and government bonds and are denoted as q_c_bonds and q_is_bonds), Islamic and 
conventional corporate bonds (q_c_corp and q_is_corp) and Islamic and conventional 
government bonds (q_c_govt and q_is_govt). For comparison, there are also all corporate 
bonds (i.e. Islamic and conventional, denoted by q_total_corp) and all government bonds 
(q_total_govt). As expected, the return and standard deviation of the corporate bond index is 
higher than for the government bond index. There is no consistent relation between 
conventional and Islamic bond index pairs. The Islamic bond index has higher returns and 
higher standard deviation than its conventional counterpart. However, the Islamic corporate 
bond index has lower returns and higher standard deviation, while the Islamic government 
bond index has lower returns and lower standard deviation than its counterpart. With only 
three years of data these descriptive statistics cannot be generalised, but they may be useful 
for interpreting the results of the hypothesis tests. 
3.6.1.5 Assets in the USA over Time and Crisis Periods 
Tables C.27 to C.30 provide the descriptive statistics for asset returns in the USA across all 
13 years of available data (2001 - 2013), for the pre-crisis period (2001 - 15 March 2008), for 
the Global Financial Crisis period (16 March 2008 – 30 March 2009) and the post-crisis 
period (31 March 2009 – 2013, respectively. Overall, the Islamic stock indices in the USA 
tend to have a lower return and lower standard deviation than their conventional counterparts. 
This applies to the overall time period of 2001-2013 and the post-crisis period. Prior to the 
crisis (2001-2008) the Islamic index (is_s2) has lower returns, but a higher instead of a lower 
standard deviation. Interestingly, the Islamic stock returns during the crisis (2008-2009) are 
higher while the standard deviation is still lower than the conventional stock indices. During 
the crisis period all the four Islamic and conventional stock indices have negative returns and 
the Islamic stock returns are less negative due to the lower standard deviation. It looks like, at 
least in the USA, Islamic stocks are a less risky investment which could be beneficial during 
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a recession or crisis. This may be similar in countries where the Islamic stock index tends to 
have a lower standard deviation, such as France, but not in countries where Islamic stocks 
have a high standard deviation, such as Australia. The differences in characteristics of Islamic 
stocks across countries could be due to many factors. Possibly the financial ratio screens and 
business screens which are applied across all countries according to the same rules, will have 
different effects on countries with different industry compositions and firm characteristics 
(especially firm leverage and cash holdings). While some countries, like the US, have well 
diversified industry sectors, other countries could be dominated by certain industry sectors. In 
that case business screens that exclude certain industry sectors could have a much bigger 
impact and create a more volatile Islamic index that is composed of only few industries. 
3.6.2 Descriptive Statistics of Macroeconomic Surprises 
Tables C.31 to C.60 show summary statistics for macroeconomic news releases and 
macroeconomic surprises, measured as changes relatively to the previous announcement. The 
news releases include interest rate announcements (in %), inflation announcements 
(Consumer Price Index (CPI), in %, and the Producer Price Index (PPI), in %), 
unemployment rate (in %), payroll employment change (in thousands), industrial production 
(in %), retail sales (in%) and GDP (in %). The summary statistics include the mean, median, 
standard deviation (Std Dev), minimum and maximum value for each announced variable 
(Min and Max) and the number of observations (N). The announcement surprises are 
computed as the difference between the actual announcement and the market consensus 
(using cutoff values described in section 3.5.3). 
3.6.2.1 Sample 2003 
Tables C.31 to C.33 show summary statistics for news announcements and macroeconomic 
surprises in the USA, France and Italy over 2003-2013. According to Table C.31, in the USA, 
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there were 87 FOMC meetings over the sample period and the Fed decided to cut the interest 
rate more frequently and to a larger extent (up to -1%) than to increase it (up to 0.25%), with 
an average of -0.01%. Only about 7% of these decisions were unexpected by the market. This 
is different to the sample period of 1986-2002 in Brenner, Pasquariello and Subrahmanyam 
(2009) who also find that the Federal Reserve decided to cut the federal funds rate or to leave 
it unchanged more frequently than to increase it, but the extent of cutting the interest rate is 
less (up to -0.5%) than increasing it (up to 0.75%) with an average of -0.034%. During their 
sample period a much larger proportion, i.e. 44% of all interest rate decisions were 
unexpected by the market. During 2003-2013 the news releases announce on average that 
there are 405,190 more employed people, 0.01% increase in unemployment, a 0.19 to 0.27% 
increase in PPI and CPI inflation (this is an annual inflation rate of 2.28 to 3.24%), and an 
increase of 0.27%, 0.14% and 2.21% in retail sales, industrial production and GDP, 
respectively. All figures are on a monthly basis. As a comparison, the sample in Brenner, 
Pasquariello and Subrahmanyam (2009) has a similar annual inflation rate of 3%, but a 
tendency of lower unemployment (-0.006%) and a slightly lower increase in payrolls 
(146,100). 
Table C.32 suggests that in France the increase in unemployment has been higher than in the 
USA (0.02%), the inflation rate has been slightly lower than the US (annual inflation of 1.8% 
to 2.04%), industrial production has been negative (-0.03%) and GDP has been positive, but 
lower than in the USA (0.32%). Table B.33 presents the descriptive statistics for Italy. The 
inflation rate is similar to France (annual inflation 2.16-2.28% using the CPI and PPI 
measures respectively), however monthly retail sales (-0.08%), industrial production (-
0.15%) and GDP (-0.07%) are all negative and unemployment is higher than in the US and 
France (0.08% monthly increase on average).  
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3.6.2.2. Sample 2007 
Tables C.34 to C.38 show the descriptive statistics of macroeconomic announcement and 
macroeconomic surprises in the USA, France, Italy, Australia and Germany over 2007-2013. 
This time period is mostly dominated by the Global Financial Crisis, so the figures show a 
slow-down of the economy and higher unemployment, when comparing them with the USA, 
France and Italy in the 2003-2013 sample. In the USA, interest rates since 2007 have not 
been increased at all, but either cut or left unchanged. 
Australia, much unlike the above countries, shows few signs of recession, with relatively 
stable unemployment rate (mean 0.01% and median 0%), positive retail sales (0.28%) and 
GDP (0.59%), while interest rates have been likewise cut more frequently than increased. 
Inflation is higher than in the other countries of this sample, with the annual inflation rate 
around 6.48-7.68% (PPI and CPI). The Reserve Bank of Australia has on average been 
decreasing the interest rates by -0.05% over the time period and out of the 76 decisions, 25 
were unanticipated by the market. 
Germany is relatively more stable than the European countries France and Italy, as 
unemployment is slightly decreasing, monthly GDP is a moderate 0.21%, annual inflation is 
1.56%-1.8% (CPI and PPI), although retail sales (-0.44%) and industrial production (-0.06%) 
are both negative. The European Central Bank has been on average reducing the interest rate 
by -0.04% over the sample period with up to -0.75% cuts but only up to 0.25% increases over 
that period. Only 5 out of 81 ECB decisions have been unanticipated by the market. 
3.6.2.3 Sample 2008 
Tables C.39 to C.45 show the descriptive statistics of macroeconomic announcements in the 
USA, France, Italy, Australia, Germany, Canada and Japan over 2008-2013. The statistics for 
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the countries from the previous section (sample period 2007-2013 for USA, France, Italy, 
Australia and Germany) are similar to the 2008-2013 sample. However, the 2008-2013 
sample is dominated even more by the Global Financial Crisis and therefore the macro 
economy tends to perform worse relative to the 2007-2013 sample. 
In Canada, the economy over 2008-2013 looks weak, but still featuring positive growth in 
retail sales (0.17%), GDP (0.09%) and payrolls (112,270), with moderate rise in 
unemployment (0.02%) and low annual inflation of only 0.12% for PPI up to 1.68% for CPI. 
The Bank of Canada made 44 announcements about interest rate over the sample period 
which tended to be interest rate cuts on average (-0.05%). Only 4 out of 44 decisions were 
unexpected by the market.  
In Japan, monthly industrial production (-0.24%) and GDP (-0.04%) have been on average 
declining over 2008-2013, although unemployment has been stable and monthly retail sales 
have been increasing by 0.2% on average and the annual inflation has been around 1.08% 
(PPI). During this time the Bank of Japan had 80 announcements under which the interest 
rate has been increased by 0.08% on average. However, according to the futures algorithm, 
all of those decisions were anticipated by the market.   
3.6.2.4 Sample 2011 
Tables C.46 to C.56 show the descriptive statistics of macroeconomic announcements in the 
USA, France, Italy, Australia, Germany, Canada, Japan, Indonesia, Turkey, UK and Malaysia 
over 2011-2013. The 2011-2013 sample period is dominated by the recovery period. Relative 
to the previous sections, the USA, France, Italy, Australia, Germany, Canada and Japan show 
more or less signs of recovery. Although, global interest rates tend to be low, with the USA 
(0-0.25%), Canada (1%) and Japan (0-0.1%) keeping their interest rates unchanged, with no 
unexpected decisions except for one unexpected decision in Canada. In Australia (-0.07%) 
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and the European Union (-0.02%) interest rates tend to be cut slightly further with 10 out of 
32 decisions being unexpected in Australia and 5 out of 33 decisions unexpected in the 
European Union.  
Indonesia has fewer data items than the previous countries. Inflation is relatively high in 
Indonesia at an annual rate of 5.4% on average, and monthly GDP growth is 0.5% on 
average. Both figures are similar to the Australian economy. The Bank of Indonesia has on 
average increased the interest rate by 0.03% with the maximum cuts and maximum increases 
being equal (-0.5% and +0.5%). Out of 33 decisions, 12 have been unexpected by the market.  
The macroeconomic releases in Turkey are of similar magnitude to Indonesia, with high 
annual inflation of 7.68% (CPI) and a monthly GDP growth of 0.44%. Unemployment is 
declining at a monthly -0.04%, while the Central Bank of the Republic of Turkey has made 
35 interest rate announcements out of which 6 were unanticipated by the market. The 
decisions were either to cut the interest rate or to leave it unchanged, with an average of -
0.06% cuts over this period and the biggest cut being -0.5%. 
Over the sample period 2011-2013 the UK had a reduction in unemployment (-0.04%) and 
claimant count (-0.01%), although payrolls have been negative at -580. Retail sales (0.16%), 
industrial production (0.01%) and GDP (0.12%) have been all positive and the annual 
inflation has been 3.24% on average. The Bank of England has kept interest rates unchanged 
at 0.5%. Out of the 33 decisions just less than half (15) were unanticipated by the market. 
In Malaysia, the industrial production (0.23%) and GDP (0.42%) growth are of similar 
magnitude to Indonesia and Turkey, although the annual inflation growth is lower with an 
average of 2.28%. The Bank Negara Malaysia has on average left the interest rate unchanged, 
although there have been increases up to 0.3% and cuts of up to 0.75%. Out of the 61 
decisions 15 have been unanticipated by the market 
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3.6.2.5 Macroeconomic Announcements in the USA over Time and Crisis Periods 
Tables C.57 to C.60 provide the descriptive statistics for macroeconomic announcements in 
the USA across all 13 years of available data (2001 - 2013), for the pre-crisis period (2001 - 
15 March 2008), for the global financial crisis period (16 March 2008 – 30 March 2009) and 
the post-crisis period (31 March 2009 – 2013). As expected, we can see that the US economy 
collapsed during the GFC with higher unemployment, lower inflation (for PPI even deflation) 
and a decline in retail sales, industrial production and in GDP, and then the US economy 
recovered during the post-crisis period.  
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3.7 RESULTS 
This results section begins with the main results of panel regressions which test the three 
hypotheses about the differences in the impact of macroeconomic surprises on Islamic versus 
conventional assets (section 3.7.1). Similar panel regressions are then presented in section 
3.7.2 but this time they are estimated separately for each asset pair. This is followed by 
section 3.7.3 with a number of GARCH(1,1) regressions for each asset and country to show 
the impact of macroeconomic surprises on the daily excess return and volatility of each stock 
and bond index within each country. This section also includes a general discussion of 
differences in the impact of macroeconomic surprises across countries, variables and time. 
The results for the three hypotheses are then discussed in section 3.7.4. Finally, four 
sensitivity analyses in section 3.7.5 examine how results are affected by the business cycle, 
the definition of surprise variable, the information content of the news and it breaks up the 
sample for the USA into pre-crisis, crisis and post-crisis periods to examine how the impact 
of macroeconomic surprises on asset returns and volatility can differ during crisis and non-
crisis periods.  
3.7.1 Main Results  
To test whether there is a significant difference between the impact of macroeconomic 
announcements on Islamic versus conventional asset returns I run panel regressions that 
include an interaction term with an additional Islamic asset variable (see equation 3.4 in 
section 3.4). The first coefficient of interest is  𝛾𝑖
𝑒 which shows the impact of a standardised 
unit of macroeconomic surprise e (either interest rate decisions, unemployment, CPI, payroll, 
PPI, industrial production, retail sales or GDP) on the conventional stock (or bond) returns. 
Further, 𝛾𝑖
𝑒 + 𝛽1,𝑖
𝑒  shows the impact of a standardised unit of surprise e (either interest rate 
decisions, unemployment, CPI, payroll, PPI, industrial production, retail sales or GDP) on the 
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Islamic stock (or bond) returns. If the coefficient 𝛽1,𝑖
𝑒  is zero then there is no difference 
between Islamic and conventional assets. In unreported analysis I include an Islamic country 
dummy variable, country fixed effects, asset fixed effects or asset pair fixed effects, but those 
are mostly insignificant and do not affect the results. 
First, I estimate those panel regressions for stock indices (sections 3.7.1.1 for balanced panels 
and 3.7.1.2 for unbalanced panel) and then for bond indices (section 3.7.1.3 for balanced 
panels). In each panel regression I include all the countries that are available for that 
macroeconomic announcement. The panels are estimated by using white cross-section 
standard errors and covariance. A discussion of these panel regressions as they relate to the 
hypothesis tests follows in section 3.7.3.  
3.7.1.1 Balanced Stock Panels 
Tables 3.2 to 3.5 show results of balanced panels for four different sample periods: 2003-
2013, 2007-2013, 2008-2013 and 2011-2013. The first sample period over 2003-2013 (Table 
2) only includes 2 countries (US and France) with one asset pair each (i.e. one Islamic and 
one matching conventional stock), while the shortest sample period over 2011-2013 (Table 5) 
includes all countries. 
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Table 3.2: Panel Regressions for Stocks 2003-2013 
 𝛾𝑖
𝑒  𝛽1,𝑖
𝑒  cross-
sections 
total panel 
observations 
Interest 0.5766 0.1593* 4 10736 
 0.8900 1.7768   
     
CPI -0.0710 0.0257 4 10733 
 -0.4063 0.5561   
     
PPI -0.1110 -0.0014 4 10728 
 -1.3264 -0.0515   
     
IP -0.0883 -0.0111 4 10736 
 -0.7945 -0.3279   
     
Retail 0.1975* 0.0102 4 10736 
 1.7000 0.3346   
     
GDP 0.0224 -0.0041 4 10736 
 0.1918 -0.1836   
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Table 3.3: Panel Regressions for Stocks 2007-2013 
 𝛾𝑖
𝑒  𝛽1,𝑖
𝑒  cross-
sections 
total panel 
observations 
     
Interest 0.3059 -0.0017 28 46819 
 0.7881 -0.0253   
     
Unemployment -0.2277** 0.0124 12 20124 
 -2.2692 0.5290   
     
CPI -0.2125 0.0251 16 26832 
 -1.3604 0.5904   
     
Payroll 0.3562* 0.0259 6 10062 
 1.6601 0.5572   
     
PPI -0.1995** 0.0137 16 26824 
 -2.0144 0.3922   
     
IP -0.0891 0.0067 14 23478 
 -0.7863 0.2409   
     
Retail 0.2474** -0.0212 14 23478 
 2.4125 -0.8588   
     
GDP 0.0386 -0.0081 16 26832 
 0.3147 -0.3768   
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Table 3.4: Panel Regressions for Stocks 2008-2013 
 
 
 
 
 
cross-
sections 
total panel 
observations 
Interest 0.2922 -0.0608 32 41984 
 0.5938 -0.9053   
     
Unemployment -0.1004 0.0324 28 36876 
 -1.0819 1.4982   
     
CPI -0.1750 0.0679 24 31608 
 -1.1009 1.3762   
     
Payroll 0.1530 -0.0668 10 13324 
 0.6437 -1.1224   
     
PPI -0.2207* 0.0031 24 31608 
 -1.8636 0.0877   
     
IP -0.1008 0.0133 22 28974 
 -0.8591 0.5419   
     
Retail 0.2435*** -0.0294 24 31608 
 2.7881 -1.4214   
     
GDP 0.1976* -0.0131 27 35559 
 1.7371 -0.5051   
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Table 3.5: Panel Regressions for Stocks 2011-2013 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
3.7.1.2 Unbalanced Stock Panels 
The unbalanced panel regression in Table 3.6 includes all the data that is available across all 
countries for all stocks. This means that some data series start in 2003 while others start only 
in 2011.
60
  
  
                                                          
60
 In unreported analysis I include an Islamic country dummy variable in the panel regression, but the dummy 
variable is not significant and does not affect any of the results. 
 
 
 
 
 
cross-
sections 
total panel 
observations 
Interest 0.1367 -0.3933** 36 23824 
 0.3940 -2.5329   
     
Unemployment -0.1018 0.0007 30 20070 
 -1.0022 0.0267   
     
CPI -0.1740 0.0723** 32 21229 
 -1.3330 2.2184   
     
Payroll 0.3859*** -0.0382 14 9366 
 3.3267 -1.0000   
     
PPI -0.1828 -0.0189 28 18732 
 -1.2072 -0.7668   
     
IP 0.0780 -0.0040 28 18572 
 0.6459 -0.1795   
     
Retail 0.2212* 0.0199 24 16056 
 1.8047 0.7200   
     
GDP 0.1240 -0.0006 35 23255 
 0.9727 -0.0203   
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Table 3.6: Unbalanced Panel Regressions for Stocks 2003-2013 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
3.7.1.3 Balanced Bond Panels 
Table 3.7 presents the results of balanced panel regression for excess returns of bond indices. 
Since I am interested in the difference between Islamic and conventional bonds I only include 
Malaysia which is the only country in my sample which has Islamic bond data. The first 
column of Table 3.7 specifies the variable and the sample period (e.g. Interest 2005 refers to 
the panel which estimates the impact of interest rate surprises on Malaysian bond returns over 
the 2005-2013 sample period). 
 
 
 
 
 
 
cross-
sections 
total panel 
observations 
Interest 0.1860 -0.0236 36 75273 
 0.5944 -0.3216   
     
Unemployment -0.1046 0.0152 30 53664 
 -1.3840 0.6694   
     
CPI -0.0789 0.0095 32 57890 
 -0.9288 0.2371   
     
Payroll 0.1182 -0.0176 14 24566 
 0.8989 -0.3556   
     
PPI -0.1502** -0.0076 28 55206 
 -2.0749 -0.2387   
     
IP -0.0438 0.0073 28 52800 
 -0.5268 0.2277   
     
Retail 0.1771*** -0.0048 24 48538 
 2.6723 -0.2027   
     
GDP 0.1086 0.0255 35 60907 
 1.3590 1.0306   
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Table 3.7: Panel Regressions for Bonds 
 𝛾𝑖
𝑒  𝛽1,𝑖
𝑒  cross-
sections 
total panel 
observations 
Interest 2005 -0.2995** 0.0306*** 2 4062 
 -2.4727 3.2965   
     
Interest 2010 0.0221 -0.0087 6 5016 
 0.0643 -0.5247   
     
Interest 2011 -0.2314 -0.0041 6 4122 
 -0.5066 -0.1766   
     
CPI 2011 -0.1395 -0.0010 6 4122 
 -1.0443 -0.0969   
     
IP 2011 -0.0333 -0.0279 6 4122 
 -0.4166 -0.9056   
     
GDP 2011 -0.2622** 0.0108 6 4122 
 -2.3171 1.3038   
 
3.7.2 Analysis on Country Level 
In Tables 3.8 through 3.16 I test the hypotheses on country level and examine whether the 
difference between the impact on the conditional excess return of Islamic versus conventional 
assets is significant. I do this with panel regressions which include one asset pair at a time, 
i.e. one Islamic and one conventional asset which is matched by country, variable, sample 
period and index provider. 
Table 3.8: Panel Regressions for Stocks with Interest Rate Surprises 
Country Asset pair γi
INT βi
INT Observations Sample period 
Australia MSCI stock pair (c_s1 and is_s1) -0.0035 -0.0026** 3640 14 Aug 2006 - 1 Nov 
2013 
  -0.7437 -2.2782    
       
Canada MSCI stock pair (c_s1 and is_s1) -0.0082 -0.0022*** 3640 14 Aug 2006 - 1 Nov 
2013 
  -1.5957 -6.9043    
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 Dow Jones stock pair (c_s2 and is_s2) -0.0077* -0.0037** 5082 2 Oct 2003 - 1 Nov 2013 
  -1.6864 -2.1671    
       
France MSCI stock pair (c_s1 and is_s1) 0.1714* 0.0240* 3640 14 Aug 2006 - 1 Nov 
2013 
  1.7285 1.6531    
       
 S&P stock pair (c_s2 and is_s2) 0.1931 -0.0069 2724 10 Jun 2008 - 1 Nov 
2013 
  1.4754 -0.1764    
       
Germany MSCI stock pair (c_s1 and is_s1) 0.1734* -0.0041 3640 14 Aug 2006 - 1 Nov 
2013 
  1.7613 -0.2921    
       
 S&P stock pair (c_s2 and is_s2) 0.2109 -0.0117 2724 10 Jun 2008 - 1 Nov 
2013 
  1.6237 -0.4265    
       
Indonesia MSCI stock pair (c_s1 and is_s1) -0.0034 0.0012 1428 4 Jan 2011 - 1 Nov 2013 
  -0.6903 0.7824    
       
Italy MSCI stock pair (c_s1 and is_s1) 0.1393 0.0523** 3640 14 Aug 2006 - 1 Nov 
2013 
  1.2942 2.3852    
       
Japan MSCI stock pair (c_s1 and is_s1) 0.3062*** -0.0029 3640 14 Aug 2006 - 1 Nov 
2013 
  28.1195 -0.7105    
       
 Dow Jones stock pair (c_s2 and is_s2) 0.2890*** -0.0027 3868 2 Mar 2006 - 1 Nov 2013 
  32.2570 -0.2963    
       
Malaysia MSCI stock pair (c_s1 and is_s1) -0.0022 0.0002 3586 14 Aug 2006 - 31 Oct 
2013 
  -0.6449 0.1443    
       
 FTSE stock pair (c_s2 and is_s2) 0.0001 -0.0022 3486 24 Oct 2006 - 31 Oct 
2013 
  0.1002 -1.1015    
       
Turkey MSCI stock pair (c_s1 and is_s1) -0.0005 -0.0134*** 1556 4 Oct 2010 - 1 Nov 2013 
  -0.0711 -4.3963    
       
UK MSCI stock pair (c_s1 and is_s1) 0.0061 0.0023*** 3640 14 Aug 2006 - 1 Nov 
2013 
  0.5890 2.5972    
       
 Dow Jones stock pair (c_s2 and is_s2) 0.0048 0.0011 5458 3 Jan 2003 - 1 Nov 2013 
  0.5021 0.9027    
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US MSCI stock pair (c_s1 and is_s1) 0.0044 0.0016 3550 14 Aug 2006 - 30 Aug 
2013 
  1.1722 1.6366    
       
 Dow Jones stock pair (c_s2 and is_s2) 0.0004 0.0019 6368 3 Jan 2001 - 30 Aug 
2013 
  0.0961 1.5882    
       
 
Table 3.9: Panel Regressions for Stocks with Unemployment Surprises 
Country Asset pair γi
UNE βi
UNE Observations Sample period 
Australia MSCI stock pair (c_s1 and is_s1) -0.0023 -0.0002 3640 14 Aug 2006 - 1 Nov2013 
  -1.5379 -0.8750    
       
Canada MSCI stock pair (c_s1 and is_s1) -0.0027 0.0010* 2942 3 Jan 2008 - 1 Nov 2013 
  -1.6371 1.7144    
       
 Dow Jones stock pair (c_s2 and is_s2) -0.0027 0.0013** 2942 3 Jan 2008 - 1 Nov 2013 
  -1.6319 1.9612    
       
France MSCI stock pair (c_s1 and is_s1) -0.0045 -0.0003 3640 14 Aug 2006 - 1 Nov2013 
  -1.1236 -0.5994    
       
 S&P stock pair (c_s2 and is_s2) -0.0054 -0.0005 2724 10 Jun 2008 - 1 Nov 
2013 
  -0.9673 -0.4841    
       
Germany MSCI stock pair (c_s1 and is_s1) -0.0017 0.0000 3444 4 Jan 2007 - 1 Nov 2013 
  -0.6121 -0.0181    
       
 S&P stock pair (c_s2 and is_s2) -0.0008 -0.0004 2724 10 Jun 2008 - 1 Nov 
2013 
  -0.2347 -0.5689    
       
Italy MSCI stock pair (c_s1 and is_s1) -0.0046 -0.0001 3640 14 Aug 2006 - 1 Nov 
2013 
  -0.9998 -0.0478    
       
Japan MSCI stock pair (c_s1 and is_s1) 0.0022 -0.0003 2982 4 Dec 2007 - 1 Nov 2013 
  0.9441 -0.6374    
       
 Dow Jones stock pair (c_s2 and is_s2) 0.0023 0.0001 2982 4 Dec 2007 - 1 Nov 2013 
  0.8903 0.1859    
       
Turkey MSCI stock pair (c_s1 and is_s1) -0.0037 0.0004 1428 4 Jan 2011 - 1 Nov 2013 
  -1.0613 0.1877    
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UK MSCI stock pair (c_s1 and is_s1) -0.0006 0.0007 2982 4 Dec 2007 - 1 Nov 2013 
  -0.2642 1.1074    
       
 Dow Jones stock pair (c_s2 and is_s2) -0.0007 0.0006 2982 4 Dec 2007 - 1 Nov 2013 
  -0.2816 0.9496    
       
US MSCI stock pair (c_s1 and is_s1) -0.0023 0.0004 3550 14 Aug 2006 - 30 Aug 
2013 
  -1.3900 1.3154    
       
 Dow Jones stock pair (c_s2 and is_s2) -0.0014 0.0001 6368 3 Jan 2001 - 30 Aug 
2013 
  -1.0701 0.5350    
       
 
 
Table 3.10: Panel Regressions for Stocks with CPI Surprises 
Country Asset pair γi
CPI βi
CPI Observations Sample period 
Australia MSCI stock pair (c_s1 and is_s1) -0.0009 -0.0006 3640 14 Aug 2006 - 1 Nov2013 
  -0.2298 -0.5366    
       
Canada MSCI stock pair (c_s1 and is_s1) 0.0012 0.0010 2942 3 Jan 2008 - 1 Nov 2013 
  0.5256 0.8508    
       
 Dow Jones stock pair (c_s2 and is_s2) 0.0011 0.0012 2942 3 Jan 2008 - 1 Nov 2013 
  0.4608 1.0463    
       
France MSCI stock pair (c_s1 and is_s1) -0.0005 -0.0002 3640 14 Aug 2006 - 1 Nov 
2013 
  -0.1152 -0.2105    
       
 S&P stock pair (c_s2 and is_s2) 0.0009 -0.0021 2724 10 Jun 2008 - 1 Nov 
2013 
  0.2083 -1.1862    
       
Germany MSCI stock pair (c_s1 and is_s1) -0.0018 -0.0001 3640 14 Aug 2006 - 1 Nov 
2013 
  -0.6940 -0.1450    
       
 S&P stock pair (c_s2 and is_s2) -0.0052 0.0018** 2724 10 Jun 2008 - 1 Nov 
2013 
  -1.3056 2.3155    
       
Indonesia MSCI stock pair (c_s1 and is_s1) -0.0012 0.0028** 1428 4 Jan 2011 - 1 Nov 2013 
  -0.5236 2.1399    
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Italy MSCI stock pair (c_s1 and is_s1) -0.0040* 0.0014* 3640 14 Aug 2006 - 1 Nov 
2013 
  -1.8968 1.9421    
       
Malaysia MSCI stock pair (c_s1 and is_s1) -0.0022 0.0005 1374 4 Jan 2011 - 31 Oct 2013 
  -1.1471 0.9716    
       
 FTSE stock pair (c_s2 and is_s2) -0.0019 0.0003 1374 4 Jan 2011 - 31 Oct 2013 
  -0.9487 1.2182    
       
Turkey MSCI stock pair (c_s1 and is_s1) 0.0018 -0.0002 1428 4 Jan 2011 - 1 Nov 2013 
  0.3440 -0.1097    
       
UK MSCI stock pair (c_s1 and is_s1) -0.0018 0.0010 3640 14 Aug 2006 - 1 Nov 
2013 
  -0.5787 1.2869    
       
 Dow Jones stock pair (c_s2 and is_s2) -0.0010 0.0002 5458 3 Jan 2003 - 1 Nov 2013 
  -0.6111 0.4493    
       
US MSCI stock pair (c_s1 and is_s1) -0.0002 -0.0007 3550 14 Aug 2006 - 30 Aug 
2013 
  -0.0440 -0.8458    
       
 Dow Jones stock pair (c_s2 and is_s2) -0.0006 -0.0003 6368 3 Jan 2001 - 30 Aug 
2013 
  -0.2625 -0.6573    
       
 
  
 129  
 
Table 3.11: Panel Regressions for Stocks with Payrolls Surprises 
  
Country Asset pair γi
PAY βi
PAY Observations Sample period 
Australia MSCI stock pair (c_s1 and is_s1) 0.0045* 0.0004 3640 14 Aug 2006 - 1 Nov 2013 
  1.6700 0.5917    
       
Canada MSCI stock pair (c_s1 and is_s1) 0.0001 -0.0013 2942 3 Jan 2008 - 1 Nov 2013 
  0.0204 -1.4640    
       
 Dow Jones stock pair (c_s2 and is_s2) 0.0001 -0.0013 2942 3 Jan 2008 - 1 Nov 2013 
  0.0183 -1.2789    
       
UK MSCI stock pair (c_s1 and is_s1) 0.0004 -0.0002 1976 2 Dec 2009 - 1 Nov 2013 
  0.1982 -0.3133    
       
 Dow Jones stock pair (c_s2 and is_s2) 0.0005 -0.0003 1976 2 Dec 2009 - 1 Nov 2013 
  0.2385 -0.8645    
       
US MSCI stock pair (c_s1 and is_s1) 0.0030 0.0001 3550 14 Aug 2006 - 30 Aug 2013 
  0.8720 0.1584    
       
 Dow Jones stock pair (c_s2 and is_s2) 0.0015 -0.0002 6368 3 Jan 2001 - 30 Aug 2013 
  0.9685 -0.4324    
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Table 3.12: Panel Regressions for Stocks with PPI Surprises 
Country Asset pair γi
PPI βi
PPI Observations Sample period 
Australia MSCI stock pair (c_s1 and is_s1) 0.0040 0.0010 3640 14 Aug 2006 - 1 Nov 2013 
  0.5703 1.0807   
      
Canada MSCI stock pair (c_s1 and is_s1) -0.0009 -0.0009 2942 3 Jan 2008 - 1 Nov 2013 
  -0.2804 -1.2869   
      
 Dow Jones stock pair (c_s2 and is_s2) -0.0009 -0.0009 2942 3 Jan 2008 - 1 Nov 2013 
  -0.2804 -1.2869   
      
France MSCI stock pair (c_s1 and is_s1) -0.0009 0.0003 3640 14 Aug 2006 - 1 Nov 2013 
  -0.3986 0.6279   
      
 S&P stock pair (c_s2 and is_s2) -0.0009 0.0010 2724 10 Jun 2008 - 1 Nov 2013 
  -0.3614 1.4305   
      
Germany MSCI stock pair (c_s1 and is_s1) -0.0041** -0.0002 3640 14 Aug 2006 - 1 Nov 2013 
  -2.5176 -0.1544   
      
 S&P stock pair (c_s2 and is_s2) -0.0049** 0.0009 2724 10 Jun 2008 - 1 Nov 2013 
  -2.4054 0.7491   
      
Italy MSCI stock pair (c_s1 and is_s1) -0.0060** 0.0001 3640 14 Aug 2006 - 1 Nov 2013 
  -2.1254 0.1139   
      
Japan MSCI stock pair (c_s1 and is_s1) 0.0006 0.0005 1428 4 Jan 2011 - 1 Nov 2013 
  0.4094 0.8901   
      
 Dow Jones stock pair (c_s2 and is_s2) 0.0004 0.0004 1428 4 Jan 2011 - 1 Nov 2013 
  0.2613 0.7044   
      
UK MSCI stock pair (c_s1 and is_s1) -0.0029 0.0001 3636 14 Aug 2006 - 1 Nov 2013 
  -1.2499 0.1965   
      
 Dow Jones stock pair (c_s2 and is_s2) -0.0021 -0.0001 5450 3 Jan 2003 - 1 Nov 2013 
  -1.3501 -0.2480   
      
US MSCI stock pair (c_s1 and is_s1) -0.0011 0.0001 3550 14 Aug 2006 - 30 Aug 
2013 
  -0.8193 0.1932   
      
 Dow Jones stock pair (c_s2 and is_s2) -0.0010 -0.0004 6368 3 Jan 2001 - 30 Aug 2013 
  -1.0621 -0.8592   
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Table 3.13: Panel Regressions for Stocks with Retail Sales Surprises 
Country Asset pair γi
RET βi
RET Observations Sample period 
Australia MSCI stock pair (c_s1 and is_s1) -0.0004 -0.0010 3640 14 Aug 2006 - 1 Nov 
2013 
  -0.2508 -1.4869    
       
Canada MSCI stock pair (c_s1 and is_s1) 0.0021 -0.0001 2982 4 Dec 2007 - 1 Nov 
2013 
  1.1020 -0.2719    
       
 Dow Jones stock pair (c_s2 and is_s2) 0.0021 -0.0001 2982 4 Dec 2007 - 1 Nov 
2013 
  1.0822 -0.1855    
       
Germany MSCI stock pair (c_s1 and is_s1) 0.0032 0.0001 3640 14 Aug 2006 - 1 Nov 
2013 
  1.5891 0.1783    
       
 S&P stock pair (c_s2 and is_s2) 0.0037 -0.0004 2724 10 Jun 2008 - 1 Nov 
2013 
  1.3942 -0.6563    
       
Italy MSCI stock pair (c_s1 and is_s1) 0.0062* -0.0008 3570 3 Oct 2006 - 1 Nov 
2013 
  1.9045 -1.1669    
       
Japan MSCI stock pair (c_s1 and is_s1) -0.0002 -0.0009*** 2982 4 Dec 2007 - 1 Nov 
2013 
  -0.1672 -2.9423    
       
 Dow Jones stock pair (c_s2 and is_s2) -0.0003 -0.0006 2982 4 Dec 2007 - 1 Nov 
2013 
  -0.2047 -1.1927    
       
UK MSCI stock pair (c_s1 and is_s1) -0.0007 0.0005 3640 14 Aug 2006 - 1 Nov 
2013 
  -0.4632 1.0402    
       
 Dow Jones stock pair (c_s2 and is_s2) 0.0000 0.0006* 5458 3 Jan 2003 - 1 Nov 
2013 
  0.0014 1.7951    
       
US MSCI stock pair (c_s1 and is_s1) 0.0074*** -0.0007 3550 14 Aug 2006 - 30 Aug 
2013 
  2.9506 -1.4603    
       
 Dow Jones stock pair (c_s2 and is_s2) 0.0026* -0.0007** 6368 3 Jan 2001 - 30 Aug 
2013 
  1.8664 -2.3884    
       
       
 132  
 
Table 3.14: Panel Regressions for Stocks with Industrial Production Surprises 
Country Asset pair γi
IP βi
IP Observations Sample period 
France MSCI stock pair (c_s1 and is_s1) 0.0008 0.0003 3640 14 Aug 2006 - 1 Nov 
2013 
  0.2833 0.6780    
       
 S&P stock pair (c_s2 and is_s2) -0.0002 0.0005 2724 10 Jun 2008 - 1 Nov 
2013 
  -0.0742 0.8711    
       
Germany MSCI stock pair (c_s1 and is_s1) -0.0025 0.0003 3640 14 Aug 2006 - 1 Nov 
2013 
  -0.9155 0.6098    
       
 S&P stock pair (c_s2 and is_s2) -0.0023 0.0001 2724 10 Jun 2008 - 1 Nov 
2013 
  -0.7648 0.1167    
       
Italy MSCI stock pair (c_s1 and is_s1) 0.0026 0.0005 3640 14 Aug 2006 - 1 Nov 
2013 
  1.2619 0.6070    
       
Japan MSCI stock pair (c_s1 and is_s1) 0.0006 0.0003 2942 3 Jan 2008 - 1 Nov 
2013 
  0.2351 0.7918    
       
 Dow Jones stock pair (c_s2 and is_s2) 0.0008 -0.0006 2942 3 Jan 2008 - 1 Nov 
2013 
  0.3297 -0.9579    
       
Malaysia MSCI stock pair (c_s1 and is_s1) 0.0007 0.0000 1374 4 Jan 2011 - 31 Oct 
2013 
  0.4730 -0.0524    
       
 FTSE stock pair (c_s2 and is_s2) 0.0006 0.0000 1374 4 Jan 2011 - 31 Oct 
2013 
  0.4138 -0.0274    
       
Turkey MSCI stock pair (c_s1 and is_s1) 0.0006 -0.0029** 1428 4 Jan 2011 - 1 Nov 
2013 
  0.2829 -2.5340    
       
UK MSCI stock pair (c_s1 and is_s1) -0.0022 0.0004 3640 14 Aug 2006 - 1 Nov 
2013 
  -1.1507 0.8208    
       
 Dow Jones stock pair (c_s2 and is_s2) -0.0010 0.0002 5458 3 Jan 2003 - 1 Nov 
2013 
  -0.6111 0.4493    
       
US MSCI stock pair (c_s1 and is_s1) -0.0033 -0.0004 3550 14 Aug 2006 - 30 Aug 
2013 
  -1.4669 -1.1084    
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 Dow Jones stock pair (c_s2 and is_s2) -0.0022 0.0002 6368 3 Jan 2001 - 30 Aug 
2013 
  -1.0689 0.4478    
 
Table 3.15: Panel Regressions for Stocks with GDP Surprises 
Country Asset pair γi
GDP βi
GDP Observations Sample period 
Australia MSCI stock pair (c_s1 and is_s1) 0.0047 -0.0001 3640 14 Aug 2006 - 1 Nov 
2013 
  1.5219 -0.1898    
       
Canada MSCI stock pair (c_s1 and is_s1) 0.0064** 0.0003 2982 4 Dec 2007 - 1 Nov 2013 
  2.5372 0.4571    
       
 Dow Jones stock pair (c_s2 and is_s2) 0.0066*** -0.0004 2982 4 Dec 2007 - 1 Nov 2013 
  2.6092 -0.4465    
       
France MSCI stock pair (c_s1 and is_s1) -0.0023 0.0003 3526 2 Nov 2006 - 1 Nov 2013 
  -0.2750 0.2692    
       
 S&P stock pair (c_s2 and is_s2) -0.0056 0.0013 2724 10 Jun 2008 - 1 Nov 
2013 
  -0.5075 0.6558    
       
Germany MSCI stock pair (c_s1 and is_s1) 0.0000 0.0006 3640 14 Aug 2006 - 1 Nov 
2013 
  -0.0157 1.2960    
       
 S&P stock pair (c_s2 and is_s2) 0.0002 -0.0007 2724 10 Jun 2008 - 1 Nov 
2013 
  0.0888 -1.0930    
       
Indonesia MSCI stock pair (c_s1 and is_s1) -0.0130*** 0.0017** 1428 4 Jan 2011 - 1 Nov 2013 
  -3.2024 2.2590    
       
Italy MSCI stock pair (c_s1 and is_s1) -0.0034*** -0.0010 3640 14 Aug 2006 - 1 Nov 
2013 
  -3.3602 -1.1770    
       
Japan MSCI stock pair (c_s1 and is_s1) 0.0025 0.0004 2942 3 Jan 2008 - 1 Nov 2013 
  1.1111 0.6760    
       
 Dow Jones stock pair (c_s2 and is_s2) 0.0028 0.0002 2942 3 Jan 2008 - 1 Nov 2013 
  1.2077 0.2438    
       
Malaysia MSCI stock pair (c_s1 and is_s1) -0.0032 -0.0012 1374 4 Jan 2011 - 31 Oct 
2013 
  -0.9058 -1.5289    
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 FTSE stock pair (c_s2 and is_s2) -0.0039 -0.0004 1374 4 Jan 2011 - 31 Oct 
2013 
  -1.0968 -0.8985    
       
Turkey MSCI stock pair (c_s1 and is_s1) -0.0005 0.0003 2102 2 Sep 2009 - 1 Nov 2013 
  -0.3401 0.1052    
       
UK MSCI stock pair (c_s1 and is_s1) 0.0016 -0.0005 3640 14 Aug 2006 - 1 Nov 
2013 
  0.6806 -1.2368    
       
 Dow Jones stock pair (c_s2 and is_s2) 0.0011 -0.0001 5458 3 Jan 2003 - 1 Nov 2013 
  0.5116 -0.2458    
       
US MSCI stock pair (c_s1 and is_s1) -0.0011 0.0005* 3550 14 Aug 2006 - 30 Aug 
2013 
  -0.6319 1.6866    
       
 Dow Jones stock pair (c_s2 and is_s2) -0.0001 0.0003 6368 3 Jan 2001 - 30 Aug 
2013 
  -0.0983 0.9341    
 
Table 3.16: Panel Regressions for Malaysian Bonds with Macroeconomic Surprises 
Country Asset pair γi
e βi
e Observations Sample period 
Panel A: Interest rates 
 Quantshop corporate bond pair 
(q_c_corp and q_is_corp)  
-0.2995** 0.0306*** 4062 1 Sep 2005 - 31 Oct 
2013 
  -2.4727 3.2965   
      
 Quantshop government bond pair 
(q_c_govt and q_is_govt) 
-0.0348 0.0494* 1672 3 Jun 2010 - 31 Oct 
2013 
  -0.1063 1.8221   
      
 Quantshop corporate + government 
bond pair (q_c_bonds and 
q_is_bonds) 
-0.0179 0.0375** 1672 3 Jun 2010 - 31 Oct 
2013 
  -0.0542 2.3004   
      
Panel B: CPI 
 Quantshop corporate bond pair 
(q_c_corp and q_is_corp) 
-0.0013 -0.0001 1374 4 Jan 2011 - 31 Oct 
2013 
  -0.9406 -0.5719   
      
 Quantshop government bond pair 
(q_c_govt and q_is_govt) 
-0.0013 0.0001 1374 4 Jan 2011 - 31 Oct 
2013 
  -0.9527 0.8595   
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 Quantshop corporate + government 
bond pair (q_c_bonds and 
q_is_bonds) 
-0.0013 0.0000 1374 4 Jan 2011 - 31 Oct 
2013 
  -0.9580 -0.3221   
      
Panel C: Industrial production 
 Quantshop corporate bond pair 
(q_c_corp and q_is_corp) 
-0.0005 -0.0006 1374 4 Jan 2011 - 31 Oct 
2013 
  -0.5827 -0.9963   
      
 Quantshop government bond pair 
(q_c_govt and q_is_govt) 
-0.0003 0.0001 1374 4 Jan 2011 - 31 Oct 
2013 
  -0.3498 0.7591   
      
 Quantshop corporate + government 
bond pair (q_c_bonds and 
q_is_bonds) 
-0.0003 -0.0003 1374 4 Jan 2011 - 31 Oct 
2013 
  -0.3864 -1.0034   
      
Panel D: GDP 
 Quantshop corporate bond pair 
(q_c_corp and q_is_corp) 
-0.0027** 0.0001 1374 4 Jan 2011 - 31 Oct 
2013 
  -2.4494 1.1965   
      
 Quantshop government bond pair 
(q_c_govt and q_is_govt) 
-0.0027** 0.0001 1374 4 Jan 2011 - 31 Oct 
2013 
  -2.2384 0.8612   
      
 Quantshop corporate + government 
bond pair (q_c_bonds and 
q_is_bonds) 
-0.0027 0.0001 1374 4 Jan 2011 - 31 Oct 
2013 
  -2.2384 0.8612   
 
3.7.3. Further Analysis on Asset Level   
This section presents country level regressions to estimate the impact of macroeconomic 
surprises on the daily excess return and volatility of each stock and bond index within each 
country. These regressions are extensions of GARCH (1,1) models with the maximum 
likelihood (ML) estimates (using the BHHH algorithm) and Bollerslev-Wooldridge robust 
standard errors below the estimates (see equations 3.1 to 3.3 in the methodology section 3.4). 
There are 11 countries with several stock and bond indices each. Further, there are 4 groups 
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of regressions with different sample periods each. The reason for the grouping by sample 
period is that each country has a different availability of data time series and I want to include 
the maximum available time series for each country, while at the same time being able to 
compare the results across countries (holding the time period constant) and to compare the 
results across time (holding the country constant).  
Each table includes several columns with results of regressions for each asset that is available 
for the particular country, e.g. rt
c_s1
 is the column with regression results for the conventional 
stock 1 (c_s1) or rt
c_govt1
 is the column with regression results for the conventional 
government bond 1. The main coefficients of interest are γi (the average impact of a unit of 
standardised news surprise on the mean excess return on the announcement day), δi(-1) (the 
percentage impact of a unit absolute standardised news surprise on the conditional variance 
of the excess return on the day before the announcement is made), δi(0) (the percentage 
impact of a unit absolute standardised news surprise on the conditional variance of the excess 
return on the announcement day), δi(-1) (the percentage impact of a unit absolute 
standardised news surprise on the conditional variance of the excess return on the day after 
the announcement is made). Each table includes this set of 4 coefficients for each of the main 
macroeconomic news surprise variables (interest, CPI, unemployment and payrolls) that are 
available for that country and time period.  
All tables are in Appendix D, where Tables D.1 to D.3 present the GARCH(1,1) regressions 
for the US, France and Italy for the 2003-2013 sample period (2 Jan 2003 – 29 Aug 2013) 
which gives a 2684 includes observations after adjustments. Tables D.4 to D.8 present 
GARCH(1,1) regressions for the US, France, Italy, Germany and Australia for the 2007-2013 
sample period which gives a 1678 included observations after adjustments. Tables D.9 to 
D.15 present the GARCH(1,1) regressions for the US, France, Italy, Germany, Australia, 
Canada and Japan for the 2008-2013 sample period which gives a 1318 included observations 
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after adjustments. Tables D.16 to D.26 present the GARCH(1,1) regressions for the US, 
France, Italy, Germany, Australia, Canada, Japan, Indonesia, UK, Turkey and Malaysia for 
the 2011-2013 sample period which gives a 670 included observations after adjustments. 
Discussion of the differences across time and countries follows in section 3.7.4.1. 
3.7.3.1 Discussion of Differences across Time and Countries 
This sub-section presents a general discussion of Tables D.1 to D.26 about the impact of 
macroeconomic surprises on the conditional return and variance of stock and bond indices. 
The first paragraph summarises the differences in the impact of macroeconomic surprises 
across time, while the next three paragraphs discuss the differences in the impact of 
macroeconomic surprises across countries (holding the sample period constant), another two 
paragraphs compare the impact of macroeconomic surprises in the US to the study of 
Brenner, Pasquariello and Subrahmanyam (2009) and another paragraph concludes with a 
brief summary of results. 
While there are differences in the impact of macroeconomic surprises on stocks and bonds 
across time, the signs of the significant coefficients in a given country are very stable across 
the different time periods. As expected, the shorter time periods tend to have fewer 
significant coefficients, although occasionally the shorter time periods have significant 
coefficients appear that were not significant over the longer time periods, e.g. CPI becomes 
significant in Australia for the 2011-2013 time period while it was not significant in the 
2007-2013 time period. In Canada the interest variable explodes in the 2011-2013 time period 
which is due to having only one interest rate surprise over that period.  For a given country 
and time period there is usually a similar pattern for the same asset class (i.e. stocks or bonds) 
in the way their conditional mean and variance of excess returns reacts to macroeconomic 
news surprises.  
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However, there are very big differences in the impact of macroeconomic surprises across 
countries and across variables. For example, out of the three countries within the group with 
the longest sample period (2003-2013) interest rates have a strong negative impact on stock 
and bond returns in the US (𝛾𝑖
𝐼𝑁𝑇 is between -1.2624 and -0.1162 percentage points), while 
interest has a strong positive impact on stock (but not bond) returns in France (𝛾𝑖
𝐼𝑁𝑇is 
between 1.3867 and 1.4330 percentage points), and it has no significant impact on either 
stock or bond returns in Italy. Likewise, CPI has no significant impact on excess returns in 
the US or France, but it does have a negative impact on one of the two government bond 
returns in Italy (𝛾𝑖
𝐶𝑃𝐼 = −0.1905). Further, unemployment has a positive impact on 
government bond returns (but not stock or corporate bond returns) in the US (𝛾𝑖
𝑈𝑁𝐸 is 
between 0.0674 and 0.1128) and on one of the two government bond index returns (but not 
the stocks) in Italy (𝛾𝑖
𝑈𝑁𝐸 = 0.0990), while it has no impact on stock or bond returns in 
France.  
Likewise, when comparing all 11 countries in 2011-2013 the results differ a lot across 
countries. For example, higher interest rates are good news for many of Australian asset 
returns, for one German government bond, for all Japanese stock and bond returns, one 
Indonesian government bond and one Malaysian corporate bond. But interest rates are bad 
news for corporate bonds in France, for an Islamic stock in the UK, another Islamic stock in 
Turkey and a corporate bond in Malaysia. Similarly, while higher payrolls (i.e. employment), 
lower inflation (CPI) and lower unemployment tends to be good news for asset returns in 
many countries, there are a number of exceptions, e.g. higher employment is bad news for US 
bonds and for a Canadian bond index.  
The impact of surprise announcements on conditional asset volatility varies across variables, 
across asset classes and across countries, although there are also some patterns. For example, 
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for both stocks and bonds the volatility after the announcements either decreases or remains 
the same (𝛿𝑖
𝑒(1) ≤ 0). More often, the volatility increases (rather than decreases) on the day 
before the announcement, while there are an about equal number of higher or lower volatility 
on the day of the announcement. The impact on volatility is stronger when the surprises relate 
to interest rates or to CPI, whereas there is less impact when payrolls or unemployment rate 
announcements are made.  
There are some similarities and differences to the results from GARCH(1,1) models in 
Brenner, Pasquariello and Subrahmanyam (2009) who study the impact of macroeconomic 
surprises on US stock and bond returns over a 1986-2002 sample period. In Brenner, 
Pasquariello and Subrahmanyam (2009), there is little evidence of an impact on conditional 
mean excess returns by macroeconomic news surprises, except for a negative impact on the 
NASDAQ stocks by both interest rate and unemployment announcements (𝛾𝑖
𝐹𝐸𝐷(0) =
−0.135⁡𝑎𝑛𝑑⁡𝛾𝑖
𝑈𝑁𝐸(0) = −0.142). My study finds the same but stronger results for interest 
rate announcements in the US sample which have a strong negative impact on all stock and 
bond returns (−1.2624 ≤ 𝛾𝑖
𝐹𝐸𝐷(0) ≤ −1.0344 for stocks).61 As in Brenner, Pasquariello and 
Subrahmanyam (2009), CPI has no significant impact on asset returns. But unlike Brenner, 
Pasquariello and Subrahmanyam (2009), I do not find a negative impact of unemployment 
surprises on stock returns, although they do have a positive impact on government bond 
returns (0.0674 ≤ 𝛾𝑖
𝑈𝑁𝐸(0) ≤ 0.1128). In addition, I find that payroll surprises have a 
consistently strong positive impact on stocks (0.3294 ≤ 𝛾𝑖
𝑃𝐴𝑌(0) ≤ 0.3636), whereas they 
have a consistently negative impact on bond returns (−0.3351 ≤ 𝛾𝑖
𝑃𝐴𝑌(0) ≤ −0.2574).62 
The significant impact of payrolls on stock and bond indices is consistent with evidence from 
                                                          
61
 I use the 2003-2011 as the longest time period to compare to the results in Brenner, Pasquariello and 
Subrahmanyam (2009). 
62
 In Table 5 of Brenner, Pasquariello and Subrahmanyam (2009) higher payrolls tend to be bad news for NYX 
stocks. 
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Andersen et al. (2007) and Vega (2007), as well as Brenner, Pasquariello and Subrahmanyam 
(2009: 1278) according to which “Nonfarm Payroll has the greatest information content 
among all public signals of the state of the US economy available to investors and 
speculators”. Differences in results between Brenner, Pasquariello and Subrahmanyam 
(2009) and my study could be attributed to the different sample as we use different stock and 
bond indices, different sample periods and a different database for obtaining the 
announcements and forecasts.  
The impact of surprises on asset volatility follows distinct patterns for stocks and bonds in 
Brenner, Pasquariello and Subrahmanyam (2009). Conditional stock return volatility 
decreases on the day before the announcement and then increases on the announcement day, 
which suggests that volatility is related to the arrival of new information as (Ross, 1989; 
Brenner, Pasquariello and Subrahmanyam, 2009). However, conditional bond return 
volatility rises on the day before the announcement and then decrease on the announcement 
day and the day after, which suggests that “the arrival of information leads to resolution 
and/or disagreement among market participants” (Brenner, Pasquariello and Subrahmanyam 
2009: 1266). Unlike Brenner, Pasquariello and Subrahmanyam (2009) my study does not 
show a clear pattern in volatility, except that the volatility on the day after the announcement 
either decreases or remains stable across all assets.
63
 Perhaps, the relatively shorter and more 
volatile sample period (which includes the global financial crisis) in my study has disturbed 
the volatility pattern that may appear in relatively calmer times as in Brenner, Pasquariello 
and Subrahmanyam’s (2009) study of the 1986-2002 sample period.  
Overall, it appears that the impact of macroeconomic news surprises on the mean and 
variance of excess returns is very sensitive to the country, asset and type of announcement. 
One reason could be that the quality and relevance of the announcement data can vary 
                                                          
63
 The only exception is 𝛿𝑖
𝑈𝑁𝐸(1) = 0.0029. 
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significantly across variables and countries. For example, a certain variable may be 
announced fortnightly and may be considered as a forecast of the future economy in a 
particular country, while the same variable may be announced with delay and at a lower 
frequency and therefore holds little new information content. Alternatively, different markets 
can be affected by the same type of news in different ways, such as higher interest rates that 
can be good news for countries or firms with large cash deposits, while it is bad news for 
those who have large amounts of debt. Further, the economies are different across countries, 
with different industry composition and size, economic cycles, firm characteristics, as well as 
regulations. 
3.7.4 Discussion of Results for the Three Hypotheses 
This section relates the results from panel regressions in sections 3.7.1 through 3.7.2, as well 
as the GARCH(1,1) regressions in sections 3.7.3 to the three hypotheses. Further, as I do not 
find enough evidence to support my hypotheses, I provide some possible explanations for my 
findings. 
3.7.4.1 Hypothesis 1 
Under the first hypothesis I expect real sector announcements (such as unemployment, 
payroll, retail sales, industrial production and GDP) to have a stronger impact on Islamic than 
conventional assets. In other words, I expect that |𝛾𝑖
𝑒 + 𝛽𝑖
𝑒| > |𝛾𝑖
𝑒|.64 However, what I find in 
the panel regressions (Tables 3.2 to 3.7) is that there is either no impact on either Islamic or 
conventional returns (i.e.⁡𝛾𝑖
𝑒 = 0 and 𝛽𝑖
𝑒 = 0), or that there is some impact on asset returns 
but without any difference between Islamic and conventional stocks/bonds (i.e.⁡𝛾𝑖
𝑒 ≠ 0 and 
𝛽𝑖
𝑒 = 0). This is consistently the case for the impact of retail sales announcements that has a 
                                                          
64
 See Table 3.1 in Methodology section 3.4 for the different combinations of 𝛽1,𝑖
𝑒  and 𝛾𝑖
𝑒 coefficients that will 
confirm or contradict my hypothesis. 
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positive impact on both Islamic and conventional stocks (0.1771 ≤ 𝛾𝑖
𝑅𝐸𝑇 ≤ 0.2474). In 
some samples payrolls also have a positive effect on both Islamic and conventional stocks 
(0.3562 ≤ 𝛾𝑖
𝑃𝐴𝑌 ≤ 0.3859 in the 2007 and 2011 panels), unemployment surprises have a 
negative effect on both Islamic and conventional stocks (𝛾𝑖
𝑈𝑁𝐸 = −0.2277), and GDP has a 
positive impact on Islamic and conventional stocks in the 2008 panel (𝛾𝑖
𝐺𝐷𝑃 = 0.1976) while 
it has a negative impact on both Islamic and conventional bonds in the 2011 panel of Table 
3.7 (𝛾𝑖
𝐺𝐷𝑃 = −0.2622).  
These results are confirmed by the GARCH(1,1) regressions from section 3.7.3 which only 
find mixed results, some of them supporting my hypothesis
65
 and others contradicting it.
66
 
When I test whether the difference in the impact between a given conventional and Islamic 
asset pair is significant (see section 3.7.2) I cannot find much evidence to support my 
hypotheses. In many cases there is no impact of a macroeconomic surprise on either 
conventional or Islamic asset return. Where the impact is significant it is usually of a similar 
magnitude on both Islamic and conventional assets, i.e.⁡𝛾𝑖
𝑒 ≠ 0 and 𝛽𝑖
𝑒 = 0 for the MSCI 
stock indices in Australia (unemployment, payrolls and GDP), the MSCI stock indices in the 
US and in Italy (retail sales), the MSCI stock indices in Italy (GDP) and all three bond asset 
pairs in Malaysia (GDP). Among the remaining asset pairs 6 confirm my hypothesis where 
the impact is only on Islamic but not on conventional assets (i.e.⁡𝛾𝑖
𝑒 = 0 and 𝛽𝑖
𝑒 ≠ 0), which 
include the MSCI and Dow Jones stock indices in Canada (unemployment), the MSCI asset 
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 For the US in the 2007-2013 and 2008-2013 samples, unemployment has a negative impact on one of the 
Islamic stocks but not its counterpart. In the 2011-2013 sample the unemployment announcements have a 
negative impact on all stocks in Australia but the effect is stronger on Islamic stocks, and it has a negative 
impact on a Canadian Islamic stock, as well as a positive impact on one of the Islamic stocks (is_s2) in the UK. 
Likewise, payrolls surprises sometimes have a stronger impact on Islamic stocks (US 2003-2013, Australia 
2007-2013 and 2008-2013 samples). 
66
 In the 2008-2013 sample unemployment has a negative impact on conventional stocks in both Australia and 
Canada, while having no impact on Islamic stocks. Further, in the 2011-2013 sample the unemployment 
announcements have a positive effect on all Japanese stocks, and is stronger for conventional stocks. Further, 
the impact of payroll surprises is often stronger on conventional stocks (US 2007-2013, 2008-2013 and 2011-
2013 and in Canada 2011-2013). 
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pair in Turkey (industrial production), the MSCI asset pair in Japan and the Dow Jones asset  
pair in UK (retail sales), as well as the MSCI asset pair in the US (GDP). On the other hand, 
two further asset pairs contradict my hypothesis, as there is an impact of macroeconomic 
surprises on both Islamic and conventional stocks but the impact on Islamic stocks is lower. 
This applies to the Dow Jones asset pair in the US where the impact of retail sales surprises 
is⁡𝛾𝑖
𝑒 = 0.0026 on conventional stocks and 𝛾𝑖
𝑒 + 𝛽𝑖
𝑒 = 0.0020 on Islamic stocks. Further, in 
Indonesia the impact of GDP surprises on the conventional stock index is 𝛾𝑖
𝑒 =⁡−0.0130 
while it is only 𝛾𝑖
𝑒 + 𝛽𝑖
𝑒 = −0.0112 on Islamic stocks. 
Overall, there is no consistent evidence that one of the macroeconomic surprises that 
represent indicators of the real economy (i.e. unemployment, payroll, industrial production, 
retail sales and GDP) has a different impact on Islamic versus conventional stocks. This 
might be because the mechanics of price formation is similar across Islamic and conventional 
assets despite their differences in stock composition and the different structuring of Islamic 
bonds. In fact, Islamic stock and bond indices have been structured to replicate their 
conventional assets and have few features of the traditional Islamic financial arrangements. 
The Islamic stock index applies filters to exclude stocks with certain characteristics, but it 
does not explicitly follow Islamic financial principles (e.g. there are few Islamic banks and 
few firms relying on Islamic loans) even in Islamic countries. Further, there has been 
criticism from Islamic scholars and jurists about Islamic bonds as some of their structures do 
not completely comply with the Islamic law.
67
 Even those Islamic bonds that are structured 
according to Islamic law have been “viewed as legal stratagems to reach illegitimate ends 
(forbidden riba) through legitimate sale means” (El-Gamal 2006: 74). 
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 “For instance, the highly respected and learned Saudi scholar ‘Abdullah ibn Mani’ retracted his approval of 
Bahraini government-issued ijara-sukuk after he was convinced that ownership of the underlying properties was 
not fully transferred to the lessor, as required in ijara (leasing) contracts discussed in great detail in classical 
jurisprudence books.” (El-Gamal 2006: 23). 
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3.7.4.2 Hypothesis 2 
Under the second hypothesis I expect the announcements of interest rate surprises to have a 
smaller or no impact on Islamic assets due to the prohibition of interest rates. Prohibition of 
interest rates means that firms that make up the Islamic stock indices hold only little cash and 
debt so should therefore be less sensitive to interest rate movements and surprises. So I 
expect that |𝛾𝑖
𝐼𝑁𝑇 + 𝛽𝑖
𝐼𝑁𝑇| < |𝛾𝑖
𝐼𝑁𝑇|.68 
However, most panel regressions in Tables 3.2 to 3.7 suggest that the opposite is the case. 
There are several regressions where there is a significant impact of interest rate 
announcements on Islamic assets but not on conventional assets (i.e. 𝛾𝑖
𝐼𝑁𝑇 = 0 and 𝛽𝑖
𝐼𝑁𝑇 ≠
0), which include the positive impact of interest rates on Islamic stocks (𝛽𝑖
𝐼𝑁𝑇 = 0.1593 in 
the 2003 panel) and the negative impact of interest rates on Islamic stocks (𝛽𝑖
𝐼𝑁𝑇 = −0.3933 
in the 2011 panel). Only one panel result provides some evidence to support hypothesis 2. In 
the 2008 panel of Table 3.7 the impact of interest rate announcements is -0.2995 on 
conventional bonds and -0.2689 on Islamic bonds, which is a slightly lower impact on 
Islamic assets compared to conventional ones. 
Results from the GARCH(1,1) regressions in this study are again very mixed, as data in some 
countries confirms hypothesis 2,
69
 while other findings from GARCH(1,1) regressions 
contradict hypothesis 2.
70
 When I test whether the difference in the impact between a given 
conventional and Islamic asset pair is significant (see section 3.7.2) all 18 pairs of stock 
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 See Table 3.1 in Methodology section 3.4 for the different combinations of 𝛽1,𝑖
𝐼𝑁𝑇 and 𝛾𝑖
𝐼𝑁𝑇 coefficients that 
will confirm or contradict my hypothesis.  
69
 For example, in the US (both 2003-2013 and 2007-2013 samples) the impact of interest rate surprises on stock 
returns is negative but the absolute impact is lower for Islamic stocks. Likewise, in the 2008-2013 sample, all 4 
stock indices in Germany are positive and significant, but the impact of interest rate announcements on the 
Islamic stocks is smaller. And in the 2011-2013 sample interest rate surprises only have a positive and 
significant impact on the conventional stock, while there is no impact on the Islamic stock. 
70
 For example, in the 2007-2013 sample both France and Germany have a positive and significant impact of 
interest rate surprises on stock returns (c_s1 and is_s1), but this time the impact on the Islamic stocks is bigger. 
Further, in the 2011-2013 sample the impact of interest rate surprises on Islamic stocks (is_s1) in the UK and in 
Turkey is negative and significant, while their conventional counterpart is not. 
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indices and 3 pairs of bonds indices contradict hypothesis 2. First of all, there is a number of 
asset pairs where interest rate surprises have no impact of either Islamic or conventional 
stocks (i.e. 𝛾𝑖
𝐼𝑁𝑇 = 0 and 𝛽𝑖
𝐼𝑁𝑇 = 0), which includes the MSCI and Dow Jones asset pairs in 
the US, the MSCI and FTSE asset pairs in Malaysia, the S&P asset pair in France, the MSCI 
asset pair in Indonesia, the MSCI and Dow Jones asset pairs in Japan and the Dow Jones 
asset pair in the UK. The remaining asset pairs indicate that the impact of interest rate 
surprises is bigger on Islamic assets relative to conventional ones. For 6 asset pairs there is no 
impact of interest rate surprises on conventional stocks and bonds while there is an impact on 
Islamic stocks and bonds (i.e. 𝛾𝑖
𝐼𝑁𝑇 = 0 and 𝛽𝑖
𝐼𝑁𝑇 ≠ 0), which include the MSCI stock pairs 
in Australia, Canada,  Germany, Italy, Turkey and the UK, as well as all three bond pairs in 
Malaysia in the 2010 panel (either positive (0.0375 ≤ 𝛽𝑖
𝐼𝑁𝑇 ≤ 0.0494) or negative (𝛽𝑖
𝐼𝑁𝑇 =
−0.1127) impact). For another two asset pairs there is an impact on both Islamic and 
conventional stocks but the impact is bigger on Islamic stocks: in Canada the impact on the 
conventional Dow Jones stock index is 𝛾𝑖
𝐼𝑁𝑇 = −0.0077 and on the Islamic Dow Jones stock 
index 𝛾𝑖
𝐼𝑁𝑇 + 𝛽𝑖
𝐼𝑁𝑇 = −0.0114, and in France the impact on the conventional MSCI stock 
index is 𝛾𝑖
𝐼𝑁𝑇 = 0.1714 and on the Islamic MSCI stock index 𝛾𝑖
𝐼𝑁𝑇 + 𝛽𝑖
𝐼𝑁𝑇 = 0.1955. 
The finding that interest rate announcements have a significant impact on Islamic stocks is 
surprising.
71
 Islamic stock indices comprise stocks of firms that hold no or only little cash and 
debt and would therefore likely be less sensitive to fluctuations in interest rates. Likewise, 
Islamic bonds are structured based on partnership and leasing arrangements that avoid 
explicit interest rates. It could be that interest rate changes signal the central bank’s 
expectations about the future economic prospects that are relevant to Islamic assets just as 
they are to conventional assets. 
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 Although there is some empirical evidence that supports this finding. For example, Kassim, Majid and Yusof 
(2009) and Ergeç and Arslan (2013) suggest that Islamic banks might be more sensitive to changes in interest 
rates relative to conventional banks in Malaysia and Turkey.    
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A possible explanation of a stronger impact of interest rate surprises on Islamic rather than 
conventional assets is that under Islamic finance the fixed interest rate is replaced with a 
variable profit rate. This originally means that deposits and investments earn a predetermined 
proportion of the profits that will be made in future. However, in practice profit rates are 
often tied to a conventional interest rate (e.g. LIBOR) and this could explain why Islamic 
assets are more sensitive to interest rate surprises as those will affect the profit rate. This 
might suggest that firms that invest their money or borrow at a fixed interest rate are more 
immune to interest rate surprises than Islamic firms that borrow and invest at variable profit 
rates that depend on the realised profit.  
Another possible explanation is that firms with high cash and debt holdings (i.e. conventional 
stocks) might have an incentive to monitor the interest rate movements more carefully and 
perhaps make their own, accurate, forecasts of interest rate announcements. Such firms would 
experience the surprise component of interest rate announcements as smaller relative to firms 
with lower cash and debt holdings (i.e. Islamic stocks) that do not have an incentive to 
closely monitor interest rates.  
3.7.4.3 Hypothesis 3 
Under the third hypothesis I expect the announcements of inflation (CPI and PPI) surprises to 
have a smaller or no impact on Islamic assets due to the prohibition of interest rates. Islamic 
assets may be considered more immune to inflation as they are based on profit rates that are 
determined based on the realised profit rather than a predetermined fixed interest rate. 
Therefore I expect to see a lower impact of inflation announcements (CPI or PPI) on Islamic 
assets, so that |𝛾𝑖
𝑒 + 𝛽𝑖
𝑒| < |𝛾𝑖
𝑒| where e refers to either CPI or PPI announcements.72 
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 See Table 3.1 in Methodology section 3.4 for the different combinations of 𝛽1,𝑖
𝑒  and 𝛾𝑖
𝑒 coefficients that will 
confirm or contradict my hypothesis. 
 147  
 
The panel regressions in Tables 3.2 to 3.7 contradict hypothesis 3. There is no impact of 
inflation surprises on stocks in the 2003 panel (Table 3.2) and on bonds (Table 3.7), while 
there is an equal impact on both Islamic and conventional stocks (−0.2207 ≤ 𝛾𝑖
𝑃𝑃𝐼 ≤
−0.1502) in the 2007, 2008 and unbalanced panels (Tables 3.3, 3.4 and 3.6). In the 2011 
panel (Table 3.5) CPI surprises have no impact on conventional stocks while they affect 
Islamic stocks (𝛾𝑖
𝐶𝑃𝐼 = 0⁡and 𝛽𝑖
𝐶𝑃𝐼 = 0.0723). 
Results from the GARCH(1,1) regressions mostly contradict hypothesis 3 and in most cases 
inflation has no significant impact on mean excess returns of stocks and bonds,
73
 although 
there is some evidence that confirms hypothesis 3.
74
 When I test whether the difference in the 
impact between a given conventional and Islamic asset pair is significant (see section 3.7.2) I 
find that all but one asset pair contradict hypothesis 3. In most cases, the inflation surprises 
have no impact on either Islamic or conventional assets (𝛾𝑖
𝑒 = 𝛽𝑖
𝑒 = 0), which includes stock 
pairs in the US, Malaysia, Australia, Canada, France, Turkey, the UK and the MSCI stock 
pair in Germany when CPI is used as the proxy for inflation, and stock pairs in the US, 
Australia, Canada, France, Japan and the UK when PPI is used as the proxy for inflation. 
Likewise, there is no impact of CPI surprises on Malaysian bond pairs. In three cases there is 
an equal impact of inflation (PPI) surprises on both Islamic and conventional stocks (i.e. 
𝛾𝑖
𝑒 ≠ 0 and 𝛽𝑖
𝑒 = 0), which includes the MSCI and S&P stock pairs in Germany and the 
MSCI stock pair in Indonesia. In another two cases, inflation surprises have no impact on 
conventional stocks but they do have a positive impact on Islamic stocks (𝛾𝑖
𝑒 = 0 and 𝛽𝑖
𝑒 ≠
                                                          
73
 In the 2008-2013 sample CPI announcements have a positive impact on Islamic stocks (is_s1 & is_s2) but no 
impact on conventional stocks (c_s1 & c_s2). In the 2011-2013 sample the CPI announcements have a negative 
impact on all German stocks and the impact is greater for Islamic stocks, while they have a positive impact on 
all Canadian stocks and the impact is again greater for Islamic stocks. In the US CPI announcements have a 
negative impact on two conventional stocks (c_s1 & c_s3) and one Islamic stock (is_s2) but no impact on 
another conventional stock (c_s2) and the other Islamic stock (is_s1). 
74
 For example, in the 2008-2013 sample CPI announcements have a negative impact on conventional stocks in 
France and Australia but no impact on Islamic stocks in those countries. Likewise, in the 2011-2013 sample, 
CPI announcements have a negative impact on conventional and Islamic stocks in Italy, but the impact is greater 
on conventional stocks.  
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0), which includes the S&P stock pair in Germany and the MSCI stock pair in Indonesia. 
There is only one asset pair that provides evidence to support the hypothesis that the impact 
of inflation surprises is less on Islamic than conventional assets: In Italy the CPI surprises 
have a smaller impact on the Islamic MSCI stock index (𝛾𝑖
𝑒 + 𝛽𝑖
𝑒 = −0.0026) than on the 
conventional MSCI stock index (𝛾𝑖
𝑒 = −0.0040). 
The reason that inflation surprises have often no impact on either asset returns could be that 
there are usually small changes in inflation from one period to the next and in many countries 
there are unlikely to be big jumps in inflation that would affect asset prices. This is consistent 
with findings by Brenner, Pasquariello and Subrahmanyam (2009), who find that CPI 
surprises have no impact on the conditional mean, and tend to have the lowest impact on the 
conditional variance of asset returns in the US. They argue that this may be due to the 
“relative stability of inflation expectations and the Fed’s significant credibility in fighting 
inflation over our sample period 1986-2002” (Brenner, Pasquariello and Subrahmanyam 
2009: 1278).  
3.7.5 Sensitivity and Further Analysis 
This section provides deeper insights into asset price formation around the announcement of 
macroeconomic surprises by accounting for the business cycle, the definition of the surprise 
variable, the information content of the news and crisis versus non-crisis periods. 
3.7.5.1 NBER Cycles 
To account for potential differences in how asset returns react to macroeconomic surprises 
during economic expansions and contractions, I repeat the main analysis for the unbalanced 
stock and bond panels (Tables 3.6 to 3.7) with an additional expansion dummy variable. This 
expansion variable is equal to 1 when the US economy is expanding and 0 during an 
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economic contraction. I use the US Business Cycle Expansions and Contractions data 
provided by NBER to define the expansion dummy variable, according to which the US 
economy went through a peak in March 2001, a trough in November 2001, a peak in 
December 2007 and another trough in June 2009. Accordingly, the expansion variable takes 
the value of 1 during March 1991 to February 2001, November 2001 to November 2007 and 
June 2009 to October 2013. 
Table 3.17 shows how the impact of macroeconomic surprises differs during expansion and 
contraction cycles. As in Table 6, there is no impact of interest rate surprises, CPI, payroll, 
industrial production and GDP surprises on stock returns. The previously positive impact of 
retail sales surprises on Islamic and conventional stocks disappears when accounting for the 
business cycles. There is an additional effect of unemployment surprises which has an impact 
on Islamic stocks only, and this impact is positive during contractions and negative during 
expansions. The previously negative impact of PPI on conventional and Islamic stock returns 
is now only significant for Islamic stocks during an expansion.   
I can only include the expansion dummy in the bond panel with interest rates (starting in 
2005) because the remaining panels have sample starting from 2010 onwards during which 
the expansion dummy would always take the value of 1. This means that those panel 
regressions in Table 3.7 already refer to the expansion cycle only, and no data is available to 
test whether results will be different during an economic contraction. Previously, Table 3.7 
suggests that the impact of interest rate surprises is negative on Islamic bonds (-0.2689) and 
on conventional bonds (-0.2995), and this effect is stronger for conventional bonds. Table 
3.17 now confirms these results which are attributed to contraction cycles only, with the 
negative impact being -0.3359 on Islamic bonds and -0.3661 on conventional bonds. 
However, during an expansion interest rate surprises have a positive impact of 0.3847 on both 
Islamic and conventional bonds. 
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Table 3.17: Unbalanced Panel Regressions for Stocks and Bonds with Expansion and 
Contraction Cycles 
 C Assets - 
Contraction 
C Asset - 
Expansion 
IS Assets - 
Contraction 
IS Assets - 
Expansion 
cross-
sections 
total panel 
observations 
Panel A: Unbalanced Stock Panel    
Interest 0.5931 -0.8931 -0.0060 -0.1363 36 75273 
 1.2310 -1.5939 -0.0726 -1.0846   
       
Unemployment -0.4160 0.3766 0.1521** -0.1620** 30 53664 
 -1.5323 1.3427 2.2473 -2.2542   
       
CPI -0.4553 0.4747 0.0614 -0.0382 32 57890 
 -1.4258 1.4582 0.5564 -0.3289   
       
Payroll -0.4095 0.6537 0.0638 -0.0697 14 24566 
 -0.7576 1.1949 0.5242 -0.5395   
       
PPI -0.1901 0.0560 0.0960 -0.1534** 28 55206 
 -0.9944 0.2770 1.4986 -2.1465   
       
IP -0.2887 0.3151 0.0344 -0.0213 28 52800 
 -1.1777 1.2358 0.4465 -0.2545   
       
Retail 0.2693 -0.1230 -0.0388 0.0428 24 48538 
 1.5930 -0.6723 -0.7816 0.7592   
       
GDP 0.2163 -0.1494 0.0222 -0.0003 35 60907 
 0.9235 -0.6119 0.4668 -0.0063   
       
Panel B: Unbalanced Bond Panel    
Interest -0.3661*** 0.3847* 0.0302*** 0.0020 2 4062 
 -2.7056 1.7673 8.6332 0.0398   
 
3.7.5.2 Alternative Definition of Interest Rate Surprises 
Descriptive statistics of interest rates (see Appendix C) suggest that many interest rate 
announcements are not classified as surprises due to the cut-off value of 0.05 (as defined in 
section 3.5.3). For example, in the US, 87 interest rate announcements were made during 
2003-2013 but only 6 of them are classified as surprises and used in the analysis of this study. 
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To examine whether the choice of 0.05 as the cut-off value for interest rate surprises affects 
the results, I use an alternative definition of interest rate surprises, according to which any 
difference between the actual and expected change in interest rates is classified as a surprise. 
Table 3.18 summarises the descriptive statistics of the actual interest rate announcements and 
the surprise content of interest rate announcements according to the new alternative definition 
of surprise. This table includes 8 individual countries and Europe (which covers France, 
Germany and Italy) and uses the longest sample period over which the actual and expected 
interest rate changes are available. There is a considerably higher proportion of interest rate 
changes that is classified as a surprise. For example, over 2001-2013 there are 102 interest 
rate announcement in the US and 47 of them are classified as a surprise. 
Table 3.18: Descriptive Statistics of Interest Rates with Alternative Definition of 
Surprise 
 Australia Canada Europe Indonesia Japan Malaysia Turkey UK US 
Announcement         
Mean -0.02 -0.02 -0.02 0.03 0 0.00 -0.06 -0.03 -0.05 
Median 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
Std Dev 0.24 0.20 0.15 0.18 0.06 0.15 0.16 0.20 0.26 
Min 0.75 0.25 0.25 0.5 0.25 0.3 0 0.25 0.25 
Max -1 -0.75 -0.75 -0.5 -0.25 -0.75 -0.5 -1.5 -1 
N 110 86 128 33 109 62 41 128 102 
          
Surprise          
Mean 0.00 -0.07 0.00 0.02 0.00 -0.01 0 0.00 -0.02 
Median 0.01 -0.03 0.01 0.00 -0.01 0.01 0.25 -0.01 0.00 
Std Dev 0.10 0.20 0.04 0.28 0.01 0.11 0.41 0.07 0.13 
Min 0.22 0.28 0.16 0.5 0.04 0.14 0.5 0.27 0.23 
Max -0.51 -0.46 -0.09 -0.25 -0.06 -0.41 -0.5 -0.4 -0.74 
N 80 13 105 13 62 34 7 106 47 
          
Sample 2003-
2013 
2003-
2013 
2003-
2013 
2011-
2013 
2006-
2013 
2004-
2013 
2009-
2013 
2003-
2013 
2001-
2013 
 
 152  
 
Table 3.19 repeats the analysis of Tables 3.6 to 3.7 for unbalanced stock and bond panels for 
just the interest rate surprises using the alternative definition. As in Table 3.17, it also 
differentiates between expansion and contraction cycles. While Table 3.6 suggests that there 
is no impact of interest rate surprises on stock returns, Table 3.19 finds that using the 
alternative definition of interest rate surprises, there is a strong positive and significant impact 
(0.3641) on conventional and Islamic stocks. This effect is attributed to contraction cycles 
only, which becomes stronger up to 0.5016, while there is no effect during expansions. In an 
unbalanced bond panel the interest rate surprises do not have any impact on bonds during 
either business cycle. 
 Table 3.19: Unbalanced Panel Regressions for Stocks and Bonds with Alternative 
Definition of Interest Surprise 
 
3.7.5.3 Differentiating between Positive and Negative Surprises 
There could be a different impact of positive versus negative surprises on asset returns. As a 
sensitivity analysis I sort macroeconomic announcements and surprises in the US into either 
 C Assets IS 
Assets 
C Assets - 
Contraction 
C Asset - 
Expansion 
IS Assets - 
Contraction 
IS Assets - 
Expansion 
cross-
sections 
total panel 
observations 
Panel A: Unbalanced Stock Panel      
Interest 0.3641** 0.0577     36 75273 
 2.0721 1.1523       
         
Interest   0.5016* -0.2612 0.0471 -0.0058 36 75273 
   1.7704 -0.7408 1.0609 -0.0614   
         
Panel B: Unbalanced Bond Panel      
Interest 0.0429 0.0018     6 7406 
 0.7122 0.5135       
         
Interest   0.0549 -0.0421 0.0037 -0.0066 6 7406 
   0.8775 -0.2642 1.0215 -0.6911   
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positive or negative (including zero) values. A summary of the descriptive statistics is in 
Table 20, which is followed by results of panel regression with MSCI stock indices in Table 
3.21 and Dow Jones stock indices in Table 3.22. 
There is evidence of a different reaction of asset returns to higher than expected versus lower 
than expected macroeconomic surprises. As in Tables 3.11 to 3.13, there is no significant 
impact of CPI and payrolls on MSCI stock indices, and of CPI, payrolls, industrial production 
and PPI on Dow Jones stock indices in the US. However, several additional effects emerge 
when differentiating the information content of the surprises. According to Table 3.9 there 
was no impact of interest rate surprises on US stocks, while Table 3.21 suggests that there is 
a positive and significant impact of higher than expected interest rate rises on conventional 
stocks (5.2323) and Islamic stocks (4.0291) and there is no impact of lower than expected 
interest rate rises on conventional stocks and a positive impact on Islamic stocks (0.2324). 
Likewise, Table 3.22 shows that using the Dow Jones stock indices, a lower than expected 
increase in interest rates has a positive effect on Islamic stocks (0.2726). An additional effect 
also comes up for higher than expected unemployment rises which has a positive impact on 
Islamic MSCI indices (0.0925), while it has a negative impact on conventional and Islamic 
Dow Jones stock indices (-0.4191). Table 3.21 also suggests that higher than expected 
inflation (PPI) has a positive impact on Islamic stocks (0.0623). Further, lower than expected 
industrial production has a negative impact on Islamic stocks (-0.0895). As in Table 3.15, 
there is an overall positive impact of higher retail sales on MSCI stocks in Table 3.21, with 
higher than expected growth in retail sales having an equal impact of 0.5416 on both Islamic 
and conventional stocks, while lower than expected growth in retail sales has a positive 
impact of 0.7598 on conventional stocks and a positive, but smaller, impact of 0.6318 on 
Islamic stocks. In Table 3.22, higher than expected growth in retail sales has a positive 
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Table 3.20: Descriptive Statistics of Positive and Negative Macroeconomic Events in US (2001-2013) 
 Payroll Payroll + Payroll - Unem- 
ployment 
Unem- 
ployment + 
Unem- 
ployment - 
PPI PPI + PPI - Retail Sales Retail Sales + Retail Sales - 
Announcement            
Mean 273.27 1375.46 -1681.64 0.02 0.22 -0.10 0.23 0.71 -0.01 0.26 0.77 -0.01 
Median 780 1260 -930 0 0.2 -0.1 0.2 0.55 0.00 0.3 0.55 0.00 
Std Dev 1932.83 791.08 1822.54 0.19 0.14 0.10 0.87 0.58 0.01 1.09 0.84 0.01 
Min -6630 10 -6630 -0.4 0.1 -0.4 -2.8 0.1 -0.03 -3.7 0.1 -0.04 
Max 4310 4310 0 0.5 0.5 0 3.2 3.2 0 7.1 7.1 0 
N 153 97 55 151 56 95 150 96 54 153 100 53 
             
Surprise             
Mean -252.81 701.59 -852.71 -0.05 0.17 0.00 0.03 0.44 0.00 0.00 0.49 0.00 
Median -420 605 -745 -0.1 0.15 0.00 -0.1 0.3 0.00 -0.1 0.4 0.00 
Std Dev 911.89 460.66 532.54 0.18 0.08 0.00 0.53 0.36 0.00 0.68 0.62 0.00 
Min -3280 210 -3280 -0.5 0.1 -0.01 -1.3 0.1 -0.01 -1.7 0.1 -0.02 
Max 1930 1930 -210 0.4 0.4 0.00 1.6 1.6 0.00 4.6 4.6 0.00 
N 114 44 70 114 40 74 139 69 70 142 67 75 
             
             
 CPI CPI + CPI - Industrial 
Production 
Industrial 
Production + 
Industrial 
Production - 
GDP GDP + GDP - Interest 
rate 
Interest rate 
+ 
Interest rate 
- 
Announcement            
Mean 0.19 0.35 0.00 0.09 0.49 -0.01 2.14 2.69 -0.03 -0.05 0.25 -0.11 
Median 0.2 0.3 0.00 0.1 0.4 0.00 2.2 2.5 -0.01 0 0.25 0 
Std Dev 0.35 0.21 0.00 0.65 0.32 0.01 2.34 1.58 0.03 0.26 0.00 0.25 
Min -1.7 0.1 -0.02 -2.8 0.1 -0.03 -6.3 0.1 -0.06 -1 0.25 -1 
Max 1.2 1.2 0 1.3 1.3 0 8.2 8.2 0.00 0.25 0.25 0 
N 152 106 46 152 91 61 152 136 16 102 17 85 
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Surprise             
Mean -0.03 0.14 0.00 -0.08 0.28 0.00 -0.06 0.39 0.00 0.11 0.56 -0.01 
Median -0.1 0.1 0.00 -0.1 0.2 0.00 -0.1 0.3 0.00 0.25 0.25 -0.01 
Std Dev 0.16 0.07 0.00 0.44 0.21 0.00 0.51 0.36 0.00 0.73 0.63 0.00 
Min -0.4 0.1 0.00 -2.3 0.1 -0.02 -1.7 0.1 -0.02 -0.75 0.25 -0.01 
Max 0.4 0.4 0.00 1.1 1.1 0.00 1.6 1.6 0.00 1.5 1.5 0.00 
N 102 44 58 140 64 76 125 53 72 7 4 3 
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impact on Islamic and conventional Dow Jones indices (0.1688) and lower than expected 
growth in retail sales has a negative impact on Islamic stocks (-0.0972) but not on 
conventional stocks. Table 3.21 confirms that higher growth in GDP has a positive impact on 
Islamic MSCI indices, and shows that this only applies to lower than expected growth 
(0.1006). This is also the case for Dow Jones stocks in Table 3.22, according to which lower 
than expected growth in GDP has a positive impact on Islamic stocks (0.0537). 
Table 3.21: MSCI Stock Regressions for the US with Positive and Negative Surprises 
 
  
 
 
 
 
total panel 
observations 
Interest 5.2323*** 0.0416 -1.2032*** 0.2324*** 3550 
 6.6866 0.0917 -10.6209 4.0879  
      
Unemployment -0.5073* 0.0460 0.0925* 0.0166 3550 
 -1.6639 0.4480 1.6459 0.5679  
      
CPI 0.0008 0.0695 -0.1931 0.0035 3550 
 0.0019 0.1386 -1.5683 0.0357  
      
Payroll 0.3029 0.3157 -0.0421 0.0485 3550 
 1.1309 0.7050 -0.5679 0.5048  
      
PPI 0.0343 0.0249 0.0623** -0.1118 3550 
 0.2889 0.0861 1.9969 -1.4008  
      
IP -0.1297 -0.1872 0.0154 -0.0895*** 3550 
 -0.4230 -0.9152 0.1657 -3.0025  
      
Retail 0.5416** 0.7598* 0.0166 -0.1280** 3550 
 2.5418 1.9261 0.4559 -2.1888  
      
GDP -0.0984 -0.0806 0.0033 0.1006** 3550 
 -0.2992 -0.3409 0.0695 2.5658  
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Table 3.22: Dow Jones Stock Regressions for the US with Positive and Negative 
Surprises 
 
  
 
 
 
 
total panel 
observations 
Interest 1.3367 -0.1827 -0.2429 0.2726*** 6368 
 0.8827 -0.3454 -1.0668 3.7348  
      
Unemployment -0.4191* 0.1150 0.0146 0.0153 6368 
 -1.7694 1.0670 0.2988 0.5498  
      
CPI 0.0208 0.0173 -0.1023 0.0189 6368 
 0.0736 0.0566 -1.4017 0.3166  
      
Payroll 0.0084 0.2026 -0.0271 0.0166 6368 
 0.0422 1.0793 -0.3848 0.5097  
      
PPI -0.0612 0.0305 0.0034 -0.0644 6368 
 -0.6689 0.1737 0.1189 -1.2919  
      
IP -0.0218 -0.1303 0.0000 -0.0383 6368 
 -0.0927 -0.7115 -0.0004 -0.8592  
      
Retail 0.1688** 0.4444 -0.0226 -0.0972** 6368 
 2.0160 1.5929 -1.2757 -2.1745  
      
GDP 0.0629 -0.0902 -0.0059 0.0537* 6368 
 0.3346 -0.6862 -0.1528 1.6487  
 
 
3.7.5.4 Crisis and non-Crisis Period in the US 
Section 3.7.5.4 adds to the above analysis by extending the US GARCH(1,1) from section 
3.7.3 for a slightly longer time period (2001-2013) and then dividing this sample period into 
pre-crisis (2001 to 15 March 2008), crisis (16 March 2008 to 30 March 2009) and post-crisis 
(31 March 2009 to 2013) periods. In fact, a study by Boyd, Hu and Jagannathan (2005) finds 
that the impact of unemployment announcements varies across states of the economy and it is 
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likely that this applies to other types of announcements as well.
75
 Overall, the results in 
Tables 3.23 to 3.26 support the findings in the GARCH(1,1) models of section 3.7.3. 
However, there are some shifts in the relevance of macroeconomic news surprises across 
crisis and non-crisis periods. In the pre-crisis period the interest rate announcements and the 
payroll announcements are the only relevant variables (𝛾𝑖
𝐼𝑁𝑇 < 0⁡𝑓𝑜𝑟⁡𝑎𝑙𝑙⁡𝑎𝑠𝑠𝑒𝑡𝑠, 𝛾𝑖
𝑃𝐴𝑌 >
0⁡𝑓𝑜𝑟⁡𝐼𝑠𝑙𝑎𝑚𝑖𝑐⁡𝑠𝑡𝑜𝑐𝑘⁡2⁡𝑎𝑛𝑑⁡𝛾𝑖
𝑃𝐴𝑌 < 𝑓𝑜𝑟⁡𝑎𝑙𝑙⁡𝑏𝑜𝑛𝑑𝑠) while during the crisis unemployment 
announcements have a strong impact on all assets (𝛾𝑖
𝑈𝑁𝐸 < 0⁡𝑓𝑜𝑟⁡𝑠𝑡𝑜𝑐𝑘𝑠⁡𝑎𝑛𝑑⁡𝛾𝑖
𝑈𝑁𝐸 >
0⁡𝑓𝑜𝑟⁡𝑏𝑜𝑛𝑑𝑠), CPI has a negative impact on one of the government bond indices, and 
payrolls have a negative impact on conventional and Islamic stocks (c_s2 and is_s2). After 
the crisis, payrolls are the most significant announcements and are now good news for stocks 
and bad news for bonds (𝛾𝑖
𝑃𝐴𝑌 > 0⁡𝑓𝑜𝑟⁡𝑠𝑡𝑜𝑐𝑘𝑠⁡𝑎𝑛𝑑⁡𝛾𝑖
𝑃𝐴𝑌 < 0⁡𝑓𝑜𝑟⁡𝑏𝑜𝑛𝑑𝑠. And CPI has a 
negative impact on conventional stocks (c_s1). 
  
                                                          
75
 For example, surprisingly rising unemployment tends to be good news for the stock market during economic 
expansions and bad news during economic contractions. 
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Table 3.23: GARCH(1,1) for US 2001-2013 
 
  
 rt
c_s2 rt
is_s2 rt
c_corp1 rt
c_govt1 rt
c_govt2 
γi
INT -0.8585* -0.0702 -0.2022*** -0.1125*** -0.1796** 
 -1.7271 -0.1508 -7.0985 -27.4290 -2.1903 
δi
INT(-1) -2.3348 -0.7853 0.0644*** 0.0743*** 0.0764*** 
 -1.3162 -0.7003 3.1042 2.9876 2.8514 
δi
INT(0) 2.6171 1.1475 0.0007 -0.0003 -0.2817 
 1.2912 0.9232 0.6053 -1.5238 -0.6788 
δi
INT(1) -0.6790*** -0.7504*** -0.0291*** -0.0351*** 0.2642 
 -6.6100 -7.7194 -19.6071 -20.8145 0.6067 
      
γi
CPI 0.0344 0.0373 0.0480* 0.0161 0.0216 
 0.5057 0.5365 1.9077 0.5237 0.7465 
δi
CPI(-1) 0.2180*** 0.2675*** -0.0320** -0.0241* -0.0159 
 2.8981 3.2521 -2.3493 -1.7437 -1.2749 
δi
CPI(0) -0.4969*** -0.3167* 0.0362** 0.0212 0.0226 
 -2.7186 -1.8207 2.4159 1.2643 1.5457 
δi
CPI(1) 0.3348 0.0798 -0.0048 0.0031 -0.0067 
 1.6417 0.4123 -0.8840 0.3175 -0.8697 
      
γi
UNE -0.0567 -0.1056 0.0362 0.0997*** 0.0561* 
 -0.5434 -1.1566 1.3592 3.0860 1.6634 
δi
UNE(-1) -0.0405 0.1282 -0.0202* -0.0212 -0.0378* 
 -0.1945 1.1403 -1.9174 -1.2365 -1.7229 
δi
UNE(0) -0.1998 -0.4380 0.0175 0.0255 0.0314 
 -0.5850 -1.5132 1.3372 1.3135 1.2353 
δi
UNE(1) 0.2583 0.2373 -0.0011 -0.0080 0.0070 
 0.8912 0.7881 -0.1389 -0.8898 0.5763 
      
γi
PAY 0.3051*** 0.3176*** -0.2277*** -0.2817*** -0.2908*** 
 2.7871 3.1280 -7.2526 -7.7061 -7.3699 
δi
PAY(-1) -0.2493 -0.2740* -0.0469*** -0.0437* -0.0591*** 
 -1.3343 -1.6788 -3.2900 -1.9315 -2.6761 
δi
PAY(0) 0.0565 0.1125 0.0459*** 0.0477** 0.0627** 
 0.1859 0.3887 2.8203 1.9610 2.5630 
δi
PAY(1) 0.1450 0.1368 0.0006 0.0041 -0.0044 
 0.5638 0.5156 0.0836 0.4719 -0.4655 
 160  
 
Table 3.24: GARCH(1,1) for US Pre-crisis 
   
 rt
c_s2 rt
is_s2 rt
c_corp1 rt
c_govt1 rt
c_govt2 
γi
INT -1.1991** -1.0518* -0.2313*** -0.0693* -0.2401*** 
 -2.0976 -1.8248 -4.2906 -1.7477 -6.9298 
δi
INT(-1) -2.1400 -2.5204 0.0543* 0.1280 0.0774*** 
 -1.3640 -1.2900 1.8114 1.5819 3.5931 
δi
INT(0) 2.1808 2.6136 -0.0112 -0.0023 0.0037*** 
 1.2328 1.2153 -0.8943 -0.7791 6.2216 
δi
INT(1) -0.5430*** -0.5683*** -0.0172 -0.0219*** -0.0400*** 
 -5.5359 -8.7476 -1.5159 -12.4239 -18.2886 
      
γi
CPI 0.0512 0.1103 0.0445 0.0247 0.0400 
 0.6365 1.4635 1.5075 0.6853 1.1142 
δi
CPI(-1) 0.1898** 0.2640*** -0.0197* -0.0436*** -0.0246 
 2.4971 3.8708 -1.7750 -3.2850 -1.5828 
δi
CPI(0) -0.2543** -0.1727** 0.0116 0.0141 0.0362** 
 -2.2928 -2.2732 0.8636 0.7462 2.1924 
δi
CPI(1) 0.0757 -0.0659 -0.0038 -0.0121 -0.0185*** 
 0.6573 -0.7851 -0.4839 -1.0496 -3.6930 
      
γi
UNE 0.1480 0.0983 0.0498 0.0672 0.0730 
 0.8358 0.5780 1.1254 1.4862 1.3411 
δi
UNE(-1) -0.0865 -0.2566 -0.0107 -0.0254 -0.0214 
 -0.3822 -1.0485 -0.6964 -1.0652 -0.7856 
δi
UNE(0) 0.2863 0.4947* 0.0000 0.0105 0.0217 
 0.9675 1.6881 0.0015 0.3401 0.6716 
δi
UNE(1) -0.1825 -0.3340* 0.0094 -0.0179 0.0006 
 -0.8407 -1.9221 0.4790 -0.9352 0.0328 
      
γi
PAY 0.1096 0.2074* -0.2174*** -0.2593*** -0.2784*** 
 0.8903 1.6888 -5.3262 -5.3614 -5.5506 
δi
PAY(-1) -0.1106 0.0059 -0.0506*** -0.0072 -0.0884*** 
 -0.7557 0.0414 -2.8932 -0.2200 -3.2826 
δi
PAY(0) -0.0605 -0.1668 0.0510** 0.0488 0.0939*** 
 -0.2557 -0.7420 2.3815 1.4317 3.1980 
δi
PAY(1) 0.1405 0.1393 -0.0001 0.0088 -0.0074 
 0.6787 0.7344 -0.0128 0.6290 -0.7740 
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Table 3.25: GARCH(1,1) for US Crisis 
 rt
c_s1 rt
is_s1 rt
c_s2 rt
is_s2 rt
c_corp1 rt
c_govt1 rt
c_govt2 
γi
INT 2.7885 2.2468 3.2673 2.4981 0.3239 -0.0986 -0.2683 
 1.0396 1.0126 1.3520 1.0568 0.5638 -0.2558 -0.4339 
δi
INT(-1) -4.3900 4.9052 0.4418 3.1205 0.2695 0.2038 0.0680 
 -0.5787 1.3273 0.1996 0.9702 0.7818 0.4129 0.2042 
δi
INT(0) -0.9793 -0.1917 -1.7642 0.3652 0.0380 0.0099 -0.4422 
 -0.0716 -0.0698 -0.3786 0.1408 0.0801 0.0381 -0.6315 
δi
INT(1) 14.0456 4.2110 12.5573* 5.8513 -0.0146 0.0370 1.4100 
 1.0462 1.2588 1.6480 1.2465 -0.1024 0.2170 1.3738 
        
γi
CPI 0.4329 -0.3040 0.2876 -0.1059 -0.0036 -0.1293** 0.1625 
 1.0177 -0.7474 0.5418 -0.2319 -0.0316 -1.9650 0.9140 
δi
CPI(-1) -2.0320 -1.7797* -3.8415* -2.5945* 0.0983 0.0177 -0.3386 
 -1.4615 -1.9254 -1.7223 -1.6617 1.1119 0.5570 -1.2316 
δi
CPI(0) 2.3982 1.7804* 4.2100* 2.6067 0.1433 -0.0082 0.3917 
 1.6408 1.7356 1.7730 1.5278 1.3635 -0.1457 1.1981 
δi
CPI(1) -0.7928*** -0.9320*** -0.9782*** -0.9125*** -0.0381** 0.0007 0.0137 
 -5.2177 -2.7531 -5.4793 -7.7021 -2.3905 0.0123 0.2578 
        
γi
UNE -0.8919*** -0.7515*** -0.7309** -0.6167*** 0.1132** 0.1666*** 0.2209** 
 -2.6496 -3.7446 -2.2329 -2.6887 2.0029 3.0959 2.2338 
δi
UNE(-1) -0.0066 0.4530 0.8404* 0.6960 -0.0462 0.0460 0.0146 
 -0.0111 0.8037 1.9191 1.5003 -1.2390 1.1379 0.4158 
δi
UNE(0) 0.6384 -1.2342 -2.6255*** -2.9692 -0.0922*** -0.0317 0.0539* 
 0.3480 -1.5509 -3.0693 -1.2231 -3.1437 -0.7541 1.6564 
δi
UNE(1) -0.3503 0.8498 2.4454*** 2.5037 -0.0421 0.0024 -0.0334 
 -0.1862 1.1987 2.7043 0.9630 -1.5275 0.0523 -1.3777 
        
γi
PAY -1.6254** -0.8519 -1.5765* -1.3644* 0.0184 -0.0299 0.1146 
 -2.2045 -1.3620 -1.6973 -1.9018 0.2282 -0.3773 1.4760 
δi
PAY(-1) 0.3469 -0.4413 -0.7407 -0.7779 -0.0735* 0.0696 0.0174 
 0.2659 -0.3318 -0.6015 -0.5539 -1.7551 1.5404 0.9166 
δi
PAY(0) -3.2512 1.0138 1.8929 4.1310 -0.0937*** -0.0194 -0.0207 
 -0.8110 0.5648 1.2979 1.3257 -3.0815 -1.2623 -0.5226 
δi
PAY(1) -0.8236 -4.3658** -5.9798*** -7.3001** -0.0163 -0.0371* -0.0661 
 -0.1982 -2.5139 -4.2944 -2.2469 -0.5079 -1.9181 -1.3858 
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Table 3.26: GARCH(1,1) for US Post-Crisis 
 rt
c_s1 rt
is_s1 rt
c_s2 rt
is_s2 rt
c_corp1 rt
c_govt1 rt
c_govt2 
γi
CPI -0.1655*** -0.1044 -0.1032 -0.0863 0.0378 0.0482 0.0481 
 -4.1808 -0.7306 -1.3093 -0.6376 0.9529 0.7059 0.8764 
δi
CPI(-1) 0.2433 0.1538 0.2845* 0.1865 0.0024 -0.0448* -0.0086 
 1.6188 1.0985 1.7455 1.3064 0.2439 -1.8602 -0.4444 
δi
CPI(0) -0.7789* -0.7220* -0.8574** -0.7279** -0.0007 0.0546** 0.0049 
 -2.1863 -1.8619 -2.1939 -2.0325 -0.0567 2.0315 0.1946 
δi
CPI(1) 0.5499 0.6278 0.6169 0.5765 0.0013 0.0009 0.0050 
 1.3260 1.4154 1.3619 1.3922 0.1434 0.0657 0.2748 
        
γi
UNE -0.0685 -0.0593* -0.0554 -0.0712 0.0265 0.0837 0.0167 
 -0.7951 -1.8566 -0.5923 -1.3125 0.7991 1.5848 0.3763 
δi
UNE(-1) 0.1499 0.1859*** 0.1412 0.1410 -0.0318** -0.0786** -0.0691** 
 1.1408 3.0880 0.9818 1.5289 -2.2707 -2.0062 -2.3587 
δi
UNE(0) -0.5276 -0.6398* -0.5766 -0.5110 0.0256 0.0614 0.0495 
 -1.2611 -1.7528 -1.2739 -1.3613 1.5940 1.3996 1.4004 
δi
UNE(1) 0.4092 0.4299 0.4543 0.3512 -0.0027 0.0021 0.0102 
 0.8704 1.0100 0.9016 0.8161 -0.3851 0.1325 0.5267 
        
γi
PAY 0.6294*** 0.5048*** 0.6585*** 0.4666*** -0.2457*** -0.3083*** -0.2977*** 
 4.1198 3.7206 4.0114 3.5128 -5.6207 -5.5811 -5.9033 
δi
PAY(-1) -0.1884 -0.3723*** -0.2071 -0.1634 0.0185 0.0385** 0.0497** 
 -0.8244 -3.3975 -0.8242 -0.8166 1.2793 2.4940 2.1821 
δi
PAY(0) -0.5460 -0.3324 -0.5562 -0.5159 -0.0205 -0.0160 -0.0591* 
 -0.7966 -0.5613 -0.7620 -0.8148 -1.1389 -0.7997 -1.8360 
δi
PAY(1) 0.6238 0.6079 0.6798 0.5761 0.0131 -0.0066 0.0242 
 0.8320 0.8838 0.8586 0.8201 1.1106 -0.4349 0.9710 
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3.8 CONCLUSION 
This chapter has examined the impact of macroeconomic surprises on stock and bond returns 
and volatility in Australia, Canada, France, Germany, Indonesia Italy, Japan, Malaysia, 
Turkey, UK and US. Initially, I expected the impact of macroeconomic surprises to be 
different on Islamic versus conventional assets. The results show that a large proportion of 
macroeconomic surprises have a significant impact on return and volatility of stock and bond 
returns, but that the direction and magnitude of the impact differs significantly across 
macroeconomic variables and countries, and that there are some changes across time.  
However, when I hold country, time period, index provider, macroeconomic variable and 
asset class (i.e., stock or bond) constant, I do not find enough evidence to support my 
hypothesis that there are significant differences in the impact of macroeconomic surprises on 
Islamic versus conventional assets. One exception is interest rate surprises, which appear to 
have a different impact on Islamic assets relative to conventional assets for almost half of the 
stock indices and for all Malaysian bond indices. Out of 15 stock asset pairs in 11 countries, 
interest rate surprises have no impact on any asset for six asset pairs, they have an equal 
impact on both Islamic and conventional assets for three asset pairs and they have a stronger 
impact on Islamic assets than conventional assets for seven asset pairs. Out of three bond 
asset pairs in Malaysia, interest rate surprises have a stronger impact on Islamic assets for two 
asset pairs and a slightly stronger impact on conventional assets for one asset pair. 
I have conducted a sensitivity analysis to look in more detail at whether the impact of 
macroeconomic surprises on stocks and bonds depends on the business cycle and the 
definition of the surprise variable, whether asset returns react asymmetrically to the 
information content of the macroeconomic surprise and whether the impact of 
macroeconomic surprises varies during crisis versus non-crisis periods. These sensitivity 
analyses provide insights into price formation following macroeconomic announcements. 
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Macroeconomic surprises can have impacts of opposite sign depending on the stage of the 
business cycle, e.g., an unexpected rise in unemployment has a positive impact on Islamic 
stock returns during contractions, while it has a negative impact on Islamic stock returns 
during expansions. An unexpected higher interest rate has a positive impact on stock returns 
during contractions (using the alternative definition of interest rate surprise), while it has a 
negative impact on bond returns during contractions and a positive impact during expansions 
(although there is no impact when using the alternative definition of interest rate surprise). 
There is also evidence that asset returns in the US react asymmetrically to the information 
content of the news, and that the effect of macroeconomic surprises on asset returns and 
volatility may shift during crisis and non-crisis periods. 
The lack of evidence for a different impact of macroeconomic surprises on Islamic versus 
conventional assets suggests that new information is impounded into Islamic and 
conventional assets in similar ways. In fact, despite structural differences in the financial 
products, Islamic and conventional stocks and bonds are traded in the same markets and there 
are few elements of Islamic market structure even for Islamic assets. El-Gamal (2006: 8) 
argues that contemporary Islamic finance aims to replicate conventional financial products 
and “deviates only insofar as some conventional practices are deemed forbidden under 
Shari’a”. There has also been criticism about Islamic bonds as not fully Shari’ah-compliant, 
but rather as a way for Muslim investors to “reach illegitimate ends (forbidden riba) through 
legitimate sale means” (El-Gamal 2006: 74). 
It is more difficult to explain why there is a stronger impact of interest rate surprises on 
Islamic stock returns in Australia, Canada, France, Italy, Turkey and the UK, and on Islamic 
bond returns in Malaysia. Islamic stock indices comprise stocks of firms that hold no or only 
limited cash and debt and would be expected to be less sensitive to fluctuations in interest 
rates. It could be possible that firms with high cash and debt holdings (i.e., conventional 
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stocks) have an incentive to monitor interest rate movements more carefully and perhaps 
make their own accurate forecasts of interest rate announcements. Conventional firms would 
then experience the surprise component of interest rate announcements as smaller relative to 
firms with lower cash and debt holdings (i.e., Islamic stocks) that do not have an incentive to 
monitor interest rates closely. Further, Islamic bonds are structured on partnership and leasing 
arrangements that avoid explicit interest rates. Instead of an interest rate, investors receive a 
variable profit rate which is often tied to a conventional interest rate (e.g., LIBOR). 
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- 4 - 
IMPACT OF THE GLOBAL FINANCIAL CRISIS      
ON ISLAMIC AND CONVENTIONAL                        
STOCKS AND BONDS 
 
4.1 INTRODUCTION 
Some evidence suggests that the Islamic financial sector has not been as severely impacted by 
the recent GFC as the overall market. For example, during the GFC in 2007–2009, Islamic 
institutions were able to maintain a 28 per cent annual compound growth in Shari’ah-
compliant assets, while asset growth in the Top 1000 World Banks slumped from 21.6 per 
cent in 2008 to 6.8 per cent in 2009 (Timewell and DiVanna 2009). This chapter examines 
whether Islamic stocks and bonds have been less affected and had greater stability in returns 
during the GFC, relative to conventional stocks and bonds. 
According to Abdul Aziz and Gintzburger (2009), Islamic financing methods may offer a 
certain insulation from the crisis. Kayed and Hassan (2011) argue that the GFC could either 
have been prevented or the impact could have been minimised if banking practices had 
followed the two principles of entrepreneurship and transparency that are expected in Islamic 
finance, since most of the sub-prime mortgage-based securities and derivatives that 
contributed to the crisis are prohibited under Islamic finance. Further, it could be that the 
Islamic financial sector was not directly affected by the Sub-prime Mortgage Crisis because 
of tighter prudential controls, including the absence of interest-based debt contracts and most 
derivative instruments, the 100 per cent reserve requirement for banks, the restricted 
securitisation arrangements for debt and the limited trading of debt in the secondary financial 
 167  
 
market, as well as tighter regulations (e.g., on short selling, speculation and margin trading) 
and a conservative approach to risk. These features aim to create stronger ties to the real 
economy and could be a source of stability. 
However, Islamic finance has not been spared in times of crises. During the GFC, it was 
likely to have been affected by factors inclusive of both the conventional and the Islamic 
markets, including the slowing of the macro economy, declining commodity prices, low 
consumption and the credit crunch that resulted in a lack of liquidity over the whole financial 
market (Abdul Aziz and Gintzburger 2009). 
To examine the impact of the GFC on Islamic and conventional asset returns I use panel 
regressions and other approaches for a sample of 11 Islamic countries (Bahrain, Egypt, 
Indonesia, Iran, Malaysia, Morocco, Pakistan, Qatar, Saudi Arabia, Turkey and UAE) and 
eight non-Islamic countries (Australia, Canada, France, Germany, Italy, Japan, UK and US) 
over 2002 to 2014. First, I test whether the GFC had a negative impact on all stock and bond 
returns and confirm this for most stock indices but not for bond indices. Second, I examine 
whether Islamic assets showed more stable returns during the GFC and I find some evidence 
to support this, although this is not consistent across all countries and specifications. Third, I 
find that the strongest benefits are in the UK and US, as well as other non-Islamic countries. 
In most Islamic countries, there are no benefits and Islamic stocks may even have been more 
vulnerable to the crisis than their conventional counterparts. 
Fourth, there is evidence that benefits of Islamic assets were greater during the first stage of 
the Crisis (the Sub-prime Mortgage Crisis) than the second stage of the crisis (the GFC). This 
is because the first stage of the crisis was mostly restricted to countries and institutions that 
were exposed to toxic sub-prime mortgage securities that are prohibited to Islamic financial 
institutions. During the second stage of the crisis, a global recession which was marked by a 
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collapse in global demand, consumption and commodity prices as well as investor panic and 
a liquidity crunch, Islamic asset values fell alongside conventional assets. 
The findings from this study suggest that there are significant benefits of Islamic stocks 
during the first stage of the crisis, which was probably due to the prohibition of sub-prime 
mortgage securities and derivatives that contributed to the crisis. Greatest benefits are found 
in countries that had a large exposure to the sub-prime mortgage investments, such as the US 
and UK. However, when the crisis spread to the global economy and financial markets 
Islamic stocks were hit alongside other, conventional, stocks, although to a less extent in 
some countries, like the UK and US. Therefore, Islamic stocks do not necessarily provide 
protection from a global recession accompanied by a decline in investor sentiment, 
consumption, production and trade. 
This is among the first quantitative studies on the impact of the GFC on Islamic versus 
conventional asset returns. It is also the first to differentiate between the impact of the first 
stage versus the second stage of the GFC. Qualitative and theoretical studies such as Abdul 
Aziz and Gintzburger (2009) and Smolo and Mirakhor (2010) recommend that a quantitative 
analysis is needed to examine the impact of the GFC on the Islamic financial sector and to 
verify whether Islamic assets were insulated from the financial crisis. This quantitative 
analysis on the impact of the GFC on Islamic and conventional assets is relevant to 
government policy makers and regulators, as the crisis has reminded the world community of 
the importance of appropriately structured financial products and regulations to ensure 
financial stability. While this analysis focuses on specific features of Islamic markets, the 
majority of these features are also relevant to conventional markets, such as regulations (e.g., 
the prohibition of short selling), risk management and securitisation practices. For example, 
Abdul Aziz and Gintzburger (2009) argue that some of the insulating principles underlying 
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Islamic financing and securitisation products could be incorporated into conventional markets 
to help economic recovery and to reduce the impact of future crises. 
 
The remainder of this chapter is structured as follows. Section 4.2 presents an overview of the 
literature on the causes of the GFC, and on the features of Islamic finance that have the 
potential to insulate it from a crisis. As well it reviews the literature relating to impacts of the 
GFC on global markets, and on the Islamic financial sector. Section 4.3 develops four 
hypotheses, while Section 4.4 states the methodology used to test the hypotheses. Section 4.5 
gives an overview of the variables, data sources and the data adjustments, as well as the 
descriptive statistics and the graphical illustration of the data. Section 4.6 presents and 
discusses the results, which is then followed in Section 4.7 by the conclusion. 
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4.2 LITERATURE REVIEW 
This literature review first tells how the Sub-prime Crisis emerged in the US and then spread 
across the global markets triggering the GFC (section 4.2.1). Section 4.2.2 discusses the 
features of Islamic finance that could provide it stability during a crisis, while sections 4.2.3 
and 4.2.4 summarise literature on the impact of the GFC on world markets as well as on the 
Islamic finance industry.  
4.2.1 Main Causes of GFC 
While the GFC has emerged from the 2007 US housing bubble and Sub-prime Mortgage 
Crisis, there are a number of contributing factors that enabled the crisis to spread to the 
financial markets and real economy in the US and the world. By September 2008 the crisis 
escalated to what is believed the biggest financial crisis since the Great Depression of 1929-
1932 (Bekaert et al. 2014). The following sections first elaborate the causes of the US 
housing bubble and the Sub-prime Crisis (section 4.2.1.1) and then explain how the Sub-
prime Crisis in the US spread across the global markets and triggered the GFC (sections 
4.2.1.2 to 4.2.1.5). This section does not present an exhaustive list of all the contributing 
factors to the GFC, but focuses on the commonly cited major triggers of the GFC: the 
housing bubble, the practice of securitization and derivatives, the investor panic following the 
collapse of Lehman Brothers, the liquidity crunch, ineffective market regulation and 
government policy, as well as globalisation and trade linkages.  
4.2.1.1 Housing Bubble and Sub-Prime Mortgage Crisis in the United States 
The origin of the crisis is usually attributed to the bursting of a housing bubble in the US (e.g. 
Ackermann 2008; Allen and Carletti 2008, Acharya et al. 2009b). Prior to the beginning of 
the crisis the US government kept interest rates low and Taylor (2009) argues that the 
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government’s “extraordinarily loose monetary policy” made mortgages more affordable and 
led to the asset bubble in the housing market. From 2002 to 2007 house prices grew at 11 
percent per year (Acharya and Richardson 2009a). Subsequently, the inevitable bust followed 
when interest rates increased and many defaulted on their mortgages that now became 
unaffordable (Bordo 2008; Ciro 2012b; Jones 2009; Taylor 2009). Further, the government 
provided incentives for leverage through its capital-gains tax cuts and the deductibility of 
interest (Stiglitz 2009). There has been an “excessive growth of leverage” in the United States 
and many households, businesses, and banks took on more debt than they could handle (Ciro 
2012b; Stiglitz 2009). According to Acharya and Richardson (2009a), the ratio of debt to 
national income in the US increased from 3.75:1 in 2002 to 4.75:1 in 2007. Banks were major 
participants in excessive leverage but instead of investing the “cheap money” into productive 
activities, it was mostly channelled into unproductive and speculative investments such as 
residential housing (Ciro 2012b). Fahlenbrach, Prilmeier and Stulz (2012) conduct an 
empirical study and find that banks were likely to perform poorly during the 1998 crisis and 
the GFC when they relied more on short-term market funding, had higher leverage, and grew 
more in the three years before a crisis.  
Another contributing factor to the housing bubble in the US has been the government policy 
to increase home ownership, especially among minority, low-income, and other underserved 
groups (Wallison 2009; Demyanyk and Van Hemert 2011). This well-intentioned government 
policy had the adverse consequences of banks and mortgage brokers lowering their lending 
standards, and increasing the number of mortgages at the expense of quality as many of the 
applicants would not qualify for prime loans (Wallison 2009 and Ciro 2012b). According to 
Stiglitz (2009), mortgage originators focused on loan volume rather than loan quality, as they 
did not hold those mortgages for long, and instead of prioritising the quality and risk of the 
mortgages, their aim was to increase revenue through a higher number of mortgages 
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originated and higher transaction costs.  As a consequence of the government’s policy, a 
housing bubble emerged, home prices doubled between 1995 and 2007, and the proportion of 
subprime loans increased dramatically (Wallison 2009). According to Claessens et al. (2010) 
credit booms leads to increasing leverage and declining lending standards which results in 
asset bubbles and financial crises. These features had been observed prior to the GFC in 
countries like the US, the UK, Spain, Ireland, and several East European countries. 
(Claessens et al. 2010).  
4.2.1.2 Securitization and Derivatives 
A major transmission channel through which the US housing bubble could spread to the US 
economy and eventually the world financial markets are mortgage-backed securities and 
derivatives. According to Ciro (2012b: 44) the credit default swap and the CDO alone 
“allowed what might have been an otherwise unremarkable deflating housing bubble to 
become a truly global and devastating event.” In order to sell securities that were originally 
backed by risky sub-prime mortgages to a broad class of investors, who were reluctant to buy 
the subprime debt, banks and intermediaries bundled prime and subprime mortgages together 
by creating complex financial instruments (Chapra 2011; Kayed and Hassan 2011). Examples 
of these mortgage-backed securities are residential mortgage-backed securities (RMBSs) and 
collateralized debt obligations (CDOs), which were also provided with a credit wrap 
protection in order to achieve a higher credit rating (Ciro 2012d, Taylor 2009).  
These “toxic” mortgage-backed securities were then sold off to investors all over the world, 
including government entities, municipal councils, equity and pension funds, and banks (Ciro 
2012b). The size of the mortgage-backed securities and derivatives was enormous. According 
to the Chairman of the Financial Crisis Inquiry Commission OTC derivatives trading grew 
from $88 trillion in 1999 to $684 trillion in 2008, and credit derivatives grew from less than 
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$1 trillion in 2000 to be over $58 trillion in 2007 (Ciro 2012d). When the housing bubble 
burst in the United States, the value of these securitized mortgage-backed securities and 
collateralized debt obligations declined simultaneously with the underlying residential real 
estate and sub-prime mortgages (Ciro 2012d). As these securities were downgraded to junk 
status and became worthless, investors all over the world were affected.  By exposing 
international investors to risky sub-prime mortgages, these financial instruments contributed 
to making the crisis systemic (Ciro 2012d).  
A major problem with the mortgage-backed securities was their complexity and lack of 
transparency. This made it difficult, or even impossible, for investors to understand and 
assess the underlying risk of the securities that they were holding and they would rely on 
rating agencies (e.g. Chapra 2011). However, ratings agencies inflated credit ratings of 
subprime mortgages and underestimated their risk, most likely because of the difficulty in 
assessing risk due to the complexity of the securities, but perhaps also due to a lack of 
competition and incentive and poor accountability (Taylor 2009). Inflated credit ratings, 
created more demand for risky securities such as RMBSs and CDOs and allowed them to be 
sold to more investors worldwide, growing into a housing bubble (Ciro 2012d; Stiglitz 2009). 
4.2.1.3 Collapse of Lehman Brothers, Investor Panic and Liquidity Crisis 
The collapse of Lehman Brothers was the point at which the Sub-prime Crisis turned into a 
global financial crisis marked by a liquidity crunch, a global stock market crash and 
undermined investor confidence. On 15 September 2008 Lehman Brothers issued a press 
statement announcing that it intended to file for bankruptcy under Chapter 11 after the 
decision by the US Treasury and the US Federal Reserve not to bail out Lehman Brothers 
(Ciro, 2012b). According to Ciro (2012b: 41), “Lehman’s bankruptcy was the largest in US 
corporate history, with estimated debts of over $US600 billion”. Therefore, Lehman’s 
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bankruptcy immediately affected financial markets all over the world. Stock markets 
collapsed, market participants panicked, while credit and debt markets froze worldwide 
which resulted in devastating consequences in the real economy (Ciro 2012b, Bordo 2008). It 
is at this point that the crisis became systemic (Ciro 2012b, Bordo 2008).  
Following the collapse of Lehman Brothers, banks were reluctant to lend money and 
tightened lending standards, while housing and asset prices continued to fall, so that collateral 
became next to worthless (Ciro 2012b). This global liquidity crisis affected many institutions 
and caused the collapse of financial institutions all over the world, including Wachovia and 
Washington Mutual Bank in the US and Allco and Babcock & Brown in Australia, to name a 
few (Ciro 2012c). When credit markets froze, highly leveraged banks and investors were 
unable to obtain short-term credit and rollover their loans, and were forced to default on their 
loans (Ciro 2012c; 2012d). These defaults and the liquidity crunch undermined investor 
confidence and trust even further, and affected households, businesses and governments, as 
well financial markets all over the world. 
4.2.1.4 Ineffective Government Policy and Market Regulation  
Governments and regulators were unsuccessful in preventing systemic risk and investor panic 
following the collapse of Lehman Brothers. Taylor (2009) argues that inadequate government 
actions and interventions have increased uncertainty in the financial markets and as such they 
prolonged and worsened the financial crisis. For instance, they “misdiagnosed the problems 
in the bank credit markets and thereby responded inappropriately by focusing on liquidity 
rather than risk.” (Taylor 2009: 362). Further, federal regulators did not accurately estimate 
the tail risks associated with a potential collapse of Lehman Brothers (Ciro 2012b). 
Moreover, they were inconsistent in their support for only certain financial institutions but 
not for others, without a clear justification (Taylor 2009). 
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Regulatory flaws include an unregulated parallel banking system, an outdated regulatory 
framework, which relied too heavily on limited, inadequate and out-of-date financial data, as 
well as the lack of macro prudential focus of the statutory regulatory framework (Ciro 
2012b). Crotty (2009) and Stiglitz (2009) also blame financial-sector deregulation for 
contributing to the crisis by allowing banks to get away with their excessive risk taking and 
leverage behaviour. Likewise, regulators failed to understand the risks associated with high 
leverage and over-the-counter derivatives and “did not pay any attention to systemic risk” 
(Stiglitz 2009: 333). Instead of doing their own risk assessments, regulators relied on self-
regulation or on credit-rating agencies (Stiglitz 2009).  
4.2.1.5 Globalisation and Trade Linkages 
Finally, globalisation of trade and capital flows enhanced systemic risk and contributed to the 
spread of the crisis to countries across the world. Even countries with little exposure to sub-
prime mortgage securities were hit by the collapse in world demand and the frozen credit 
market. As international trade declined, countries dependent upon trade and exports income 
were affected in particular. According to Ciro (2012d), financial markets had become 
interconnected through securitization and globalisation, which in turn became a channel of 
systemic or contagion risk that allowed the crisis to spread throughout the entire financial 
system. Giannone, Lenza and Reichlin (2010) also believe that economies were less able to 
protect themselves from financial shocks due to the liberalisation of credit markets. 
Moreover, investments all over the world were retracted as investors faced liquidity problems 
and had to sell off their assets. According to Alasrag (2010), even developing countries with 
little exposure to subprime mortgage securities were affected by the GFC, especially those 
with a high level of integration in world economy and international markets. For those 
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countries, the transmission channels have been through a decline in trade, commodity prices 
and financial flows (e.g. FDI and remittances) (Alasrag 2010). 
4.2.2 Insulating Features of Islamic Finance  
Some suggest that principles of Islamic finance and the conservative approach to risk provide 
some stability and protection from crises (e.g. Abdul Aziz and Gintzburger 2009; Farooq 
2009; Mirakhor and Krichene 2009; Akhtar 2010; Smolo and Mirakhor 2010; Chapra 2011; 
Kayed and Hassan 2011). Kayed and Hassan (2011: 551) believe that a crisis like the GFC 
would not have occurred under an Islamic financial system because “most, if not all, of the 
factors that have caused or contributed to the development and spread of the crisis are not 
allowed under the rules and guidance of Shariah”. Sections 4.2.2.1 through 4.2.2.5 give an 
overview of these insulating features, including profit-and-loss sharing that replaces interest, 
restricted securitization and derivatives contracts to avoid speculation and unnecessary 
uncertainty, as well as the emphasis on the link between the financial sector and the real 
economy, and finally the focus on equity over efficiency under Islamic finance. 
4.2.2.1 Replacing Interest with Profit and Loss Sharing 
Under Islamic finance, interest (riba) is forbidden and interest-based debt contracts are 
replaced by equity, leasing, profit-and-loss sharing (PLS) and other contracts (Kayed and 
Hassan 2011). The charging of interest (riba) is considered a way to create “wealth without 
actually being the outcome of productive economic activity or as the result of an increase in 
commodity supply” (Kayed and Hassan 2011: 557). Market discipline and the prohibition of 
interest-based debt contracts could benefit Islamic financial assets during a crisis as this limits 
the amount of debt and in particular excessive leverage and speculation, and as such reduces 
risk, prevents asset bubbles and increases financial stability (Darrat 1988; 2002; Mirakhor 
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and Krichene 2009; Akhtar 2010; Chapra 2011; Kayed and Hassan 2011). Further, since 
Islamic stock indices consist of low-leverage stocks, they are less sensitive to leverage risk 
and might have lower distress risk due to their reduced exposure to the credit market, 
especially during credit crises (Bhatt and Sultan 2012). 
Further benefits of restricted availability of debt and credit are its encouragement to live 
within means, which stands in contrast to the “culture of consumerism” and reliance on debt 
by many governments, businesses and households (Chapra 2011). According to Chapra 
(2011: 570), debt and credit cards
76
 were to a large extent used for consumption and 
speculation instead of “productive investments that would lead to a rise in output and the 
ability of the borrower to repay.” Chapra (2011) suggests that to increase the stability of the 
financial system, the proportion of equity financing needs to be increased and that of debt 
reduced, credit should not exceed the ability of the borrowers to repay,
77
 and the main 
purpose of credit should be for transactions that are related to the real sector that will increase 
the borrowers’ ability to repay, rather than for consumption purposes.  
A profit-and-loss sharing (PLS) structure under Islamic finance (e.g. musharakah or 
mudarabah) is the main alternative to interest-based debt contracts. PLS means that both the 
financier and the entrepreneur share the profit as well as the loss at a predetermined ratio 
(Chapra 2011). Under PLS, predetermined fixed interest is replaced with a profit rate that is 
determined ex post, which "symbolises successful entrepreneurship and the creation of 
additional wealth; whereas interest, determined ex ante, is a cost that is accrued irrespective 
of the outcome of business operations and may not create wealth if there are business losses” 
(Iqbal and Tsubota 2009: 6). The PLS system may help avoid excessive and imprudent 
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 “A typical US household owns around 13 credit cards, and the total personal debt has grown to $16.2 trillion, 
or $51,946 per citizen.” (Chapra 2011: 570). 
77
 A the same time, Chapra (2011: 576) emphasises that some arrangements need to be made for subprime 
borrowers “at affordable terms to enable them to buy a home, pursue higher education or vocational training, 
and establish their own small and microenterprises” 
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lending by banks as the system encourages more transparency and careful evaluation of loan 
applications and associated risks, in order to avoid losses. (Akhtar 2010; Chapra 2011; Kayed 
and Hassan 2011; Mohieldin 2012). At the same time, the PLS system can impose discipline 
on the banks as the depositors, who will share in the bank’s profit or loss, will be concerned 
about the ex-post profit rate and therefore about the operations of the bank (Chapra 2011). As 
a result, they will demand better management and governance, greater transparency, and 
more effective risk management, auditing, regulation and supervision (Chapra 2011). These 
investment depositors are like “temporary shareholders” and they should make informed 
decisions when choosing to deposit or withdraw their deposits, just like purchasing or 
redeeming the bank’s shares (Chapra 2011). Further, Kayed and Hassan (2011) believe that 
when both lenders and borrowers have mutual interest in the transaction, then speculative and 
subprime deals are highly unlikely to take place. Another protective feature of PLS is that 
asset prices and liabilities decline concurrently, which is different to the conventional system 
that is dominated by interest-based debt contracts (Mirakhor and Krichene 2009). 
While interest-based debt contracts are prohibited and equity and PLS contracts are 
encouraged, debt financing is not ruled out in Islamic finance. There are a number of sales- 
and lease-based modes of financing that create debt through the sale or lease of real assets 
(e.g. murabahah, ijarah, salam, istisna and sukuk) (Chapra 2008; 2011; Kayed and Hassan 
2011). The purpose of these debt contracts is the purchase of real goods and services that are 
currently needed, rather than for “inessential and wasteful consumption and unproductive 
speculation” (Chapra 2008: 15). These contracts need to be based on tangible assets. See, for 
example, Abdul Aziz and Gintzburger (2009) for a detailed comparison of the Islamic 
financing models (asset-based financing, equity-based financing and leasing arrangement) 
and the conventional financing modes, which achieve similar economic objectives, but are 
structured differently for the Islamic financing models to avoid explicit interest.   
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4.2.2.2 Securitization 
Under Islamic finance there are restricted securitisation arrangements for debt and limited 
trading of debt in the secondary financial market, as well as tighter regulations (e.g. on short 
selling, speculation and margin trading). According to Shari’ah principles, “one can’t sell or 
lease unless he/she possesses real assets” (Kayed and Hassan 2011: 558). In the context of the 
crisis, these restrictions would protect Islamic financial institutions from trading and holding 
sub-prime mortgage securities. For instance, Islamic stock indices that exclude conventional 
financial institutions do not include banks that collapsed due to the exposure to toxic sub-
prime securities. While certain securitization contracts are permitted (e.g. various contracts 
based on tawriq or sukuk, see Abdul Aziz and Gintzburger 2009), most investors hold on to 
the securities until maturity, the contracts must be transparent and clear, and they must be 
asset-based instead of asset-backed (Abdul Aziz and Gintzburger 2009). Islamic bonds, or 
sukuk,
78
 are asset-based contracts that achieve similar economic outcomes as conventional 
bonds, but they need to be structured carefully to avoid explicit interest. The idea of a sukuk 
is that its profit rate is linked to the performance of a real asset, and as such needs to be 
backed by a specific tangible asset (Iqbal and Tsubota 2009).  
4.2.2.3 Derivatives 
Generally, the use of derivatives is prohibited under Islamic finance, although there are 
exceptions, such as the Bai-Salam contract under which full advance payment is made for a 
specific commodity (usually agricultural) to be delivered at a future date. While there is no 
issue with the use of derivatives for genuine hedging or insurance purpose, they must not be 
used for speculation or gambling (Chapra 2011). Derivatives like collateralized debt 
obligations (CDO) and credit default swaps (CDS) are not compliant with the Shari’ah 
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 The word Sukuk is the plural of the Arabic word Sakk which means Certificate (Iqbal and Tsubota 2009) 
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principles, and therefore unavailable to Islamic financial institutions (Smolo and Mirakhor 
2010). In view of the GFC, the restricted availability of derivatives to Islamic finance 
benefited it through being protected from a channel of contagion (Smolo and Mirakhor 2010; 
Chapra 2011). The size of the debt and derivatives market greatly exceeded the much smaller 
base of equity, real wealth and real sector activities (El-Gamal 2009; Smolo and Mirakhor 
2010). For example, “the compounded annual rate of growth of total outstanding derivatives 
between 2000 and 2007 was 29.9% per annum, while that in total real world output was only 
3.1% per annum” (Chapra 2011: 573). 
4.2.2.4 Real Economy instead of Speculation 
Under an Islamic financial system there is a strong emphasis on the link between the financial 
sector and the real economy. What this means is that the financial sector should support real 
trade and production, and that the rate of return to the financial sector be proportionate to the 
growth (or profit rate) in the real sector of the economy (Mirakhor and Krichene 2009; Smolo 
and Mirakhor 2010). Smolo and Mirakhor (2010: 377) believe that one of the triggers of the 
GFC was the “decoupling” of the financial system from the real sector of the economy, as “an 
inverted colossal pyramid of debt was created on a much smaller base of real sector 
activities”.  
By prohibiting interest, speculation, debt trading, short-selling and many forms of derivatives  
Islamic finance aims to prevent the financial sector from expanding beyond the real economy 
so that more financial resources will be available for the real sector and employment-creating 
activities (Chapra 2007; Mirakhor and Krichene 2009; Chapra 2011). According to Chapra 
(2011: 573), the following four conditions should ensure that credit expands in proportion to 
the growth of the real sector by excluding most speculative and gambling transactions, 
derivative contracts, and short-selling: (1) “the asset that is being sold or leased must be real, 
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and not imaginary or notional;” (2) “the seller must own and possess the goods being sold or 
leased;” (3) “the transaction must be a genuine trade transaction with the full intention of 
giving and taking delivery;” and (4) “the debt cannot be sold, and thus the risk of default 
associated with it must be borne by the lender himself.”  
Further, an Islamic banking system consists of two components to help tie the financial sector 
to the real economy: interest-free deposit accounts with 100% reserve requirement, and 
investment accounts, where deposits are considered as non-speculative equity shares 
(Mirakhor and Krichene 2009). These savings must be directly invested in employment-
creating activities such as trade and production and the depositors share in the profit or loss of 
these investments (Mirakhor and Krichene 2009). The rate of return on financial assets is 
primarily determined by the return to the real sector as the investments are made into 
productive activities in agriculture, industry and services. Thus, returns to invested funds 
arise ex-post from the profits or losses of the investment and therefore, in a growing 
economy, Islamic banks will experience net positive returns (Mirakhor and Krichene 2009). 
In this way, Islamic institutions assume a developmental role with the primary function being 
trade rather than banking (Kayed and Hassan 2011).   
4.2.2.5 Equity, Stability and Values 
El-Gamal (2009: 31) argues that there is a “fundamental economic tradeoff” between 
economic growth and efficiency versus equity and stability. In theory, the Islamic financial 
system emphasises equity and stability, moral values such as honesty, justice and fairness, 
social responsibility and sustainability while condemning fraud, greed and corruption 
(Ahmed 2010; Kayed and Hassan 2011). For instance, under the Shari’ah, investment in 
unethical activities, such as alcohol, pork, drugs, gambling, conventional banking and 
insurance, defence and indecent entertainment, is prohibited (Kayed and Hassan 2011). 
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Further, Islam encourages people to moderation and to live within their means (Kayed and 
Hassan 2011). However, El-Gamal (2009) argues that in practice, Islamic economists failed 
to recognise the fundamental tradeoff between equity and efficiency, and Islamic finance in 
practice, follows the path of efficiency and profit rather than equity. El-Gamal (2009: 33) 
explains this choice with the Prisoners’ dilemma, as societies and individuals can pursue the 
more equitable and less efficient path only if others do the same, otherwise they will be 
punished if other societies and individuals “pursue faster-growth less-equitable paths”. 
4.2.3 Impacts on World Economy and Financial Markets 
The GFC affected almost every market and country and has been described as “the greatest 
financial and economic crisis the world has seen since the Great Depression of the 1930s” 
(Ciro 2012a: 1). The crisis spread to both financial markets and the real economy not only in 
the United States, but across the world. However, not all countries were affected at the same 
time, as some countries were affected through direct exposure to subprime securities already 
by the end of 2007, while other countries were affected through the subsequent global 
recession and drop in international trade following the bankruptcy of Lehman Brothers in 
September 2008 (Claessens et al. 2010).  
Following the bankruptcy of Lehman Brothers, global financial markets collapsed, as stock 
markets fell sharply and credit markets froze. In a number of countries the collapse in stock 
markets was even sharper than in the US (Bekaert et al. 2014). In some cases financial 
markets became dislocated and ceased to function properly (Ciro 2012d). Due to the shortage 
of credit and liquidity, banks stopped lending, which in turn encouraged deflation in asset 
price and reduced the number of investors (Ciro 2012d). As a result of the credit crisis, 
further home foreclosures and bankruptcies followed, with corporate collapses in the United 
States, the United Kingdom, Australia, Iceland, Ireland, Spain and Portugal (Ciro 2012c). 
 183  
 
Moreover, the collapse of Lehman Brothers undermined consumer and investor confidence, 
security in financial markets and market sentiment, which led to runs on numerous banks and 
financial institutions (Ciro 2012c).   
The crisis has spread and affected the macroeconomy as economic growth, real wealth, 
commodity prices, industrial production, trade and exports dropped, deflation began to take 
hold and unemployment rose not only in the United States, but across the world. For 
example, according to the IMF (2009), during the fourth quarter of 2008 overall global GDP 
declined by 6.25%, while GDP for developed economies dropped by 7.5%, and for 
developing nations GDP dropped by 4%. Even emerging countries and countries with limited 
exposure to the mortgage-backed securities that originated in the US sub-prime market 
suffered due to the rapid decline in trade and export volumes, as well as the declining 
consumer demand and business investment (Ciro 2012c). In particular, this affected countries 
which relied on exports and had extensive trade linkages with countries that were hit by the 
crisis (Claessens et al. 2010). Finally, the GFC has contributed to the emergence of sovereign 
debt crises in Europe, including Greece, Ireland, Portugal, Spain and Italy (Ciro 2012b). 
4.2.4 Impacts on Islamic Finance 
Islamic financial institutions and markets were not spared by the GFC and the resulting 
global recession (Abdul Aziz and Gintzburger 2009; Akhtar 2010; Alasrag 2010; Smolo and 
Mirakhor 2010; Kayed and Hassan 2011; Ajmi et al. 2014). Smolo and Mirakhor (2010) 
believe that Islamic financial institutions have been hit by the crisis, although by a much 
more moderate extent than conventional institutions. Even countries with significant 
proportion of Islamic banking suffered in terms of growth, equity market downturns and a 
collapse in real estate and properties (Akhtar 2010). For example, “AMLAK, the Dubai-
based Islamic mortgage provider, is in financial woes, and Investment Dar of Kuwait has 
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defaulted on its sukuk obligations” (Kayed and Hassan 2011: 558). Further, there was a 
decline in sukuk and other product issuance by late 2008 (Akhtar 2010).  Islamic finance was 
affected during the GFC mainly due to the contraction of the economy, the collapse in asset 
prices, the credit crunch and the resulting lack of liquidity in the whole financial market as 
well as declining oil revenues and low consumption in the global economy (Abdul Aziz and 
Gintzburger 2009; Akhtar 2010; Mohieldin 2012).   
According to Abdul Aziz and Gintzburger (2009), Ahmed (2009), Akhtar (2010), Alasrag 
(2010) and Smolo and Mirakhor (2010), Islamic financial institutions are not insulated from 
financial crises because Islamic financial institutions are currently only a subset of the 
conventional financial system, so when the conventional financial market is hit severely, the 
Islamic financial market is affected in an equivalent manner. In addition, “Islamic banks may 
be more vulnerable to fluctuations in the mortgage market, given their high activity in the real 
estate sector compared to conventional banks” (Alasrag 2010: 56).  
However, some argue that Islamic financial institutions have been relatively more resilient or 
immune to the crisis compared to their conventional counterpart (Moody’s Investor Service 
2008; Akhtar 2010; Alasrag 2010; Hasan and Dridi 2010; Sukmana and Kholid 2010; Kayed 
and Hasan 2011; Dogarawa 2012; Mohieldin 2012; Beck, Demirgüç-Kunt and Merrouche 
2013; Al-Khazali, Lean and Samet 2014; Ho et al. 2014; Jawadi, Jawadi and Louhichi 2014; 
Rosman, Wahab and Zainol 2014). Some preliminary evidence suggests that Islamic financial 
institutions have been relatively more resilient or immune to the crisis compared to their 
conventional counterpart. For example, Sukmana and Kholid (2010) use GARCH methods to 
study the impact of the global financial crisis (March 2008 to July 2009) on the Islamic and 
conventional stock indices in Indonesia. They find that the crisis does not affect the mean 
returns of either stock index, but that the crisis affects the volatility of both indices and this 
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effect is about 40 times stronger for the conventional stock index. They conclude for 
Indonesia that investing in the Islamic stock index is less risky than the conventional index, 
especially during a crisis. Another empirical study compares the relative performance of 
Islamic versus conventional banks across a sample of 22 countries during the GFC (Beck, 
Demirgüç-Kunt and Merrouche 2013). They find that during the GFC Islamic banks have a 
relatively better stock market performance, which is possibly due to their higher 
capitalization, and better asset quality during the crisis (Beck, Demirgüç-Kunt and Merrouche 
2013). This suggests Islamic banks have “a more conservative approach to risk-taking” 
(Beck, Demirgüç-Kunt and Merrouche 2013: 434).  
Further studies in this area are Al-Khazali, Lean and Samet (2014) who use a stochastic 
dominance analysis and find that for 5 regional and 4 country-level Dow Jones stock indices, 
Islamic indices outperform their conventional counterparts during the GFC period which they 
define as 2007-2012. However, this study does not include Muslim countries. Ho et al. (2014) 
use risk-adjusted performance measures and find that 12 Islamic indices in 2 Muslim and 6 
Western countries outperformed their conventional counterparts during crisis periods (2002-
2002 and 2007-2008) due to the lower volatility and beta of Islamic stock indices and the 
conservative nature of Shari’ah-compliant investments. Jawadi, Jawadi and Louhichi (2014) 
apply the Sharpe Ratio, Treynor Ratio, Omega Ratio and Jensen’s Alpha as well as GARCH 
models to examine the financial performance of 3 regional Dow Jones Indices (the World, the 
USA and Europe) and find that Islamic stock indices outperform their conventional 
counterparts during the crisis period which they define as July 2007 to June 2011. Further, 
Rosman, Wahab and Zainol (2014) study the efficiency level of 79 Islamic banks in 19 
Middle Eastern and Asian countries (mostly Muslim countries) during the crisis period of 
2007 to 2010. They find that Islamic banks sustained operations through the crisis, but many 
of the Islamic banks were scale inefficient. 
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Some of the commonly cited reasons for a relatively better performance of Islamic financial 
institutions during the GFC are first of all the lack of exposure to toxic assets that contributed 
to the crisis, such as most securitised financial instruments and derivative products, which are 
not acceptable under Islamic finance (Akhtar 2010; Alasrag 2010; Dogarawa 2012). Further 
protective elements are lower leverage, the risk-sharing and asset-based nature of Islamic 
finance, as well as higher capitalization and better asset quality of Islamic financial 
institutions (Akhtar 2010; Dogarawa 2012; Beck, Demirgüç-Kunt and Merrouche 2013). 
Further protective features of Islamic financial institutions were the high lending standards, as 
well as strong asset quality and high provisions for nonperforming loans (Akhtar 2010).  
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4.3 HYPOTHESIS DEVELOPMENT 
This section introduces the four hypotheses derived from the literature in Section 4.2. First, I 
test whether all Islamic and conventional stock and bond indices have been affected 
negatively by the GFC. Second, I test whether the impact of the GFC has been smaller on 
Islamic assets than otherwise comparable conventional assets, which we refer to as “benefit” 
of Islamic assets. Third, I test whether the benefit of Islamic assets during the GFC was 
greater in non-Islamic countries than in Islamic countries. Fourth, I test whether there are 
greater benefits of Islamic assets during the early Sub-prime Crisis than in the later stage of 
the GFC. 
4.3.1 Hypothesis 1: Negative Impact of GFC on all Assets 
As explained in the literature review in this chapter, the GFC affected all financial markets 
and economies irrespective of their exposure to the sub-prime market. The main factors that 
contributed to the spread of the GFC to almost every part of the world economy were 
declining commodity prices, low consumption and the credit crunch that resulted in a lack of 
liquidity in the whole financial market, inclusive of both the conventional and the Shari’ah-
compliant markets. As reviewed in Section 4.2.4 there is some evidence that Islamic financial 
institutions were also affected by the GFC, mainly because the Islamic finance system is 
embedded within the conventional financial system and therefore is not immune to the 
challenges facing the whole financial sector. Therefore, Hypothesis 1 examines whether 
assets, including conventional and Islamic stock and bond indices in a number of Islamic and 
non-Islamic countries were affected negatively by the GFC. For each asset i, which is either 
an Islamic or a conventional stock or bond index, I test the following: 
H0,A: There is either no or a positive impact of the GFC on asset i. 
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H1,A: The impact of the GFC is negative on asset i. 
4.3.2 Hypothesis 2: Smaller Impact of GFC on Islamic Assets 
The literature reviewed in Sections 4.2.2 and 4.2.4 suggests that Islamic finance was not 
immune to the crisis, but that the features of Islamic finance did provide it with some 
protection. These protective features include profit-and-loss sharing that replaces interest-
based debt contracts, the restricted availability of securitisation and derivatives contracts to 
avoid speculation and unnecessary uncertainty, as well as the emphasis on the link between 
the financial sector and the real economy, and finally the focus on equity and stability over 
profit and efficiency in Islamic finance. In fact, according to Kayed and Hassan (2011: 551) 
the GFC would not have occurred under an Islamic financial system because “most, if not all, 
of the factors that have caused or contributed to the development and spread of the crisis are 
not allowed under the rules and guidance of Shariah”. 
Claessens et al. (2010) also provide a framework that suggests Islamic assets were likely to 
be affected to a smaller extent than conventional assets. Their empirical analysis shows that 
the first countries to be affected by the crisis were those with closer links to the US financial 
system and a larger exposure to sub-prime securities. The countries that were hit the hardest 
were the ones with domestic weaknesses such as rapid credit expansion, high leverage, asset 
bubbles and current account imbalances. Islamic assets are protected from some of these 
weaknesses, as Islamic financial institutions are prohibited from holding sub-prime securities, 
while credit and leverage are encouraged to remain low to be used for production and trade 
but not for consumption purposes. 
Therefore, I test this proposition empirically by examining whether the GFC had a smaller 
impact on Islamic assets than otherwise comparable conventional assets. The following are 
the hypotheses, where the Islamic asset j and conventional asset k are two indices from the 
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same provider, for the same country and time period with the only difference being the 
Islamic versus conventional structure: 
H0,B: There is no difference in the impact of the GFC on the Islamic asset j and the 
conventional asset k 
H1,B: The impact of the GFC on the Islamic asset j is smaller than on the conventional asset k 
4.3.3 Hypothesis 3: Greater Benefit of Islamic Assets in non-Islamic 
Countries 
Some evidence from the literature reviewed in sections 4.2.1 and 4.2.3 suggests that 
securities backed by US sub-prime mortgages were concentrated in Western countries, and 
those countries were hit particularly hard with numerous bankruptcies of financial 
institutions. For example, Lane and Milesi-Ferretti (2010) find that the crisis hit advanced 
economies the hardest. Collapses of financial institutions were concentrated in the United 
States, the United Kingdom, Australia, Iceland, Ireland, Spain and Portugal. (Ciro 2012c). 
The fall in annual GDP during the crisis was around 4 per cent for developing countries, 
while it was 7.5 per cent for developed countries (International Monetary Fund 2009), and the 
subsequent sovereign debt crisis affected only European countries such as Greece, Ireland, 
Portugal, Spain and Italy (Ciro 2012b). Further, conventional securitisation and derivative 
contracts as well as speculation and excessive leverage are prohibited under Islamic law, so 
that the exposure of Islamic countries to these practices is likely to be smaller. It is also likely 
that the difference between Islamic and conventional stock indices is smaller in Islamic 
countries, as the number of firms involved in prohibited (haram) business such as alcohol, 
pork, conventional banks and insurance etc. as well as high leverage is limited compared to 
non-Islamic countries. Therefore, I expect to see a greater benefit in terms of more stable 
returns for Islamic assets in non-Islamic countries, where the difference between Islamic and 
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conventional indices will be bigger and where the exposure to toxic assets is greater. I test the 
following hypothesis: 
H0,C: The benefit of Islamic assets during the GFC is the same across non-Islamic and Islamic 
countries. 
H1,C: The benefit of Islamic assets during the GFC was bigger in non-Islamic countries. 
4.3.4 Hypothesis 4: Stronger Benefits of Islamic Assets During the First 
Stage Rather Than Second Stage of the Crisis 
There is evidence that the Islamic financial industry was spared during the early stage of the 
GFC due to the absence of investments in toxic sub-prime mortgages, while it was later 
damaged by the liquidity crunch and investor panic in a similar way as the conventional 
financial system (Akhtar 2010; Alasrag 2010). For example, according to Akhtar (2010: 232), 
“the first round impact of the crisis was subdued in the Islamic industry, given its 
conservatism and lack of exposure to the subprime mortgage market”, while “in the second 
round, from mid-2008, stress started to appear”. Likewise, Abdul Aziz and Gintzburger 
(2009) believe that the Islamic financial sector was not directly affected by the Sub-prime 
Mortgage Crisis, although it was then affected by the overall collapse of the global economy. 
I therefore examine the two stages of the crisis separately, the first being the Sub-prime 
Mortgage Crisis of 2007 up to 14 September 2008 and the second stage being the GFC that 
started with the collapse of Lehman Brothers on the 15 September 2008, and I test the 
following hypothesis: 
H0,D: The benefits of Islamic assets are the same during the Sub-prime Crisis and the GFC  
H1,D: There are greater benefits of Islamic assets during the Sub-prime Crisis than the GFC  
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 4.4 METHODOLOGY 
To examine the impact of the GFC on stock and bond returns I use several approaches. First, 
I present descriptive statistics of monthly asset returns for pre-crisis (up to February 2008), 
crisis (March 2008 to March 2009) and post-crisis (April 2009 onwards) samples in section 
4.5.3 and Appendix F. Second, in section 4.5.4 I draw graphs of the stock and bond indices 
with one asset pair at a time, where the level is indexed to 100 as a common starting point, 
such that 𝑥?̂? = (
𝑥𝑡
𝑥1
) × 100, where 𝑥?̂? is the indexed value at time t, 𝑥𝑡 is the raw return at 
time t, while 𝑥1 is the raw return at time 1. The graphs are based on daily local currency 
returns between 10.08.06 and 16.6.14 except for Malaysian bonds which are for 10.08.06 to 
31.10.13 and UAE bonds up to 01.11.13.  Third, I compute the wealth destruction of stock 
and bond indices over the crisis period, which is presented in section 4.6.1. I define wealth 
destruction as (
𝑅𝐼𝑡−𝑅𝐼𝑡−𝑖
𝑅𝐼𝑡−𝑖
) × 100, where 𝑅𝐼𝑡 is the index level of a stock or bond index on 
31.03.09 and 𝑅𝐼𝑡−𝑖 is the index level of the same stock or bond index on 14.03.08 (except for 
Iran where it is 15.03.08 as the 14
th
 is a Friday and falls on their weekend). I make similar 
calculations for the first stage of the crisis (01.06.07 to 12.09.08) and the second stage of the 
crisis (15.09.08 – 31.03.09). 
Fourth, to explicitly test my hypotheses regarding the different impact of the crisis on Islamic 
versus conventional assets I estimate panel regressions with results presented in sections 4.6.2 
and 4.6.3. In section 4.6.2 these panel regressions refer to stock indices in all countries or 
bond indices in all countries, as well as further sub-samples of stock indices in either Islamic 
or non-Islamic countries. In section 4.6.3 panel regressions are estimated on asset pair level 
(i.e. a pair of Islamic and conventional asset holding everything else constant, e.g. same 
country, same asset class (stock or bond), same index provider (e.g. MSCI), and same sample 
period). Equations 4.1 and 4.2 are the panel regressions which are estimated with White 
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cross-section standard errors & covariance (and fixed cross-section for panel regression with 
all countries): 
𝑟𝑖,𝑡 = 𝛼0 + 𝛼1𝑟𝑡−1
𝑖 + 𝛼2𝐺𝐹𝐶 + 𝛼3𝐺𝐹𝐶 × 𝐼𝑆⁡𝐴𝑠𝑠𝑒𝑡 +⁡𝜀𝑡
𝑖                                        (4.1) 
𝑟𝑖,𝑡 = 𝛽0 + 𝛽1𝑟𝑡−1
𝑖 + 𝛽2𝑐𝑟𝑖𝑠𝑖𝑠1 + 𝛽3𝑐𝑟𝑖𝑠𝑖𝑠2 + 𝛽4𝑐𝑟𝑖𝑠𝑖𝑠1 × 𝐼𝑆⁡𝐴𝑠𝑠𝑒𝑡 + 𝛽5𝑐𝑟𝑖𝑠𝑖𝑠2 ×
𝐼𝑆⁡𝐴𝑠𝑠𝑒𝑡 +⁡𝜀𝑡
𝑖                         (4.2) 
When I estimate panel regressions with all countries an issue is the different data availability 
across assets and countries. I choose to estimate an unbalanced panel with all data available 
first, as well as balanced panels starting in 2005 (including all countries except for Saudi 
Arabia and one asset pair from Malaysia) or 2007 (including all countries). 
The main variables of interest in equations 4.1 and 4.2 are either the GFC dummy (March 
2008 to March 2009), or the Crisis 1 (June 2007 to August 2008) and Crisis 2 (September 
2008 to March 2009) dummies, which all refer to the GFC but different stages or definitions 
of the crisis. To confirm hypothesis 1 that the crisis has a negative impact on stock and bond 
returns, I expect the coefficients 𝛼2, 𝛽2, and 𝛽3 to be negative and significant at least at the 
10% level of significance. Further, the interaction terms between those three dummies and the 
Islamic asset dummy allows me to test the second hypothesis according to which there is a 
smaller impact of the crisis on Islamic assets relative to conventional assets. If the impact of 
the crisis is smaller on Islamic assets than on conventional assets the interaction terms with 
the crisis and Islamic asset dummy should be positive, i.e. offsetting the negative impact of 
the crisis overall. I therefore expect that coefficients 𝛼3, 𝛽4, and 𝛽5 are positive and 
significant. In order to test the third hypothesis that the benefits of Islamic assets are stronger 
in non-Islamic than Islamic countries, I first divide the sample into two groups with only 
Islamic or non-Islamic countries and estimate equations 4.1 and 4.2 for the sub-samples 
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separately. Second, I include an interaction term of the crisis dummies with the Islamic asset 
and Islamic country dummies which show whether there is a significant benefit of Islamic 
assets in Islamic countries, while the interaction term of the crisis dummies with just the 
Islamic asset dummy shows whether there is a significant benefit of Islamic assets in non-
Islamic countries. These regressions are shown in equations 4.3 and 4.4. 
𝑟𝑖,𝑡 = 𝛼0
∗ + 𝛼1
∗⁡𝑟𝑡−1
𝑖 + 𝛼2
∗⁡𝐺𝐹𝐶 + 𝛼3
∗⁡𝐺𝐹𝐶 × 𝐼𝑆⁡𝐴𝑠𝑠𝑒𝑡 + 𝛼4⁡𝐺𝐹𝐶 × 𝐼𝑆⁡𝐴𝑠𝑠𝑒𝑡 ×
𝐼𝑆⁡𝐶𝑜𝑢𝑛𝑡𝑟𝑦 +⁡𝜀𝑡
𝑖                      (4.3) 
𝑟𝑖,𝑡 = 𝛽0
∗ + 𝛽1
∗𝑟𝑡−1
𝑖 + 𝛽2
∗𝑐𝑟𝑖𝑠𝑖𝑠1 + 𝛽3
∗𝑐𝑟𝑖𝑠𝑖𝑠2 + 𝛽4
∗𝑐𝑟𝑖𝑠𝑖𝑠1 × 𝐼𝑆⁡𝐴𝑠𝑠𝑒𝑡 + 𝛽5
∗𝑐𝑟𝑖𝑠𝑖𝑠2 ×
𝐼𝑆⁡𝐴𝑠𝑠𝑒𝑡 +⁡𝛽6⁡𝑐𝑟𝑖𝑠𝑖𝑠1 × 𝐼𝑆⁡𝐴𝑠𝑠𝑒𝑡 × 𝐼𝑆⁡𝐶𝑜𝑢𝑛𝑡𝑟𝑦 + 𝛽7⁡𝑐𝑟𝑖𝑠𝑖𝑠2 × 𝐼𝑆⁡𝐴𝑠𝑠𝑒𝑡 ×
𝐼𝑆⁡𝐶𝑜𝑢𝑛𝑡𝑟𝑦 + 𝜀𝑡
𝑖                             (4.4) 
Under hypothesis 3 I expect to find bigger benefits of Islamic assets in non-Islamic than 
Islamic countries. If this is the case, the interaction term of crisis and Islamic asset dummies 
(coefficients 𝛼3
∗
, 𝛽4
∗ and 𝛽5
∗) should be positive, as it measures the impact of the crisis on 
Islamic assets in non-Islamic countries, while the interaction term of crisis, Islamic asset and 
Islamic country dummies should be negative (coefficients  𝛼4, 𝛽6, and 𝛽7), as this measures 
the impact of the crisis on Islamic assets in Islamic countries relative to non-Islamic 
countries.  
Finally, hypothesis 4 explores whether there are differences in benefits of Islamic assets in 
the first versus the second stage of the crisis. Equations 4.2 and 4.4 are used to test this 
hypothesis. If the benefits of Islamic assets are bigger during the first stage of the crisis 
relative to the second stage of the crisis, then either (1) there are benefits of Islamic assets 
during the first stage of the crisis but no benefits during the second stage, or (2) there are 
benefits of Islamic assets in both stages of the crisis, but this benefit is greater during the first 
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stage of the crisis. This can, for example, be measured as the benefit relative to the overall 
impact of the crisis in order to account for the overall bigger impact of the second stage crisis 
on most asset returns relative to the first stage of the crisis. Therefore, I expect the ratio 
|
𝐵𝑒𝑛𝑒𝑓𝑖𝑡⁡𝑜𝑓⁡𝐼𝑠𝑙𝑎𝑚𝑖𝑐⁡𝑎𝑠𝑠𝑒𝑡𝑠
𝐼𝑚𝑝𝑎𝑐𝑡⁡𝑜𝑓⁡𝑐𝑟𝑖𝑠𝑖𝑠⁡𝑜𝑛⁡𝑐𝑜𝑛𝑣𝑒𝑛𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛𝑎𝑙⁡𝑎𝑠𝑠𝑒𝑡𝑠
| = |
𝐶𝑜𝑒𝑓𝑓𝑖𝑐𝑖𝑒𝑛𝑡⁡𝑜𝑓⁡𝑐𝑟𝑖𝑠𝑖𝑠⁡×⁡𝐼𝑆⁡𝐴𝑠𝑠𝑒𝑡
𝐶𝑜𝑒𝑓𝑓𝑖𝑐𝑖𝑒𝑛𝑡⁡𝑜𝑓⁡𝑐𝑟𝑖𝑠𝑖𝑠
|⁡ to be greater during the 
first stage of the crisis relative to the second stage, i.e. |
?̂?4
?̂?2
| > |
?̂?5
?̂?3
| and |
?̂?4
∗
?̂?2
∗| > |
?̂?5
∗
?̂?3
∗| in equations 
4.2 and 4.4, respectively.
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Finally, as an additional analysis in section 3.6.5. and Appendix G I estimate OLS regressions 
with robust standard errors (White Heteroskedasticity-Consistent Standard Errors & 
Covariance) for each index individually where I include dummy variables that proxy for the 
crisis period (either GFC, Crisis 1 or Crisis 2 dummies, which are defined as in the panel 
regressions). These regressions use data in local currency and monthly frequency. The 
following are the two OLS equations that I estimate separately for each asset i: 
𝑟𝑖,𝑡 = 𝛾0 + 𝛾1𝑟𝑡−1
𝑖 + 𝛾2𝐺𝐹𝐶 +⁡𝜀𝑡
𝑖                                                                             (4.7) 
𝑟𝑖,𝑡 = 𝛿0 + 𝛿1𝑟𝑡−1
𝑖 + 𝛿2𝑐𝑟𝑖𝑠𝑖𝑠1 + 𝛿3𝑐𝑟𝑖𝑠𝑖𝑠2 +⁡𝜀𝑡
𝑖               (4.8) 
 
  
                                                          
79
 I only apply this ratio when ?̂?2 ≠ 0 and ?̂?3 ≠ 0 or ?̂?2
∗ ≠ 0 and ?̂?3
∗ ≠ 0. 
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4.5 DATA 
4.5.1 Crisis Dummy 
The main variable of interest is the crisis period which I proxy by a dummy variable. The 
main definition of the crisis dummy that I use in this study is 17.03.08 to 31.03.09 (Manda, 
2010). I refer to this dummy as the GFC dummy. Further, I split the crisis into two 
subperiods, the first being the Sub-prime Mortgage crisis (01.06.07 to 14.09.08) and the 
second being the global financial crisis which begins with the bankruptcy of Lehman 
Brothers and the subsequent spread of the crisis across global markets (15.09.08 to 31.03.09). 
This definition of the subperiods follows Aït-Sahalia et al. (2012) who argue that the 
beginning of the crisis can be identified based on a Markov-switching vector autoregression 
of bond data (see Nowak et al. (2011)), while the 14 September 2008 when Lehman Brothers 
collapsed is the end of the subprime crisis phase and the beginning of the global phase of the 
crisis. Further, the end date of the crisis dummy (31 March 2009) coincides with the G20 
Leaders’ Summit on Financial Markets and the World Economy that took place in London on 
2 April 2009, when more than 1 trillion dollars was pledged for improving international 
finance and trade in order to support a recovery from the GFC (Aït-Sahalia et al. 2012).  
4.5.2 Asset Returns 
I include stock and bond indices for a total of 19 countries, which covers 8 non-Islamic 
countries (Australia, Canada, France, Germany, Italy, Japan, UK and US) and 11 Islamic 
countries (Bahrain, Egypt, Indonesia, Iran, Malaysia, Morocco, Pakistan, Qatar, Saudi 
Arabia, Turkey, UAE). All countries have at least one Islamic stock index, all countries 
except for Iran have at least one conventional stock index,
 80
 most countries have at least one 
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 For the names, sources and sample period of the individual stock indices see Table E.1 in Appendix E. 
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conventional bond index (corporate, government or both) and Malaysia and UAE have an 
Islamic bond index (sukuk).
 81
 I include the maximum number of Islamic countries for which 
comprehensive data is available. For an asset to be included I require it to be continuously 
available at least over the 2007-2013 period. A complete list of all indices, the index 
providers, data source and sample period is in Appendix E.  
The data is in monthly frequency over June 2002 through June 2014, except where the 
beginning and end date are adjusted whenever index data is not available (e.g. a number of 
Islamic stock indices are only available after 2004, 2005 or 2007, while Islamic bond indices 
are only available between August 2005 and June 2014 for Malaysia and between December 
2004 and October 2013 for the UAE). I choose the monthly frequency for several reasons, 
first, daily data is noisy and subject to stale prices, second, monthly data for Islamic stock 
indices is available over a longer time period than daily or weekly data, and third, because 
monthly data avoids issues with public holidays, as countries in the panel regressions have 
different public holidays and a number of Muslim countries have weekends that fall on either 
Thursday and Friday or on Friday and Saturday. In addition to the monthly frequency, I also 
use the daily frequency for the purpose of plotting graphs of the stock and bond indices over 
time. Further, all analysis is done in local currency as to avoid the impact of the exchange 
rate which can have a big effect during crises.  
I use continuously compounded excess returns over the country’s respective risk-free rate 
(e.g. the one-month Treasury bill rate from Ibbotson Associates for the US)
82
 such that the 
return series for each index k is )ln(
1,
,
,


tk
tk
tk
P
P
r .  
                                                          
81
 For the names, sources and sample period of the individual bond indices see Table E.2 in Appendix E. 
82
 For the names, sources and sample period of the individual series that proxy the risk-free rate see Table E.3 in 
Appendix E. 
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I need to make minor adjustments to some asset data: (1) Since Iranian stock data is provided 
with dates according to the local calendar (Solar Hijri calendar), I use a date converter to 
convert those dates into the Western, Gregorian, calendar. (2) Some data (bond data in 
Malaysia and UAE and stock data in Iran) is only available in daily frequency, so I extract the 
monthly data by taking the index value on the last day of each calendar month. (3) Data for 
UAE bond returns is only available in US currency, so I obtain the exchange rate from 
Datastream to convert the US returns into local currency. (4) Sometimes the risk free rate is 
not available for all the sample period, in which case I take the average of the last 1-2 years 
of data as a proxy for the missing observations. (5) I clean the data for one of the Islamic 
stock indices in Iran (is_s2) where decimal points are entered incorrectly for a number of 
observations over 2011-2014. 
4.5.3 Descriptive Statistics of Asset Returns 
For the monthly returns in local currency that I use in the main analysis I include tables F.1-
F.19 with descriptive statistics for excess returns of each asset in Appendix F. Overall I find 
for the overall time period (2002-2014 or parts thereof subject to data availability) that stock 
excess returns (over the risk-free rate) are positive on average for all countries except for 
Italy and Turkey, where the average conventional stock index return is negative, and all 4 
Islamic and conventional stock indices in Bahrain as well as in the UAE. Among corporate 
bond index excess returns, there are more negative average excess returns (18) than positive 
returns (10), while among government bond index excess returns, there are more positive 
(23) than negative average returns (2). During this time the bond volatility (as measured by 
the standard deviation) is lower than stock index volatility, and according to the Jarque-Bera 
test of normality the majority of time series does not follow a normal distribution (using the 
5% level of significance).  
 198  
 
In terms of the relative performance of Islamic versus conventional assets there is a 
significant variation across countries and I sort the stock pairs into 4 groups based on their 
relative return and standard deviation. Islamic stocks in group 1 outperform their 
conventional counterparts with higher (or same) returns and lower standard deviation 
(France, Germany, Italy, US MSCI and Saudi Arabia), in group 2 Islamic stock indices 
underperform their conventional counterparts with lower returns and higher (or same) 
standard deviation (Japan MSCI and DJ, Bahrain MSCI and MSCI Domestic, Egypt, 
Indonesia, Qatar MSCI Domestic, UAE MSCI and MSCI Domestic, Canada MSCI and 
Morocco). In group 3 Islamic stocks have higher (or same) returns but this comes with a 
higher standard deviation than their conventional counterparts (Australia, Canada DJ, UK 
MSCI and DJ, Malaysia MSCI and FTSE, Pakistan, Qatar MSCI and Turkey), while in group 
4 Islamic stocks have lower returns and this comes with a lower standard deviation than their 
conventional counterparts (US DJ). Based on these groups it appears that Islamic stocks tend 
to have a higher standard deviation than conventional stock indices in most countries, except 
for France, Germany, Italy, the US and Saudi Arabia. However, there are about the same 
number of Islamic indices with either higher or lower returns than their conventional 
counterparts. In terms of relative bond performance the Islamic bonds have lower returns and 
a lower standard deviation than conventional bonds in Malaysia, while it is the opposite in the 
UAE where Islamic bonds have higher returns and a higher standard deviation than their 
conventional counterparts. 
As the focus of this study is on the impact of the global financial crisis I also examine the 
relative performance of Islamic versus conventional assets during the crisis period which is 
included on Panel C of the same tables in Appendix F. All of the stock returns have on 
average a negative return during the crisis period of March 2008 to March 2009. We can look 
at the relative performance of Islamic assets by dividing the asset pairs into four groups as 
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above. In group 1, Islamic stocks outperform their conventional counterparts with higher 
returns (i.e. less negative returns) and lower standard deviation (France, Italy, Japan DJ, US 
MSCI and DJ, Egypt, Morocco, Pakistan and Saudi Arabia). In group 2, Islamic stocks 
underperform their conventional counterparts with lower returns and higher standard 
deviation (Canada DJ, Japan MSCI, Bahrain MSCI Domestic, Malaysia MSCI and FTSE, 
and UAE MSCI and MSCI Domestic). In group 3, Islamic stocks have higher returns and a 
higher standard deviation than their conventional counterparts (Australia, Canada MSCI, 
Germany, UK MSCI and DJ, Indonesia and Qatar), while in group 4, Islamic stocks have 
lower returns and lower standard deviation than their conventional counterparts (Bahrain 
MSCI and Turkey). Relative to the overall sample period, the relative performance of Islamic 
assets is slightly better during the crisis period with several countries shifting into group 1 
(from 5 to 9) and group 2 becoming smaller (from 10 to 6). Still, there is no obvious trend in 
relative performance and it looks like the performance is country and time specific. 
4.5.4 Graph of Stock and Bond Index Pairs  
The graphs 1-30 show one asset pair at a time for each country, where the index data is 
normalised to an initial value of 100, and is in local currency and daily frequency. Each asset 
pair refers to an Islamic and a conventional index which are matched by asset type (i.e. stock 
or bond), asset provider (e.g. MSCI, Dow Jones, FTSE, S&P), sample period and country. An 
exception is Iran where no conventional stock index is available and instead of an asset pair I 
plot all four Islamic stock indices on graph 11 for Iran. I use the 10 August 2006 to 14 June 
2014 as the common sample period for all graphs except for Saudi Arabia (2007 onwards) 
and the bond asset pairs in Malaysia and the UAE (only up to 31 October 2013). 
The graphs represent the diversity of the asset performance across countries. In all countries 
the collapse in asset prices of 2008 is pronounced to a smaller or bigger extent and applies to 
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all assets, including Islamic and conventional assets, as well as to stocks and bonds. Most 
countries recover their asset prices to at least their pre-crisis levels except for Bahrain, Italy 
(conventional stock), Japan, and the UAE (conventional stocks). In a substantial number of 
countries the Islamic stock index outperforms during the early crisis period (2007 – August 
2008) which suggests that they have been more immune to the toxic assets of the subprime 
crisis. These countries include Australia, Bahrain, Canada, France, Germany, Indonesia, Italy, 
Japan (only slightly for MSCI), Malaysia, Qatar, Saudi Arabia, Turkey, UAE, UK and US. 
For bonds this only holds in Malaysia where Islamic bonds slightly outperform conventional 
bonds, but not in UAE where Islamic bonds perform similar to conventional bonds before the 
crisis and are hit harder during the crisis.  
While Islamic and conventional assets are both hit hard during the crisis in every country of 
our sample, there is a variation in the speed of recovery after the crisis and in some cases 
there opens a wide gap between the relative performance of Islamic versus conventional 
assets after the crisis. In Australia, the Islamic stock index recovers quicker after the crisis, 
although in early 2013 the conventional stock index rises above the level of the Islamic index. 
In Bahrain none of the stock indices recover to their pre-crisis level and the Islamic index 
slightly underperforms after the crisis relative to its conventional counterpart. In Canada the 
post-crisis performance is either similar or the Islamic index slightly outperforms, but as in 
Australia, the conventional index rises to above the Islamic index from 2012 onwards. While 
the immediate recovery from the crisis is similar for Islamic and conventional stock indices in 
Egypt, the Islamic index rises above the conventional ones subsequently and the gap widens 
after December 2010 when the uprisings of Arab Spring begin in Egypt and the Middle East 
and during this time the conventional index is hit harder than the Islamic index. This changes 
in late 2013 onwards where the conventional index outperforms once again. In France, 
Germany, Italy, Japan, Pakistan, Saudi Arabia, UK and US the Islamic index recovers from 
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the crisis quicker than the conventional index and outperforms it consistently over the rest of 
the sample period. In Indonesia, on the other hand, the conventional index recovers quicker 
and outperforms the Islamic index over the remaining sample period. Iran, in graph 11, does 
not have a conventional stock index, but some comparisons can be made between the 
TEPDIX (Tehran Exchange Price and Dividend Index) which includes changes in price and 
dividends, the TEPIX (Tehran Exchange Price Index) which only tracks the changes in price, 
as well as the industrial index and the top 50 index which are both price indices. The Top 50 
Index performs worse relative to the TEPIX and industrial indices, which could be the effect 
of sanctions which would affect bigger firms that rely on international trade, banking and 
many of them the export of oil, which are all sectors that have been sanctioned by the US. All 
4 stock indices rise since 2010 and especially since 2012 which may be partly due to the high 
inflation. In Malaysia the relative performance of Islamic and conventional stocks and bonds 
is similar, although the stock indices do appear to recover quicker for the MSCI indices and 
the bond indices and continue to outperform for the MSCI indices, although Islamic indices 
slightly underperform for the FTSE indices in 2010-2011 and for the bond indices 2012 
onwards. In Morocco the Islamic index consistently underperforms the conventional index 
throughout the sample period. In Qatar the Islamic stocks perform similar or slightly better 
than the conventional stock indices. In Turkey, the conventional index recovers quicker than 
the Islamic index, although since 2013 the Islamic index outperforms once again. In the UAE 
the Islamic bonds recover slightly quicker than the conventional ones, despite having been hit 
harder at the peak of the crisis. However, the conventional stock indices in the UAE recover 
more quickly than their Islamic counterparts and continue outperforming them until the end 
of the sample period.  
In mid-2011 when stock markets dropped as a reaction to the intensifying European 
sovereign debt crisis, most countries in our sample, and France, Germany, Italy, UK and US 
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in particular, have been hit hard. The graphs suggest that Islamic and conventional assets 
were affected in a similar way and Islamic stocks were not spared. 
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4.6 RESULTS 
4.6.1 Wealth Destruction 
Table 4.1 presents the percentage wealth destruction for all pairs of Islamic and conventional 
assets over three time periods: GFC (14 March 2008 – 31 March 2009), crisis 1 which is the 
first stage of the Sub-prime Mortgage Crisis (1 June 2007 – 12 September 2008) and crisis 2 
which is the second stage of the GFC when financial markets were affected globally (15 
September 2008 – 31 March 2009). The assets are sorted by country and each conventional 
asset is followed by its Islamic counterpart (e.g. c_s1 and is_s1). Those asset pairs where the 
Islamic index outperforms the conventional index are indicated by a hash sign (#). Overall, 
Islamic stock indices tend to outperform their conventional counterpart indices during the 
crisis periods, although there are variations across countries. The strongest benefits can be 
found in the UK and the US, while consistent benefits across the crisis time periods also 
apply to Australia, Egypt, France, Italy, Japan, Morocco and Pakistan. Most other countries 
have mixed results with benefits during some crisis periods, while Islamic stock indices in 
Indonesia, Turkey, and UAE overall perform worse than their conventional counterparts. In 
Iran all stock indices are Islamic, so they cannot be compared to conventional indices, but for 
the Top50 Index (is_s4) which consists of large firms which are more likely to depend on 
exports or oil prices, the impact of the crisis is much worse than for the total stock indices 
(is_s1 and is_s2) or the industrial stock index (is_s3). Malaysian bonds do not seem to be 
affected negatively by the crisis, while bonds in the UAE show signs of wealth destruction, 
although to a less extent than stock indices in the UAE. In both Malaysia and the UAE the 
conventional bonds tend to perform better than the Islamic counterparts. 
According to Table 4.1 a number of Muslim countries were not affected by the first stage of 
the crisis: Bahrain, Egypt, Iran, Morocco, Qatar and Saudi Arabia. In another set of countries 
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(Australia, Canada and Indonesia) only the conventional stock index was affected while the 
Islamic counterpart index was spared or only showed small signs of the crisis. Further, while 
the Islamic stock indices in the UK and the US were affected by the crisis, this effect is much 
smaller than for the conventional counterpart index (wealth destruction of 5.42 to 7.51 
percent for Islamic stocks versus 12.98 to 16 percent for conventional stocks). This suggests 
that Islamic assets provided some level of protection during the first stage of the crisis as 
Islamic financial institutions were prohibited from holding most of the sub-prime mortgage 
securities and derivatives. Further, the crisis had not reached several Muslim countries, 
perhaps because they had less trade and financial flow linkages to the US, or because their 
financial institutions were not exposed to the sub-prime mortgage securities. However, during 
the second stage of the crisis every single stock index and the UAE bond indices collapsed, 
while only the Malaysian bond indices have remained stable over that time period.  
 
Table 4.1: Wealth Destruction for Three Time Periods 
Country Asset GFC 
(14.3.08-31.3.09) 
Crisis 1 
(1.6.07-12.9.08) 
Crisis 2 
(15.9.08-31.3.09) 
Australia c_s1 -24.90# -16.81# -21.40# 
Australia is_s1 -21.06# -3.66# -18.37# 
Bahrain c_s1 -68.59 12.25 -59.17# 
Bahrain is_s1 -69.93 8.20 -58.23# 
Bahrain c_s2 -71.42 9.29 -61.93 
Bahrain is_s2 -73.69 7.77 -63.56 
Canada c_s1 -29.94 -4.05# -26.18# 
Canada is_s1 -31.81 5.53# -22.35# 
Canada c_s2 -31.57 -5.44# -27.33# 
Canada is_s2 -34.07 -2.34# -21.89# 
Egypt c_s1 -59.38# 5.68# -41.00# 
Egypt is_s1 -58.02# 9.65# -38.12# 
France c_s1 -35.77# -26.57# -31.79# 
France is_s1 -31.23# -19.41# -27.91# 
Germany c_s1 -40.00# -22.23# -35.38 
Germany is_s1 -37.81# -15.55# -36.44 
Indonesia c_s1 -37.86 -3.92# -11.10 
Indonesia is_s1 -49.00 3.70# -20.48 
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Iran is_s1 -19.10 25.52 -31.60 
Iran is_s2 -12.57 56.57 -32.58 
Iran is_s3 -22.02 25.58 -32.83 
Iran is_s4 -48.18 -12.34 -46.14 
Italy c_s1 -45.50# -30.80# -38.88# 
Italy is_s1 -35.71# -21.28# -27.20# 
Japan c_s1 -34.97# -32.57# -34.43# 
Japan is_s1 -34.82# -32.55# -33.73# 
Japan c_s2 -37.81# -32.71 -37.70# 
Japan is_s2 -33.13# -33.65 -31.06# 
Malaysia c_s1 -25.02# -22.21# -12.47# 
Malaysia is_s1 -24.91# -15.82# -10.86# 
Malaysia c_s2 -27.26# -20.69 -15.20# 
Malaysia is_s2 -27.14# -21.93 -11.80# 
Malaysia c_bond 5.36 1.68# 6.06 
Malaysia is_bond 4.78 1.85# 5.23 
Morocco c_s1 -30.00# 19.88# -19.09# 
Morocco is_s1 -19.51# 22.96# -9.69# 
Pakistan c_s1 -58.17# -30.72# -29.67# 
Pakistan is_s1 -52.55# -18.33# -29.35# 
Qatar c_s1 -48.67# 39.31# -37.40# 
Qatar is_s1 -45.87# 51.61# -35.71# 
Qatar c_s2 -49.02# 32.64# -37.20# 
Qatar is_s2 -45.92# 44.94# -36.24# 
Saudi Arabia c_s1 -52.26# 12.67# -34.47 
Saudi Arabia is_s1 -51.20# 16.53# -36.74 
Turkey c_s1 -38.10 -20.54# -24.93 
Turkey is_s1 -51.34 -18.11# -34.18 
UAE c_s1 -72.41 -18.23# -59.79 
UAE is_s1 -79.22 -13.82# -68.97 
UAE c_s2 -65.61 -8.57 -50.82 
UAE is_s2 -77.33 -17.23 -65.06 
UAE c_bond -12.14 -0.48 -10.36 
UAE is_bond -14.23 -0.51 -12.99 
UK c_s1 -27.24# -15.53# -22.90# 
UK is_s1 -15.95# -6.76# -11.09# 
UK c_s2 -27.39# -12.98# -23.17# 
UK is_s2 -14.77# -5.42# -11.74# 
US c_s1 -36.26# -16.00# -31.92# 
US is_s1 -28.67# -6.36# -26.15# 
US c_s2 -36.28# -15.96# -32.62# 
US is_s2 -29.72# -7.51# -26.97# 
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4.6.2 Main Results 
The main results in Tables 4.2 to 4.6 refer to the panel regressions with either stock assets 
across all countries (section 4.6.2.1) or with bond assets in Malaysia and the United Arab 
Emirates, which are the only two countries where data of Islamic bond indices is available 
(section 4.6.2.2).  
4.6.2.1 Panel Regressions with Stock Indices 
Table 4.2 presents the panel regressions with stock indices where the stock return is the 
dependent variable and the independent variables of interest are the GFC dummy (equal to 1 
over 14 March 2008 to 31 March 2009), the interaction between the GFC dummy and the 
Islamic asset dummy (which is equal to 1 if the asset is Islamic), as well as an interaction 
between the GFC dummy, the Islamic asset dummy and the Islamic country dummy (equal to 
1 if the asset is from an Islamic country). There are 6 columns with different combinations, 
including the unbalanced panel, a balanced panel with 2007 as the starting date and a 
balanced panel with 2005 as the starting date, and for each of them I estimate the regressions 
either with the interaction of GFC, Islamic asset and Islamic country, or without. Panel 
regressions in all Tables (4.2 to 4.8) are estimated with White cross-section standard errors 
and covariance, and with fixed cross-section. 
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Table 4.2: Stock Panel and GFC 
 Unbalanced Panel Balanced Panel 2007 Balanced Panel 2005 
Constant 0.8529*** 0.8541*** 0.9286** 0.9289** 0.7452* 0.7457* 
 2.6669 2.6793 2.0303 2.0409 1.9452 1.9542 
AR(1) 0.0925* 0.0897* 0.1370* 0.1329* 0.1069* 0.1034* 
 1.6896 1.6503 1.9508 1.9032 1.7080 1.6625 
GFC -6.1071*** -6.1070*** -6.1824*** -6.1826*** -6.0873*** -6.0881*** 
 -2.8852 -2.8889 -2.8095 -2.8154 -2.7992 -2.8034 
GFC * IS asset 0.1316 2.0841* 0.0863 2.1797* 0.0930 1.9713 
 0.3031 1.8066 0.1903 1.7820 0.2053 1.6297 
GFC * IS asset * IS country  -3.5561*  -3.7679*  -3.7560* 
  -1.8024  -1.8256  -1.6569 
Fixed cross-section yes yes yes yes yes yes 
Adjusted R-Squared 0.0803 0.0828 0.1096 0.1129 0.0887 0.0916 
Observations 6880 6880 4558 4558 5184 5184 
 
According to Table 4.2 stock indices across all countries have been affected by the GFC with 
highly significant coefficients suggesting that the stock returns dropped by 6.09 to 6.18 
percentage points. When the interaction between the GFC, Islamic asset and Islamic country 
is included there are significant differences between Islamic assets and conventional ones. 
For instance, results from the unbalanced panel (in column 2) show that while conventional 
assets dropped by 6.11 percentage points, Islamic assets in non-Islamic countries dropped by 
only 4.02 percentage points, although Islamic assets in Islamic countries dropped by 9.66 
percentage points. This suggests that relative to their conventional counterparts, Islamic 
assets have provided protection during the GFC in non-Islamic countries, while they have 
been more vulnerable in Islamic countries. Perhaps, there was less exposure to toxic sub-
prime assets in Islamic countries and the impact of the crisis was rather through the declining 
demand, commodity prices and trade which affected all assets, while Islamic stock indices 
tend to be less diversified and might have been over exposed to vulnerable industries such as 
the real estate and commodity sectors (e.g. oil). In regressions where I do not include the 
interaction term of GFC, Islamic asset and Islamic country, there are no significant 
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differences between Islamic and conventional assets, which is likely to be because of the 
opposite effects on Islamic assets in Islamic versus non-Islamic countries which cancels out 
when the regression does not take into account the two groups of countries. 
The structure of Table 4.3 is similar to Table 4.2 except that the GFC dummy is replaced with 
a Crisis 1 dummy (equal to 1 during the first stage of the crisis, June 2007 to August 2008) 
and a Crisis 2 dummy (equal to 1 during the second stage of the crisis, September 2008 to 
March 2009). Again, there are 6 columns with different combinations, including the 
unbalanced panel, a balanced panel with 2007 as the starting date and a balanced panel with 
2005 as the starting date, and for each of them estimate the regressions either with the 
interaction of Crisis (1 and 2), Islamic asset and Islamic country, or without.  
Table 4.3: Stock Panel and Crises 1 and 2 
 Unbalanced Panel Balanced Panel 2007 Balanced Panel 2005 
Constant 0.8551*** 0.8562*** 0.9736** 0.9745** 0.7749** 0.7760** 
 2.6699 2.6888 2.1089 2.1270 2.0154 2.0347 
AR(1) 0.0781 0.0721 0.1135* 0.1058 0.0860 0.0779 
 1.5437 1.4211 1.7367 1.6106 1.4588 1.3080 
Crisis 1 -1.5440 -1.5425 -1.6712 -1.6697 -1.5707 -1.5691 
 -1.3519 -1.3600 -1.3437 -1.3546 -1.3541 -1.3652 
Crisis 1 * IS asset 0.7448*** 0.2112 0.6076** 0.0175 0.6720** -0.1812 
 2.6157 0.2880 2.0607 0.0205 2.2156 -0.2264 
Crisis 1 * IS asset * IS country  0.9432  1.0635  1.7073 
  0.6638  0.6843  1.0442 
Crisis 2 -8.9037*** -8.9066*** -9.0021*** -9.0070*** -9.0226*** -9.0292*** 
 -2.7254 -2.7300 -2.6645 -2.6717 -2.6977 -2.7049 
Crisis 2 * IS asset 0.2891 2.8853 -0.0170 2.1674 0.0565 2.1646 
 0.4733 1.6076 -0.0293 1.1562 0.0924 1.1602 
Crisis 2 * IS asset * IS country  -4.6962  -3.9367  -4.2204 
  -1.5990  -1.2885  -1.2296 
Fixed cross-section yes yes yes yes yes yes 
Adjusted R-Squared 0.0925 0.0952 0.1284 0.1309 0.1064 0.1095 
Observations 6880 6880 4558 4558 5184 5184 
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Table 4.3 shows that there are in fact very different effects of the first stage of the crisis 
compared to the second stage. The first stage crisis did not have an effect on global stock 
markets, as the coefficient for Crisis 1 is insignificant, and the interaction of Crisis 1 with the 
Islamic asset dummy is positive,
83
 suggesting that Islamic assets returns grew slightly by 
about 0.61 to 0.74 percentage points and outperformed conventional assets during the first 
stage of the crisis. However, the second stage of the crisis affected all stock markets, 
irrespective asset type and country. All coefficients of Crisis 2 are highly significant and 
suggest drops of 8.90 to 9.03 percentage points.  
Tables 4.4 and 4.5 build on Tables 4.2 and 4.3 and they separate the sample into either 
Islamic countries (columns 1, 3, and 5) or non-Islamic countries (columns 2, 4, and 6). Table 
4.4 looks at the impact of the GFC on Islamic versus conventional assets, while Table 5 looks 
at the impact of the first (Crisis 1) or the second stage (Crisis 2) of the crisis on Islamic 
versus conventional stocks. In Table 4.4 there is a consistently negative and highly significant 
coefficient on the GFC dummy, and this impact is stronger in Islamic countries (drop of 7.44 
to 7.59 percentage points) relative to non-Islamic countries (drop of 4.56 to 4.70 percentage 
points). 
  
                                                          
83
 When the interaction term of Crisis 1, Islamic asset and Islamic country is included in Columns 2, 4 and 6, 
there is no significant impact of Crisis 1 on either Islamic or conventional assets. 
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Table 4.4: Stock Panel with Islamic and non-Islamic Countries and GFC 
 Unbalanced Panel Balanced Panel 2007 Balanced Panel 2005 
 Islamic Non-Islamic Islamic Non-Islamic Islamic Non-Islamic 
Constant 0.9476** 0.7624** 1.0882** 0.7358 0.6251 0.8660** 
 2.4533 2.2736 2.1276 1.5148 1.3497 2.1977 
AR(1) 0.0906 0.0814 0.1421* 0.0992 0.1060 0.0889 
 1.5090 1.0548 1.8550 1.0355 1.5455 1.0084 
GFC -7.4399*** -4.5907** -7.5859*** -4.5561** -7.4810*** -4.6987** 
 -3.0347 -2.3083 -2.9816 -2.2269 -2.8598 -2.3406 
GFC * IS asset -0.1391 0.5687 -0.1844 0.5547 -0.3911 0.5820 
 -0.2502 0.9109 -0.3129 0.8694 -0.6041 0.9237 
Fixed cross-section yes yes yes yes yes yes 
Adjusted R-Squared 0.0905 0.0638 0.1257 0.0836 0.0945 0.0824 
Observations 3424 3456 2494 2064 2592 2592 
 
Table 4.5: Stock Panel with Islamic and non-Islamic Countries and Crises 1 and 2 
 
Table 4.5 confirms most findings from the previous tables, with distinct differences between 
the first and second stages of the crisis, as well as between Islamic and non-Islamic countries.  
The first stage of the crisis does not affect any stocks in Islamic countries, while it does have 
a negative impact on stock returns in non-Islamic countries. There is, however, a benefit of 
 Unbalanced Panel Balanced Panel 2007 Balanced Panel 2005 
 Islamic Non-Islamic Islamic Non-Islamic Islamic Non-Islamic 
Constant 0.8174** 0.9238*** 0.9182* 1.0437** 0.4436 1.1094*** 
 2.1372 2.7780 1.8242 2.1464 0.9713 2.8715 
AR(1) 0.0702 0.0579 0.1141 0.0634 0.0788 0.0543 
 1.1886 0.8075 1.4840 0.7237 1.1174 0.6765 
Crisis 1 -0.8151 -2.3911** -0.9642 -2.5330** -0.5541 -2.6009** 
 -0.5644 -2.0775 -0.6177 -2.0840 -0.3687 -2.2323 
Crisis 1 * IS asset 0.4293 0.7828* 0.3636 0.8361** 0.5096 0.8273** 
 1.3654 1.8989 1.0834 1.9719 1.4982 1.9907 
Crisis 2 -10.1323** -7.4596*** -10.1499** -7.6096*** -10.3706** -7.6625*** 
 -2.5782 -2.6662 -2.4963 -2.6822 -2.4649 -2.7414 
Crisis 2 * IS asset -0.5903 0.7839 -0.6012 0.8330 -0.7111 0.8309 
 -0.7601 0.8796 -0.7412 0.9220 -0.7354 0.9337 
Fixed cross-section yes yes yes yes yes yes 
Adjusted R-Squared 0.0967 0.1016 0.1314 0.1371 0.1021 0.1329 
Observations 3424 3456 2494 2064 2592 2592 
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Islamic assets in non-Islamic countries during the first stage of the crisis, as returns of 
conventional stocks drop by 2.39 to 2.60 percentage points, but returns of Islamic stocks only 
drop by 1.61 to 1.77 percentage points. The second stage of the crisis affects all stock 
markets with no difference between Islamic versus conventional assets. As in Table 4.4, the 
impact of Crisis 2 is stronger for Islamic countries (a drop of 10.13 to 10.37 percentage 
points) than for non-Islamic countries (a drop of 7.46 to 7.66 percentage points).  
4.6.2.2 Panel Regressions with Bond Indices 
Table 4.6 summarises the results of the impact of the crisis (GFC, Crisis 1 or Crisis 2) on 
bond index returns, instead of stock index returns. There are only two countries with Islamic 
bond indices and both countries are Islamic (Malaysian and UAE). Therefore, there is no 
need to divide the sample into Islamic versus non-Islamic countries or to include an 
interaction term with Islamic country. While these results cannot be generalised for all 
countries, bonds in Malaysia and UAE were not affected by the crisis when measuring it 
either with the GFC or the Crisis 2 sample periods. The only exception is the first stage of the 
crisis, which had a negative impact on bond returns (a drop of 0.55 to 0.60 percentage points) 
without a distinction between Islamic and conventional bonds as the coefficient of the 
interaction between Crisis 1 and Islamic asset is insignificant.  
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Table 4.6: Bond Panel and GFC, Crises 1 and 2 
 Unbalanced Panel Balanced Panel 2005 
 GFC Crises 1 
and 2 
GFC Crises 1 
and 2 
Constant 0.3536*** 0.4011*** 0.4023*** 0.4608*** 
 3.0978 3.2493 3.2666 3.4359 
AR(1) 0.1922 0.1872 0.1863 0.1799 
 1.3124 1.3290 1.2758 1.2824 
GFC -0.8307  -0.8764  
 -1.0598  -1.1244  
GFC * IS asset -0.1699  -0.1751  
 -0.5063  -0.5217  
Crisis 1  -0.5472***  -0.6043*** 
  -3.3504  -3.5635 
Crisis 1 * IS asset  -0.0275  -0.0346 
  -0.1779  -0.2176 
Crisis 2  -1.0570  -1.1122 
  -0.7500  -0.7932 
Crisis 2 * IS asset  -0.3103  -0.3165 
  -0.5647  -0.5766 
Fixed cross-section yes yes yes yes 
Adjusted R-
Squared 
0.0537 0.0526 0.0523 0.0540 
Observations 420 420 388 388 
 
4.6.3 Panel Regressions on Country Level 
Tables 4.7 and 4.8 present results of panel regressions similar to section 4.6.2 but with only 
one asset pair per regression (e.g. a pair of MSCI conventional stock and MSCI Islamic stock 
for Australia). The dependent variable is either the stock or bond return, while the 
independent variable of interest is either the GFC or the Crisis 1 and Crisis 2 dummies, and 
interaction terms of those dummies with an Islamic asset dummy. According to Table 7, the 
GFC had a negative effect on stock indices in all countries except for Pakistan and Qatar, 
which were not significantly affected by the crisis. Likewise, bond returns in Malaysia and 
the UAE have not been affected by the GFC. Among the countries with the biggest impact of 
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the GFC are Bahrain, Egypt, Indonesia, Pakistan, Saudi Arabia and the UAE,
84
 with a drop in 
stock returns by 7.58 to 10.94 percentage points. This is a large effect compared to countries 
like Australia (a drop of 3.81 percentage points), the UK (a drop of 3.67 to 3.68 percentage 
points) or the US (a drop of 4.70 to 4.77 percentage points). In most countries there is no 
significant difference between the impact of the GFC on Islamic versus conventional assets. 
Exceptions are Morocco, the UK and the US where the Islamic asset provides a benefit by up 
to 1.60 percentage points during the crisis, as well as the UAE where the Islamic MSCI 
Domestic stock index performed worse than the conventional counterpart index (the 
difference being 3.02 percentage points). 
  
                                                          
84
 Onour (2010) finds that among the Middle Eastern countries, the UAE has been hit particularly hard, where 
Dubai financial market portfolio loss reached 42% and a local debt crisis followed the GFC in October 2009. 
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Table 4.7: Asset Pair Panels and GFC 
 Constant GFC  GFC * IS 
asset 
AR(1) Adjusted R-
Squared 
Observations 
Australia MSCI 0.6693** -3.8086** 0.3680 0.0429 0.0502 288 
 2.0698 -2.2582 0.3207 0.4474   
Bahrain MSCI -0.7501 -7.7071* -0.3658 0.3318*** 0.2101 216 
 -0.8256 -1.7855 -0.1210 3.7329   
Bahrain MSCI Domestic -0.7082 -8.6387** -0.5564 0.3835*** 0.2657 216 
 -0.7367 -2.0105 -0.1754 3.8580   
Canada MSCI 0.9050** -3.9894* 0.0650 0.0962 0.0556 288 
 2.4462 -1.8433 0.0592 0.8326   
Canada Dow Jones 0.7380** -3.9816* -0.1299 0.0767 0.0513 288 
 2.0094 -1.8806 -0.1009 0.6633   
Egypt MSCI 1.6851* -9.5576** 0.5237 0.1425* 0.0863 240 
 1.7490 -2.1486 0.3045 1.6705   
France MSCI 0.6256 -4.7188** 0.6760 0.0974 0.0609 288 
 1.4123 -2.3299 1.0579 0.9396   
Germany MSCI 0.9695* -5.4815** 0.1774 0.0479 0.0487 288 
 1.7625 -2.5197 0.1939 0.4863   
Indonesia MSCI 1.8881*** -7.5843** -1.7928 0.1022 0.0934 288 
 2.9735 -2.0078 -1.1726 1.1354   
Italy MSCI 0.6587 -6.0178*** 1.1484 0.0137 0.0671 288 
 1.4875 -2.9697 0.8370 0.1578   
Japan MSCI 0.6919 -5.0100* -0.0182 0.2275*** 0.1032 288 
 1.3145 -1.7442 -0.0301 2.6437   
Japan Dow Jones 0.6495 -5.4313* 0.7882 0.2191*** 0.1025 288 
 1.2737 -1.7965 1.0305 2.6816   
Malaysia MSCI 1.1630*** -4.5591*** -0.3652 0.0284 0.0888 288 
 3.4886 -2.9380 -0.4223 0.3008   
Malaysia FTSE 1.4249*** -5.1770*** -0.2277 0.0890 0.1648 182 
 3.1593 -3.0478 -0.4664 0.7735   
Malaysia Bonds 0.2244*** 0.4129 -0.0335 -0.0272*** 0.1566 210 
 2.8484 4.6235 -0.1163 -0.3887 
  Morocco MSCI 0.5022 -3.5483** 1.5976* -0.0377 0.0146 288 
 1.2030 -2.1185 1.7238 -0.4450   
Pakistan MSCI 1.9537*** -9.8048 1.3591 -0.0076 0.0613 288 
 3.3104 -1.6066 0.9521 -0.0905   
Qatar MSCI 0.9295 -6.2959 0.3501 -0.0225 0.0297 216 
 1.2873 -1.4780 0.2963 -0.1590   
Qatar MSCI Domestic 0.9566 -6.3553 0.5593 0.0106 0.0316 216 
 1.3320 -1.4472 0.4864 0.0753   
Saudi Arabia MSCI 1.6446** -7.8801** 0.1006 0.0833 0.1264 172 
 2.2626 -2.2087 0.0751 0.5285   
Turkey MSCI 0.6361 -5.8811** -1.8301 -0.1505* 0.0531 288 
 0.9611 -2.1667 -0.8542 -1.7250   
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UAE MSCI 0.3598 -10.9436** -1.7452 0.1388 0.1143 216 
 0.3020 -2.4636 -0.8077 1.0808   
UAE MSCI Domestic 0.4468 -9.1497** -3.0248* 0.1730 0.1259 216 
 0.3982 -2.3048 -1.8559 1.5192   
UAE Bonds 0.4780** -1.5969 -0.3045 0.1604 0.0624 210 
 2.2549 -1.0391 -0.4732 1.1542   
UK MSCI 0.6759** -3.6779** 1.0523 -0.0500 0.0362 288 
 2.1402 -2.2046 1.3173 -0.5181   
UK Dow Jones 0.6377** -3.6742** 1.2155* -0.0508 0.0344 288 
 2.0092 -2.2397 1.8889 -0.5106   
US MSCI 0.9665*** -4.7044** 0.8515 0.0625 0.0780 288 
 2.8292 -2.1935 1.5994 0.5873   
US Dow Jones 0.9822*** -4.7692** 0.8901* 0.0801 0.0773 288 
 2.7336 -2.1276 1.8234 0.7612   
 
Results in Table 4.8 show that the first stage of the crisis had a negative effect on all bond 
returns and on stock returns in most non-Islamic countries (Australia, France, Germany, Italy, 
Japan (MSCI index), UK and US) as well as in Malaysia and Pakistan, while it had no impact 
on stock returns in most Islamic countries (Bahrain, Canada, Egypt, Indonesia, Morocco, 
Qatar, Saudi Arabia, Turkey and UAE), as well as in Canada and Japan (Dow Jones index). 
The impact of the GFC on stock returns is between -0.50 and -5.24 percentage points. 
Further, there has been a benefit of Islamic assets up to 1.44 percentage points in Australia, 
Canada, France, UK and US. The second stage crisis has a negative impact on all bond 
returns and most stock returns (except for Egypt, Indonesia and Pakistan), with the extent of 
the impact between -5.31 and -17.15 percentage points. As before, in the UK and US there is 
a significant benefit of Islamic assets during the second stage of the crisis, with the benefit 
ranging between 1.27 and 1.85 percentage points. For example, the conventional MSCI stock 
index in the UK dropped by 5.71 percentage points during the second stage of the crisis, 
while the Islamic MSCI stock index in the UK dropped by only 3.86 percentage points. As in 
Table 4.7, the second stage of the crisis has a stronger impact on the Islamic stock index than 
its conventional counterpart in the UAE.   
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Table 4.8:  Asset Pair Panels and Crises 1 and 2 
 Constant Crisis 1 Crisis 1 * 
IS asset 
Crisis 2 Crisis 2 * 
IS asset 
AR(1) Adjusted 
R-
Squared 
Obser-
vations 
Australia MSCI 0.7756** -2.3335* 1.4412* -5.5413** 0.1504 0.0288 0.0707 288 
 2.4438 -1.8298 1.7318 -2.2878 0.0882 0.3319   
Bahrain MSCI -1.0818 1.7166 -0.2163 -12.8748* -0.2912 0.2275* 0.2457 216 
 -1.3262 0.9389 -0.1956 -1.9073 -0.0658 1.7720   
Bahrain MSCI Domestic -1.0223 1.3456 -0.1750 -13.9635** -0.9956 0.2601* 0.3029 216 
 -1.2508 0.6666 -0.1615 -2.1523 -0.2212 1.7804   
Canada MSCI 0.9490** -1.0811 1.0970* -7.1289** -0.0410 0.0769 0.0934 288 
 2.5313 -0.9722 1.7227 -2.1882 -0.0239 0.8103   
Canada Dow Jones 0.7842** -0.9875 0.6645 -7.1166** 0.0304 0.0575 0.0840 288 
 2.1133 -0.9626 0.8271 -2.2456 0.0147 0.6030   
Egypt MSCI 1.5151 -1.6889 0.0126 -11.7069 1.9079 0.1509* 0.0649 240 
 1.4420 -0.7306 0.0069 -1.5001 0.7564 1.7443   
France MSCI 0.8591** -3.0469** 0.8447* -7.7471*** 0.8002 0.0644 0.1050 288 
 1.9789 -2.0397 1.7911 -3.2072 1.0308 0.5977   
Germany MSCI 1.1781** -2.8279* 0.5388 -8.5809*** -0.5405 0.0213 0.0816 288 
 2.1409 -1.8326 1.0569 -2.8340 -0.4178 0.2136   
Indonesia MSCI 1.6344** -0.9625 0.8368 -8.2759 -2.1199 0.1231 0.0621 288 
 2.4320 -0.4461 0.8032 -1.2302 -0.8837 1.4373   
Italy MSCI 0.8725* -3.5437** 0.9265 -8.8266*** 1.8007 -0.0108 0.0988 288 
 1.9477 -2.5664 1.3413 -3.6850 0.7763 -0.1198   
Japan MSCI 0.9338* -3.0757* 0.3593 -8.1313** -0.1793 0.1866** 0.1345 288 
 1.8094 -1.7473 0.7884 -2.1357 -0.1933 2.1956   
Japan Dow Jones 0.8984* -3.0889 0.2803 -8.8759** 1.2039 0.1754** 0.1369 288 
 1.8006 -1.6261 0.4510 -2.3357 1.4666 2.1860   
Malaysia MSCI 1.1984*** -2.6696** 0.4324 -4.2006* -0.1272 0.0522 0.0528 288 
 3.4738 -2.0877 0.5590 -1.6870 -0.1176 0.5485   
Malaysia FTSE 1.5559*** -2.9606** -0.0305 -5.3495** 0.3452 0.1085 0.1213 182 
 3.2949 -2.0749 -0.0652 -1.9776 1.1665 0.9463   
Malaysia Bonds 0.2564*** -0.4478** 0.0208 0.4104* -0.0842 0.3276*** 0.2067 210 
 3.4626 -2.2291 0.3591 1.8132 -1.0072 3.3406 
  Morocco MSCI 0.3800 0.5243 0.4684 -5.3108** 2.1854 -0.0424 0.0198 288 
 0.8837 0.4912 0.9588 -1.9482 1.4098 -0.5134   
Pakistan MSCI 2.0234*** -5.2352* 0.9407 -8.2611 0.1521 0.0083 0.0328 288 
 3.2628 -1.9549 0.7068 -0.7417 0.1474 0.0829   
Qatar MSCI 0.6126 2.0424 0.7333 -10.9907* -0.2161 -0.1146 0.0809 216 
 0.8922 0.9273 0.9975 -1.8507 -0.1268 -0.9443   
Qatar MSCI Domestic 0.7051 1.5744 0.7184 -11.0053* -0.2138 -0.0780 0.0793 216 
 1.0179 0.7772 0.8706 -1.7272 -0.1257 -0.6546   
Saudi Arabia MSCI 1.3746** -0.2946 0.1829 -10.2837* -1.0220 0.0708 0.1315 172 
 2.1838 -0.1047 0.2635 -1.9098 -0.4869 0.4688   
Turkey MSCI 0.8258 -3.5792 0.4933 -8.0027** -2.8145 -0.1671 0.0616 288 
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 1.2292 -1.4030 0.2838 -2.4024 -1.2739 -1.8936   
UAE MSCI 0.2721 -1.2232 1.1630 -17.1513** -2.7240 0.0789 0.1402 216 
 0.2324 -0.4669 1.1583 -2.4853 -0.7562 0.6119   
UAE MSCI Domestic 0.3282 -0.6021 -0.2026 -13.6180** -4.5583* 0.1128 0.1384 216 
 0.3032 -0.2149 -0.2069 -2.1854 -1.7221 0.9806   
UAE Bonds 0.5457** -0.6426** -0.0788 -2.5469 -0.5208 0.1419 0.0757 210 
 2.4002 -2.2085 -0.2719 -0.9303 -0.4930 1.0645   
UK MSCI 0.8024** -2.1397* 0.8447 -5.7101** 1.8482* -0.0600 0.0587 288 
 2.4982 -1.9454 1.5833 -2.4619 1.7956 -0.6307   
UK Dow Jones 0.7515** -1.9167* 0.7883* -5.6865** 1.8118** -0.0598 0.0557 288 
 2.3096 -1.7622 1.8498 -2.4894 2.3012 -0.6157   
US MSCI 1.1260*** -2.3788** 0.8584** -7.7519** 1.2736* 0.0237 0.1273 288 
 3.3153 -2.3736 2.2394 -2.4384 1.7564 0.2294   
US Dow Jones 1.1524*** -2.4249** 0.8507** -7.9576** 1.2947* 0.0418 0.1269 288 
 3.2324 -2.3486 2.4052 -2.3912 1.9388 0.4096   
 
4.6.4 Discussion of Main Results with Respect to the Four Hypotheses 
4.6.4.1 Hypothesis 1: Negative Impact of GFC on all Assets 
According to Hypothesis 1, I expect to find that returns on all types of assets have been 
affected negatively by the GFC. In the joint tests of tables 4.2 to 4.5 this is consistently the 
case for stock indices, as the coefficients of the GFC dummy (14 March 2008–31 March 
2009) and the Crisis 2 dummy (15 September 2008–31 March 2009) are negative and highly 
significant. Therefore, I reject the null hypothesis that there is no (or a positive) impact of the 
GFC on global stock returns and conclude that there has been a negative impact on all stock 
markets. However, the dummy for the first stage of the crisis (Crisis 1, 1 June 2007–14 
September 2008) is only significant for stocks in non-Islamic countries, with negative 
impacts on returns of -2.39 to -2.60 percentage points, while it does not have an impact on 
stock returns in Islamic countries (see Table 4.5). When looking at the country level analysis 
in tables 4.7 and 4.8, these results hold for most countries, i.e., the GFC dummy has a 
negative impact on stock indices in all countries, except for Pakistan and Qatar, while the 
second stage crisis has a negative impact on stock indices in all countries, except for Egypt, 
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Indonesia and Pakistan. The first stage crisis dummy has a negative effect on stocks in all 
non-Islamic countries except for Canada and Japan (Dow Jones Index), and it does not have 
any impact on stock indices in Islamic countries except for Malaysia and Pakistan. 
I find different results for bond indices, although these results cannot be generalised because 
Islamic bonds are available for only two countries (Malaysia and UAE). According to Table 
4.6, there is no significant impact of the GFC dummy (14 March 2008–31 March 2009) and 
the Crisis 2 dummy (15 September 2008–31 March 2009) on either conventional or Islamic 
bonds in those two countries. However, the first stage of the crisis has a small negative 
impact on all bond returns in Malaysia and UAE, with the effect ranging from -0.55 to -0.60 
percentage points. Therefore, I reject the null hypothesis (that there is no impact of the GFC 
on bond returns) for the first stage of the crisis. 
4.6.4.2 Hypothesis 2: Smaller Impact of GFC on Islamic Assets 
There is some evidence of a smaller impact of the GFC on Islamic indices than conventional 
stock indices, although there is no difference in the impact on Islamic versus conventional 
bond indices. According to Table 4.2, Islamic stocks in non-Islamic countries provide a 
benefit during the GFC by up to 2.19 percentage points. However, In Islamic countries 
Islamic stocks are affected more strongly by the GFC by up to 3.77 percentage points. 
Therefore, it is difficult to generalise the results for all Islamic stocks, as they differ in 
Islamic and non-Islamic countries. On a country level, I find that benefits of Islamic assets 
during the GFC are mainly in Morocco, UK and US (see Table 4.7). 
4.6.4.3 Hypothesis 3: Stronger Benefit of Islamic Assets in non-Islamic Countries 
There is evidence to support the hypothesis that there are stronger benefits of Islamic assets 
in non-Islamic countries. For example, during the GFC, Islamic assets only provide a benefit 
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for Islamic stocks in non-Islamic countries, but perform worse than conventional stocks in 
Islamic countries (see Table 4.2). Further, the first stage crisis only has a negative impact on 
stocks in non-Islamic countries, where Islamic stocks show significantly better performance, 
while it does not affect stock returns in Islamic countries. However, during the second stage 
of the crisis there are no differences between Islamic and non-Islamic stocks under any 
specification. I therefore reject the null hypothesis of no difference in the benefit of Islamic 
assets in Islamic versus non-Islamic countries only for the first stage of the crisis or the GFC 
overall, but not for the second stage of the crisis. 
4.6.4.4 Hypothesis 4: Stronger Benefit of Islamic Assets During the First Stage Rather 
Than Second Stage of the Crisis 
According to hypothesis 4, Islamic assets are better protected during the first stage of the 
crisis because of their lack of exposure to sub-prime mortgage securities and derivatives. 
According to tables 4.3 and 4.5, Islamic assets performed better during the first stage of the 
crisis, although only in non-Islamic countries. However, Islamic stocks did not perform better 
during the second stage of the crisis, which confirms Hypothesis 4. 
In Table 4.8, there are a number of countries where Islamic stocks show better performance 
during the first stage of the crisis (Australia, Canada, France, UK and US), while during the 
second stage of the crisis, this is only the case in the UK and US. The ratio of benefits of 
Islamic assets to the overall impact of the crisis can only be applied to those asset pairs in 
Table 4.8 for which all coefficients are significant:  UK Dow Jones, US MSCI and US Dow 
Jones asset pairs. In all three cases the relative benefit of Islamic assets is greater during the 
first stage of the crisis than the second stage of the crisis, i.e., |
?̂?4
?̂?2
| > |
?̂?5
?̂?3
| (see Section 4.4). 
For UK Dow Jones stock pair, |
0.7883
−1.9167
| > |
1.8118
−5.6865
| ⁡𝑜𝑟⁡0.4113 > 0.3186, for the US MSCI 
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stock pair, |
0.8584
−2.3788
| > |
1.2736
−7.7519
| ⁡𝑜𝑟⁡0.3609 > 0.1643, and for the US Dow Jones stock pair, 
|
0.8507
−2.4249
| > |
1.2947
−7.9576
| 𝑜𝑟⁡0.3508 > 0.1627. In the US the relative benefit of Islamic assets 
during the first stage of the crisis is more than double the size of the relative benefit during 
the second stage of the crisis. 
It is interesting that the strongest benefits of Islamic assets are in the UK and US during all 
stages of the crisis. Those were among the countries hit the hardest by the GFC, since they 
had a large exposure to sub-prime mortgage securities and derivatives. According to Ciro 
(2012a), they are among the “bubble” economies that had a high rate of appreciation of house 
prices in the run-up to the crisis, and the crash in house prices contributed significantly to the 
economic downtown in these two countries. 
4.6.5 Further Analysis  
Appendix G contains Tables G.1 to G.6 which are similar to Tables 4.2 to 4.6 but without the 
AR(1) term, as it is not significant in most regressions in the main results section. The results 
do not change overall, but do become stronger and more significant. The only exception is in 
Table G.2, which reveals an additional finding that even during the second stage of the crisis 
the Islamic stocks provide a benefit in non-Islamic countries and suffer more than 
conventional stocks in Islamic countries (see column 2). 
Further, I look at individual asset regressions on country level and include the results in 
Appendix H. As for hypothesis 1 I find slightly different results on asset level compared to 
the main results, as there is a number of Islamic stock indices that are not affected by the 
GFC (Australia, Canada, Iran, Morocco, Pakistan, Qatar, UK), Crisis 1 (Australia, Canada, 
Egypt, France, Germany, Indonesia, Iran, Italy, Japan, Malaysia, Morocco, Qatar, Saudi 
Arabia, Turkey, UAE, UK, US) or Crisis 2 (Australia, Canada, Egypt, Indonesia, Malaysia, 
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Pakistan, UK). A smaller number of conventional stock indices, which is mostly limited to 
Islamic countries, has also not been affected by the GFC (Pakistan, Qatar), Crisis 1 (Bahrain, 
Canada, Egypt, Indonesia, Japan, Morocco, Qatar, Saudi Arabia, Turkey, UAE), or Crisis 2 
(Egypt, Indonesia, Pakistan). Further, most bond indices are not affected by the crisis and the 
impact of the crisis is very similar for Islamic versus conventional bonds in Malaysia and 
UAE, except that the first stage of the crisis only has a significantly negative impact on 
conventional bonds in the UAE (-0.67 percentage points) but not on Islamic bonds. 
The asset level regressions confirm the main results for hypothesis 2, under which Islamic 
assets are affected less than conventional assets during the GFC. First, there is a number of 
countries where only conventional stock returns are affected by the crisis, while there is no 
impact on Islamic stock returns (Australia, Canada, France, Germany, Italy, Japan, Malaysia, 
Morocco, Qatar, UK and US). Second, where a significant impact of the crisis exists on both 
Islamic and conventional stock returns, there is a bigger impact on the conventional stock 
returns in Egypt, France, Germany, Italy, Japan, Malaysia, Morocco, Pakistan and US. There 
are less countries where the results are opposite, meaning the Islamic stock returns were hit 
harder than conventional stock returns during the crisis (Bahrain, Indonesia, Saudi Arabia, 
Turkey, UAE, and a few specification of Germany, Japan, Malaysia and Qatar). As 
mentioned in the previous paragraph, there is only one specification under which the first 
stage of the crisis has a significantly negative impact on conventional bonds in the UAE (-
0.67 percentage points) but not on Islamic bonds. 
As expected under the third hypothesis, benefits of Islamic assets are mostly found in non-
Islamic countries, including Australia, Canada, France, Germany, Italy, Japan, UK and US, 
but only in 4 Islamic countries under certain specifications (Malaysia, Morocco, Pakistan and 
Qatar). Among countries where there Islamic stocks perform worse during the crisis are 7 
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Islamic countries (Bahrain, Indonesia, Malaysia, Qatar, Saudi Arabia, Turkey and UAE) but 
only 2 non-Islamic countries (Germany and Japan). 
It is difficult to draw conclusion from the asset level regressions whether the benefits of 
Islamic assets are stronger during the first stage rather than the second stage of the crisis. This 
is because there are often differences in the magnitude of the impact between Islamic and 
non-Islamic assets, but according to the panel regression from the main results, this 
difference may not always be significant. During both stages of the crisis the two most 
common scenarios are either that Islamic stocks provide some protection, or that there is no 
impact on either Islamic or non-Islamic stocks. Benefits of Islamic assets during the first 
stage crisis are found in Australia, France, Germany, Italy, Japan, Malaysia, Pakistan, UK 
and US, and during the second stage crisis in Australia, Canada, France, Italy, Japan (Dow 
Jones), Malaysia, Morocco, Qatar (MSCI Domestic), UK and US. Countries where neither 
Islamic nor conventional stocks were affected by the first stage crisis are Bahrain, Canada, 
Egypt, Indonesia, Iran for 3 out of 4 Islamic stock indices, Morocco, Qatar, Saudi Arabia, 
Turkey, UAE, and during the second stage of the crisis Egypt, Indonesia and Pakistan. When 
there is no impact of the crisis on any stock returns there is no need for protection from the 
crisis. There are only few countries where Islamic stocks perform worse than conventional 
stocks. During the first stage of the crisis Islamic stocks perform slightly worse than 
conventional stocks only in Japan for the Dow Jones indices and in Malaysia for the FTSE 
indices, while during the second stage of the crisis there is a bigger impact on Islamic than 
conventional stocks in Bahrain, Germany, Japan MSCI, Qatar MSCI, Saudi Arabia, Turkey 
and UAE. As there are more countries during the second stage crisis where Islamic stocks 
perform worse than conventional stocks, this finding perhaps confirms hypothesis 4 that there 
are more benefits of Islamic assets during the first stage rather than the second stage of the 
crisis. 
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4.7 CONCLUSION 
This chapter has examined the relative impact of the GFC on Islamic versus conventional 
asset returns by employing panel regressions and other approaches for a sample of 11 Islamic 
countries (Bahrain, Egypt, Indonesia, Iran, Malaysia, Morocco, Pakistan, Qatar, Saudi 
Arabia, Turkey and UAE) and eight non-Islamic countries (Australia, Canada, France, 
Germany, Italy, Japan, UK and US) over the period 2002 to 2014. The focus of the analysis is 
on the overall impact of the GFC on stock and bond returns, and in particular on the relative 
impact on Islamic versus conventional stocks. I also examined whether Islamic stocks 
provide protection in certain countries or certain stages of the crisis. 
First, the results confirm that the GFC had a negative impact on most stock index returns 
(except in a few Islamic countries), but not on bond index returns. Second, I provided some 
evidence that there were benefits of Islamic assets during the GFC, although this was not 
consistent across all countries and specifications. Third, I found that the strongest benefits 
were in the UK and US, as well as in other non-Islamic countries. In most Islamic countries 
(e.g., in UAE) there were no benefits and Islamic stocks may have been even more vulnerable 
to the crisis than their conventional counterparts. Fourth, there was evidence that benefits of 
Islamic assets were greater during the first stage of the crisis (the Sub-prime Mortgage Crisis) 
than the second stage of the Crisis (the GFC). This was because the first stage of the crisis 
was mostly restricted to countries and institutions that were exposed to toxic sub-prime 
mortgage securities that are prohibited to Islamic financial institutions. However, during the 
second stage of the crisis Islamic assets fell in value alongside conventional assets. 
The findings from this chapter suggest that there are significant benefits of Islamic stocks 
during economic crises that are caused by excessive leverage and risk-taking, especially 
significant exposure to risky assets such as sub-prime mortgage securities and derivatives. 
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Because they may not hold these products, Islamic financial institutions are to a certain extent 
protected or insulated from the effects of a collapse in risky securities. Greatest benefits are 
found in countries where markets had a large exposure to sub-prime mortgage investments, 
such as the US and UK. 
However, this chapter has also found that Islamic assets do not protect from crises that are 
marked by a global recession, and Islamic stock indices were as vulnerable as any others to a 
decline in investor sentiment, consumption, production and trade. Islamic stocks were 
affected during the second stage of the crisis, when it spread to the global economy and 
financial markets. In a number of Islamic countries they fell more in value than their 
conventional counterparts. This is possibly due to the lower diversification of Islamic stock 
indices, which exclude a number of Shari’ah incompliant firms and industry sectors, and 
which might therefore be more vulnerable to a collapse in real estate or commodity prices 
(e.g., oil). 
The results mostly confirm predictions from the literature, according to which Islamic 
financial products have elements of stability on one hand, but on the other hand, many of 
them are structured to replicate conventional financial products as closely as possible instead 
of following all of the principles and guidelines of the Shari’ah. For example, according to 
Chapra (2011: 575) Islamic finance is still in its infancy with a small proportion of equity and 
PLS modes of finance and it “does not genuinely reflect the ethos of Islamic teachings”, such 
as equity, honesty and stability, and many of the Shari’ah principles are misunderstood or 
simply not observed. At this stage, Islamic finance is not ready to play “a significant role in 
contributing to the health and stability of the international financial system” (Chapra 2011: 
576). Islamic banking is also “functionally indistinguishable from conventional banking” and 
in practice does not follow its principles and ideals (Khan 2010: 805). Kayed and Hassan 
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(2011) suggest that more research and commitment is necessary to develop Islamic finance 
from being merely Shari’ah-compliant, mostly replicating conventional financial products, to 
becoming Shari’ah-based in its substance, meeting objectives of an equitable and stable 
financial system. 
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- 5 - 
CONCLUSION 
 
This thesis consists of three projects and has studied Islamic assets in Islamic and non-Islamic 
countries and has compared their performance characteristics and their reaction to 
macroeconomic surprises and the GFC with that of conventional assets. The first project 
employed two datasets and various methodologies to analyse Islamic and non-Islamic stocks 
in Malaysia with respect to their risk, return and mean-variance efficiency. It found that 
Islamic stocks provided similar returns at a lower risk than non-Islamic stocks, as the 
standard deviation of Islamic stocks is on average 3.43–3.78 percentage points lower than the 
standard deviation of non-Islamic stocks. The Islamic portfolio was closer to the mean-
variance efficient frontier and the minimum variance portfolio than the non-Islamic portfolio 
because it reduced risk for a similar level of expected returns. These results were driven by 
financial ratio screens (as opposed to business activity screens), which exclude firms with 
high income from interest and highly leveraged firms from the Islamic stock portfolio. 
The second project examined the impact of macroeconomic surprises on Islamic and 
conventional asset returns and volatility in three Islamic and eight non-Islamic countries. 
Overall, the results showed that a large proportion of macroeconomic surprises have a 
significant impact on returns and on the volatility of stock and bond returns. The direction 
and magnitude of impacts differed significantly across macroeconomic variables and 
countries. However, there was not enough evidence to show that there were significant 
differences in the impact of macroeconomic surprises on Islamic versus conventional assets. 
This suggested that new information was impounded into Islamic and conventional assets in 
similar ways, supporting El-Gamal’s (2006: 8) argument that contemporary Islamic finance 
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aims to replicate conventional financial products and “deviates only insofar as some 
conventional practices are deemed forbidden under Shari’a”. 
The third project examined the relative impact of the GFC on Islamic versus conventional 
asset returns by employing panel regressions and other approaches for a sample of 11 Islamic 
and eight non-Islamic countries. First, the project found that the GFC had a negative impact 
on most stock index returns (except for a few Islamic countries), but not on bond index 
returns. Further, there were benefits of Islamic assets during the GFC, although this was not 
consistent across all countries and specifications. The strongest benefits were in the UK and 
US, as well as other non-Islamic countries, while in most Islamic countries there were no 
benefits of Islamic assets. The findings from this project suggest that there were greater 
benefits of Islamic stocks during the first stage of the crisis (the Sub-prime Mortgage Crisis) 
than the second stage of the crisis (the GFC). This was because the first stage of the crisis was 
mostly restricted to countries and institutions that were exposed to sub-prime mortgage 
securities, which are prohibited to Islamic financial institutions. During the second stage of 
the crisis, Islamic assets collapsed alongside conventional assets due to a global recession, the 
fall in global demand, consumption and commodity prices as well as investor panic and a 
liquidity crunch. 
The analysis and results from this thesis add to the emerging body of quantitative research on 
Islamic assets. The implications of the findings are important in view of the increasing 
popularity of Islamic finance even beyond Islamic countries. This thesis is the first to identify 
Islamic, or Shari’ah-compliant, stocks in Malaysia and compare their characteristics to non-
Islamic stocks using robust tests and graphical analysis. The screen-based methodology 
allows deeper insights into the characteristics of Islamic stocks rather than relying on 
aggregate Islamic stock indices. The thesis also shows that there are no significant differences 
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in how Islamic and conventional assets react to macroeconomic surprises, which implies that 
new information is impounded into Islamic and conventional assets in similar ways. 
This thesis also provides the first quantitative analysis of the impact of the GFC on Islamic 
and conventional stocks and bonds in Islamic and non-Islamic countries, and it is the first 
study to differentiate between the first and the second stage of the GFC in this context. This 
research is therefore relevant to academics, investors, regulators and governments, especially 
those who have exposure to Islamic financial assets. Understanding the risk and return 
characteristics of Islamic and non-Islamic stocks is important for risk management and 
portfolio selection. Knowledge about the price response of Islamic assets following 
macroeconomic surprises and in times of financial crisis is important for portfolio allocation 
and for policies that aim to increase stability in financial markets. 
 
  
 234  
 
BIBLIOGRAPHY 
 
Abdul Aziz, R. P. and A. Gintzburger (2009), “Equity-based, asset-based and asset-backed 
transactional structures in Shari’a-compliant financing: Reflections on the current financial 
crisis”, Economic Papers 28(3): 270-278. 
Acharya, V. C. and M. Richardson (2009a), “Causes of the financial crisis”, Critical Review: 
A Journal of Politics and Society 21(2-3): 195-210. 
Acharya, V. C., .T. Philippon, M. Richardson and N. Roubini (2009b), “The financial crisis 
of 2007-2009: Causes and remedies”, Financial Markets, Institutions & Instruments 18(2): 
89-137. 
Ackermann, J. (2008), “The subprime crisis and its consequences”, Journal of Financial 
Stability 4: 329-337. 
Affleck-Graves, J. and B. McDonald (1989), “Nonnormalities and tests of asset pricing 
theories”, Journal of Finance 44: 889-908. 
Ahmed, H. (2009), “Financial crisis: Risks and lessons for Islamic finance”, ISRA 
International Journal of Islamic Finance 1(1): 7-32. 
Ahmed, A. (2010), “Global financial crisis: An Islamic finance perspective”, International 
Journal of Islamic and Middle Eastern Finance and Management 3(4): 306-320. 
Aït-Sahalia, Y., J. Andritzky, A. Jobst, S. Nowak and N. Tamirisa (2012), “Market response 
to policy initiatives during the global financial crisis”, Journal of International Economics 
87(1): 162-77. 
Ajmi, A. N., S. Hammoudeh, N. Duc Khuong and S. Sarafrazi (2014), “How strong are the 
causal relationships between Islamic stock markets and conventional financial systems? 
Evidence from linear and nonlinear tests”, Journal of International Financial Markets, 
Institutions and Money 28: 213-227. 
Akhtar, S. (2010), “Islamic banks: Resilience and stability – not immune from crisis”, in A. 
M. Vernados (ed.),  Current Issues in Islamic Banking and Finance: Resilience and Stability 
in the Present System, World Scientific. 
Akhtar, S., M. Jahromi and K. John (2013), “The intensity of volatility linkages in Islamic 
and conventional markets”, Working Paper. 
Alam, N. and M. S. Rajjaque (2010), “Shariah-compliant equities: Empirical evaluation of 
performance in the European market during credit crunch”, Journal of Financial Services 
Marketing 15: 228-240. 
Alasrag, H. (2010), “Global financial crisis and Islamic finance”, MPRA Working Paper No. 
22167. 
Albaity, M. and R. Ahmad (2011), “Return performance and leverage effect in Islamic and 
socially responsible stock indices evidence from Dow Jones (DJ) and Financial Times Stock 
Exchange (FTSE)”,  African Journal of Business Management 5(16): 6927-6939. 
 235  
 
Al-Khazali, O., H. H. Lean and A. Samet (2014), “Do Islamic stock indexes outperform 
conventional stock indexes? A stochastic dominance approach”, Pacific-Basin Finance 
Journal 28: 29-46. 
Allen, F. and E. Carletti (2008), “The role of liquidity in financial crises“, Working Paper. 
Al-Tamimi, H., A. Hassan, A. A. Alwan and A. A. Abdel Rahman (2011), “Factors Affecting 
Stock Prices in the UAE Financial Markets”, Journal of Transnational Management 16(1): 3-
19. 
Al-Zoubi, H. A. and A. I. Maghyereh (2007), “The relative risk performance of Islamic 
finance: A new guide to less risky investments”, International Journal of Theoretical and 
Applied Finance 10(2): 235-249. 
Andersen, T., T. Bollerslev, F. Diebold and C. Vega (2003), “Micro Effects of Macro 
Announcements: Real-Time Price Discovery in Foreign Exchange”, American Economic 
Review 93: 38–62. 
Andersen, T. G., T. Bollerslev, F. X. Diebold and C. Vega (2007), “Real-time price discovery 
in global stock, bond and foreign exchange markets”, Journal of International Economics 73: 
251-277. 
Andritzky, J. R., G. J. Bannister and N. T. Tamirisa (2007), “The impact of macroeconomic 
announcements on emerging market bonds”, Emerging Markets Review: 20-37. 
Athukorala, P. (2010), “Malaysian economy in three crises”, Working Paper No. 2010/12, 
https://crawford.anu.edu.au/acde/publications/publish/papers/wp2010/wp_econ_2010_12.pdf 
[accessed 8 August 2013]. 
Australian Trade Commission (2010), “Islamic finance”, Australian Government, 
http://www.austrade.gov.au/ArticleDocuments/2792/Islamic-Finance-Publication.pdf.aspx 
[accessed 5 February 2013]. 
Bahru, J. (2013), “Malaysia leads the charge in Islamic finance”, The Economist, 
http://www.economist.com/news/finance-and-economics/21569050-malaysia-leads-charge-
islamic-finance-banking-ummah [accessed 26 February 2015]. 
Baker, M., B. Bradley and J. Wurgler (2011), “Benchmarks as limits to arbitrage: 
Understanding the low-volatility anomaly”, Financial Analysts Journal 67(1): 40-54. 
Balduzzi, P., E. Elton and C. Green (2001), “Economic News and Bond Prices: Evidence 
from the U.S. Treasury Market”, Journal of Financial and Quantitative Analysis 36: 523–
543. 
Batchelor, R. (2000), “The IMF and OECD versus Consensus forecasts”, Applied Economics 
33(2): 225-235. 
Beck, T., A. Demirgüç-Kunt and O. Merrouche (2013), “Islamic vs. conventional banking: 
Business model, efficiency and stability”, Journal of Banking & Finance 37: 433–447. 
Beer, F. M., J. P. Estes and H. J. Munte (2011), “The performance of the faith and ethical 
investment products: An empirical investigation of the last decade”, The Journal of the 
Academy of Business and Economics 30: 101-124. 
 236  
 
Bekaert, G. and C. R. Harvey (1997), “Emerging equity market volatility”, Journal of 
Financial Economics 43: 29-78. 
Bekaert, G., C. B. Erb, C. R. Harvey and T. E. Viskanta (1998), “Distributional 
characteristics of emerging market returns and asset allocation”, Journal of Portfolio 
Management 24: 102-116. 
Bekaert, G. and C. R. Harvey (2002), “Research in emerging markets finance: looking to the 
future”, Emerging Markets Review 3: 429-448. 
Bekaert, G., M. Ehrmann, M. Fratzscher, and A. Mehl (2014), “The global crisis and equity 
market contagion”, Journal of Finance 69: 2597-2649.  
Beltratti, A. and R. M. Stulz (2009), “Why did some banks perform better during the credit 
crisis? A cross-country study of the impact of governance and regulation”, NBER Working 
Paper 15180. 
Bernanke, B. and K. Kuttner (2005), “What explains the stock market’s reaction to federal 
reserve policy?”, Journal of Finance 60: 1221–1257. 
Bhatt, V. and J. Sultan (2012), “Leverage risk, financial crisis, and stock returns: Comparison 
among Islamic, conventional and socially responsible stocks”, paper presented to the 8th 
International Conference on Islamic Economics and Finance, Qatar. 
Blix, M., J. Wadefjord, U. Wienecke and M. Adahl (2001), “How good is the forecasting 
performance of major institutions?”. Economic Review of the Swedish Central Bank, 
http://www.riksbank.se/Upload/Dokument_riksbank/Kat_publicerat/PoV_sve/eng/2001/econ
omic_review_2001_3.pdf [accessed 18 September 2013]. 
Bomfim, A. and V. Reinhart (2000), “Making news: Financial market effects of Federal 
Reserve disclosure practices”, Working Paper, International Monetary Fund. 
Bomfim, A. (2003), “Pre-Announcement effects, news effects, and volatility: Monetary 
policy and the stock market”, Journal of Banking & Finance 27: 133–151. 
Bordo, M. D. (2008), “An historical perspective on the crisis of 2007-2008”, NBER Working 
Paper 14569. 
Boyd, J., J. Hu and R. Jagannathan (2005), “The stock market’s reaction to unemployment 
news: Why bad news is usually good for stocks?”, Journal of Finance 60: 649–672. 
Brenner, M., P. Pasquariello and M. Subrahmanyam (2009), “On the volatility and 
comovement of U.S. financial markets around macroeconomic news announcements”, 
Journal of Financial and Quantitative Analysis 44(6): 1265-1289. 
Chapra, M. U. (2008), “The global financial crisis: Can Islamic finance help minimize the 
severity and frequency of such a crisis in the futures?”, Paper prepared for presentation at 
the Forum on the Global Financial Crisis at the Islamic Development Bank on 25 October 
2008. 
Chapra, M. U. (2011), “The global financial crisis: Some suggestions for reform of the global 
financial architecture in the light of Islamic finance”, Thunderbird International Business 
Review 53(5): 565-579. 
 237  
 
Charles, A., O. Darné and A. Pop (2012), “Are Islamic indexes more volatile than 
conventional indexes? Evidence from the Dow Jones indexes”, Working Paper. 
Chuliá, H., M. Martens and D. van Dijk (2010), “Asymmetric effects of federal funds target 
rate changes on SP100 stock returns, volatilities and correlations”, Journal of Banking and 
Finance 34: 834–839. 
Ciro, T. (2012a), “Timeline of the crisis”, Global Financial Crisis: Triggers, Responses and 
Aftermath, Ashgate Publishing. 
Ciro, T. (2012b), “Triggers of the crisis”, Global Financial Crisis: Triggers, Responses and 
Aftermath, Ashgate Publishing. 
Ciro, T. (2012c), “The crisis goes global”, Global Financial Crisis: Triggers, Responses and 
Aftermath, Ashgate Publishing. 
Ciro, T. (2012d), “Financial markets and the GFC”, Global Financial Crisis: Triggers, 
Responses and Aftermath, Ashgate Publishing. 
Claessens, S., G. Dell’Ariccia, D. Igan and L. Laeven (2010), “Cross-country experiences 
and policy implications from the global financial crisis”, Economic Policy 25: 267–293.  
Cochrane, J. H. (2000), “Asset pricing”, 
http://ecsocman.hse.ru/data/018/648/1219/finbook.pdf [accessed 26 July 2013]. 
Connolly, R. A. and F. A. Wang (2003), “International equity market comovements: 
Economic fundamentals or contagion?”, Pacific-Basin Finance Journal 11: 23-43. 
Crotty, J. (2009), “Structural causes of the global financial crisis: A critical assessment of the 
‘new financial architecture’”, Cambridge Journal of Economics 33: 563–580. 
Darrat, A. F. (1988), “The Islamic interest-free banking system: some empirical evidence”, 
Applied Economics 20(3): 417: 425. 
Darrat, A. F. (2002), “The relative efficiency of interest-free monetary system: Some 
empirical evidence”, The Quarterly Review of Economics and Finance 42: 747–764. 
De Goeij, P. and W. Marquering (2006), “Macroeconomic announcements and asymmetric 
volatility in bond returns”, Journal of Banking & Finance 30: 2659–2680. 
Demyanyk, Y. and O. Van Hemert (2011), “Understanding the subprime mortgage crisis”, 
Review of Financial Studies 24:1848–80. 
De Santis, G. and B. Gérard (1998), “How big is the premium for currency risk?”, Journal of 
Financial Economics 49(3): 375-412. 
Derigs, U. and S. Marzban (2009), “New strategies and a new paradigm for Shariah-
compliant portfolio optimization”, Journal of Banking & Finance 33: 1166-1176. 
Dharani, M. and P. Natarajan (2011), “Equanimity of risk and return relationship between 
Shariah index and general index in India”, Journal of Economics and Behavioral Studies 
2(5): 213-222. 
 238  
 
Dow Jones (2011), “Methodology map: Islamic indexes”, 
http://www.djindexes.com/mdsidx/downloads/analytics_and_research/Methodology_Map_Isl
amic_Indexes.pdf [accessed 2 January 2013]. 
Dogarawa, A. B. (2012), “Global financial crisis and the search for new financial 
architecture: Can Islamic finance provide alternative?”, Journal of Islamic Economics, 
Banking and Finance 8(4): 33-48.  
Dumas, B. and B. Solnik (1995), “The world price of foreign exchange risk”, Journal of 
Finance 50: 445-479. 
Ehrmann, M., M. Fratzscher and R. Rigobon (2011), “Stocks, bonds, money markets and 
exchange rates: Measuring international financial transmission”, Journal of Applied 
Econometrics 26: 948-974. 
El-Gamal, M. A. (2009), “A Muslim’s perspective on the financial crisis”, The American 
Economist 53(1): 31-34. 
El-Gamal, M. A. (2006), Islamic Finance: Law, Economics, and Practice, Cambridge 
University Press, New York.  
Ergeç, E. H. and B. G. Arslan (2013), “Impact of interest rates on Islamic and conventional 
banks: the case of Turkey”, Applied Economics 45(17): 2381-2388. 
Ernst & Young (2012), “World Islamic banking competitiveness report 2013”, December 
2012, http://www.mifc.com/index.php?rp=ey_world_islamic_banking_competi [accessed 13 
August 2013]. 
Ernst & Young (2013), “World Islamic banking competitiveness report 2013-2014: The 
transition begins”, 13 December 2013 
www.ey.com/Publication/vwLUAssets/World_Islamic_Banking_Competitiveness_Report_2013-
14/$FILE/World Islamic Banking Competitiveness Report 2013-14.pdf [accessed 15 September 
2014] 
Fabozzi, F. J., K. C. Ma and B. J. Oliphant (2008), “Sin stock returns”, The Journal of 
Portfolio Management 35(1): 82-94. 
Faff, R. W. and S. Lau (1997), “A generalised method of moments test of mean variance 
efficiency in the Australian stock market”, Pacific Accounting Review 9(1): 2-16 
Fahlenbrach, R., R. Prilmeier and R. M. Stulz (2012), “This time is the same: Using bank 
performance in 1998 to explain bank performance during the recent financial crisis“, Journal 
of Finance 67(6): 2139-2185. 
Fama, E. F. and K. R. French (2002), “Testing trade-off and pecking order predictions about 
dividends and debt”, Review of Financial Studies 15(1): 1-33. 
Farooq, M. O. (2009), “Global financial crisis and the link between the monetary & real 
sector: Moving beyond the asset-backed Islamic finance”, Proceeding if the 20th Annual 
Islamic Banking Seminar: Financial and Economic Crisis and Development of Islamic 
Banking System of Iran. 
Flannery, M. and A. Protopapadakis (2002), “Macroeconomic factors do influence aggregate 
stock returns”, Review of Financial Studies 15: 751–782. 
 239  
 
Fleming, M. and E. Remolona (1999), “Price formation and liquidity in the U.S. treasury 
market: The response to public information”, Journal of Finance 54: 1901–1915. 
Foster, F. and S. Viswanathan (1993), “The effect of public information and competition on 
trading volume and price volatility”, Review of Financial Studies 6: 23–56. 
Giannone, D., M. Lenza and L. Reichlin (2010), “Market freedom and the global recession”, 
Working Paper, London Business School. 
Gibbons, M. R., S. A. Ross and J. Shanken (1989), “A test of the efficiency of a given 
portfolio”, Econometrica 57(5): 1121-1152. 
Gilbert, T., C. Scotti, G. Strasser and C. Vega (2010), “Why do certain macroeconomic news 
announcements have a big impact on asset prices?”, Working Paper. 
Girard, E. and M. K. Hassan (2005), “Faith-based investing - the case of Dow Jones Islamic 
Indices reexamined”, Working Paper, New Orleans. 
Godlewski, C. J., R. Turk-Ariss and L. Weill (2010), “Are Sukuk really special? Evidence 
from the Malaysian stock exchange”, Working Paper. 
Gürkaynak, R., B. Sack and E. Swanson (2007), “Market-based measures of monetary policy 
expectations”, Journal of Business and Economic Statistics 25: 201–212. 
Hakim, S. and M. Rashidian (2002), “Risk and return of Islamic stock market indexes”, 
Economic Research Forum Annual Meetings, Sharjah, United Arab Emirates. 
Hakim, S. and M. Rashidian (2004), “How costly is investors’ compliance to Sharia?”, 
Proceedings of the 11th economic research forum annual conference, Sharjah, United Arab 
Emirates. 
Hanif, M. (2011), “Risk and return under Shari‘a framework: an attempt to develop Shari‘a 
compliant asset pricing model-SCAPM”, Pakistan Journal of Commerce and Social Sciences 
5(2): 283-292. 
Harju, K. and S. M. Hussain (2011), “Intraday seasonalities and macroeconomic news 
announcements”, European Financial Management 17(2): 367–390. 
Harvey, C. R. and R. D. Huang (1991), “Volatility in the foreign currency futures market”, 
Review of Financial Studies 4: 543–569. 
Harvey, C. R. (1995), “Predictable risk and returns in emerging markets”, Review of 
Financial Studies 8(3): 773-816. 
Hassan, A., A. Antoniou and D. K. Paudyal (2005), “Impact of ethical screening on 
investment performance: the case of the Dow Jones Islamic Index”, Islamic Economic 
Studies 12(2): 67-97. 
Hassan, A. and A. Antoniou (2007), “Equity fund’s Islamic screening: effects on its financial 
performance”, http://kantakji.com/fiqh/Files/Markets/c76.pdf [accessed 5 February 2013]. 
Hasan, M. and J. Dridi (2010), “The effects of the global crisis on Islamic and conventional 
banks: A comparative study”, IMF Working Paper.  
 240  
 
Hashim, N. (2008), “The FTSE global Islamic and the risk dilemma”, Working Paper, 
http://orp.aiub.edu/WorkingPaper/WorkingPaper.aspx?year=2008 [accessed 5 February 
2013]. 
Hayo, B., A. M. Kutan and M. Neuenkirch (2009), “FOMC communication and emerging 
equity markets”, Joint Discussion Paper Series in Economics No. 2009,23.  
Heinkel, R., A. Kraus and J. Zechner (2001), “The effect of green investment on corporate 
behavior”, Journal of Financial and Quantitative Analysis 36: 431-449. 
Ho, C. S. F., N. A. A. Rahman, N. H. M. Yusuf and Z. Zamzamin (2014), “Performance of 
global Islamic versus conventional share indices: International evidence”, Pacific-Basin 
Finance Journal 28: 110–121. 
Hong, H. and M. Kacperczyk (2009), “The price of sin: The effect of social norms on 
markets”, Journal of Financial Economics 93: 15-36. 
Huang, C. and R. H. Litzenberger (1988), Foundations for Financial Economics, North-
Holland (New York). 
Hussein, K. and M. Omran (2005), “Ethical investment revisited: evidence from Dow Jones 
Islamic indexes”, Journal of Investing 14(3): 105-119. 
Hussein, K. A. (2004), “Ethical investment: empirical evidence from FTSE Islamic index”, 
Islamic Economic Studies 12(1): 21-40. 
Ibrahim, M. (2003), “Macroeconomic forces and capital market integration: A VAR analysis 
for Malaysia”, Journal of the Asia Pacific Economy 8(1): 19–40. 
IMF (International Monetary Fund) (2009), “World Economic Outlook: Crisis and 
Recovery”, Washington, DC: IMF World Economic and Financial Surveys, April 2009. 
Ingersoll, J. E. (1987), Theory of Financial Decision Making, Rowman & Littlefield 
Publishers, Inc, Oxford. 
Iqbal, Z. and H. Tsubota (2009), “Emerging Islamic capital markets: A quickening pace and 
new potential”, in S. Gopalan (ed.), Islamic Capital Markets: Opportunities and Challenges, 
The Icfai University Press. 
Iqbal, Z. and A. Mirakhor (2011), An Introduction to Islamic Finance: Theory and Practice, 
2
nd
 edition, Wiley. 
Jawadi, F., N. Jawadi and W. Louhichi (2014), “Conventional and Islamic stock price 
performance: An empirical investigation”, International Economics 37: 73–87. 
Jiang, G. J., E. Konstantinidi and G. Skiadopoulos (2010), “The impact of news 
announcements on volatility spillovers: International evidence from implied volatility 
markets”, Working Paper. 
Jiang, G. J., I. Lo and A. Verdelhan (2011), “Information shocks, liquidity shocks, jumps, and 
price discovery- Evidence from the U.S. treasury market”, Journal of Financial and 
Quantitative Analysis: 46(2): 527–551. 
 241  
 
Jones, C., O. Lamont and R. Lumsdaine (1998), “Macroeconomic news and bond market 
volatility”, Journal of Financial Economics 47: 315–337. 
Jones, C. I. (2009), “The global financial crisis: Overview”, A Supplement to 
Macroeconomics, www.econ.iastate.edu/.../GlobalFinancialCrisisOverview.2009.CJones.pdf 
[accessed 12 August 2014]. 
Kassim, S., M. A. Majid and R. M. Yusof (2009), “Impact of monetary policy shocks on 
conventional and Islamic banks in a dual banking system: evidence from Malaysia”, Journal 
of Economic Cooperation and Development 30: 41-58. 
Kayed, R. N. and M. K. Hassan (2011), “The global financial crisis and Islamic finance”, 
Thunderbird International Business Review 53(5): 551-564. 
Khan, F. (2010), “How ‘Islamic’ is Islamic banking?”, Journal of Economic Behavior & 
Organization 76: 805–820. 
Kim, S. and J. Sheen (2000), “International linkages and macroeconomic news effects on 
interest rate volatility – Australia and the US”, Pacific-Basin Finance Journal 8: 85–113. 
Kim, S., M. McKenzie and R. Faff (2004), “Macroeconomic news announcements and the 
role of expectations: Evidence for US bond, stock and foreign exchange markets”, Journal of 
Multinational Financial Management 14: 217–232. 
Krueger, A. (2003), “Do markets respond more to the reliable labor market data? A test of 
market rationality”, Journal of the European Economic Association 14: 931-957. 
Kurov, A. (2010), “Investor sentiment and the stock market’s reaction to monetary policy”, 
Journal of Banking and Finance 34: 139–149. 
Kuttner, K. (2001), “Monetary policy surprises and interest rates: Evidence from the Fed 
funds futures market”, Journal of Monetary Economics 47: 523–544. 
Kyle, A. (1985), “Continuous auctions and insider trading”, Econometrica 53: 1315–35. 
Lane, P. R. and G. M. Milesi-Ferretti (2010), “The cross-country incidence of the global 
crisis”, IMF Working Paper. 
Lee, D. D., J. E. Humphrey, K. L. Benson and J. Y. K. Ahn (2010), “Socially responsible 
investment fund performance: The impact of screening intensity”, Accounting and Finance 
50(2): 351-370. 
Li, L. and R. Engle, (1998), “Macroeconomic announcements and volatility of treasury 
futures”, Working Paper, University of California, San Diego. 
Liston, D. P. and G. Soydemir (2010), “Faith-based and sin portfolios: An empirical inquiry 
into norm-neglect vs norm-conforming investor behavior”, Managerial Finance 36(10): 876-
885. 
MacKinlay, A. (1985), “An analysis of multivariate financial tests”, PhD dissertation, 
University of Chicago. 
MacKinlay, A. G. and M. P. Richardson (1991), “Using generalised method of moments to 
test mean-variance efficiency”, The Journal of Finance 46: 511-527. 
 242  
 
Manda, K. (2010), “Stock market volatility during the 2008 financial crisis”, Working Paper, 
Stern School of Business (New York University), 
http://www.stern.nyu.edu/cons/groups/content/documents/webasset/uat_024308.pdf 
[accessed 15 August 2013]. 
Markowitz, H. (1952), “Portfolio selection”, Journal of Finance 7: 77-91. 
McQueen, G. and V. V. Roley (1993), “Stock prices, news and business conditions”, Review 
of Financial Studies 6(3): 683-707. 
Merton, R. (1987), “A simple model of capital market equilibrium with incomplete 
information”, Journal of Finance 42: 483–510. 
Mirakhor, A. (2009), “Resilience and stability of Islamic finance”, New Horizon, 
http://www.newhorizon-
islamicbanking.com/index.cfm?section=news&action=view&id=10786 [accessed 3 July 
2014]. 
Mirakhor, A. and N. Krichene (2009), “The recent crisis: Lessons for Islamic finance”, 
MPRA Paper No. 56022. 
Mitton, T. (2002), “A cross-ﬁrm analysis of the impact of corporate governance on the East 
Asian ﬁnancial crisis”, Journal of Financial Economics 64: 215-241. 
Mohd Yusof, R. and M. S. Abd Majid (2007), “Stock market volatility transmission in 
Malaysia: Islamic versus conventional stock market”, Journal of King Abdulaziz University: 
Islamic Economics 20(2): 17-35.  
Mohieldin, M. (2012), “Realizing the potential of Islamic finance”, Poverty Reduction and 
Economic Management Network, The World Bank. 
Moody’s Investor Service (2008), “Gulf Islamic Banks Resilient amid Global Credit Woes”, 
http://ddata.over-blog.com/4/08/16/46//Moody-s-report-on-Islamic-banks--resilience.pdf 
[accessed 12 July 2014]. 
Murphy, K. M. and R. H. Topel (1985), “Estimation and inference in two-step econometric 
models”, Journal of Business and Economic Statistics 3(4): 370-379. 
Naughton, T. and S. Naughton (2000), “Religion, ethics and stock trading: The case of an 
Islamic equities market”, Journal of Business Ethics 23 (2): 145-159. 
Nikkinen, J., M. Omran, P. Sahlström and J. Äijö (2006), “Global stock market reactions to 
scheduled U.S. macroeconomic news announcements”, Global Finance Journal 17: 92–104. 
Novotny, F. and M. Rakova (2010), “Assessment of consensus forecasts accuracy: The 
Check National Bank perspective”, Working Paper. 
Nowak, S., J. Andritzky, A. Jobst and N. Tamirisa (2011), “Macroeconomic fundamentals, 
price discovery, and volatility dynamics in emerging bond markets”, Journal of Banking & 
Finance 35: 2584–2597. 
Onour, I. (2010), “The global financial crisis and equity markets in Middle East oil exporting 
countries”, MPRA Working Paper. 
 243  
 
Opler, T. C. and S. Titman (1994), “Financial distress and corporate performance”, Journal 
of Finance 49(3): 1015-1040. 
Ostdiek, B. (1998), “The world ex ante risk premium: An empirical investigation”, Journal of 
International Money and Finance 17(6): 967-999. 
Özatay, F., E. Özmen and G. Şahinbeyoğlu (2009), “Emerging market sovereign spreads, 
global financial conditions and U.S. macroeconomic news”, Economic Modelling 26: 526–
531. 
Pasquariello, P. (2007), “Imperfect competition, information heterogeneity, and financial 
contagion”, Review of Financial Studies 20: 391–426. 
Pasquariello, P. and C. Vega (2007), “Informed and strategic order flow in the bond 
markets”, Review of Financial Studies 20: 1975–2019. 
Pearce, D. K. and V. V. Roley (1985), “Stock prices and economic news”, NBER Working 
Paper No. 1296. 
Rahman, A. A., N. Z. M. Sidek and F. H. Tafri (2009), “Macroeconomic determinants of 
Malaysian stock market”, African Journal of Business Management 3(3): 95-106. 
Rahman, H. U. and H. M. Mohsin (2011), “Monetary policy announcements and stock 
returns: Evidence from the Pakistani market”, Transition Studies Review 18: 342–360. 
Rajan, R. G. and L. Zingales (1995), “What do we know about capital structure? Some 
evidence from international data”, Journal of Finance 50(5): 1421-1460. 
Rangel, J. G. (2011), “Macroeconomic news, announcements, and stock market jump 
intensity dynamics”, Journal of Banking & Finance 35: 1263–1276. 
Richardson, M. and T. Smith (1993), “A test of multivariate normality in stock returns”, 
Journal of Business 66: 295-321. 
Rosman, R., N. A. Wahab and Z. Zainol (2014), “Efficiency of Islamic banks during the 
financial crisis: An analysis of Middle Eastern and Asian countries”, Pacific-Basin Finance 
Journal 28: 76–90. 
Ross, S. (1989), “Information and volatility: The no-arbitrage martingale approach to timing 
and resolution irrelevancy”, Journal of Finance 44: 1–17. 
Ruppert, D. (2011), Statistics and Data Analysis for Financial Engineering, Springer, New 
York. 
Securities Commission Malaysia (2011), “List of Shariah-compliant securities by the Shariah 
Advisory Council of the Securities Commission Malaysia”, 
http://www.sc.com.my/eng/html/icm/sas/sc_syariahcompliant_111125.pdf [accessed 5 March 
2013]. 
Sherry, N. (2010), “The future of Islamic finance in Australia”, Keynote Address to the 2010 
Islamic Finance Conference in Melbourne, 8 June 2010, 
http://www.treasurer.gov.au/DisplayDocs.aspx?doc=speeches/2010/019.htm&pageID=005&
min=njsa&Year=&DocType=) [accessed 29 April 2012]. 
 244  
 
Shubbar, S. A. (2010), “Empirical performance of Islamic stock market indices in 2008 credit 
crisis”, PhD Thesis, http://essay.utwente.nl/60816/1/MSc_Sayed_Ahmed_Shubbar.pdf 
[accessed 5 March 2013]. 
Smolo, E. and A. Mirakhor (2010), “The global financial crisis and its implications for the 
Islamic financial industry”, International Journal of Islamic and Middle Eastern Finance and 
Management 3(4):372-385. 
Social Investment Forum (2007), “2007 report on socially responsible investing trends in the 
United States”, Social Investment Forum, Washington, DC, 
http://www.ussif.org/files/Publications/07_Trends_%20Report.pdf [accessed 15 July 2013]. 
Standard & Poor’s, “Islamic Finance Outlook 2010”, 1 Feb 2010. 
Stiglitz, J. E. (2009), “The anatomy of a murder: Who killed America’s economy?”, Critical 
Review: A Journal of Politics and Society 21(2-3): 329-339. 
Sukmana, R. and M. Kholid (2010), “Impact of global financial crisis on Islamic and 
conventional stocks in emerging market: an application of ARCH and GARCH method”, 
Working Paper, http://www.iefpedia.com/english/wp-content/uploads/2010/12/Impact-of-
global-financial-crisis-on-Islamic-and-conventional-stocks-Muhamad-Kholid.pdf [accessed 5 
March 2013]. 
S&P Dow Jones (2013), “Guide to the Dow Jones Islamic market indices”, 
http://www.djindexes.com/mdsidx/downloads/rulebooks/Dow_Jones_Islamic_Market_Indice
s_Rulebook.pdf [accessed 15 August 2013]. 
Tan, T. K. (2012), “Financial distress and firm performance: Evidence from the Asian 
financial crisis”, Working Paper, http://www.aabri.com/manuscripts/121199.pdf [accessed 5 
March 2013].  
Taylor, J. B. (2009), “Economic policy and the financial crisis: An empirical analysis of what 
went wrong”, Critical Review: A Journal of Politics and Society 21(2-3): 341-364. 
The Banker (2009), “Top 500 Islamic financial institutions”, FT Business, 
http://www.thebanker.com/Reports/Special-Reports/Top-500-Islamic-financial-
institutions/Top-500-Islamic-Financial-Institutions [accessed 5 March 2013]. 
Timewell, S. and J. DiVanna (2009), “More growth, more challenges”, The Banker: Top 500 
Islamic Financial Institutions: 3 – 8. 
Urich, T. and P. Wachtel (1984), "Market Response to the Weekly Money Supply 
Announcements in the 1970s”, Journal of Finance 36: 1063-1072. 
Usmani, T. (2002), “An Introduction to Islamic Finance”, Springer. 
Vähämaa, S., S. Watzka and J. Äijö (2005), “What moves option-implied bond market 
expectations?”, The Journal of Futures Markets 25(9): 817–843. 
Wallison, P. J. (2009), “Cause and effect: Government policies and financial crisis”, Critical 
Review: A Journal of Politics and Society 21(2-3): 365-376. 
Wongswan, J. (2005), “Transmission of information across international equity markets”, 
Review of Financial Studies 19(4): 1157-1189. 
 245  
 
Wongswan, J. (2009), “The response of global equity indexes to U.S. monetary policy 
announcements”, Journal of International Money and Finance 28: 344–365. 
 
  
 246  
 
APPENDIX A 
Table A.1: Regressions of Returns or Variance on Islamic Dummy (SAC-based dataset 
1997-2012) 
Panel A: Returns on Islamic Dummy 
 Coefficient T-statistic P-value 
Constant 0.0106 1.7027 0.0895 
Islamic Dummy -0.0004 -0.2207 0.8254 
    
Total panel observations 344   
Adjusted R-squared -0.0029   
    
Panel B: Variance on Islamic Dummy 
 Coefficient T-statistic P-value 
Constant 0.0067 6.6209 0.0000 
Islamic Dummy -0.0017 -3.8226 0.0002 
    
Total panel observations 344   
Adjusted R-squared 0.0021   
 
 
Table A.2: Regressions of Returns or Variance on Islamic Dummy (Screen-based 
dataset 1986-2012) 
Panel A: Returns on Islamic Dummy 
 Coefficient T-statistic P-value 
Constant 0.0070 1.6170 0.1064 
Islamic Dummy -0.0023 -0.4064 0.6846 
    
Total panel observations 626   
Adjusted R-squared -0.0013   
    
Panel B: Variance on Islamic Dummy 
 Coefficient T-statistic P-value 
Constant 0.0059 10.5850 0 
Islamic Dummy -0.0014 -2.0388 0.0419 
    
Total panel observations 626   
Adjusted R-squared 0.0050   
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Table A.3: Descriptive Statistics of Market, non-Islamic, Islamic and the Decile Portfolios (SAC-based dataset 1997-2012) 
 Market Non-
Islamic 
Islamic NIS 1 NIS 2 NIS 3 NIS 4 NIS 5 IS 1 IS 2 IS 3 IS 4 IS 5 
Average 12.47 12.74 12.22 7.05 5.82 4.77 12.26 13.88 7.99 4.18 6.88 8.39 13.45 
Median 14.73 15.18 15.34 4.67 1.08 1.07 10.01 13.97 9.18 2.85 1.54 5.07 14.33 
Maximum 299.32 358.29 296.48 515.50 464.11 477.09 371.64 354.67 647.08 581.44 457.99 421.49 264.75 
Minimum -310.36 -316.90 -304.26 -353.06 -358.52 -363.08 -357.79 -302.29 -420.65 -385.79 -298.56 -339.94 -295.03 
Std. Dev. 25.85 28.34 24.58 32.57 35.57 33.88 32.10 27.83 36.01 34.33 31.26 31.27 23.91 
 
Table A.4: Descriptive Statistics of Market, non-Islamic, Islamic and the Decile Portfolios (Screen-based dataset 1986-2012) 
 Market Non-
Islamic 
Islamic NIS 1 NIS 2 NIS 3 NIS 4 NIS 5 IS 1 IS 2 IS 3 IS 4 IS 5 
Average 4.09 5.08 2.73 0.18 -2.35 -0.94 -0.20 6.88 -8.07 -4.12 -3.81 2.33 4.25 
Median 9.73 10.27 6.87 -0.46 4.09 -1.26 1.57 12.72 -16.67 -7.67 -3.97 6.62 10.48 
Maximum 256.35 275.23 228.90 363.42 310.26 346.70 284.02 254.08 427.22 351.41 309.75 295.32 247.96 
Minimum -268.28 -282.04 -243.38 -349.03 -348.44 -323.05 -337.41 -277.94 -336.27 -349.48 -314.01 -288.97 -255.21 
Std. Dev. 24.73 26.55 22.46 31.67 30.53 32.01 30.46 25.67 32.35 31.14 27.77 24.32 22.44 
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APPENDIX B 
Table B.1: List of Data Sources for the Stock Indices in Chapter 3 
Country Name  Abbreviation Source and Period  
 
Australia, Canada, 
France, Germany, 
Indonesia, Italy, 
Japan, Malaysia, 
Turkey, United Arab 
Emirates (UAE), 
United Kingdom 
(UK), United States 
(US) 
 
Canada 
 
 
 
 
France, Germany, 
Italy 
 
 
Indonesia 
 
 
Japan 
 
 
 
 
Malaysia 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
UK 
 
 
 
 
US 
 
 
 
 
 
 
MSCI Standard Index 
and MSCI Standard 
Islamic Index 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Dow Jones Canada 
Titans 60,  Index and 
Dow Jones Islamic 
Canadian Index 
 
S&P BMI Index and 
S&P EUR 350 
Shariah Index 
 
Jakarta SE Islamic 
 
 
Dow Jones Japan 
Titans 100 Index and 
Dow Jones Islamic 
Japan Index 
 
FTSE Bursa Malaysia 
EMAS Index, and 
FTSE Bursa Malaysia 
Hijrah Shariah Index 
 
Bursa Malaysia 
EMAS  Shariah 
Index, 
 
Dow Jones UK Titans 
50 Index and Dow 
Jones Islamic UK 
Index  
 
Dow Jones US Total 
Stock Market, Dow 
Jones Islamic US 
Index and DJGL 
United States Index 
 
 
 
 
 
 
c_s1 for 
conventional MSCI 
indices and is_s1 
for Islamic MSCI 
indices 
 
 
 
 
 
c_s2 and is_s2 
 
 
 
 
c_s2 and is_s2 
 
 
 
c_s2 
 
 
c_s2 and is_s2 
 
 
 
 
c_s2 and is_s3 
 
 
 
 
is_s2 
 
 
 
c_s2 and is_s2 
 
 
 
 
c_s2, is_s2 and 
c_s3 
 
11 August 2006 – 1 November 2013 
for Islamic indices and longer for some 
conventional indices; MSCI Barra  
[www.mscibarra.com/products/indices] 
 
 
 
 
 
 
2 January 2003 - 1 November 2013, 
Datastream 
 
 
 
2 January 2003 – 1 November 2013 
(c_s2) and 9 June 2008 – 30 August 
2013 (is_s2), Datastream 
 
4 January 2004 – 1 November 2013 
(c_s2) and 9 June 2008 – 1 November 
2013 2013 (is_s2), Datastream 
2 January 2003 - 30 August 2013, 
Datastream 
 
 
 
2 January 2004 – 1 November 2013, 
Datastream 
 
 
 
23 October 2006 – 1 November 2013, 
Datastream 
 
 
2 January 2003 – 1 November 2013, 
Datastream 
 
 
 
2 January 2001 – 1 November 2013, 
Datastream 
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Table B.2: List of Data Sources for the Bond Indices in Chapter 3 
Country Name  Abbreviation  Source and Period 
Australia 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Canada 
 
 
 
 
France 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Germany 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Indonesia 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Italy 
 
 
 
 
AFMA Australian Corporate 
Index 
 
Macquarie BK Corporate 
Bond  
 
AFMA Australian 
Government Index  
 
UBS Treasury All Maturities  
 
FTSE Global Government 
All Maturities 
 
AU Total All Lives DS 
Government Index 
 
Barclays Multiverse Canada 
 
FTSE Global Government 
All Maturities 
 
Barclays Multiverse France 
 
FTSE Global Government 
All Maturities 
 
FR Total All Lives DS 
Government Index 
 
Barclays Multiverse 
Germany 
 
FTSE Global Government 
All Maturities 
 
BD Total All Lives DS 
Government Index 
 
JPM EMBI Global 
 
JPM EMBI+ 
 
Barclays EM Asia 
 
JPM GBI-EM Global 
 
Banca Fideuram Euro Inv 
GDE Corporate Index 
 
Barclays Multiverse Italy 
 c_corp1  
 
 
c_corp2 
 
 
c_govt1  
 
 
c_govt2  
 
c_govt3 
 
 
c_govt4 
 
 
c_corp1 
 
c_govt1 
 
 
c_corp1 
 
c_govt1 
 
 
c_govt2 
 
 
c_corp1 
 
 
c_govt1 
 
 
c_govt2 
 
 
c_corp1 
 
c_corp2 
 
c_corp3 
 
c_govt1 
 
c_corp1 
 
 
c_corp2 
 
 
2 January 2003 - 1 November 
2013, Datastream [all 
Australian bonds] 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
17 August 2005 – 1 November 
2013, Datastream 
2 January 2003 - 1 November 
2013, Datastream 
 
17 August 2005 – 1 November 
2013, Datastream 
2 January 2003 - 1 November 
2013, Datastream 
 
2 January 2003 - 1 November 
2013, Datastream 
 
17 August 2005 – 1 November 
2013, Datastream 
 
2 January 2003 - 1 November 
2013, Datastream 
 
2 January 2003 - 1 November 
2013, Datastream 
 
1 June 2004 - 1 November 
2013, Datastream 
1 November 2006 - 1 
November 2013, Datastream 
2 January 2004 - 1 November 
2013, Datastream 
2 January 2004 - 1 November 
2013, Datastream 
1 July 2003 - 1 November 
2013, Datastream 
 
17 August 2005 – 1 November 
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Japan  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Malaysia 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Turkey 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
FTSE Global Government 
All Maturities 
 
Italy Total All Lives DS 
Government Index 
 
Barclays Multiverse Japan  
 
FTSE Global Government 
Japan All Maturities 
 
Japan Total All Lives DS 
Government Index 
 
Barclays Multiverse 
Malaysia 
 
JPM EMBI Global Malaysia  
 
JPM GBI-EM 
 
JPM GBI – EM Global 
 
Malaysian Corporate 
Conventional Bond Index 
and Malaysian Corporate 
Islamic Bond Index 
 
Malaysian Government 
Bond Index and Malaysian 
Government Islamic Bond 
Index 
Malaysian Bond Index 
(Corporate & Government) 
and Malaysian Islamic Bond 
Index (Corporate & 
Government) 
 
Malaysian Corporate Bond 
Index (Conventional and 
Islamic) and Malaysian 
Government Bond Index 
(Conventional and Islamic) 
 
Barclays EM Middle East 
Turkey  
 
JPM EMBI Global Turkey 
 
JPM GBI-EM Turkey 
 
FTSE Global Government 
Turkey All Maturities 
 
c_govt1 
 
 
c_govt2 
 
 
c_corp1 
 
c_govt1 
 
 
c_govt2 
 
 
c_corp1 
 
 
c_corp2 
 
c_govt1 
 
c_govt2 
 
q_c_corp and 
q_is_corp 
(AP1) 
 
 
q_c_govt and 
q_is_govt 
(AP2) 
 
q_c_bonds 
and 
q_is_bonds 
(AP3) 
 
 
q_total_corp 
and 
q_total_govt 
 
 
 
c_corp1 
 
 
c_corp2 
 
c_govt1 
 
c_govt2 
 
2013, Datastream 
2 January 2003 - 1 November 
2013, Datastream 
 
2 January 2003 - 1 November 
2013, Datastream 
 
17 August 2005 – 1 November 
2013, Datastream 
2 January 2003 - 1 November 
2013, Datastream 
 
2 January 2003 - 1 November 
2013, Datastream 
 
17 August 2005 – 1 November 
2013, Datastream 
 
2 January 2004 – 1 November 
2013, Datastream 
2 January 2004 – 1 November 
2013, Datastream 
2 January 2004 – 1 November 
2013, Datastream 
31 May 2007 – 1 November 
2013, provided by Quant Shop 
[www.quantshop.com] 
 
 
31 May 2007 – 1 November 
2013, provided by Quant Shop 
[www.quantshop.com] 
 
31 May 2007 – 1 November 
2013, provided by Quant Shop 
[www.quantshop.com] 
 
 
 
31 May 2007 – 1 November 
2013, provided by Quant Shop 
[www.quantshop.com] 
 
 
 
1 November 2002 – 1 
November 2013, Datastream 
 
1 November 2002 – 1 
November 2013, Datastream 
2 March 2004 – 1 November 
2013, Datastream 
3 January 2003 – 1 November 
2013, Datastream 
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UK 
 
 
 
FTSE Sterling Corporate All 
Maturities 
 
Barclays Multiverse United 
Kingdom 
 
FTSE Global Government 
UK All Maturities 
 
UK Total All Lives DS 
Government Index 
 
 
 
c_corp1 
 
 
c_corp2 
 
 
c_govt1 
 
 
c_govt2 
 
 
 
 
2 March 2004 – 1 November 
2013, Datastream 
 
17 August 2005 – 1 November 
2013, Datastream 
 
2 January 2003 – 1 November 
2013, Datastream 
 
2 January 2003 – 1 November 
2013, Datastream 
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Table B.3: List of Data Sources for the Macroeconomic Announcements and Consensus 
Forecasts in Chapter 3 
Country Name  Abbreviation  Source, Period and Frequency 
Australia 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Canada 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
European Union 
 
PPI - Q/Q (in %) 
 
Retail Sales - M/M (in %) 
 
GDP - Q/Q (in %) 
 
CPI - Q/Q (in %) 
 
Employment (Level) 
 
Unemployment (in %) 
 
RBA Announcement – 
Change (quoted as bp) for 
the announcement days and  
SFE-30 DAY INTERBANK 
CASH - SETT. PRICE for 
futures algorithm 
 
 
 
 
CPI - M/M (in %) 
 
 
Retail Sales - M/M (in %) 
 
 
PPI (IPPI) - M/M (in %) 
 
Monthly GDP - M/M (in %) 
 
 
Labour Force Survey - 
Level Change 
 
Unemployment (in %) 
 
Interest rate - Bank of 
Canada Announcement (in 
%) for announcement days 
and ME-30 DAY 
OVERNIGHT REPO– 
SETT. PRICE for futures 
algorithm 
 
 
 
Interest Rate - ECB 
Announcement (in %) for 
 PPI 
 
Retail 
 
GDP 
 
CPI 
 
Payrolls 
 
Unemployment 
 
Interest 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
CPI 
 
 
Retail 
 
 
PPI 
 
GDP 
 
 
Payrolls 
 
 
Unemployment 
 
Interest 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Interest 
 
 
 
Bloomberg, 23 July 2006 – 1 
August 2013, quarterly 
Bloomberg, 1 March 2006 – 2 
September 2013, monthly 
Bloomberg, 28 February 2006 
– 3 September 2013, quarterly 
Bloomberg, 25 July 2006 – 
23 July 2013, quarterly 
Bloomberg, 7 March 2006 – 6 
November 2013, monthly 
Bloomberg, 7 March 2006 – 6 
November 2013, monthly 
Bloomberg, 4 November 
2003 – 4 November 2013, 11 
announcements per year; and 
Datastream, 4 November 
2003 – November 2013, daily 
frequency, monthly contracts 
for November 2003 through 
November 2013 [AIB1103 – 
AIB1113] 
 
Bloomberg, 25 January 2008 
– 20 September 2013, 
monthly  
Bloomberg, 21 December 
2007 – 24 September 2013, 
monthly 
Bloomberg, 4 January 2008 – 
30 September 2013, monthly 
Bloomberg, 21 December 
2007 – 31 October 2013, 
monthly 
Bloomberg, 11 January 2008 
– 6 September 2013, monthly 
 
Bloomberg, 11 January 2008 
– 6 September 2013, monthly 
Bloomberg, 21 January 2003 
– 4 September 2013, 8-9 
announcements per year; and  
Datastream, 15 October 2003 
– 4 September 2013, daily 
frequency and monthly 
contracts for October 2003 
through September 2013 
[CDR0903 - CDR1213] 
 
Bloomberg, 9 January 2003 – 
5 September 2013, 11-13 
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France 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Germany 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Indonesia 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Italy 
announcement days and  
LIFFE-3 MTH EURIBOR - 
SETT. PRICE for futures 
algorithm 
 
 
 
 
Industrial Production - M/M 
(in %) 
 
CPI - M/M (in %) 
 
 
ILO Unemployment Rate 
(in %) 
 
 
PPI - M/M (in %) 
 
GDP - Q/Q (in %) 
 
 
 
 
Industrial Production - M/M 
(in %) 
 
 
CPI - M/M (in %) 
 
PPI - M/M (in %) 
 
Retail Sales - M/M (in %) 
 
Unemployment Rate – 
Level (in %) 
 
GDP Flash - Q/Q (in %) 
 
 
BI - Overnight BI Rate (in 
%) 
 
 
 
CPI – Y/Y (in %) 
 
 
GDP – Q/Q (in %) 
 
 
 
GDP - Q/Q (in %) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
IP 
 
 
CPI 
 
 
Unemployment 
 
 
 
PPI 
 
GDP 
 
 
 
 
IP 
 
 
 
CPI 
 
PPI 
 
Retail 
 
Unemployment 
 
 
GDP 
 
 
Interest 
 
 
 
 
CPI 
 
 
GDP 
 
 
 
GDP 
announcements per year; and 
Datastream, 9 January 2003 – 
5 September 2013, daily 
frequency and monthly 
contracts for January 2003 
through September 2013 
[LEI0103 – LEI0913] 
 
Bloomberg, 12 March 2003 – 
8 November 2013, monthly 
 
Bloomberg, 14 March 2003 – 
15 October 2013, 1-2 per 
month 
Bloomberg, 30 April 2003 – 5 
September 2013, monthly 
(2003 – 2007) and then 
quarterly (2008 – 2013) 
Bloomberg, 29 April 2003 – 
31 October 2013, monthly 
Bloomberg, 20 May 2003 – 
27 September 2013, 8 times 
per year (2003 – 2006), and 
then quarterly (2008 – 2013) 
 
Bloomberg, 12 January 2003 
– 9 October 2013, fortnightly 
(2003-2005) and then 
monthly (2006-2013) 
Bloomberg, 25 July 2003 – 
29 August 2013, fortnightly 
Bloomberg, 22 April 2003 – 4 
October 2013, monthly 
Bloomberg, 1 October 2003 – 
30 September 2013, monthly 
Bloomberg, 3 January 2007 – 
1 October 2013, monthly 
 
Bloomberg, 15 May 2003 – 
14 August 2013, quarterly 
 
Financial Times Economic 
Calendar, 5 January 2011 – 
12 November 2013, 11-12 
announcements per year 
 
Financial Times Economic 
Calendar, 3 January 2011 – 1 
November 2013, monthly 
Financial Times Economic 
Calendar, 7 February 2011 – 
6 November 2013, quarterly 
 
Bloomberg, 15 May 2003 – 
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Japan 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Malaysia 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
PPI - M/M (in %) 
 
CPI - M/M (in %) 
 
 
Industrial Production - M/M 
(in %) 
 
Unemployment Rate – 
Level (in %) 
 
Retail Sales - M/M (in %) 
 
 
 
PPI (CGPI) - M/M (in %) 
 
Industrial Production - M/M 
(in %) 
 
 
 
 
Unemployment Rate – 
Level (in %) 
 
GDP - Q/Q (in %) 
 
 
Retail Sales - Y/Y (in %) 
 
Bank of Japan 
Announcement – Level (in 
%) for announcement days 
and TIFFE-3 MTH 
EUROYEN TIBOR - SETT. 
PRICE for futures algorithm 
 
 
 
 
Industrial Production – Y/Y 
(in %) 
 
CPI – Y/Y (in %) 
 
 
GDP – Y/Y (in %) 
 
 
 
BNM - Overnight Policy 
 
 
PPI 
 
CPI 
 
 
IP 
 
 
Unemployment 
 
 
Retail 
 
 
 
PPI 
 
IP 
 
 
 
 
 
Unemployment 
 
 
GDP 
 
 
Retail 
 
Interest 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
IP 
 
 
CPI 
 
 
GDP 
 
 
 
Interest 
14 November 2013, 6-9 
announcements per year 
Bloomberg, 2 April 2003 – 31 
October 2013, monthly 
Bloomberg, 21 August 2003 – 
30 September 2013, 
fortnightly 
Bloomberg, 14 April 2003 – 
12 September 2013, monthly 
 
Bloomberg, 26 March 2003 – 
30 August 2013, quarterly 
 
Bloomberg, 20 October 2006 
– 26 September 2013, 
monthly 
 
Bloomberg, … - 10 
September 2013, monthly 
Bloomberg, 14 March 2007 - 
29 September 2013, 
fortnightly (March 2007 – 
January 2008), and then 
monthly (February 2008 – 
September 2013) 
Bloomberg, 27 December 
2007 – 30 September 2013, 
monthly 
Bloomberg, 9 September 
2007 - 8 September 2013, 8 
announcements per year 
Bloomberg, 29 August 2007 - 
29 September 2013, monthly 
Bloomberg, 9 March 2006 – 3 
October 2013, 14-16 
announcements per year; and 
Datastream, 9 March 2006 – 
3 October 2013, daily 
frequency, monthly contracts 
for March 2006 through 
October 2013 [JEY0306 – 
JEY1013] 
 
Financial Times Economic 
Calendar, 10 January 2011 – 
11 November 2013, monthly 
Financial Times Economic 
Calendar, 19 January 2011 – 
25 October 2013, monthly 
Financial Times Economic 
Calendar, 18 February 2011 – 
15 November 2013, quarterly 
 
Bank Negara Malaysia, 25 
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Turkey 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
United Kingdom 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Rate (in %) for 
announcement days and  
KLSE-3 MONTH KLIBOR 
- SETT. PRICE for futures 
algorithm 
 
 
 
 
Industrial Production – Y/Y 
(in %) 
 
Unemployment – Level (in 
%) 
 
PPI – M/M (in %) 
 
 
CPI – M/M (in %) 
 
 
CBT - 1 Week Repo Rate 
(in %) 
 
GDP (Y/Y) (in %) 
 
 
 
 
PPI - M/M (in %) 
 
Industrial Production - M/M 
(in %) 
 
CPI - M/M (in %) 
 
Employment – Level  
 
 
Unemployment rate – Level 
(in %) 
 
Retail Sales - M/M (in %) 
 
GDP - Q/Q (in %) 
 
Interest rate - BOE 
Announcement (in %) for 
announcement days and 
LIFFE-3MTH STERLING - 
SETT. PRICE for futures 
algorithm 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
IP 
 
 
Unemployment 
 
 
PPI 
 
 
CPI 
 
 
Interest 
 
 
GDP 
 
 
 
 
PPI 
 
IP 
 
 
CPI 
 
Payrolls 
 
 
 
 
 
Retail 
 
GDP 
 
Interest 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
February 2004 – 7 November 
2013, 4-8 announcements per 
year; and Datastream, 1 July 
2004 – 5 September 2013, 
daily frequency, monthly 
contracts for July 2004 
through September 2013 
[KLI0704 - KLI0913] 
 
Financial Times Economic 
Calendar, 10 January 2011 – 
8 November 2013, monthly 
Financial Times Economic 
Calendar, 17 January 2011 – 
15 November 2013, monthly 
Financial Times Economic 
Calendar, 3 January 2011 – 4 
November 2013, monthly 
Financial Times Economic 
Calendar, 3 January 2011 – 4 
November 2013, monthly 
Financial Times Economic 
Calendar, 20 January 2011 – 
19 November 2013, monthly 
Financial Times Economic 
Calendar, 10 September 2009 
– 10 September 2013, 
monthly 
 
Bloomberg, 10 March 2003 – 
17 September 2013, monthly 
Bloomberg, 11 March 2003 – 
6 September 2013, monthly 
 
Bloomberg, 18 March 2003 – 
17 September 2013, monthly 
Bloomberg, 16 December 
2009 – 11 September 2013, 
monthly 
Bloomberg, 17 January 2007 
– 11 September 2013, 
monthly 
Bloomberg, 20 March 2003 – 
19 September 2013, monthly 
Bloomberg, 27 March 2003 – 
26 September 2013, monthly 
Bloomberg, 9 January 2003 – 
5 September 2013, monthly; 
and Datastream, 9 January 
2003 – 5 September 2013, 
daily frequency, monthly 
contracts for January 2003 
through September 2013 
[LIP0103 - LIP0913] 
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United States 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Nonfarm payrolls - M/M 
change (Level) 
 
Unemployment Rate – 
Level (in %) 
 
PPI - M/M (in %) 
 
 
Retail sales - M/M change 
(in %) 
 
CPI - M/M change (in %) 
 
 
Industrial Production - M/M 
change (in %) 
 
Real GDP - Q/Q change – 
SAAR (in %) 
 
FOMC Federal Funds Rate - 
Target Level (in %) for 
announcement days and 
CBT-30 DAY FED FUNDS 
- SETT. PRICE for futures 
algorithm 
 
 
Payrolls 
 
 
Unemployment 
 
 
PPI 
 
 
Retail 
 
 
CPI 
 
 
IP 
 
 
GDP 
 
 
Interest 
 
Bloomberg, 5 January 2001 – 
6 September 2013, monthly 
 
Bloomberg, 5 January 2001 – 
6 September 2013, monthly 
 
Bloomberg, 12 January 2001 
– 13 September 2013, 
monthly 
Bloomberg, 12 January 2001 
– 13 September 2013, 
monthly 
Bloomberg, 17 January 2001 
– 17 September 2013, 
monthly 
Bloomberg, 17 January 2001 
– 16 September 2013, 
monthly 
Bloomberg, 31 January 2001 
– 29 August 2013, monthly 
 
Bloomberg, 31 January 2001 
– 31 July 2013, 8-10 
announcements per year; 
Datastream, 31 January 2001 
– 31 July 2013, daily 
frequency, monthly contracts 
for January 2001 through July 
2013 [CFF0103 - CFF0713] 
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APPENDIX C 
Table C.1 Assets USA 2003 
 c_s1 c_s2 is_s2 c_s3 c_corp1 c_govt1 c_govt2 
        
 Mean 0.0257 0.0293 0.0280 0.0277 -0.0078 0.0098 0.0091 
 Median 0.0751 0.0887 0.0784 0.0798 0.0000 0.0096 0.0153 
 Maximum 11.0386 10.7567 11.7360 10.9074 1.3555 1.5237 2.0504 
 Minimum -9.5079 -9.6371 -9.6982 -9.6318 -1.2981 -1.5327 -1.9398 
 Std. Dev. 1.2838 1.3015 1.2346 1.3018 0.2489 0.2863 0.3024 
 Skewness -0.3139 -0.3570 -0.1370 -0.3446 -0.0859 -0.1235 -0.0539 
 Kurtosis 13.4314 12.5582 13.4542 12.9293 4.8774 5.0908 5.4569 
        
 Jarque-Bera 12217.5900 10277.8400 12235.2100 11083.1100 397.6224 495.8728 676.6246 
 Probability 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
        
 
Observations 
2685 2685 2685 2685 2685 2685 2685 
 
Table C.2: Assets France 2003 
 c_s1 c_s2 c_govt1 c_govt2 
     
 Mean 0.0270 0.0296 0.0211 0.0208 
 Median 0.0623 0.0740 0.0330 0.0321 
 Maximum 11.9978 11.5223 5.2591 5.3757 
 Minimum -11.5697 -11.2367 -3.8417 -3.9980 
 Std. Dev. 1.7080 1.6708 0.7013 0.6969 
 Skewness -0.0065 -0.0177 0.0780 0.1172 
 Kurtosis 9.3369 9.2570 6.0909 6.5316 
     
 Jarque-Bera 4492.4650 4380.1040 1071.5460 1401.4470 
 Probability 0 0 0 0 
     
Observations 2685 2685 2685 2685 
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Table C.3: Assets Italy 2003 
 c_s1 c_govt1 c_govt2 
    
 Mean 0.0060 0.0118 0.0211 
 Median 0.0580 0.0087 0.0248 
 Maximum 12.466 4.3959 5.4358 
 Minimum -10.8913 -3.4375 -4.3555 
 Std. Dev. 1.8012 0.3716 0.8235 
 Skewness -0.0662 0.5949 0.0531 
 Kurtosis 9.1069 20.5085 6.5667 
    
 Jarque-Bera 4174.291 34453.4 1424.448 
 Probability 0 0 0 
    
Observations 2685 2685 2685 
 
Table C.4: Assets USA 2007 
 c_s1 is_s1 c_s2 is_s2 c_s3 c_corp1 c_govt1 c_govt2 
         
 Mean 0.0139 0.0224 0.0169 0.0206 0.0151 -0.0026 0.0144 0.0141 
 Median 0.0758 0.0853 0.0885 0.0890 0.0854 0.0000 0.0193 0.0180 
 Maximum 11.0386 11.7323 10.7567 11.7360 10.9074 1.3555 1.5237 2.0504 
 Minimum -9.5079 -9.7328 -9.6371 -9.6982 -9.6318 -1.2981 -1.5167 -1.9398 
 Std. Dev. 1.5052 1.3990 1.5288 1.4242 1.5275 0.2610 0.2942 0.3220 
 Skewness -0.3014 -0.1530 -0.3393 -0.1413 -0.3291 -0.0844 -0.0204 -0.0096 
 Kurtosis 11.1661 12.3802 10.3760 11.8864 10.7210 4.8707 4.9540 5.4781 
         
 Jarque-Bera 4687.8190 6158.3850 3836.0430 5526.7770 4198.2910 246.6783 267.0640 429.3763 
 Probability 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
         
Observations 1678 1678 1678 1678 1678 1678 1678 1678 
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Table C.5: Assets France 2007 
 c_s1 is_s1 c_s2 c_corp1 c_govt1 c_govt2 
       
 Mean -0.0060 0.0016 -0.0044 -0.0007 0.0165 0.0161 
 Median 0.0285 0.0630 0.0378 0.0000 0.0393 0.0350 
 Maximum 11.9978 12.8857 11.5223 0.9772 5.2591 5.3757 
 Minimum -11.5697 -11.8986 -11.2367 -1.0005 -3.8417 -3.9980 
 Std. Dev. 1.9946 1.9745 1.9569 0.2443 0.7151 0.7061 
 Skewness 0.0508 0.1297 0.0429 -0.1252 0.1692 0.2383 
 Kurtosis 7.7737 8.3725 7.6389 4.2937 7.4017 8.1641 
       
 Jarque-Bera 1594.0210 2022.7330 1505.0990 121.4045 1362.6290 1880.4190 
 Probability 0 0 0 0 0 0 
       
Observations 1678 1678 1678 1678 1678 1678 
 
Table C.6: Assets Italy 2007 
 c_s1 is_s1 c_corp1 c_corp2 c_govt1 c_govt2 
       
 Mean -0.0408 -0.0087 0.0082 -0.0042 0.0148 0.0158 
 Median 0.0139 0.0564 0.0252 0.0000 0.0150 0.0264 
 Maximum 12.4660 17.1481 5.1109 3.3877 4.3959 5.4358 
 Minimum -10.8913 -11.8190 -3.8790 -2.6900 -3.4375 -4.3555 
 Std. Dev. 2.1671 2.1857 0.7047 0.3899 0.4402 0.8934 
 Skewness 0.0082 0.3768 0.1154 0.3530 0.5773 0.1064 
 Kurtosis 6.8761 10.3620 6.9591 14.6726 16.5366 6.8690 
       
 Jarque-Bera 1050.4490 3829.0920 1099.6440 9560.9120 12904.6400 1049.7850 
 Probability 0 0 0 0 0 0 
       
Observations 1678 1678 1678 1678 1678 1678 
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Table C.7: Assets Australia 2007 
 c_s1 is_s1 c_corp1 c_corp2 c_govt1 c_govt2 c_govt3 c_govt4 
         
 Mean 0.0166 0.0121 0.0299 0.0050 0.0297 0.0285 0.0285 0.0282 
 Median 0.0981 0.1378 0.0690 0.0420 0.0685 0.0728 0.0615 0.0684 
 Maximum 8.8039 9.1365 6.7027 6.6952 6.8275 6.9549 6.9867 6.9899 
 Minimum -15.9789 -15.6655 -8.8336 -8.8339 -8.8336 -8.0901 -8.1127 -8.8186 
 Std. Dev. 2.0303 2.2317 1.0091 1.0447 0.9891 0.9828 0.9606 0.9794 
 Skewness -0.8288 -0.7576 -1.0248 -0.9804 -0.9612 -0.8377 -0.8650 -0.9138 
 Kurtosis 9.7550 8.7750 15.4319 14.2600 15.9366 15.0855 15.8630 16.2900 
         
 Jarque-Bera 3382.4560 2492.2460 11099.5100 9133.4080 11959.2800 10408.2100 11777.5200 12582.5500 
 Probability 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
         
 
Observations 
1678 1678 1678 1678 1678 1678 1678 1678 
 
Table C.8: Assets Germany 2007 
 c_s1 is_s1 c_s2 c_corp1 c_govt1 c_govt2 
       
 Mean 0.0071 0.0142 0.0078 -0.0001 0.0155 0.0159 
 Median 0.0658 0.0892 0.0811 0.0000 0.0373 0.0283 
 Maximum 11.5880 16.8099 11.4115 0.9346 5.2690 5.3608 
 Minimum -9.6413 -11.0262 -9.8740 -0.8990 -3.8512 -4.0310 
 Std. Dev. 1.9418 1.9571 1.9260 0.2203 0.6692 0.6694 
 Skewness -0.0210 0.0917 -0.0653 -0.0440 0.2511 0.3099 
 Kurtosis 7.3987 10.9206 7.1900 3.9958 8.5155 9.2146 
       
 Jarque-Bera 1352.9360 4388.6570 1228.6560 69.8782 2144.5410 2727.1040 
 Probability 0 0 0 0 0 0 
       
Observations 1678 1678 1678 1678 1678 1678 
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Table C.9: Assets USA 2008 
 c_s1 is_s1 c_s2 is_s2 c_s3 c_corp1 c_govt1 c_govt2 
         
 Mean 0.0220 0.0220 0.0256 0.0208 0.0231 0.0006 0.0150 0.0139 
 Median 0.0890 0.0829 0.0939 0.0804 0.0934 0.0084 0.0237 0.0253 
 Maximum 11.0386 11.7323 10.7567 11.7360 10.9074 1.3555 1.5237 2.0504 
 Minimum -9.5079 -9.7328 -9.6371 -9.6982 -9.6318 -1.2981 -1.5167 -1.9398 
 Std. Dev. 1.5941 1.4788 1.6227 1.5073 1.6197 0.2573 0.2928 0.3259 
 Skewness -0.3153 -0.1246 -0.3540 -0.1196 -0.3433 -0.0876 -0.0159 0.0123 
 Kurtosis 11.0255 12.3589 10.1612 11.8061 10.5381 5.2978 5.1879 5.8316 
         
 Jarque-Bera 3558.9520 4813.5450 2843.7740 4261.8250 3146.3730 291.6284 262.9376 440.3405 
 Probability 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
         
Observations 1318 1318 1318 1318 1318 1318 1318 1318 
 
Table C.10: Assets France 2008 
 c_s1 is_s1 c_s2 is_s2 c_corp1 c_govt1 c_govt2 
        
 Mean -0.0101 -0.0089 -0.0061 0.0108 0.0071 0.0104 0.0097 
 Median 0.0177 0.0374 0.0378 0.0379 0.0096 0.0315 0.0196 
 Maximum 11.9978 12.8857 11.5223 12.8696 0.9772 5.2591 5.3757 
 Minimum -11.5697 -11.8986 -11.2367 -11.0787 -1.0005 -3.8417 -3.9980 
 Std. Dev. 2.1372 2.1092 2.0979 1.9835 0.2504 0.7607 0.7509 
 Skewness 0.0529 0.1454 0.0437 0.3003 -0.1748 0.2097 0.2777 
 Kurtosis 7.2592 7.8683 7.1216 8.5342 4.4172 7.1462 7.9247 
        
 Jarque-Bera 996.8635 1306.1900 933.3033 1701.7920 117.0126 953.7481 1348.7990 
 Probability 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
        
Observations 1318 1318 1318 1318 1318 1318 1318 
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Table C.11: Assets Italy 2008 
 c_s1 is_s1 is_s2 c_corp1 c_corp2 c_govt1 c_govt2 
        
 Mean -0.0464 -0.0193 0.0017 0.0016 0.0027 0.0218 0.0097 
 Median 0.0107 0.0456 0.0835 0.0128 0.0090 0.0230 0.0119 
 Maximum 12.4660 17.1481 19.1091 5.1109 3.3877 4.3959 5.4358 
 Minimum -10.8913 -11.8190 -12.3836 -3.8790 -2.6900 -3.4375 -4.3555 
 Std. Dev. 2.3615 2.3716 2.5292 0.7575 0.4224 0.4822 0.9728 
 Skewness 0.0186 0.4064 0.4680 0.1524 0.3174 0.5245 0.1223 
 Kurtosis 6.1138 9.3878 10.3793 6.4922 13.4551 14.5576 6.1565 
        
 Jarque-Bera 532.5448 2277.0840 3038.5270 674.8237 6025.0210 7396.0760 550.4348 
 Probability 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
        
Observations 1318 1318 1318 1318 1318 1318 1318 
 
Table C.12: Assets Australia 2008 
 c_s1 is_s1 c_corp1 c_corp2 c_govt1 c_govt2 c_govt3 c_govt4 
         
 Mean 0.0066 -0.0174 0.0238 -0.0066 0.0226 0.0210 0.0214 0.0211 
 Median 0.0698 0.1139 0.0428 0.0014 0.0387 0.0524 0.0351 0.0470 
 Maximum 8.8039 9.1365 6.7027 6.6952 6.8275 6.9549 6.9867 6.9899 
 Minimum -15.9789 -15.6655 -8.8336 -8.8339 -8.8336 -8.0901 -8.1127 -8.8186 
 Std. Dev. 2.0746 2.2785 1.0690 1.1079 1.0485 1.0417 1.0139 1.0377 
 Skewness -0.8269 -0.7128 -0.9485 -0.8945 -0.8721 -0.7381 -0.7684 -0.8214 
 Kurtosis 9.9970 8.8058 14.9224 13.6955 15.3661 14.5162 15.4899 15.7489 
         
 Jarque-Bera 2838.7810 1962.6790 8003.7020 6457.8470 8564.8940 7402.8620 8696.5100 9074.1110 
 Probability 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
         
Observations 1318 1318 1318 1318 1318 1318 1318 1318 
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Table C.13: Assets Germany 2008 
 
 c_s1 is_s1 c_s2 is_s2 c_corp1 c_govt1 c_govt2 
        
 Mean -0.0036 -0.0069 -0.0021 0.0089 0.0066 0.0086 0.0091 
 Median 0.0452 0.0642 0.0496 0.0627 0.0081 0.0284 0.0169 
 Maximum 11.5880 16.8099 11.4115 18.8727 0.9346 5.2690 5.3608 
 Minimum -9.6413 -11.0262 -9.8740 -12.0912 -0.8990 -3.8512 -4.0310 
 Std. Dev. 2.0765 2.0951 2.0578 2.1893 0.2285 0.7062 0.7076 
 Skewness 0.0120 0.1816 -0.0355 0.5052 -0.0722 0.3069 0.3657 
 Kurtosis 6.8464 10.0777 6.6772 12.8646 3.9633 8.4663 9.1496 
        
 Jarque-Bera 812.5124 2758.1930 742.8527 5400.0640 52.1015 1661.6030 2106.1640 
 Probability 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
        
Observations 1318 1318 1318 1318 1318 1318 1318 
 
Table C.14: Assets Canada 2008 
 c_s1 is_s1 c_s2 is_s2 c_corp1 c_govt1 
       
 Mean -0.0071 -0.0314 -0.0191 -0.0343 -0.0008 0.0146 
 Median 0.1041 0.0516 0.0474 0.0012 0.0000 0.0317 
 Maximum 10.2766 11.2983 10.4540 11.9037 1.3451 4.6783 
 Minimum -14.2399 -13.7758 -14.4016 -13.7631 -1.5883 -4.6652 
 Std. Dev. 1.9207 2.2358 1.9371 2.2686 0.2906 0.7025 
 Skewness -0.7056 -0.6660 -0.6916 -0.6670 -0.0940 0.1366 
 Kurtosis 10.5439 10.2986 10.7192 10.2656 4.9081 9.3230 
       
 Jarque-Bera 3234.6900 3022.7900 3377.3340 2996.6930 201.8921 2199.7010 
 Probability 0 0 0 0 0 0 
       
Observations 1318 1318 1318 1318 1318 1318 
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Table C.15: Assets Japan 2008 
 c_s1 is_s1 c_s2 is_s2 c_corp1 c_govt1 c_govt2 
        
 Mean -0.0086 -0.0095 -0.0148 -0.0052 0.0026 0.0141 0.0142 
 Median 0.0129 0.0150 0.0000 0.0356 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 
 Maximum 11.4634 11.2279 11.8804 10.6550 1.1590 5.0257 5.0126 
 Minimum -9.5171 -9.9314 -10.0316 -9.5524 -0.5775 -3.4512 -3.3709 
 Std. Dev. 1.5991 1.6300 1.6719 1.5275 0.1290 0.7811 0.7776 
 Skewness -0.1355 -0.1689 -0.1053 -0.1672 0.3870 0.2817 0.2884 
 Kurtosis 8.6547 8.2418 8.4661 8.4401 9.7000 7.4508 7.3308 
        
 Jarque-Bera 1760.0420 1515.2090 1643.2290 1631.3740 2498.1000 1105.2830 1048.2910 
 Probability 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
        
 
Observations 
1318 1318 1318 1318 1318 1318 1318 
 
Table C.16: Assets USA 2011 
 c_s1 is_s1 c_s2 is_s2 c_s3 c_corp1 c_govt1 c_govt2 
         
 Mean 0.0478 0.0436 0.0518 0.0422 0.0474 -0.0035 0.0102 0.0101 
 Median 0.0803 0.0815 0.1014 0.0772 0.099 0.0000 0.0139 0.0215 
 Maximum 4.6900 4.5227 4.9593 4.6002 4.8729 0.6331 1.1302 0.8342 
 Minimum -6.9452 -6.2867 -7.2886 -6.4010 -7.1839 -1.0864 -0.9455 -0.9476 
 Std. Dev. 1.0929 1.0756 1.1362 1.1033 1.1202 0.2135 0.2523 0.2562 
 Skewness -0.5741 -0.5197 -0.5704 -0.4804 -0.5776 -0.3020 0.1497 -0.1136 
 Kurtosis 8.0438 7.2282 8.1082 7.2321 8.1415 4.2832 4.8194 3.6025 
         
 Jarque-Bera 746.9927 529.2361 764.7667 525.7829 775.2225 56.1550 94.9169 11.5758 
 Probability 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0.0031 
         
Observations 670 670 670 670 670 670 670 670 
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Table C.17: Assets France 2011 
 c_s1 is_s1 c_s2 is_s2 c_corp1 c_govt1 c_govt2 
        
 Mean 0.0202 0.0230 0.0242 0.0487 0.0046 0.0168 0.0160 
 Median 0.0205 0.0880 0.0378 0.1277 0.0095 0.0460 0.0496 
 Maximum 8.1004 6.9280 7.9152 6.2925 0.8633 2.4898 2.1891 
 Minimum -7.3187 -6.9635 -7.3383 -6.2607 -1.0005 -2.5672 -2.5982 
 Std. Dev. 1.8410 1.7690 1.8163 1.6257 0.2458 0.6650 0.6428 
 Skewness -0.2115 -0.1547 -0.2302 -0.1544 -0.1733 -0.0972 -0.0947 
 Kurtosis 5.1135 4.7230 5.1199 4.5069 4.5937 4.0771 4.0046 
        
 Jarque-Bera 129.6994 85.5485 131.3724 66.0554 74.2622 33.4420 29.1764 
 Probability 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
        
Observations 670 670 670 670 670 670 670 
 
Table C.18: Assets Italy 2011 
 c_s1 is_s1 is_s2 c_corp1 c_corp2 c_govt1 c_govt2 
        
 Mean -0.0161 0.0033 0.0253 0.0148 0.0058 0.0248 0.0252 
 Median 0.0097 -0.0066 0.0672 0.0203 0.0098 0.0159 0.0682 
 Maximum 8.2559 7.0696 8.9828 2.5915 3.3877 4.3959 4.5872 
 Minimum -8.6028 -8.0166 -8.0121 -2.2878 -2.6900 -3.4375 -4.3555 
 Std. Dev. 2.1904 1.9742 2.1193 0.6505 0.5245 0.6096 1.0223 
 Skewness -0.2522 -0.1621 -0.0746 -0.1042 0.3032 0.4897 -0.0323 
 Kurtosis 4.4354 4.9161 4.9084 4.2748 10.5019 10.7932 5.5086 
        
 Jarque-Bera 64.6215 105.4284 102.2910 46.5827 1581.3750 1722.2500 175.7972 
 Probability 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
        
Observations 670 670 670 670 670 670 670 
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Table C.19: Assets Australia 2011 
 c_s1 is_s1 c_corp1 c_corp2 c_govt1 c_govt2 c_govt3 c_govt4 
         
 Mean 0.0101 -0.0347 0.0079 -0.0210 0.0074 0.0058 0.0058 0.0050 
 Median 0.0499 0.0734 0.0045 -0.0185 0.0252 0.0388 0.0112 0.0358 
 Maximum 6.2468 6.3654 3.0330 3.2800 2.7829 2.7629 2.7506 2.6469 
 Minimum -6.8281 -7.9011 -4.0636 -4.1082 -4.4964 -4.6464 -4.5118 -4.9915 
 Std. Dev. 1.4471 1.5858 0.7177 0.7502 0.7074 0.7114 0.6521 0.6939 
 Skewness -0.3198 -0.3462 -0.3672 -0.2737 -0.4915 -0.5264 -0.5434 -0.6557 
 Kurtosis 5.4812 5.1917 6.5518 5.9328 7.0454 7.1176 7.9722 8.2033 
         
 Jarque-Bera 183.2821 147.4812 367.2324 248.4932 483.8446 504.2506 723.1396 803.8426 
 Probability 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
         
Observations 670 670 670 670 670 670 670 670 
 
 
Table C.20: Assets Germany 2011
 c_s1 is_s1 c_s2 is_s2 c_corp1 c_govt1 c_govt2 
        
 Mean 0.0237 0.0198 0.0238 0.0341 0.0028 0.0136 0.0144 
 Median 0.0458 0.0696 0.0434 0.0998 0.0000 0.0432 0.0381 
 Maximum 7.3988 6.6788 7.2107 6.3781 0.9346 1.8493 2.0150 
 Minimum -7.5964 -7.4470 -7.4880 -7.9262 -0.7756 -2.4209 -2.3601 
 Std. Dev. 1.8239 1.7528 1.7955 1.7196 0.2319 0.5614 0.5547 
 Skewness -0.2329 -0.2473 -0.2572 -0.2708 -0.0362 -0.0507 -0.0859 
 Kurtosis 5.2502 5.1506 5.2393 4.9939 3.8537 3.8661 3.9334 
        
 Jarque-Bera 147.4059 135.9443 147.3704 119.1782 20.4921 21.2275 25.1470 
 Probability 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
        
Observations 670 670 670 670 670 670 670 
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Table C.21: Assets Canada 2011 
 c_s1 is_s1 c_s2 is_s2 c_corp1 c_govt1 
       
 Mean -0.0079 -0.0389 -0.0191 -0.0530 -0.0032 0.0057 
 Median 0.0438 -0.0229 0.0248 -0.0350 0.0000 0.0258 
 Maximum 5.3778 6.2030 5.4621 6.0147 1.3451 1.4704 
 Minimum -6.1889 -7.4751 -6.0978 -7.8970 -1.3902 -2.5573 
 Std. Dev. 1.2412 1.4852 1.2460 1.5251 0.2884 0.4610 
 Skewness -0.2973 -0.2678 -0.2876 -0.3066 -0.0331 -0.4762 
 Kurtosis 5.3936 4.9700 5.3649 5.0425 5.1541 5.3181 
       
 Jarque-Bera 169.8133 116.3548 165.3596 126.9649 129.6624 175.3400 
 Probability 0 0 0 0 0 0 
       
Observations 670 670 670 670 670 670 
 
Table C.22: Assets Japan 2011 
 c_s1 is_s1 c_s2 is_s2 c_corp1 c_govt1 c_govt2 
        
 Mean 0.0097 -0.0031 0.0073 0.0019 0.0010 -0.0213 -0.0213 
 Median 0.0040 0.0024 0.0000 0.0402 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 
 Maximum 7.1319 6.9886 6.8106 6.7579 1.1590 2.3734 2.4520 
 Minimum -8.5552 -8.4064 -8.1333 -6.8354 -0.5218 -3.4512 -3.3709 
 Std. Dev. 1.3290 1.3158 1.3764 1.2176 0.1206 0.6629 0.6625 
 Skewness -0.5428 -0.4523 -0.4833 -0.3488 0.9235 -0.5407 -0.5011 
 Kurtosis 7.9868 7.4672 6.9045 6.9106 17.0298 6.4245 6.3956 
        
 Jarque-Bera 727.1497 579.9428 451.6794 440.5051 5590.2550 360.0185 349.9210 
 Probability 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
        
Observations 670 670 670 670 670 670 670 
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Table C.23: Assets Indonesia 2011 
 c_s1 is_s1 is_s2 c_corp1 c_corp2 c_corp3 c_govt1 
        
 Mean -0.0094 0.0195 -0.0133 0.0027 0.0052 -0.0371 -0.0073 
 Median 0.0160 0.0680 0.0000 0.0267 0.0184 0.0000 0.0029 
 Maximum 6.8804 6.0563 5.8269 1.9692 2.0502 2.6145 3.2703 
 Minimum -9.7990 -9.6478 -8.7011 -3.8996 -3.7593 -7.8259 -3.6183 
 Std. Dev. 1.5925 1.5984 1.6775 0.4666 0.4817 0.5811 0.7321 
 Skewness -0.8292 -0.7431 -0.5789 -1.8866 -1.5172 -4.0672 -0.6130 
 Kurtosis 8.0101 7.4039 5.7546 17.0130 15.0480 54.1375 7.0361 
        
 Jarque-Bera 777.5106 603.0846 249.2523 5879.3060 4309.2490 74850.6100 496.7186 
 Probability 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
        
Observations 670 670 670 670 670 670 670 
 
Table C.24: Assets Turkey 2011 
 c_s1 is_s1 c_corp1 c_corp2 c_govt1 c_govt2 
       
 Mean -0.031 0.004 -0.024 0.010 -0.021 -0.019 
 Median 0.091 0.091 -0.001 0.018 0.015 0.029 
 Maximum 6.524 8.172 1.868 2.695 3.198 2.809 
 Minimum -11.491 -9.577 -4.106 -4.250 -5.657 -4.287 
 Std. Dev. 1.941 1.903 0.506 0.542 0.808 0.704 
 Skewness -0.731 -0.412 -1.538 -0.924 -0.651 -0.482 
 Kurtosis 6.506 5.662 16.515 13.111 7.166 5.476 
       
 Jarque-Bera 402.833 216.824 5363.475 2949.229 531.729 197.153 
 Probability 0 0 0 0 0 0 
       
Observations 670 670 670 670 670 670 
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Table C.25: Assets UK 2011 
 c_s1 is_s1 c_s2 is_s2 c_corp1 c_corp2 c_govt1 c_govt2 
         
 Mean 0.0267 0.0103 0.0263 0.0090 0.0249 0.0060 0.0200 0.0195 
 Median 0.0861 0.0590 0.0702 0.0517 0.0514 -0.0005 0.0343 0.0286 
 Maximum 4.8958 5.3482 4.8907 5.5400 1.7601 1.2419 2.0835 2.0653 
 Minimum -6.4584 -6.7210 -6.4253 -7.2234 -2.9747 -1.1723 -3.1565 -3.0292 
 Std. Dev. 1.2978 1.3473 1.2843 1.4383 0.5481 0.3366 0.5733 0.5572 
 Skewness -0.3655 -0.3068 -0.3640 -0.3434 -0.4226 0.0429 -0.3560 -0.2927 
 Kurtosis 4.9029 4.7977 4.9552 4.9434 4.5799 3.7392 4.8506 4.9845 
         
 Jarque-Bera 116.0106 100.7307 121.5214 118.6046 89.6171 15.4613 109.7578 119.5126 
 Probability 0 0 0 0 0 0.0004 0 0 
         
Observations 670 670 670 670 670 670 670 670 
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Table C.26: Assets Malaysia 2011 
  
 c_s1 is_s1 c_s2 is_s2 is_s3 c_corp1 c_corp2 c_govt1 c_govt2 
          
 Mean 0.0307 0.0469 0.0373 0.0432 0.0496 -0.0016 0.0228 0.0127 0.0127 
 Median 0.0446 0.0348 0.0740 0.0668 0.0177 0.0000 0.0250 0.0048 0.0048 
 Maximum 5.7837 4.9522 5.4950 5.1453 4.8854 0.5412 1.1139 3.1726 3.1726 
 Minimum -3.4440 -3.3788 -3.4141 -3.4851 -3.3344 -0.6662 -2.0291 -1.7419 -1.7419 
 Std. Dev. 0.9165 0.9198 0.9027 0.9206 0.9033 0.0952 0.3330 0.4696 0.4696 
 Skewness 0.1341 -0.0284 -0.0156 -0.1416 -0.1074 -0.3945 -0.8638 0.3241 0.3241 
 Kurtosis 6.7007 5.4126 6.6191 5.9990 5.7033 9.7849 8.6815 7.0956 7.0956 
          
 Jarque-Bera 394.6548 166.9457 375.4930 260.1204 210.8162 1337.5320 1010.9030 492.8891 492.8891 
 Probability 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
          
Observations 688 688 688 688 688 688 688 688 688 
          
 q_c_bonds q_is_bonds q_c_corp q_is_corp q_c_govt q_is_govt q_total_corp q_total_govt 
          
 Mean 0.0149 0.0177 0.0280 0.0250 0.0131 0.0127 0.0263 0.0129  
 Median 0.0182 0.0205 0.0315 0.0301 0.0165 0.0157 0.0317 0.0154  
 Maximum 3.4022 3.3592 4.0800 3.5896 3.2994 3.1365 3.7228 3.2512  
 Minimum -1.9158 -1.9084 -2.1465 -3.7403 -1.8805 -1.7771 -2.6876 -1.8503  
 Std. Dev. 0.4724 0.4779 0.5221 0.5374 0.4699 0.4578 0.5254 0.4659  
 Skewness 0.4530 0.3770 0.7124 0.2163 0.4014 0.3752 0.4097 0.3956  
 Kurtosis 7.9737 7.6451 9.7057 11.9196 7.6095 7.1251 9.0541 7.4721  
          
 Jarque-Bera 732.6720 634.8436 1347.2150 2286.0500 627.5773 503.9471 1069.9570 591.2580  
 Probability 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0  
          
Observations 688 688 688 688 688 688 688 688  
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Table C.27: Assets USA 2001-2013 
 c_s2 is_s2 c_s3 c_corp1 c_govt1 c_govt2 
       
 Mean 0.0120 0.0072 0.0098 -0.0068 0.0117 0.0109 
 Median 0.0682 0.0647 0.0631 0.0000 0.0123 0.0187 
 Maximum 10.7567 11.7360 10.9074 1.3555 1.5237 2.0504 
 Minimum -9.6371 -9.6982 -9.6318 -1.2981 -1.5327 -1.9398 
 Std. Dev. 1.3311 1.3113 1.3381 0.2521 0.2968 0.3103 
 Skewness -0.2382 -0.0414 -0.2200 -0.1435 -0.1477 -0.1500 
 Kurtosis 10.5969 10.3399 10.7613 4.6138 4.7755 5.0545 
       
 Jarque-Bera 7689.1190 7150.5300 8019.8490 356.5547 429.9433 572.0909 
 Probability 0 0 0 0 0 0 
       
Observations 3185 3185 3185 3185 3185 3185 
 
Table C.28: Assets USA pre-crisis 
 c_s2 is_s2 c_s3 c_corp1 c_govt1 c_govt2 
       
 Mean -0.0013 -0.0072 -0.0032 -0.0115 0.0113 0.0107 
 Median 0.0502 0.0465 0.0497 -0.0050 0.0046 0.0173 
 Maximum 5.2279 6.0184 5.4069 0.9164 1.3912 1.0365 
 Minimum -5.2274 -4.3971 -5.1804 -1.0084 -1.5327 -1.3028 
 Std. Dev. 1.0729 1.1535 1.0908 0.2446 0.2976 0.2963 
 Skewness 0.0272 0.0637 0.0425 -0.1947 -0.2309 -0.2877 
 Kurtosis 5.2710 5.2305 5.3837 4.1348 4.6167 4.2759 
       
 Jarque-Bera 388.9517 376.2171 428.8175 108.4959 213.0827 147.6619 
 Probability 0 0 0 0 0 0 
       
Observations 1809 1809 1809 1809 1809 1809 
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Table C.29: Assets USA Crisis 
 c_s1 is_s1 c_s2 is_s2 c_s3 c_corp1 c_govt1 c_govt2 
         
 Mean -0.1816 -0.1406 -0.1820 -0.1420 -0.1817 -0.0093 0.0227 0.0208 
 Median 0.0084 -0.0349 -0.0277 0.0207 0.0094 -0.0084 0.0396 -0.0061 
 Maximum 11.0386 11.7323 10.7567 11.7360 10.9074 1.3555 1.5237 2.0504 
 Minimum -9.5079 -9.7328 -9.6371 -9.6982 -9.6318 -1.2981 -1.5167 -1.9398 
 Std. Dev. 2.7576 2.5114 2.7613 2.5503 2.7771 0.3668 0.3944 0.4646 
 Skewness 0.0116 0.1669 -0.0323 0.1660 -0.0202 0.1105 -0.0491 0.1634 
 Kurtosis 5.4763 6.7093 5.2330 6.4463 5.3353 4.2205 4.5563 5.2148 
         
 Jarque-Bera 66.9480 151.4135 54.4777 130.8566 59.5518 16.7948 26.5456 54.7175 
 Probability 0 0 0 0 0 0.0002 0 0 
         
Observations 262 262 262 262 262 262 262 262 
 
Table C.30: Assets USA Post-crisis 
 c_s1 is_s1 c_s2 is_s2 c_s3 c_corp1 c_govt1 c_govt2 
         
 Mean 0.0741 0.0657 0.0792 0.0656 0.0760 0.0014 0.0097 0.0089 
 Median 0.1008 0.0963 0.1054 0.0890 0.1024 0.0091 0.0198 0.0262 
 Maximum 4.6900 4.5227 4.9593 4.6002 4.8729 0.9546 1.1302 0.8342 
 Minimum -6.9452 -6.2867 -7.2886 -6.4010 -7.1839 -1.0864 -1.0739 -1.0487 
 Std. Dev. 1.1377 1.0782 1.1819 1.1062 1.1693 0.2300 0.2676 0.2868 
 Skewness -0.4107 -0.4007 -0.4044 -0.3756 -0.4078 -0.2400 -0.0562 -0.2303 
 Kurtosis 6.2865 5.9947 6.3294 6.0043 6.3227 4.0657 4.1785 3.4872 
         
 Jarque-Bera 532.6810 446.0735 544.8893 445.1540 543.3386 63.4100 65.0505 20.8638 
 Probability 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
         
Observations 1114 1114 1114 1114 1114 1114 1114 1114 
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Table C.31: Descriptive Statistics of Macroeconomic Events: USA 2003 - 2013 
 Payroll Unemployment PPI Retail Sales CPI Industrial 
Production 
GDP Interest 
rate 
Announcement 
Mean 405.19 0.01 0.28 0.27 0.19 0.14 2.21 -0.01 
Median 960 0 0.3 0.3 0.2 0.2 2.5 0 
Std Dev 1982.85 0.19 0.90 0.89 0.37 0.66 2.39 0.23 
Min -6630 -0.4 -2.8 -2.8 -1.7 -2.8 -6.3 -1 
Max 4310 0.5 3.2 2.7 1.2 1.3 8.2 0.25 
N 129 128 150 129 152 152 128 87 
         
Surprise  
Mean -219.69 -0.05 0.06 -0.03 -0.02 -0.07 -0.10 0.17 
Median -390 -0.1 0.1 -0.1 -0.1 -0.1 -0.1 0.25 
Std Dev 901.87 0.18 0.53 0.56 0.17 0.44 0.49 0.79 
Min -3280 -0.5 -1.3 -1.6 -0.4 -2.3 -1.7 -0.75 
Max 1880 0.4 1.6 1.8 0.4 1.1 1.6 1.5 
N 96 95 117 121 83 119 104 6 
 
Table C.32: Descriptive Statistics of Macroeconomic Events: France 2003 - 2013 
 Unemployment PPI CPI Industrial 
Production 
GDP 
Announcement 
Mean 0.02 0.15 0.17 -0.03 0.32 
Median 0 0.2 0.2 0 0.3 
Std Dev 0.20 0.55 0.31 1.21 0.46 
Min -0.8 -1.9 -0.5 -3.1 -1.2 
Max 0.9 1.3 1.6 3.2 1.2 
N 70 130 133 129 56 
      
Surprise 
Mean 0.02 -0.04 0.03 -0.15 -0.05 
Median 0.1 -0.1 0.1 -0.2 -0.1 
Std Dev 0.17 0.37 0.27 1.10 0.15 
Min -0.3 -1.1 -0.4 -3.5 -0.3 
Max 0.4 0.7 1.7 2.8 0.1 
N 39 93 74 117 13 
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Table C.33: Descriptive Statistics of Macroeconomic Events: Italy 2003 - 2013 
 Unemployment PPI Retail 
Sales 
CPI Industrial 
Production 
GDP 
Announcement 
Mean 0.08 0.19 -0.08 0.18 -0.15 -0.07 
Median 0 0.2 0 0.2 -0.2 0.1 
Std Dev 0.35 0.50 0.61 0.18 1.45 0.67 
Min -0.4 -1.6 -3.1 -0.4 -5.3 -2.6 
Max 1 1.5 2.1 0.8 7 1.1 
N 41 126 126 199 127 83 
       
Surprise  
Mean -0.01 -0.04 -0.09 -0.01 -0.18 -0.16 
Median 0 -0.1 -0.15 -0.1 -0.3 -0.1 
Std Dev 0.32 0.35 0.45 0.22 1.77 0.72 
Min -0.7 -0.8 -1.1 -0.5 -11.1 -4.2 
Max 0.6 1.2 1.5 1.1 5.5 0.8 
N 28 73 70 55 96 39 
 
Table C.34: Descriptive Statistics of Macroeconomic Events: USA 2007 - 2013 
 Payroll Unemployment PPI Retail Sales CPI Industrial 
Production 
GDP Interest 
rate 
Announcement 
Mean 48.40 0.03 0.27 0.21 0.18 0.07 1.50 -0.10 
Median 880 0 0.3 0.3 0.2 0.1 1.9 0 
Std Dev 2248.97 0.21 0.95 0.86 0.39 0.73 2.49 0.23 
Min -6630 -0.4 -2.8 -2.8 -1.7 -2.8 -6.3 -1 
Max 4310 0.5 3.2 2.7 1.1 1.3 5.9 0 
N 81 80 150 81 152 152 80 55 
         
Surprise  
Mean -146.55 -0.04 0.06 -0.06 -0.01 -0.08 -0.08 0.15 
Median -300 -0.1 0.1 -0.1 -0.1 -0.1 -0.1 0.25 
Std Dev 805.66 0.20 0.49 0.55 0.17 0.50 0.47 0.88 
Min -2330 -0.5 -1.3 -1.6 -0.4 -2.3 -1.1 -0.75 
Max 1850 0.4 1.6 1.8 0.4 1.1 1.6 1.5 
N 55 60 76 75 52 74 65 5 
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Table C.35: Descriptive Statistics of Macroeconomic Events: France 2007 – 2013 
 Unemployment PPI CPI Industrial 
Production 
GDP 
Announcement 
Mean 0.06 0.13 0.15 -0.08 0.16 
Median 0 0.25 0.15 0 0.3 
Std Dev 0.29 0.63 0.32 1.26 0.49 
Min -0.8 -1.9 -0.5 -3.1 -1.2 
Max 0.9 1.3 0.8 2.6 0.9 
N 27 84 82 83 26 
      
Surprise  
Mean 0.09 -0.04 -0.02 -0.08 0.01 
Median 0.15 0.1 -0.1 -0.1 0.1 
Std Dev 0.20 0.43 0.17 1.19 0.11 
Min -0.2 -1.1 -0.4 -3.5 -0.1 
Max 0.4 0.7 0.3 2.8 0.1 
N 10 60 49 79 9 
 
Table C.36: Descriptive Statistics of Macroeconomic Events: Italy 2007 - 2013 
 Unemployment PPI Retail 
Sales 
CPI Industrial 
Production 
GDP 
Announcement  
Mean 0.20 0.14 -0.07 0.19 -0.23 -0.23 
Median 0.2 0.2 0 0.2 -0.2 -0.2 
Std Dev 0.36 0.54 0.38 0.20 1.73 0.75 
Min -0.3 -1.6 -1.6 -0.4 -5.3 -2.6 
Max 1 1.5 0.7 0.6 7 1.1 
N 27 81 81 112 81 53 
       
Surprise  
Mean 0 -0.06 -0.09 0.02 -0.24 -0.19 
Median 0.1 -0.1 -0.1 -0.1 -0.4 -0.1 
Std Dev 0.34 0.34 0.46 0.23 2.00 0.79 
Min -0.7 -0.8 -1.1 -0.5 -11.1 -4.2 
Max 0.6 1.2 1.5 1.1 5.5 0.8 
N 22 57 67 42 71 31 
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Table C.37: Descriptive Statistics of Macroeconomic Events: Australia 2007 - 2013 
 Payroll Unemployment PPI Retail Sales CPI GDP Interest rate 
Announcement 
Mean 149.22 0.01 0.54 0.28 0.64 0.59 -0.05 
Median 145 0 0.5 0.2 0.6 0.6 0 
Std Dev 232.90 0.81 0.68 0.78 0.51 0.56 0.26 
Min -362 -5.2 -0.8 -2 -0.3 -1.2 -1 
Max 715 5 2 3.8 1.6 1.6 0.25 
N 83 83 27 81 27 27 76 
        
Surprise  
Mean 65.88 0.01 0.07 -0.14 -0.12 0.16 -0.01 
Median 54 -0.1 0.1 -0.3 -0.1 0.1 0.05 
Std Dev 241.89 0.98 0.70 0.92 0.34 0.41 0.16 
Min -471 -5.2 -1.2 -2.2 -0.7 -0.5 -0.51 
Max 673 5.3 1.6 3.7 0.6 0.8 0.22 
N 77 62 24 75 25 20 25 
 
Table C.38: Descriptive Statistics of Macroeconomic Events: Germany 2007 - 2013 
 Unemployment PPI Retail 
Sales 
CPI Industrial 
Production 
GDP Interest 
rate 
Announcement 
Mean -0.04 0.15 -0.44 0.13 -0.06 0.21 -0.04 
Median 0 0.1 -0.3 0.1 0.05 0.3 0 
Std Dev 0.11 0.60 2.17 0.33 1.98 1.10 0.16 
Min -0.4 -1.5 -9.7 -0.6 -7.5 -3.8 -0.75 
Max 0.2 2 6.3 1 4 2.2 0.25 
N 82 79 85 115 82 28 81 
        
Surprise  
Mean 0.01 -0.03 -0.69 -0.02 -0.20 0.10 0.03 
Median 0.1 -0.1 -0.7 0.1 -0.25 0.1 0.09 
Std Dev 0.16 0.48 1.57 0.22 1.55 0.38 0.10 
Min -0.4 -1.6 -3.6 -0.9 -4.5 -0.8 -0.09 
Max 0.3 1.3 4.5 0.3 3.7 0.8 0.12 
N 51 73 78 52 80 23 5 
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Table C.39: Descriptive Statistics of Macroeconomic Events: USA 2008 - 2013 
 Payroll Unemployment PPI Retail Sales CPI Industrial 
Production 
GDP Interest 
rate 
Announcement        
Mean -124.92 0.03 0.18 0.20 0.13 0.06 1.28 -0.05 
Median 800 0 0.2 0.35 0.1 0.15 1.9 0 
Std Dev 2487.31 0.23 0.93 0.92 0.42 0.79 2.65 0.18 
Min -6630 -0.4 -2.8 -2.8 -1.7 -2.8 -6.3 -1 
Max 4310 0.5 1.8 2.7 1.1 1.3 5.9 0 
N 63 63 150 64 152 152 63 43 
         
Surprise     
Mean -161.67 -0.04 0.02 -0.06 -0.02 -0.11 -0.10 0.42 
Median -335 -0.1 0.1 -0.1 -0.1 -0.1 -0.2 0.25 
Std Dev 857.96 0.20 0.44 0.57 0.18 0.52 0.49 1.01 
Min -2330 -0.5 -1.3 -1.6 -0.4 -2.3 -1.1 -0.5 
Max 1850 0.3 1 1.8 0.4 1.1 1.6 1.5 
N 42 49 60 59 40 59 52 3 
 
Table C.40: Descriptive Statistics of Macroeconomic Events: France 2008 - 2013 
 Unemployment PPI CPI Industrial 
Production 
GDP 
Announcement     
Mean 0.15 0.10 0.13 -0.14 0.10 
Median 0.1 0.2 0.1 -0.05 0.15 
Std Dev 0.25 0.67 0.34 1.33 0.51 
Min -0.2 -1.9 -0.5 -3.1 -1.2 
Max 0.9 1.3 0.8 2.6 0.9 
N 19 66 65 66 22 
      
Surprise  
Mean 0.11 -0.07 -0.03 -0.10 -0.01 
Median 0.2 -0.1 -0.1 -0.1 -0.1 
Std Dev 0.22 0.48 0.16 1.28 0.11 
Min -0.2 -1.1 -0.4 -3.5 -0.1 
Max 0.4 0.7 0.3 2.8 0.1 
N 8 45 41 63 7 
 
 
 
278 
 
Table C.41: Descriptive Statistics of Macroeconomic Events: Italy 2008 – 2013 
 Unemployment PPI Retail 
Sales 
CPI Industrial 
Production 
GDP 
Announcement      
Mean 0.28 0.08 -0.10 0.15 -0.27 -0.37 
Median 0.2 0.1 -0.1 0.1 -0.1 -0.3 
Std Dev 0.34 0.57 0.39 0.21 1.89 0.74 
Min -0.3 -1.6 -1.6 -0.4 -5.3 -2.6 
Max 1 1.5 0.7 0.5 7 0.6 
N 22 65 64 76 64 44 
       
Surprise  
Mean -0.01 -0.12 -0.07 0.00 -0.19 -0.25 
Median 0.1 -0.1 -0.1 -0.1 -0.4 -0.1 
Std Dev 0.39 0.36 0.47 0.15 2.19 0.82 
Min -0.7 -0.8 -1 -0.2 -11.1 -4.2 
Max 0.6 1.2 1.5 0.4 5.5 0.3 
N 17 43 55 26 57 27 
 
Table C.42: Descriptive Statistics of Macroeconomic Events: Australia 2008 - 2013 
 Payroll Unemployment PPI Retail Sales CPI GDP Interest 
rate 
Announcement       
Mean 123.85 0.02 0.47 0.22 0.63 0.49 -0.08 
Median 108 0 0.3 0.2 0.5 0.6 0 
Std Dev 242.72 0.91 0.68 0.84 0.51 0.57 0.27 
Min -362 -5.2 -0.8 -2 -0.3 -1.2 -1 
Max 715 5 2 3.8 1.6 1.3 0.25 
N 66 66 21 63 21 21 60 
        
Surprise   
Mean 66.61 0.01 0.05 -0.14 -0.07 0.03 -0.01 
Median 59 -0.1 0.1 -0.3 -0.1 -0.1 0.07 
Std Dev 252.87 1.10 0.70 1.02 0.33 0.38 0.17 
Min -471 -5.2 -1.2 -2.2 -0.7 -0.5 -0.51 
Max 673 5.3 1.6 3.7 0.6 0.8 0.22 
N 61 49 20 58 19 15 23 
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Table C.43: Descriptive Statistics of Macroeconomic Events: Germany 2008 – 2013 
 Unemployment PPI Retail 
Sales 
CPI Industrial 
Production 
GDP Interest 
rate 
Announcement       
Mean -0.02 0.10 -0.24 0.10 -0.19 0.03 -0.05 
Median 0 0 -0.3 0.1 -0.05 0.2 0 
Std Dev 0.09 0.64 1.58 0.35 2.18 1.21 0.18 
Min -0.2 -1.5 -2.9 -0.6 -7.5 -3.8 -0.75 
Max 0.2 2 6.3 1 4 2.2 0.25 
N 64 62 64 80 64 21 64 
        
Surprise   
Mean 0.00 -0.04 -0.63 -0.01 -0.26 0.04 0.03 
Median -0.1 -0.1 -0.7 0.1 -0.4 0.1 0.09 
Std Dev 0.17 0.46 1.59 0.18 1.68 0.39 0.10 
Min -0.4 -1.4 -3.6 -0.3 -4.5 -0.8 -0.09 
Max 0.3 1.3 4.5 0.2 3.7 0.8 0.12 
N 38 57 60 36 63 18 5 
 
Table C.44: Descriptive Statistics of Macroeconomic Events: Canada 2008 - 2013 
 Payroll Unemployment PPI Retail 
Sales 
CPI GDP Interest 
rate 
Announcement       
Mean 112.27 0.02 0.01 0.17 0.14 0.09 -0.05 
Median 125 0 0.05 0.3 0.2 0.1 0 
Std Dev 472.71 0.18 0.65 1.08 0.39 0.33 0.19 
Min -1290 -0.3 -2.6 -5.4 -0.7 -1 -0.75 
Max 1087 0.6 1.4 2.1 1.2 0.7 0.25 
N 63 63 64 64 64 65 44 
        
Surprise   
Mean 56.77 0.00 -0.09 -0.01 -0.02 -0.03 -0.08 
Median 0 -0.1 -0.1 0.1 -0.1 0.1 -0.08 
Std Dev 418.50 0.22 0.51 0.70 0.24 0.21 0.32 
Min -890 -0.4 -1.6 -1.6 -0.4 -0.5 -0.46 
Max 979 0.6 1.3 2 0.5 0.5 0.28 
N 60 54 57 58 57 50 4 
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Table C.45: Descriptive Statistics of Macroeconomic Events: Japan 2008 - 2013 
 Unemployment PPI Retail 
Sales 
Industrial 
Production 
GDP Interest 
rate 
Announcement      
Mean 0.00 0.09 0.20 -0.24 -0.04 0.08 
Median 0 0.1 0.1 0.55 0.2 0 
Std Dev 0.18 0.90 2.93 3.80 1.35 0.14 
Min -0.4 -1.9 -8.5 -15.3 -4 0 
Max 0.5 5.6 10.3 5.9 1.5 0.5 
N 64 64 64 64 43 80 
       
Surprise  
Mean 0.01 0.07 0.15 -0.48 -0.03  
Median 0.1 0.1 0.5 -0.5 0.1  
Std Dev 0.24 0.22 1.48 1.50 0.34  
Min -0.5 -0.5 -4.3 -4.6 -0.9  
Max 0.8 0.4 3.3 3.9 0.7  
N 56 24 61 63 31 0 
 
Table C.46: Descriptive Statistics of Macroeconomic Events: USA 2011 - 2013 
 Payroll Unemployment PPI Retail Sales CPI Industrial 
Production 
GDP Interest 
rate 
Announcement        
Mean 1372.42 -0.08 0.25 0.38 0.18 0.22 1.96 0 
Median 1460 -0.1 0.2 0.4 0.2 0.2 1.9 0 
Std Dev 645.23 0.16 0.64 0.45 0.30 0.48 0.84 0 
Min 0 -0.4 -1 -0.5 -0.4 -1.2 -0.1 0 
Max 2440 0.2 1.7 1.1 0.7 1.1 3.2 0 
N 33 33 150 33 152 152 32 21 
         
Surprise     
Mean -83.81 -0.09 0.03 -0.02 0.00 -0.11 -0.20  
Median 230 -0.1 0.1 -0.1 -0.1 -0.1 -0.2  
Std Dev 713.82 0.19 0.31 0.32 0.15 0.41 0.35  
Min -1160 -0.5 -0.4 -0.7 -0.2 -1.1 -1.1  
Max 1080 0.2 0.9 0.6 0.3 0.8 0.6  
N 21 28 31 29 22 32 27  
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Table C.47: Descriptive Statistics of Macroeconomic Events: France 2011 - 2013 
 Unemployment PPI CPI Industrial 
Production 
GDP 
Announcement     
Mean 0.11 0.20 0.14 -0.02 0.17 
Median 0.1 0.35 0.15 0 0.1 
Std Dev 0.13 0.61 0.37 1.21 0.34 
Min -0.1 -1.2 -0.5 -2.7 -0.3 
Max 0.3 1.2 0.8 2.3 0.9 
N 11 34 34 35 11 
      
Surprise  
Mean 0.02 -0.09 -0.05 0.00 -0.05 
Median 0.05 0 -0.1 -0.1 -0.1 
Std Dev 0.21 0.47 0.17 1.20 0.10 
Min -0.2 -1 -0.4 -3.5 -0.1 
Max 0.2 0.6 0.2 2.3 0.1 
N 4 22 22 34 4 
 
Table C.48: Descriptive Statistics of Macroeconomic Events: Italy 2011 - 2013 
 Unemployment PPI Retail 
Sales 
CPI Industrial 
Production 
GDP 
Announcement      
Mean 0.35 0.17 -0.16 0.31 -0.23 -0.37 
Median 0.2 0.15 -0.2 0.4 -0.3 -0.3 
Std Dev 0.43 0.38 0.45 0.15 1.53 0.41 
Min -0.3 -0.5 -1.6 0.1 -4.8 -0.9 
Max 1 1.1 0.7 0.5 4.3 0.3 
N 11 34 33 15 33 23 
       
Surprise  
Mean 0 -0.15 -0.09 0.08 0.01 -0.06 
Median -0.1 -0.2 -0.2 0.1 -0.3 -0.1 
Std Dev 0.47 0.29 0.58 0.10 1.43 0.17 
Min -0.7 -0.8 -1 -0.1 -2.8 -0.3 
Max 0.6 0.5 1.5 0.2 4.1 0.3 
N 7 20 26 6 31 11 
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Table C.49: Descriptive Statistics of Macroeconomic Events: Australia 2011 - 2013 
 Payroll Unemployment PPI Retail 
Sales 
CPI GDP Interest 
rate 
Announcement       
Mean 81.63 0.01 0.40 0.22 0.59 0.57 -0.07 
Median 91 0 0.3 0.2 0.4 0.6 0 
Std Dev 239.25 1.24 0.40 0.48 0.51 0.66 0.13 
Min -362 -5.2 -0.3 -0.8 0 -1.2 -0.5 
Max 715 5 1.2 1.3 1.6 1.3 0 
N 35 35 11 33 11 11 32 
        
Surprise   
Mean 1.63 0.01 -0.07 -0.18 -0.08 0.08 0.00 
Median -18.5 -0.1 -0.1 -0.3 -0.15 -0.1 -0.06 
Std Dev 249.82 1.47 0.36 0.53 0.35 0.38 0.12 
Min -471 -5.2 -0.8 -1.3 -0.6 -0.3 -0.17 
Max 615 5.3 0.4 1 0.6 0.8 0.16 
N 32 27 11 29 10 8 10 
 
Table C.50: Descriptive Statistics of Macroeconomic Events: Germany 2011 - 2013 
 Unemployment PPI Retail 
Sales 
CPI Industrial 
Production 
GDP Interest 
rate 
Announcement       
Mean -0.02 0.20 -0.19 0.19 -0.02 0.32 -0.02 
Median 0 0.1 -0.3 0.1 -0.25 0.3 0 
Std Dev 0.08 0.43 1.79 0.35 1.67 0.53 0.11 
Min -0.2 -0.4 -2.9 -0.5 -2.9 -0.6 -0.25 
Max 0.1 1.2 6.3 1 4 1.5 0.25 
N 34 31 34 19 34 11 33 
        
Surprise   
Mean 0.01 -0.03 -0.59 0.06 -0.01 0.05 0.03 
Median -0.1 -0.1 -0.6 0.1 -0.2 0.1 0.09 
Std Dev 0.17 0.32 1.86 0.11 1.31 0.26 0.10 
Min -0.2 -0.6 -3.6 -0.1 -2.5 -0.4 -0.09 
Max 0.3 0.6 4.5 0.2 3.6 0.5 0.12 
N 19 27 34 8 33 10 5 
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Table C.51: Descriptive Statistics of Macroeconomic Events: Canada 2011 - 2013 
 Payroll Unemployment PPI Retail 
Sales 
CPI GDP Interest 
rate 
Announcement       
Mean 192.21 -0.02 0.13 0.25 0.15 0.14 0 
Median 151 0 0.15 0.3 0.2 0.2 0 
Std Dev 378.46 0.13 0.45 0.70 0.41 0.24 0 
Min -545 -0.2 -0.8 -2.1 -0.7 -0.5 0 
Max 950 0.2 1.4 1.9 1.2 0.6 0 
N 33 33 34 33 33 34 22 
        
Surprise   
Mean 60.10 0.01 -0.05 -0.06 -0.04 -0.01 -0.21 
Median 23 -0.1 -0.1 0 -0.1 0.1 -0.21 
Std Dev 387.42 0.19 0.45 0.70 0.24 0.20  
Min -740 -0.4 -0.9 -1.6 -0.4 -0.5 -0.21 
Max 770 0.4 1.3 1.5 0.5 0.2 -0.21 
N 31 28 30 28 31 27 1 
 
Table C.52: Descriptive Statistics of Macroeconomic Events: Japan 2011 - 2013 
 Unemployment PPI Retail 
Sales 
Industrial 
Production 
GDP Interest 
rate 
Announcement      
Mean -0.03 0.12 0.31 0.04 0.16 0.00 
Median 0 0.2 0.2 0.6 -0.05 0 
Std Dev 0.16 0.36 3.11 3.63 0.79 0.00 
Min -0.4 -0.7 -8.5 -15.3 -0.9 0 
Max 0.4 0.9 10.3 5.7 1.5 0 
N 33 33 33 33 22 39 
       
Surprise  
Mean 0.01 0.05 -0.03 -0.62 -0.04  
Median 0.1 0.1 0 -0.7 -0.1  
Std Dev 0.25 0.22 1.43 1.55 0.24  
Min -0.5 -0.5 -4.3 -4.3 -0.5  
Max 0.8 0.3 2.2 3.9 0.3  
N 30 23 32 33 13 0 
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Table C.53: Descriptive Statistics of Macroeconomic Events: Indonesia 2011 - 2013 
 CPI GDP Interest rate  
Announcement    
Mean 0.45 0.50 0.03  
Median 0.38 0.69 0  
Std Dev 0.12 0.63 0.18  
Min 0.30 -0.48 -0.5  
Max 0.73 1.15 0.5  
N 35 12 33  
     
Surprise  
Mean -0.01 0.07 0.02  
Median -0.01 -0.02 0  
Std Dev 0.04 0.16 0.29  
Min -0.08 -0.05 -0.25  
Max 0.07 0.47 0.5  
N 25 11 12  
 
Table C.54: Descriptive Statistics of Macroeconomic Events: Turkey 2011 - 2013 
 Unemployment CPI Industrial 
Production 
GDP Interest 
rate 
 
Announcement      
Mean -0.04 0.64 0.45 0.44 -0.06  
Median 0 0.56 0.37 0.37 0  
Std Dev 0.48 0.91 0.44 0.28 0.15  
Min -0.9 -1.43 -0.48 0.12 -0.5  
Max 0.7 3.27 1.58 0.92 0  
N 34 35 35 11 35  
       
Surprise  
Mean 0.00 0.01 0.02 0.03 0.08  
Median 0 0 -0.03 0.01 0.25  
Std Dev 0.39 0.58 0.48 0.08 0.38  
Min -0.6 -1.43 -0.78 -0.1 -0.5  
Max 0.8 1.42 1.59 0.18 0.5  
N 28 30 34 11 6  
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Table C.55: Descriptive Statistics of Macroeconomic Events: UK 2011 - 2013 
 
Table C.56: Descriptive Statistics of Macroeconomic Events: Malaysia 2011 - 2013 
 CPI Industrial 
Production 
GDP Interest rate  
Announcement     
Mean 0.19 0.23 0.42 0  
Median 0.17 0.25 0.41 0  
Std Dev 0.07 0.26 0.06 0.15  
Min 0.1 -0.43 0.34 -0.75  
Max 0.29 0.68 0.54 0.3  
N 34 35 12 61  
      
Surprise  
Mean 0.00 0.00 0.03 -0.04  
Median -0.01 -0.01 0.04 -0.06  
Std Dev 0.02 0.20 0.07 0.16  
Min -0.02 -0.46 -0.13 -0.41  
Max 0.06 0.35 0.12 0.14  
N 25 35 11 15  
 
 
 Payroll Unemployment PPI Retail 
Sales 
CPI Industrial 
Production 
GDP Interest 
rate 
Claimant 
Count 
Announcement         
Mean -0.58 -0.04 0.27 0.16 0.27 0.01 0.12 0 -0.01 
Median 7 0 0.2 0.2 0.3 0 0.2 0 0 
Std Dev 148.26 1.03 0.35 1.05 0.37 1.01 0.50 0 0.07 
Min -326 -1.73 -0.4 -2.3 -0.5 -2.5 -0.7 0 -0.1 
Max 371 1.73 1 2.1 1 2.9 1 0 0.2 
N 33 26 33 33 33 33 33 33 33 
          
Surprise     
Mean -38.64 -0.01 0.03 0.03 0.00 -0.15 -0.08 0.04 -0.01 
Median -78 0 0.1 0 0.1 -0.2 -0.1 0.1 -0.1 
Std Dev 114.28 0.18 0.24 0.77 0.20 0.82 0.30 0.10 0.11 
Min -197 -0.3 -0.4 -1.3 -0.3 -1.6 -0.9 -0.07 -0.2 
Max 171 0.3 0.4 1.6 0.3 1.7 0.4 0.1 0.1 
N 25 26 25 30 21 30 17 3 15 
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Table C.57: Descriptive Statistics of Macroeconomic Events: USA 2001 - 2013 
 Payroll Unem-
ployment 
PPI Retail 
Sales 
CPI Industrial 
Production 
GDP Interest rate 
Announcement        
Mean 273.27 0.02 0.23 0.26 0.19 0.09 2.14 -0.05 
Median 780 0 0.2 0.3 0.2 0.1 2.2 0 
Std Dev 1932.83 0.19 0.87 1.09 0.35 0.65 2.34 0.26 
Min -6630 -0.4 -2.8 -3.7 -1.7 -2.8 -6.3 -1 
Max 4310 0.5 3.2 7.1 1.2 1.3 8.2 0.25 
N 153 151 150 153 152 152 152 102 
         
Surprise        
Mean -252.81 -0.05 0.03 0.00 -0.03 -0.08 -0.06 0.11 
Median -420 -0.1 -0.1 -0.1 -0.1 -0.1 -0.1 0.25 
Std Dev 911.89 0.18 0.53 0.68 0.16 0.44 0.51 0.73 
Min -3280 -0.5 -1.3 -1.7 -0.4 -2.3 -1.7 -0.75 
Max 1930 0.4 1.6 4.6 0.4 1.1 1.6 1.5 
N 114 114 139 142 102 140 125 7 
 
Table C.58: Descriptive Statistics of Macroeconomic Events: USA pre-crisis 
 Payroll Unemployment PPI Retail Sales CPI Industrial 
Production 
GDP Interest 
rate 
Announcement        
Mean 588.16 0.01 0.26 0.31 0.23 0.12 2.83 -0.04 
Median 880 0 0.25 0.2 0.2 0.1 3.05 0 
Std Dev 1379.65 0.15 0.83 1.21 0.30 0.52 1.87 0.30 
Min -4150 -0.3 -1.9 -3.7 -0.6 -1.3 -1.3 -1 
Max 3370 0.5 3.2 7.1 1.2 1.1 8.2 0.25 
N 87 85 150 87 152 152 86 57 
         
Surprise     
Mean -318.29 -0.06 0.03 0.04 -0.03 -0.06 -0.04 -0.25 
Median -490 -0.1 -0.1 -0.1 -0.1 -0.1 -0.1 -0.25 
Std Dev 951.65 0.15 0.59 0.76 0.15 0.36 0.53 0.50 
Min -3280 -0.3 -1.2 -1.7 -0.3 -1.1 -1.7 -0.75 
Max 1930 0.3 1.6 4.6 0.3 0.9 1.6 0.25 
N 70 62 76 81 61 78 71 3 
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Table C.59: Descriptive Statistics of Macroeconomic Events: USA crisis 
 Payroll Unemployment PPI Retail Sales CPI Industrial 
Production 
GDP Interest 
rate 
Announcement        
Mean -2542.50 0.28 -0.10 -0.58 0.02 -0.68 -0.50 -0.30 
Median -1215 0.35 0.2 -0.15 0.25 -0.6 0.6 -0.13 
Std Dev 2467.86 0.21 1.47 1.28 0.80 1.14 3.09 0.37 
Min -6510 -0.1 -2.8 -2.8 -1.7 -2.8 -6.3 -1 
Max -200 0.5 1.8 1 1.1 1.3 3.3 0 
N 12 12 150 12 152 152 13 10 
         
Surprise     
Mean -480 0.16 0.04 -0.10 0.04 -0.25 0.12 0.38 
Median -350 0.2 0 -0.1 0.1 -0.3 0.2 0.25 
Std Dev 856.54 0.17 0.53 0.83 0.28 0.83 0.72 0.83 
Min -2330 -0.2 -1.1 -1.5 -0.4 -2.3 -0.8 -0.5 
Max 550 0.4 0.7 1.8 0.4 1.1 1.6 1.5 
N 8 9 12 12 8 13 9 4 
 
Table C.60: Descriptive Statistics of Macroeconomic Events: USA post-crisis 
 Payroll Unemployment PPI Retail Sales CPI Industrial 
Production 
GDP Interest 
rate 
Announcement        
Mean 391.67 -0.01 0.27 0.37 0.16 0.22 1.68 0 
Median 1030 0 0.2 0.4 0.1 0.2 2 0 
Std Dev 2095.05 0.20 0.72 0.71 0.26 0.56 2.28 0 
Min -6630 -0.4 -1.2 -1.5 -0.4 -1.5 -6.1 0 
Max 4310 0.5 1.8 2.7 0.7 1.2 5.9 0 
N 54 54 150 54 152 152 53 35 
         
Surprise     
Mean -75 -0.08 0.02 -0.04 -0.04 -0.07 -0.14  
Median -30 -0.1 0.1 -0.1 -0.1 -0.1 -0.2  
Std Dev 836.47 0.19 0.42 0.48 0.14 0.39 0.42  
Min -1290 -0.5 -1.3 -1.6 -0.3 -1.1 -1.1  
Max 1850 0.3 1 0.7 0.3 0.8 1.2  
N 36 43 51 49 33 49 45  
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APPENDIX D 
Table D.1: GARCH(1,1) for USA 2003-2013 
 rt
c_s1 rt
c_s2 rt
is_s2 rt
c_s3 rt
c_corp1 rt
c_govt1 rt
c_govt2 
γi
INT -1.1176** -1.2624*** -1.0344** -1.2090** -0.1856*** -0.1162*** -0.1825** 
 -2.1889 -2.6237 -2.3126 -2.4903 -10.9150 -17.1696 -2.3233 
δi
INT(-1) -3.9609 -5.3364* -5.8386** -4.8958 0.0608** 0.0983*** 0.0678*** 
 -1.4014 -1.7029 -2.2222 -1.5782 2.5122 2.7456 2.7602 
δi
INT(0) 3.9653 5.3788 6.2118** 4.2752 0.0046 -0.0149 -0.2596 
 1.2401 1.5206 2.0920 1.1938 1.0498 -1.0858 -0.4919 
δi
INT(1) -0.4344*** -0.3671* -0.6098*** 0.3693 -0.0286*** -0.0158 0.2452 
 -2.6304 -1.6881 -8.1202 0.4503 -17.2544 -1.0566 0.4412 
        
γi
CPI 0.0375 0.0584 0.0569 0.0523 0.0363 -0.0087 0.0200 
 0.5423 0.8669 0.8764 0.7804 1.3314 -0.2792 0.6441 
δi
CPI(-1) 0.2099*** 0.2230*** 0.2446*** 0.2086*** -0.0390** -0.0183 -0.0189 
 2.7995 2.9353 3.0704 2.7616 -2.4685 -1.3287 -1.3944 
δi
CPI(0) -0.2474 -0.3074* -0.2993* -0.3581** 0.0422** 0.0206 0.0250 
 -1.5099 -1.7153 -1.7039 -2.1036 2.4408 1.2483 1.5936 
δi
CPI(1) 0.0721 0.1073 0.0601 0.1751 -0.0036 0.0010 -0.0048 
 0.3958 0.5363 0.3048 0.9212 -0.6551 0.1008 -0.6009 
        
γi
UNE -0.0725 -0.0831 -0.0795 -0.0783 0.0459 0.1128*** 0.0674* 
 -0.6910 -0.7659 -0.8241 -0.7290 1.5458 3.1314 1.8068 
δi
UNE(-1) -0.0982 -0.1104 -0.0708 -0.1083 -0.0326 -0.0264 -0.0587 
 -0.5366 -0.5611 -0.4964 -0.5681 -2.3655 -1.4207 -2.3506 
δi
UNE(0) -0.1640 -0.1724 -0.2565 -0.1776 0.0345** 0.0256 0.0569** 
 -0.4885 -0.4891 -0.8068 -0.5111 2.2465 1.2054 2.0127 
δi
UNE(1) 0.2518 0.2696 0.2722 0.2763 -0.0074** -0.0050 0.0029** 
 0.8224 0.8501 0.8595 0.8748 -1.3674 -0.5305 0.2404 
        
γi
PAY 0.3316*** 0.3294*** 0.3636*** 0.3299*** -0.2574*** -0.3351*** -0.3095*** 
 3.1361 3.0160 3.4635 3.0723 -7.6555 -7.8769 -7.7306 
δi
PAY(-1) -0.1253 -0.1288 -0.0681 -0.1108 -0.0369 -0.0411 -0.0427* 
 -0.7821 -0.7563 -0.4846 -0.6670 -2.2396 -1.5507 -1.8911 
δi
PAY(0) -0.0514 -0.0511 -0.0804 -0.0792 0.0363** 0.0584** 0.0450* 
 -0.1709 -0.1670 -0.2806 -0.2581 1.9786 2.0650 1.7802 
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Table D.2: GARCH(1,1) for France 2003-2013 
  
δi
PAY(1) 0.1162 0.1375 0.1080 0.1532 -0.0030** -0.0019 -0.0040 
 0.4165 0.4955 0.3842 0.5421 -0.4935 -0.2432 -0.3931 
 rt
c_s1 rt
c_s2 rt
c_govt1 rt
c_govt2 
γi
INT 1.4330** 1.3867** 0.1597 0.1445 
 2.5234 2.4666 1.2674 1.2483 
δi
INT(-1) -1.7467* -1.5674 0.3395*** 0.3972*** 
 -1.6737 -1.5262 3.0942 2.9047 
δi
INT(0) 2.1524* 2.0787** 0.0666* -0.0063 
 1.9165 1.8808 1.7595 -0.1721 
δi
INT(1) 0.0091 0.0295 -0.2718*** -0.3447*** 
 0.0209 0.0705 -10.6310 -9.5906 
     
γi
CPI -0.0232 0.0047 0.0070 0.0386 
 -0.4608 0.2634 0.3005 0.5560 
δi
CPI(-1) 0.0709 0.0863 0.0770*** 0.3163*** 
 1.3214 1.5909 3.3665 3.6269 
δi
CPI(0) -0.1029 -0.1212* -0.1101 -0.1261 
 -1.2826 -1.7474 -1.3493 -1.4892 
δi
CPI(1) 0.0030 0.0182 0.0537 0.0398 
 0.0339 0.2374 0.6167 0.4236 
     
γi
UNE -0.1627 -0.1253 -0.0924 -0.0249 
 -1.0817 -0.8458 -1.0351 -0.2466 
δi
UNE(-1) -0.0535 -0.0800 0.0798 0.0773 
 -0.2753 -0.4253 1.3948 1.0242 
δi
UNE(0) -0.3029 -0.2392 -0.0535 -0.1017 
 -0.7802 -0.6548 -0.4979 -0.9124 
δi
UNE(1) 0.2612 0.2131 -0.0154 -0.0191 
 0.6877 0.6058 -0.1493 -0.1690 
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Table D.3: GARCH(1,1) for Italy 2003-2013 
 rt
c_s1 rt
c_govt1 rt
c_govt2 
γi
INT 1.046 -0.330 0.232 
 1.640 -1.524 1.307 
δi
INT(-1) -1.891 0.226 0.4941*** 
 -1.036 0.696 3.198 
δi
INT(0) 3.172 0.1457* -0.025 
 1.541 1.694 -0.415 
δi
INT(1) -1.1462*** -0.0378*** -0.3587*** 
 -3.340 -8.838 -16.446 
    
γi
CPI -0.2761 -0.0297 -0.1905* 
 -1.1884 -0.6596 -1.9430 
δi
CPI(-1) 0.5611** 0.0074 0.0454 
 2.0282 0.7060 0.8476 
δi
CPI(0) -0.5818 -0.0815*** 0.0209 
 -1.3171 -2.7507 0.3865 
δi
CPI(1) 0.2262 0.1082*** -0.0704*** 
 0.5730 2.9402 -7.3246 
    
γi
UNE -0.3444 0.0990** -0.2544 
 -0.9642 1.9962 -1.5803 
δi
UNE(-1) 0.5857 0.0443 0.1908 
 0.8012 1.2456 1.0285 
δi
UNE(0) 0.4845 -0.0402 -0.9810 
 0.7153 -1.1720 -0.8060 
δi
UNE(1) -0.7754* 0.0366 1.1029 
 -1.9287 0.8683 0.8349 
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Table D.4: GARCH(1,1) for USA 2007-2013 
  
 rt
c_s1 rt
is_s1 rt
c_s2 rt
is_s2 rt
c_s3 rt
c_corp1 rt
c_govt1 rt
c_govt2 
γi
INT -1.5598*** -1.2850*** -1.7179*** -1.2586*** -1.8485*** -0.2242*** -0.0706* -0.2204*** 
 -4.9200 -3.2619 -4.9498 -4.0152 -4.8486 -4.1219 -1.8922 -4.1859 
δi
INT(-1) -8.5430* -11.7103*** -12.9959*** -8.8798*** -14.6561*** 0.0670 0.1096** 0.0649* 
 -1.8023 -3.6190 -2.6422 -2.7726 -2.7219 1.6166 2.0397 1.8041 
δi
INT(0) 6.4273 13.0293*** 11.6087* 9.5359** 13.6418** 0.0017 0.0008 -0.4418 
 1.0272 3.4872 1.8416 2.5711 2.0533 0.2719 0.2837 -0.3893 
δi
INT(1) 2.2075 -0.7404*** 2.0352 -0.7802*** 1.7262 -0.0264*** -0.0341*** 0.4429 
 0.6362 -9.6727 0.6305 -10.8050 0.6053 -10.8770 -7.2406 0.3705 
         
γi
CPI 0.0524 0.0464 0.0426 -0.0016 0.0481 0.0319 -0.0011 0.0236 
 0.4191 0.3038 0.3292 -0.0148 0.3254 0.8096 -0.0222 0.5012 
δi
CPI(-1) 0.5206** 0.4495** 0.5257** 0.4837** 0.5161** -0.0235 -0.0095 -0.0216 
 2.2257 2.0034 2.1669 2.2334 2.1712 -0.8382 -0.2595 -1.0281 
δi
CPI(0) -0.4964 -0.3211 -0.5342 -0.4624 -0.5209 0.0345 0.0178 0.0313 
 -1.4758 -0.5385 -1.4452 -1.3290 -1.4453 1.1399 0.8212 1.2536 
δi
CPI(1) 0.3073 0.0321 0.3495 0.2344 0.3436 -0.0039 0.0064 -0.0062 
 0.8035 0.0470 0.8327 0.5838 0.8401 -0.4217 0.4297 -0.4104 
         
γi
UNE -0.1718 -0.1891*** -0.1866 -0.1519 -0.1903* 0.0368 0.1031** 0.0386 
 -1.5429 -3.3310 -1.5300 -1.5566 -1.6501 1.2126 2.5660 0.9959 
δi
UNE(-1) -0.0554 0.1377* -0.0490 0.0175 -0.0426 -0.0242** -0.0240 -0.0494** 
 -0.2336 1.8121 -0.1913 0.1242 -0.1755 -2.1040 -1.2398 -2.1198 
δi
UNE(0) -0.4766 -0.6174* -0.4978 -0.5208 -0.4952 0.0246* 0.0123 0.0383 
 -1.0365 -1.7882 -1.0254 -1.3540 -1.0481 1.8076 0.1559 1.3621 
δi
UNE(1) 0.5397 0.4735 0.5578 0.4830 0.5443 -0.0089 0.0050 0.0038 
 1.2460 1.1983 1.2336 1.1717 1.2205 -1.3045 0.0613 0.2462 
         
γi
PAY 0.5342*** 0.4331*** 0.5291*** 0.4851*** 0.5464*** -0.2194*** -0.2742 -0.2615*** 
 3.6662 3.8715 3.4379 3.4164 3.6811 -5.0419 -1.6086 -4.9172 
δi
PAY(-1) -0.2152 -0.2373 -0.3467 -0.1948 -0.2501 0.0034 -0.0353 0.0187 
 -0.5417 -1.4591 -0.9280 -0.8434 -0.6286 0.2371 0.3265 0.9566 
δi
PAY(0) -0.4963 -0.4136 -0.4061 -0.3927 -0.5105 0.0038 0.0762 -0.0261 
 -0.6898 -0.7799 -0.5599 -0.6797 -0.6923 0.2035 0.2973 -1.0102 
δi
PAY(1) 0.5761 0.4096 0.6448 0.4320 0.6342 -0.0019 -0.0343 0.0196 
 0.8816 0.6966 0.9371 0.7074 0.9330 -0.1450 0.6109 1.0586 
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Table D.5: GARCH(1,1) for France 2007-2013 
 
 
  
 rt
c_s1 rt
is_s1 rt
c_s2 rt
c_corp1 rt
c_govt1 rt
c_govt2 
γi
INT 1.1902* 1.5467** 1.2513* -0.3707*** 0.1238 0.1183 
 1.6630 2.2965 1.7879 -6.0655 0.9379 0.9340 
δi
INT(-1) -2.0308 -1.6529 -1.9867 0.0398** 0.3426* 0.3201** 
 -1.1688 -0.9834 -1.2611 2.3661 1.9250 2.1471 
δi
INT(0) 2.3674 1.9765 2.0990 -0.0516* -0.0199 -0.0480 
 1.3033 1.0237 1.2858 -1.7416 -0.4824 -1.1998 
δi
INT(1) 0.1817 -0.5207 0.1461 0.0234 -0.4041*** -0.3488*** 
 0.4433 -0.4900 0.3955 0.7762 -8.9170 -10.1239 
       
γi
CPI 0.0118 -0.2694 0.0083 0.0976*** 0.2569* 0.2603* 
 0.0388 -0.8087 0.0205 4.7584 1.6624 1.8665 
δi
CPI(-1) 0.0013 0.3885 0.4394 0.0078** 0.5809** 0.6100** 
 0.0027 1.3237 1.0473 1.9610 2.1115 2.5630 
δi
CPI(0) 0.4369 -0.1673 0.0077 -0.0084 0.2194 0.1424 
 1.0687 -0.9680 0.0233 -1.3375 1.3405 1.1283 
δi
CPI(1) -0.7196*** -1.1821*** -0.8978*** -0.0050 -0.3367*** -0.2667*** 
 -6.9930 -11.8108 -8.7506 -0.7019 -13.4959 -11.3435 
       
γi
UNE 0.2616 -0.4633 -0.0402 0.0552** -0.0476 -0.0496 
 0.4254 -1.0151 -0.0733 2.5616 -0.3771 -0.4183 
δi
UNE(-1) -2.3069 0.0871 -1.5494 0.0034* 0.1795 0.1944** 
 -1.6267 0.0945 -1.3773 1.7372 1.5511 2.1168 
δi
UNE(0) 1.9363 0.1382 1.4658 -0.0370 -0.0825 -0.0824 
 1.1330 0.1099 1.0910 -1.2342 -1.1312 -0.9807 
δi
UNE(1) 0.3344 -0.0775 0.1289 0.0275 -0.2827*** -0.2410*** 
 0.5154 -0.0817 0.2201 0.8483 -3.4014 -2.7558 
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Table D.6: GARCH(1,1) for Italy 2007-2013 
 rt
c_s1 rt
is_s1 rt
c_corp1 rt
c_corp2 rt
c_govt1 rt
c_govt2 
γi
INT 1.0780 1.2056 0.3571** -0.3648* -0.3375 0.1674 
 1.4827 1.5731 2.0506 -1.7431 -1.4167 1.1323 
δi
INT(-1) -2.0728 -2.3339 0.2371** 0.0636 0.3306 0.3195* 
 -0.9314 -0.9170 2.5132 0.3669 0.4274 1.6857 
δi
INT(0) 3.1511 1.1085 0.0216 0.1499 0.1468 0.1066 
 1.2689 0.3891 0.3725 1.2734 1.0094 1.1159 
δi
INT(1) -1.5641*** 1.6808 -0.2062*** -0.0816*** -0.0823*** -0.4343*** 
 -4.9637 1.3332 -16.9133 -9.0477 -3.1832 -10.7041 
       
γi
CPI -0.2043 -0.0471 -0.2122* -0.0156 -0.0151 -0.1717 
 -1.1775 -0.6634 -1.7890 -0.3401 -0.3377 -1.6296 
δi
CPI(-1) 0.5879** -0.0016 0.0033 -0.0082** 0.0070 0.0477 
 2.2449 -0.0343 0.0391 -2.4070 0.4368 0.9403 
δi
CPI(0) -0.7521 -0.1281 -0.0026 -0.0162 -0.0728** -0.0025 
 -1.4525 -0.9365 -0.0287 -1.3843 -2.0722 -0.0480 
δi
CPI(1) 0.2545 -0.0808 -0.0314*** -0.0140** 0.0568 -0.0800*** 
 0.4364 -0.4980 -3.8758 -1.9755 1.0844 -4.5082 
       
γi
UNE -0.3980 -0.6283 -0.4149** 0.0453* 0.0942** -0.3555** 
 -0.9927 -1.5794 -2.9427 1.7188 2.2208 -2.2786 
δi
UNE(-1) 0.6592 -0.3913 0.0003 0.0780 0.0958 0.3472* 
 0.6714 -0.3792 0.0020 1.0333 1.1378 1.8484 
δi
UNE(0) 0.6443 0.7498 -0.5549 -0.0330** -0.0415 -1.3066 
 0.8371 0.7460 -0.7340 -2.0572 -1.5081 -0.8809 
δi
UNE(1) -1.1562*** -0.5905 0.7057 -0.0299 -0.0541* 1.2711 
 -2.9414 -1.5810 0.9143 -1.3758 -1.9559 0.7750 
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Table D.7: GARCH(1,1) for Australia 2007-2013 
 rt
c_s1 rt
is_s1 rt
c_corp1 rt
c_corp2 rt
c_govt1 rt
c_govt2 rt
c_govt3 rt
c_govt4 
γi
INT 0.1713 -0.0128 0.1245 0.2860** 0.0222 0.1395 0.1598 0.0850 
 0.5477 -0.0307 1.0021 1.9737 0.2848 1.0313 1.2717 0.5448 
δi
INT(-1) 0.7528 -1.4898 0.4483** 0.3882** 0.6419*** 0.6597** 0.5999 0.4646 
 1.6441 -0.8373 2.3487 2.2128 2.9075 2.4667 1.4509 1.5832 
δi
INT(0) -0.8566 2.3743 -0.5056 -0.4684 -0.6372 -0.5650 -0.5543 -0.5314 
 -1.4929 1.2026 -0.3459 -0.3071 -0.4635 -0.3448 -0.3058 -0.2479 
δi
INT(1) 0.1372 0.2328 0.2345 0.2497 0.3408 0.3357 0.3153 0.3119 
 0.2013 0.5760 0.1314 0.1331 0.2071 0.1700 0.1452 0.1202 
         
γi
CPI -0.0737 0.0785 0.1536 0.1027 0.2067 0.1171 0.1850 0.1877 
 -0.4108 0.5620 1.0816 0.7273 1.4678 0.7850 1.3844 1.2426 
δi
CPI(-1) -0.0604 -0.0436 -0.1275 -0.1134 -0.1324 -0.1485 -0.0988 -0.1564 
 -0.4402 -1.2585 -0.7431 -0.8380 -0.8725 -0.9463 -0.4872 -1.0380 
δi
CPI(0) -4.6758 -5.7321 -0.0174 -0.0454 0.0826 0.0033 -0.0614 0.0608 
 -1.1329 -1.2045 -0.1372 -0.3592 0.9447 0.0351 -0.8137 0.8227 
δi
CPI(1) 4.7233 5.6736 -0.3119*** -0.2708*** -0.2765*** -0.3357*** -0.3988*** -0.4522*** 
 0.9764 1.0173 -7.5557 -5.4775 -4.3054 -9.1502 -7.8596 -7.7646 
         
γi
UNE -0.1511 -0.0789 -0.2512** -0.2503*** -0.1568*** -0.1863** -0.2192*** -0.2068** 
 -1.0192 -0.3907 -2.3830 -3.2313 -2.6144 -2.0843 -2.6535 -2.2703 
δi
UNE(-1) 0.0813 -0.1733 -0.0097 0.0046 -0.0004 -0.0121 -0.0003 -0.0711* 
 0.4368 -0.5448 -0.1749 0.0966 -0.0127 -0.2350 -0.0064 -1.8501 
δi
UNE(0) -0.2227 -0.2361 -0.0418 -0.0578** -0.0514** -0.0563 -0.0549 0.0457 
 -1.0141 -0.4967 -0.6490 -1.9705 -2.0142 -0.9457 -1.3536 1.0955 
δi
UNE(1) 0.0974 0.4298 -0.0194 -0.0090 -0.0278*** -0.0446*** -0.0378* -0.1075*** 
 0.7330 1.2926 -0.8146 -0.2523 -3.1016 -4.6503 -1.7864 -3.2400 
         
γi
PAY 0.5590*** 0.7809*** 0.1959*** 0.2821*** 0.1545*** 0.1327*** 0.1249** 0.1156*** 
 3.1703 3.5005 4.7718 4.6853 6.9472 3.1274 2.2556 2.6109 
δi
PAY(-1) -0.2864 -0.2156 0.1695** 0.1107* 0.2054*** 0.2854*** 0.3309* 0.3675** 
 -0.9839 -0.3684 2.4157 1.6547 2.6142 3.3681 1.9028 2.2899 
δi
PAY(0) 0.4957 0.4587 -0.0302 -0.0128 -0.0239*** -0.0476 -0.0119 -0.1367** 
 1.6209 0.6876 -1.3366 -0.4101 -2.6401 -1.3961 -0.2180 -2.4886 
δi
PAY(1) -0.6077*** -0.6644*** -0.2743*** -0.2936*** -0.1857*** -0.2434*** -0.3196*** -0.2254*** 
 -4.9484 -8.4501 -11.3145 -10.8441 -11.2396 -6.6768 -6.0897 -3.3292 
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Table D.8: GARCH(1,1) for Germany 2007-2013 
 rt
c_s1 rt
is_s1 rt
c_s2 rt
c_corp1 rt
c_govt1 rt
c_govt2 
γi
INT 1.1833* 1.3775** 1.1200 -0.3089*** 0.1895 0.2055 
 1.6719 1.9942 1.5902 -3.7680 0.8603 1.3237 
δi
INT(-1) -1.9870 -1.5917 -1.9358 0.0110 0.2545 0.2293 
 -1.2591 -1.1951 -1.1589 0.3985 1.0973 0.9882 
δi
INT(0) 2.6824* 2.5517* 2.5971 0.0200 -0.1858* -0.1272** 
 1.6595 1.9189 1.5272 0.7080 -1.8016 -2.1760 
δi
INT(1) -0.4684* -1.2661*** -0.2002 -0.0177** -0.2962*** -0.3651*** 
 -1.6608 -4.6145 -1.6229 -2.1972 -3.6539 -12.9206 
       
γi
CPI -0.2023 -0.2447 -0.1030 -0.0096 -0.1887 -0.1935 
 -1.2858 -1.5674 -0.8085 -0.6436 -1.5319 -1.2113 
δi
CPI(-1) -0.0942 -0.1514 -0.1046 0.0059 0.0025 0.0170 
 -1.1882 -1.6404 -1.1811 1.4689 0.0370 0.2213 
δi
CPI(0) -0.0072 0.0078 -0.1963 -0.0024 -0.0348 -0.0450 
 -0.0320 0.0782 -0.5341 -0.5804 -0.3922 -0.3833 
δi
CPI(1) -0.2797 -0.6206*** -0.0009 -0.0023 -0.1294*** -0.1279*** 
 -1.2285 -6.5151 -0.0023 -0.4738 -18.0024 -18.1831 
       
γi
UNE -0.0320 -0.1691 -0.0386 0.0147 -0.1553 -0.1508 
 -0.1456 -0.8145 -0.1767 0.5817 -1.4554 -1.4072 
δi
UNE(-1) 0.3549 1.0529** 0.2462 0.0033 -0.1992 -0.1783 
 0.9067 2.2941 0.6552 0.4517 -1.1757 -0.9741 
δi
UNE(0) -0.6357 -0.9610 -0.6225 -0.0085 0.3306 0.3394 
 -0.8620 -1.5950 -0.7625 -0.8028 1.4764 1.4623 
δi
UNE(1) 0.5289 0.3281 0.5782 0.0093 -0.1019 -0.1178 
 0.6805 0.4856 0.6651 0.9465 -1.3528 -1.6182 
 
  
296 
 
Table D.9: GARCH(1,1) for USA 2008-2013 
 rt
c_s1 rt
is_s1 rt
c_s2 rt
is_s2 rt
c_s3 rt
c_corp1 rt
c_govt1 rt
c_govt2 
γi
INT -5.2146 -3.2227 -4.0873 -8.8251* -3.0502 0.0644 0.2282 0.2485 
 -1.2104 -0.9798 -0.9457 -1.7199 -0.7163 0.0740 0.2954 0.2554 
δi
INT(-1) 23.3967 18.6732 21.8895 -3.4050 8.5741 -0.3359 -0.1693 0.0598 
 1.3676 1.3405 1.3275 -0.1739 0.5317 -0.8419 -0.2109 0.0946 
δi
INT(0) -38.1492 -9.1820 -35.1299 21.5982 -29.6004 0.4597 0.2468 -2.3783 
 -1.5345 -0.3366 -1.4908 0.6831 -1.0852 1.0486 0.2830 -0.9631 
δi
INT(1) 41.6333 3.2995 40.8622 5.1527 29.6267 0.0687 0.3875 2.9176 
 1.5056 0.1058 1.5348 0.1617 0.9646 0.3346 0.8296 1.1446 
         
γi
CPI -0.0045 -0.0719 0.0123 -0.0714 0.0079 0.0322 -0.0057 0.0248 
 -0.0343 -0.6659 0.0917 -0.6509 0.0489 0.7960 -0.1002 0.4898 
δi
CPI(-1) 0.1637 0.1476 0.1912 0.1638 0.0763 -0.0104 -0.0371 -0.0229 
 1.0713 1.4740 1.2283 1.5426 0.3749 -0.5638 -1.4922 -0.9532 
δi
CPI(0) -0.5990 -0.2805 -0.6602 -0.4944 -0.2061 0.0170 0.0434 0.0219 
 -1.5585 -0.4039 -1.5385 -1.1609 -0.3964 0.8512 1.4263 0.7631 
δi
CPI(1) 0.4258 0.0303 0.4660 0.2576 0.0165 -0.0030 0.0104 0.0023 
 0.9762 0.0378 0.9606 0.5255 0.0292 -0.3229 0.5303 0.1322 
         
γi
UNE -0.0881 -0.0793** -0.0679 -0.0746 -0.0383 0.0195 0.0911** 0.0213 
 -1.1897 -2.3916 -0.7945 -1.4199 -0.3330 0.5805 1.9879 0.4974 
δi
UNE(-1) 0.1550 0.2219*** 0.1806 0.1675* 0.2427** -0.0348*** -0.0195* -0.0455** 
 1.4538 2.9488 1.4684 1.8420 2.0800 -2.7859 -1.6557 -2.4756 
δi
UNE(0) -0.6608 -0.7400* -0.7563 -0.6621 -1.0418** 0.0303** 0.0068 0.0279 
 -1.4376 -1.9174 -1.5493 -1.6004 -2.1191 2.1271 0.3871 1.0951 
δi
UNE(1) 0.5215 0.5254 0.6024 0.5201 0.7874 -0.0032 -0.0004 0.0092 
 1.0078 1.1808 1.1086 1.1050 1.4239 -0.5022 -0.0310 0.5112 
         
γi
PAY 0.5701*** 0.4380*** 0.5887*** 0.4373*** 0.6647*** -0.2124*** -0.2745*** -0.2607*** 
 3.9408 3.8092 3.7390 3.3087 2.9109 -4.6206 -4.4224 -4.5164 
δi
PAY(-1) -0.1856 -0.3847*** -0.2264 -0.1645 -0.0728 0.0164 -0.0305 0.0224 
 -0.8635 -2.9696 -0.9490 -0.8400 -0.2161 1.2345 -0.7276 1.0319 
δi
PAY(0) -0.5093 -0.3475 -0.5103 -0.4907 -0.3808 -0.0191 0.0525 -0.0296 
 -0.6979 -0.5720 -0.6604 -0.7292 -0.4649 -1.1396 1.1698 -0.9740 
δi
PAY(1) 0.5530 0.6080 0.6153 0.5365 0.5493 0.0124 -0.0055 0.0213 
 0.6946 0.8716 0.7376 0.7206 0.6404 1.1167 -0.4052 0.9322 
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Table D.10: GARCH(1,1) for France  2008-2013 
 
 rt
c_s1 rt
is_s1 rt
c_s2 rt
is_s2 rt
c_corp1 rt
c_govt1 rt
c_govt2 
γi
INT 1.6102 1.6691* 1.5790 1.5109** -0.4806*** 0.0693 0.0755 
 1.6422 1.7771 1.6415 1.9841 -8.1924 0.5252 0.5639 
δi
INT(-1) -2.9586 -2.6370 -2.8746 -0.9405 0.0554*** 0.1444 0.2428** 
 -1.0894 -1.0009 -1.1036 -0.5749 2.9596 1.2574 2.1950 
δi
INT(0) 4.1465 3.3203 4.1086 1.6107 -0.0589* -0.0459 -0.0795* 
 1.3916 1.0991 1.4506 0.8827 -1.6857 -0.3948 -1.8450 
δi
INT(1) -2.0580*** -1.3282 -2.1507*** -1.4474* 0.0259 -0.4677*** -0.3211*** 
 -3.5052 -1.1331 -5.3074 -1.6634 0.6719 -3.2211 -11.0838 
        
γi
CPI -0.1980 -0.2311 -0.1671 -0.0831 0.0694 0.4052** 0.3569** 
 -0.3291 -0.6551 -0.2933 -0.3415 2.4607 2.0860 2.0188 
δi
CPI(-1) 0.9857 0.5936 0.9482 0.2332 0.0052 0.7008** 0.7073*** 
 1.4411 1.4058 1.4809 0.9904 1.0500 2.0247 2.7717 
δi
CPI(0) -1.3268* -1.0556** -1.1741* -0.5691*** -0.0105 0.1835 0.0599 
 -1.6499 -2.3138 -1.6612 -2.9769 -0.8795 0.9298 0.3618 
δi
CPI(1) -1.3481** -1.2814*** -1.4027** -1.2548*** -0.0025 -0.3687*** -0.1272 
 -2.0162 -2.6016 -2.3097 -5.4036 -0.1899 -3.9678 -1.3500 
        
γi
UNE -0.4898 -0.5710 -0.4598 -0.5133 0.0587** -0.0977 -0.1487* 
 -0.9744 -1.3044 -0.9354 -1.3120 2.1080 -0.6676 -1.6526 
δi
UNE(-1) 0.7163 0.8358 0.6760 0.3825 0.0033 0.1783 0.2112*** 
 0.5856 0.8276 0.5818 0.4834 1.3336 1.3848 2.5853 
δi
UNE(0) 0.7964 0.0190 0.8951 -0.2804 -0.0358 -0.1174 -0.0942 
 0.5696 0.0149 0.6752 -0.2377 -1.0818 -1.0788 -1.0222 
δi
UNE(1) -1.1128 -0.5569 -1.2041 -0.3464 0.0267 -0.3048*** -0.2176** 
 -1.1752 -0.5348 -1.3955 -0.3192 0.7321 -2.6329 -2.0805 
 
 
 
  
298 
 
Table D.11: GARCH(1,1) for Italy  2008-2013 
 rt
c_s1 rt
is_s1 rt
is_s2 rt
c_corp1 rt
c_corp2 rt
c_govt1 rt
c_govt2 
γi
INT 1.1614 0.9720 0.2787 0.1426 -0.4692 -0.5295 0.0933 
 1.0485 0.8614 0.1812 1.3193 -1.5435 -1.2761 0.2913 
δi
INT(-1) -4.1072 -5.8109 -15.2765** 0.3345*** 0.0138 0.4856 0.4376 
 -1.0652 -1.4970 -1.8573 4.3069 0.0682 0.5692 1.3115 
δi
INT(0) 5.6183 4.2862 16.3927** -0.0386 0.2560 0.3164 0.3116 
 1.2984 0.9207 1.8119 -1.0993 1.6217 1.5315 1.2915 
δi
INT(1) -3.1410*** 1.3191 0.4968 -0.3246*** -0.0750*** -0.0356*** -0.8045*** 
 -3.5757 0.5575 0.2740 -5.4846 -3.9181 -5.2461 -4.4883 
        
γi
CPI -0.9278*** -0.2245 0.2019 -0.2832** 0.0207 0.0143 -0.4018** 
 -3.0890 -1.5547 0.9338 -2.3011 0.7906 0.2706 -2.4357 
δi
CPI(-1) 3.3212*** 1.9489*** 2.3960*** 0.1000 -0.0223*** -0.0210 0.4330** 
 4.1749 3.3554 3.4487 0.8853 -4.1701 -1.6348 2.3887 
δi
CPI(0) -2.6949** -1.1777** -2.3825** -0.1581 -0.0614** -0.1207** -0.1683 
 -2.3404 -2.1402 -2.3325 -1.0224 -2.3221 -2.4617 -1.2284 
δi
CPI(1) 0.3193 -0.7505 0.6460 0.0626 -0.0029 0.1278 -0.1656 
 0.2449 -1.1758 0.5775 0.4482 -0.0722 1.5677 -1.1423 
        
γi
UNE -0.4207 -0.4778 -0.3989 -0.4049*** 0.0436** 0.0480 -0.3625** 
 -0.9711 -1.0470 -0.8180 -3.1085 2.4571 1.2086 -2.4958 
δi
UNE(-1) 0.0710 -0.6935 -1.5207 0.0012 0.0790 0.0970 0.3289 
 0.0775 -0.5845 -1.2345 0.0103 0.8554 1.3673 1.5330 
δi
UNE(0) 0.9391 1.1244 2.0091 -2.4675 -0.0302* -0.0885*** -1.5696 
 1.1741 1.0124 1.5557 -1.3748 -1.8199 -3.3238 -0.8859 
δi
UNE(1) -1.0622*** -0.6255** -0.9644*** 2.6240 -0.0273 0.0434 1.5564 
 -2.8929 -2.1539 -3.2617 1.3917 -1.0893 0.9819 0.7797 
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Table D.12: GARCH(1,1) for Australia  2008-2013 
 rt
c_s1 rt
is_s1 rt
c_corp1 rt
c_corp2 rt
c_corp3 rt
c_govt1 rt
c_govt2 rt
c_govt3 rt
c_govt4 
γi
INT 0.3682 0.1921 0.2485** 0.5159*** -0.1963*** 0.0662 0.1921 0.2560* 0.1393 
 0.8666 0.4489 2.0255 4.1067 -4.0250 0.3763 1.0946 1.8532 0.8195 
δi
INT(-1) 0.8470* -1.4248 0.3087** 0.2203* 0.0063 0.2666 0.3226 0.3691* 0.2874 
 1.7786 -0.7007 2.2143 1.8181 0.4925 0.7613 0.7876 1.8228 1.3200 
δi
INT(0) -0.8256 2.4548 -0.5385 -0.5374 -0.0031 -0.4357 -0.3648 -0.4770 -0.4885 
 -1.3300 1.0904 -0.3997 -0.4942 -0.1912 -0.1256 -0.1177 -0.2597 -0.1912 
δi
INT(1) 0.1342 0.4077 0.3689 0.4538 0.0034 0.3056 0.2966 0.3667 0.3392 
 0.1960 0.8227 0.2391 0.3758 0.2415 0.0714 0.0780 0.1763 0.1126 
          
γi
CPI -0.3693** 0.0141 0.0990 0.1538 -0.0432 0.0372 0.0327 0.0936 0.1094 
 -2.1116 0.0702 0.6471 1.0819 -0.9484 0.2087 0.1766 0.6774 0.4869 
δi
CPI(-1) 0.1254 0.1020 -0.1182 -0.0455 0.0099 -0.1301 -0.1125 -0.0518 -0.1527 
 0.6758 0.9816 -1.2535 -0.6961 1.3141 -0.7422 -0.6320 -0.5611 -0.4826 
δi
CPI(0) -0.3858 -0.9269** 0.0772 0.0127 -0.0001 -0.0746 -0.1056 0.0332 -0.0638 
 -1.5679 -2.1046 0.6071 0.0956 -0.0190 -0.4264 -0.5851 0.3981 -0.6233 
δi
CPI(1) -0.2724 0.1917 -0.3665*** -0.2863** -0.0053 -0.3752** -0.3670** -0.4070*** -0.4340*** 
 -0.9842 0.3767 -3.0375 -2.0807 -0.7614 -2.4278 -2.1098 -6.9512 -5.9574 
          
γi
UNE -0.2193* -0.0713 0.0663 -0.1077*** 0.0372 0.0289 0.0378 -0.0070 0.1412 
 -1.7181 -0.4028 0.4970 -4.6650 1.5394 0.2958 0.3590 -0.0818 0.7395 
δi
UNE(-1) 0.1370 -0.0569 -0.0098 0.0252 0.0006 0.0664 0.0722 0.0281 -0.0339 
 0.9764 -0.2255 -0.1087 1.1791 0.2347 0.7770 0.7969 0.5141 -0.1698 
δi
UNE(0) -0.1495* -0.3435 -0.0314 -0.0723*** -0.0052 -0.1432* -0.1580* -0.0416 -0.0477 
 -1.6506 -0.9618 -0.2608 -3.5735 -1.0677 -1.7401 -1.6841 -0.8697 -0.1732 
δi
UNE(1) 0.0026 0.4217* -0.0409** -0.0172 -0.0021 -0.0619 -0.0546 -0.0665*** -0.0667*** 
 0.0346 1.7568 -1.9632 -0.7535 -0.5174 -0.8316 -0.6461 -7.9339 -3.1799 
          
γi
PAY 0.5669*** 0.8561*** 0.3102*** 0.3559*** -0.0612** 0.2066** 0.1964** 0.2404*** 0.2056*** 
 2.9095 3.6712 4.9225 5.2373 -2.3070 2.2195 1.9623 3.0716 5.3317 
δi
PAY(-1) -0.3213 -0.6060 0.2511*** 0.2083*** -0.0132 0.3435** 0.3611** 0.3693*** 0.4921** 
 -0.9910 -1.0000 3.8470 3.1421 -1.4279 2.1463 2.0273 5.1731 2.0691 
δi
PAY(0) 0.6215* 1.0777 -0.0308** 0.0448 0.0178* -0.1479 -0.1536 -0.0732** -0.1881** 
 1.8580 1.6445 -2.2627 1.0916 1.6990 -0.8861 -0.7916 -2.4463 -2.4915 
δi
PAY(1) -0.5145*** -0.5780*** -0.2358*** -0.1442*** -0.0073* -0.1854 -0.1838 -0.2478*** -0.2195** 
 -3.7014 -10.4901 -11.3839 -8.2711 -1.8726 -1.2310 -1.1412 -7.7594 -2.5544 
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Table D.13 GARCH(1,1) for Germany  2008-2013 
 rt
c_s1 rt
is_s1 rt
c_s2 rt
is_s2 rt
c_corp1 rt
c_govt1 rt
c_govt2 
γi
INT 1.6592* 1.5379* 1.6172* 1.5736* -0.3317*** 0.0420 0.0349 
 1.7355 1.6828 1.6774 1.9338 -3.2219 0.2752 0.7458 
δi
INT(-1) -1.2438 -1.2256 -1.5097 -0.5121 -0.0079 0.1636** 0.2510*** 
 -0.5211 -0.5539 -0.6312 -0.2826 -0.2316 2.0753 4.0311 
δi
INT(0) 3.5344 3.6817* 3.6195 2.4877 0.0342 -0.1471 -0.1368*** 
 1.5301 1.6954 1.5172 1.3865 0.9531 -1.1926 -3.2954 
δi
INT(1) -1.0479*** -1.3044*** -1.2604*** -1.8988*** -0.0051 -0.0494 -0.1585*** 
 -5.8067 -7.4068 -6.5614 -10.5238 -0.2616 -0.4345 -3.5661 
        
γi
CPI -0.2559 -0.2787 -0.3686 -0.2160 -0.0045 -0.2118 -0.2020 
 -0.9128 -1.1017 -1.4607 -0.8235 -0.2408 -1.5787 -1.5130 
δi
CPI(-1) -0.0381 0.4243 0.4723 0.5642 0.0135** -0.0916 -0.0493 
 -0.0921 1.1991 0.9794 1.3841 2.4370 -0.6641 -0.4146 
δi
CPI(0) -0.0938 -0.4548 0.1633 0.0468 -0.0108 0.1621 0.1229 
 -0.1034 -0.6843 0.0465 0.0233 -0.9053 1.1351 0.9868 
δi
CPI(1) 0.3547 0.2909 -0.5606 -0.5036 -0.0006 -0.0247 -0.0240 
 0.3888 0.4212 -0.1451 -0.2244 -0.0414 -0.5347 -0.4630 
        
γi
UNE 0.1455 0.0792 0.1176 -0.0072 0.0236 -0.1501 -0.1577 
 0.5231 0.3139 0.4383 -0.0274 1.1799 -1.0896 -1.1838 
δi
UNE(-1) 0.6586 0.6011 0.8124 0.8054 0.0120** -0.1491 -0.1246 
 1.2467 1.1762 1.5176 1.5122 1.9912 -0.7269 -0.6280 
δi
UNE(0) 0.9017** -0.0882 -0.4217 -0.4782 -0.0176* 0.2445 0.2504 
 2.2681 -0.1578 -0.6371 -0.7875 -1.7734 1.1391 1.1925 
δi
UNE(1) -0.9890*** -0.0715 0.2701 0.1918 0.0075 -0.0703 -0.0936** 
 -6.5934 -0.1441 0.3776 0.3213 0.6857 -1.3815 -1.9760 
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Table D.14: GARCH(1,1) for Canada  2008-2013 
 rt
c_s1 rt
is_s1 rt
c_s2 rt
is_s2 rt
c_corp1 rt
c_govt1 
γi
INT -0.4663 -0.7771 -0.5554 -0.8511 -0.0064 0.4447* 
 -1.1113 -0.9855 -0.8882 -1.0896 -0.0574 1.6619 
δi
INT(-1) 0.0733 1.0675 0.7427 1.0485 0.0179 0.1970 
 0.2616 1.4062 1.3628* 1.3561 0.6026 0.9898 
δi
INT(0) -1.4803 -4.0044 -3.2992 -4.3915 -0.0721 -0.1667 
 -1.0816 -1.4488 -1.6552 -1.4633 -0.9911 -0.7260 
δi
INT(1) 0.5206 2.4585 1.7293 2.9028 0.0610 -0.0828 
 0.3381 0.8242 0.7861 0.8839 0.7573 -0.5147 
       
γi
CPI 0.1805 0.4063* 0.1501 0.4529* -0.0134 0.2993*** 
 1.3242 1.9044 0.9924 1.9561 -0.3686 2.6482 
δi
CPI(-1) 0.4671*** 0.2099 0.6182*** 0.1910 -0.0060 -0.2243 
 2.6291 0.4225 2.6252 0.3147 -0.5730 -1.3841 
δi
CPI(0) -0.8696 -0.0514 -0.7851 0.0213 -0.0014 0.0474 
 -1.6196 -0.0617 -1.5766 0.0216 -0.0644 0.2012 
δi
CPI(1) 0.7255 0.5168 0.6044 0.7024 0.0074 0.2218 
 1.2120 0.6607 1.0996 0.7678 0.3226 1.2718 
       
γi
UNE -0.2796** -0.1600 -0.4319*** -0.1363 0.0236 -0.0814 
 -1.9669 -1.2479 -3.4807 -1.0931 0.6291 -0.9583 
δi
UNE(-1) 0.8175*** 0.5422 0.6294* 0.6031 -0.0138 0.1641 
 3.1997 1.1259 1.9286 1.2654*** -0.7001 1.6401 
δi
UNE(0) -1.2886 -2.5913*** -1.0614* -2.5946 0.0178 -0.0462 
 -1.5141 -2.8067 -1.7266 -2.6774 0.6350 -0.2868 
δi
UNE(1) 0.3453 1.1616 0.0045 1.1438 0.0012 -0.2087 
 0.3578 1.1281 0.0066 1.0632 0.0511 -1.5686 
       
γi
PAY 0.1509 0.0949 0.0942 0.1172 -0.1441*** -0.0271 
 1.0335 0.5144 0.6207 0.6048 -4.4218 -0.2573 
δi
PAY(-1) -0.1922 -0.4336 -0.2118 -0.4492 0.0094 -0.3200** 
 -0.7554 -0.8879 -0.6138 -0.7868 0.5393 -2.0022 
δi
PAY(0) 0.1768 1.6814*** 0.4140 1.6530*** -0.0170 0.2590 
 0.3120 3.8089 0.8352 2.8015 -0.7709 0.9994 
δi
PAY(1) 0.0631 -1.2892*** -0.1344 -1.2288*** -0.0030 0.0563 
 0.1035 -4.1488 -0.2825 -3.2219 -0.2000 0.2584 
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Table D.15: GARCH(1,1) for Japan  2008-2013 
 rt
c_s1 rt
is_s1 rt
c_s2 rt
is_s2 rt
c_corp1 rt
c_govt1 rt
c_govt2 
γi
UNE 0.2272 0.2225 0.2436 0.2755 0.0154 0.1049*** 0.0367 
 1.1113 1.0262 1.1664 1.4013 0.7415 5.4608 0.5940 
δi
UNE(-
1) 
-0.3905 -0.9733* -0.2960 -0.6459 -0.0034 0.0700*** -0.0345 
 -0.9339 -1.8160 -0.7797 -1.4718 -0.9477 3.4635 -0.9220 
δi
UNE(0) 0.5812 1.1767* 0.4418 0.7628 0.0046 -0.0701 -0.0076 
 1.0805 1.8298 0.8766 1.3937 1.1140 -1.2756 -0.0517 
δi
UNE(1) -0.0392 -0.1103 -0.0884 -0.0167 -0.0021 -0.0487 -0.2293 
 -0.0944 -0.3402 -0.2116 -0.0481 -0.9655 -0.8225 -1.3269 
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Table D.16: GARCH(1,1) for USA  2011-2013 
 rt
c_s1 rt
is_s1 rt
c_s2 rt
is_s2 rt
c_s3 rt
c_corp1 rt
c_govt1 rt
c_govt2 
γi
CPI -0.1274** -0.1781 -0.1050 -0.2072*** -0.1280** 0.0682 0.1113 0.0734 
 -2.2407 -1.3474 -1.5142 -2.6562 -2.1879 1.5368 1.3231 1.1051 
δi
CPI(-1) 0.2221 0.1047 0.2896 0.1316 0.2368 0.0041 -0.0406 -0.0202 
 1.2313 0.9470 1.2479 1.1768 1.2814 0.4497 -1.3604 -0.9674 
δi
CPI(0) -0.7103** -0.8282** -0.7685** -0.8521** -0.7401* -0.0064 0.0664** 0.0184 
 -2.0232 -1.9772 -2.2415 -2.2765 -1.9388 -0.4968 2.1537 0.6607 
δi
CPI(1) 0.5774 0.7472 0.6045 0.7308 0.5942 0.0042 -0.0084 0.0024 
 1.3153 1.4442 1.3367 1.5615 1.2374 0.3590 -0.6212 0.1222 
         
γi
UNE -0.0531 -0.1085 -0.1328 -0.0669 -0.0568 0.0133 0.0529 0.0022 
 -0.4772 4.9097 -1.4403 -0.5957 -0.4861 0.3276 1.0391 0.0394 
δi
UNE(-1) -0.0229 0.0832 -0.0762 -0.0018 -0.0207 -0.0843*** -0.0246 -0.1068*** 
 -0.1719 1.2513 -0.4770 -0.0163 -0.1454 -4.5307 -1.3327 -3.8649 
δi
UNE(0) -0.4400 -0.4952 -0.4207 -0.4202 -0.4106 0.0847*** 0.0287 0.0915** 
 -1.3030 -1.6180 -1.1751 -1.1880 -1.0769 3.8527 1.4392 2.4915 
δi
UNE(1) 0.4578 0.4168 0.2273 0.4573 0.4422 -0.0022 -0.0078 0.0131 
 1.1874 1.1100 0.5545 1.0690 0.9970 -0.2481 -0.8992 0.5834 
         
γi
PAY 0.8941*** 0.6654*** 0.8550*** 0.8199*** 0.9361*** -0.3094*** -0.3597*** -0.3646*** 
 4.9781 -1.3913 5.2615 5.1391 5.0283 -4.7895 -4.2124 -7.2434 
δi
PAY(-1) -0.1555 -0.1955** -0.1087 -0.0947 -0.1495 0.0466*** -0.0024 0.0731*** 
 -0.8143 -1.9736 -0.2910 -0.6283 -0.6918 4.8119 -0.0659 5.2706 
δi
PAY(0) 0.3670 -0.3649 0.0985 0.1013 0.2438 -0.0565*** -0.0099 -0.0903*** 
 1.2313 -0.6771 0.1776 0.2894 0.6222 -3.3937 -0.2324 -3.2790 
δi
PAY(1) -0.6030** 0.3326 0.0010 -0.3888 -0.4768 0.0045 0.0356 0.0223 
 -2.3835 0.5063 0.0021 -0.9720 -1.2173 0.2962 1.5017 0.8857 
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Table D.17: GARCH(1,1) for France  2011-2013 
 rt
c_s1 rt
is_s1 rt
c_s2 rt
is_s2 rt
c_corp1 rt
c_govt1 rt
c_govt2 
γi
INT 0.7408 0.8166 0.6553 0.8244 -0.3963*** -0.0703 0.0195 
 0.6162 0.7234 0.5422 0.9336 -4.6768 -0.3569 0.0997 
δi
INT(-1) -2.3215 -1.9592 -2.7103 0.0330 0.0622** 0.2255 0.3412** 
 -0.6890 -0.6760 -0.7838 0.0165 2.0794 1.1538 2.1298 
δi
INT(0) 4.1002 3.8566 4.8684 2.4227 -0.0704 0.0437 0.1162 
 1.1297 1.2466 1.3461 1.1796 -1.5905 0.3754 0.9377 
δi
INT(1) -1.5503 -1.5862* -1.8941*** -1.8925*** 0.0467 -0.2813*** -0.3495*** 
 -1.4163 -1.7562 -3.8913 -3.0821 0.9923 -4.3936 -4.1126 
        
γi
CPI -0.1248 -0.1076 0.0043 0.0072 0.0540 0.5527** 0.5600** 
 -0.2438 -0.4245 0.0100 0.0228 1.0062 1.9913 2.2800 
δi
CPI(-1) 1.7004** 1.2625** 1.7035** 0.0438 0.0062 -0.3982 -0.2057 
 2.1268 2.1079 2.3753 0.2001 0.8319 -1.4136 -0.9877 
δi
CPI(0) -1.0709* -0.5089 -0.8972* -0.6725*** -0.0350 0.2981 0.2676 
 -1.6575 -0.8749 -1.6592 -3.0074 -1.0926 1.0255 1.0705 
δi
CPI(1) -1.6368*** -1.7782*** -1.6285*** -1.2849*** 0.0236 -0.1725 -0.1965 
 -2.6642 -2.6457 -2.7605 -4.7845 0.6806 -1.2787 -1.2515 
        
γi
UNE -0.8081 -0.9559 -0.7961 -0.7882 -0.0566 -0.0880 -0.1076 
 -1.0493 -1.3637 -1.0662 -1.0768 -0.4249 -0.3654 -0.7280 
δi
UNE(-1) 1.3891 1.5080 1.0957 0.6692 -0.0589*** 0.1068 0.2569** 
 1.1567 1.4159 1.0032 0.6468 -2.6773 0.3821 2.4029 
δi
UNE(0) -0.1558 0.1244 0.0738 -0.6461 -0.0616 0.2873 0.0422 
 -0.1026 0.1106 0.0516 -0.5938 -0.6746 1.2394 0.9609 
δi
UNE(1) -0.8933 -1.3870 -0.9174 -1.3069** 0.1133 -0.3768*** -0.3468*** 
 -0.6764 -1.5334 -0.7485 -2.5347 1.1597 -9.4424 -8.3876 
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Table D.18: GARCH(1,1) for Italy  2011-2013 
 rt
c_s1 rt
is_s1 rt
is_s2 rt
c_corp1 rt
c_corp2 rt
c_govt1 rt
c_govt2 
γi
INT -0.0126 -0.3576 0.3048 0.1681 -0.2147 -0.1621 0.0125 
 -0.0086 -0.2373 0.1421 0.8484 -0.8137 -0.5865 0.0287 
δi
INT(-1) -6.9326 -8.7141 -12.0816 0.2861*** 0.4063 1.1433 0.5041 
 -1.3118 -1.4969 -1.0109 2.8903 0.6052 0.4883 0.8794 
δi
INT(0) 9.2556* 7.9859 14.8441 0.0693 0.1508 0.1705 0.5624 
 1.6576 1.1904 1.1602 0.8609 1.2925 1.1243 1.4756 
δi
INT(1) -2.8689*** 1.3720 -0.7086 -0.4346*** -0.1260*** -0.1165*** -0.8580*** 
 -7.2471 0.5097 -0.5038 -8.2598 -3.4026 -5.1080 -5.6260 
        
γi
CPI -1.0508** -0.7737* -0.7761 -0.4374*** 0.0879 0.0666 -0.4266 
 -2.1224 -1.7651 -1.3147 -3.1174 0.5886 0.5777 -1.6253 
δi
CPI(-1) 1.1470 0.4906 1.4117 0.2551*** 0.0292 -0.0601 0.6612** 
 1.1469 0.5266 1.1185 3.2061 0.3652 -1.2592 2.0392 
δi
CPI(0) -0.7572 0.2215 -0.8858 -0.1687 -0.0648 -0.0877 -0.1978 
 -0.5412 0.2532 -0.7640 -1.0108 -0.5855 -0.6235 -0.7635 
δi
CPI(1) -1.0947 -1.5593** 0.0398 -0.0788 -0.0702 -0.0587 -0.5056** 
 -0.7625 -2.1328 0.0594 -0.4578 -0.8817 -0.2626 -2.4313 
        
γi
UNE -0.4389 -0.5660 -0.6730 -0.2790** 0.2034 0.1091 -0.1330 
 -0.8032 -1.1540 -1.1573 -2.0008 1.3351 1.2227 -0.5223 
δi
UNE(-1) 0.8684 -0.0549 -0.1926 0.1672** 0.1233 0.2129 0.3216 
 0.8898 -0.0486 -0.1371 2.1142 0.8359 0.9486 1.4249 
δi
UNE(0) 0.7466 0.9263 1.5806 -0.0591 -0.0286 -0.0597 -0.1795 
 0.9313 1.0410 1.1162 -0.7017 -0.5054 -1.5856 -0.8043 
δi
UNE(1) -1.8928*** -0.7399** -1.4888*** -0.1107 -0.0958*** -0.1161** -0.2478 
 -4.0866 -2.2301 -5.8851 -1.6093 -5.5430 -2.2754 -1.3981 
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Table D.19: GARCH(1,1) for Australia  2011-2013 
 rt
c_s1 rt
is_s1 rt
c_corp1 rt
c_corp2 rt
c_govt1 rt
c_govt2 rt
c_govt3 rt
c_govt4  
γi
INT 1.1274* 0.8349 0.7225*** 0.9425*** 0.3047 0.3044* 0.5257*** 0.5351  
 1.8144 1.4108 2.7728 3.2331 1.2531 1.7549 3.5504 1.6072  
δi
INT(-1) -0.0795 0.1778 0.1993 0.2321** 0.3150** 0.2298*** 0.2723*** -0.5727  
 -0.0956 0.2399 1.4746 2.0213 2.3660 2.7762 2.7841 -1.1417  
δi
INT(0) 0.3352 0.3110 -0.0873 -0.0338 -0.1879 -0.2112 -0.0161 0.7271  
 0.3439 0.3921 -0.6840 -0.2438 -1.6146 -1.2975 -0.2769 1.2744  
δi
INT(1) -0.5973** -0.3915 -0.2572** -0.2542*** -0.2553** -0.0553 -0.3063*** -0.2772***  
 -2.3421 -0.7512 -2.5229 -3.6293 -2.0643 -0.3044 -3.9409 -4.8171  
          
γi
CPI -0.1479 0.0175 0.2629 0.2712 0.2102 0.1880 0.2519 0.4210  
 -1.0161 0.1219 0.7656 1.6281 1.1458 1.0010 1.4843 1.6216  
δi
CPI(-1) 0.0805 0.1606 0.0920 0.0477 -0.0508 -0.0578 0.0525 0.0485  
 0.4379 1.0649 0.3334 0.6380 -0.4060 -0.5290 0.6441 0.2303  
δi
CPI(0) -0.5885** -1.2103** -0.0895 -0.2792*** 0.1067 0.0559 -0.0190 -0.0384  
 -2.1087 -2.3224 -0.2558 -3.2532 0.7221 0.3760 -0.1965 -0.1502  
δi
CPI(1) -0.0610 0.1956 -0.2928** 0.0830 -0.2385** -0.0912 -0.1280* -0.1672***  
 -0.1973 0.3100 -2.0542 1.0419 -2.5165 -0.7767 -1.9507 -3.8035  
          
γi
UNE -0.1603* -0.2020* -0.2216*** -0.3318** -0.1788*** -0.1622*** -0.3506** -0.1378***  
 -1.7906 -1.8436 -2.7356 -2.4448 -2.6815 -3.3779 -2.0865 -3.6910  
δi
UNE(-1) 0.1780 0.1635 0.0162 -0.0179 0.0365 0.0257 -0.0016 -0.0321  
 1.4656 1.1370 0.4100 -0.2578 0.8955 0.8420 -0.0155 -0.5199  
δi
UNE(0) -0.1808 -0.1805 -0.0295 -0.0001 -0.0395 -0.0357*** -0.0153 0.0099  
 -1.3228 -0.5182 -1.1263 -0.0008 -1.4396 -4.6324 -0.0770 0.1698  
δi
UNE(1) -0.0375 -0.0239 -0.0151 -0.0181 -0.0229** -0.0122 -0.0201** 0.0129  
 -0.2399 -0.0574 -0.7120 -0.8179 -2.2963 -1.6173 -2.1316 0.5780  
          
γi
PAY 0.2307 0.3790 0.1648** 0.2347*** 0.1134** 0.1377*** 0.1331* 0.0959  
 0.8275 1.2888 2.1499 2.6245 1.9865 10.0384 1.6918 1.5084  
δi
PAY(-1) -0.2309 -0.6921 0.1895** 0.1641** 0.1825** 0.1708*** 0.2309** 0.2825***  
 -0.4173 -1.1503 1.9641 2.5696 2.0935 2.8733 2.3266 2.6661  
δi
PAY(0) 0.8238 1.6066*** -0.0401 -0.0233 -0.0131 0.0025 0.0096 -0.0518  
 1.3387 2.6361 -0.6321 -0.5578 -0.3498 0.8449 0.1849 -1.3153  
δi
PAY(1) -0.5566*** -0.5836*** -0.0938 -0.0494 -0.0983*** -0.0703*** -0.1057*** -0.0583  
 -4.0734 -5.7859 -1.4742 -1.0994 -2.7230 -5.8156 -5.0105 -1.3479  
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Table D.20: GARCH(1,1) for Germany  2011-2013 
 rt
c_s1 rt
is_s1 rt
c_s2 rt
c_is2 rt
c_corp1 rt
c_govt1 rt
c_govt2 
γi
INT 0.4236 0.6705 0.3965 0.9614 -0.1751 -0.0345 0.0524*** 
 0.3753 0.6239 0.3440 1.0399 -1.1967 -0.2297 1.5574 
δi
INT(-1) -0.8341 -0.5003 -1.3749 0.8113 -0.0572 -0.1972*** 0.0017 
 -0.2519 -0.1733 -0.3887 0.3457 -1.6153 -2.6370 0.0187 
δi
INT(0) 4.0575 3.9690 4.4860 1.9886 0.0827** -0.1338** -0.2009*** 
 1.2062 1.3839 1.2336 0.8943 2.2480 -2.1614 -5.6440 
δi
INT(1) -1.1422*** -1.4209*** -1.2140*** -1.1453 -0.0059 0.0480 -0.0486 
 -5.9680 -7.5741 -7.0725 -1.4925 -0.3090 0.4290 -0.9261 
        
γi
CPI -0.7992*** -0.9140*** -0.8700*** -0.9565*** -0.0229 -0.4644*** -0.5265 
 -4.3123 -3.5578 -5.2797 -3.6818 -0.5515 -3.4019 -4.3794 
δi
CPI(-1) 0.9262*** 0.7931*** 0.9543*** 0.9663** 0.0215* -0.0586 0.0449 
 3.3426 3.2202 3.5286 2.0178 1.9471 -0.5383 0.4667 
δi
CPI(0) -1.1359 -0.9604 -1.2708 -0.8121 -0.0115 -0.0641 -0.0475 
 -0.9885 -1.1784 -1.2430 -0.7541 -0.5396 -0.6073 -0.7117 
δi
CPI(1) 0.3832 0.1773 0.4380 -0.3957 0.0069 -0.0654 -0.0900 
 0.3070 0.1970 0.3953 -0.3191 0.2988 -0.9391 -1.5226 
        
γi
UNE -0.0788 -0.1766 -0.1058 -0.4521 0.0179 -0.1658 -0.0634 
 -0.2198 -0.5431 -0.3025 -1.1754 0.3490 -0.8772 -0.3775 
δi
UNE(-1) 0.8463 0.8474 0.8655 0.5108 0.0009 0.1068 0.0068 
 1.2287 1.3516 1.3773 0.5632 0.0720 0.7133 0.0466 
δi
UNE(0) -0.2150 -0.3893 -0.2203 0.2113 -0.0069 0.1468 0.1753 
 -0.3227 -0.6363 -0.3370 0.2613 -0.3988 0.5883 1.0816 
δi
UNE(1) -0.2540 0.0211 -0.2268 -0.0525 0.0043 -0.0850* -0.0818* 
 -0.5032 0.0372 -0.4535 -0.0793 0.2639 -1.8089 -1.9396 
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Table D.21: GARCH(1,1) for Canada  2011-2013 
 rt
c_s1 rt
is_s1 rt
c_s2 rt
is_s2 rt
c_corp1 rt
c_govt1 
γi
INT 118.3625 -290.4800 -82.0185 -2.7205 4.8329 -0.3672 
 1.0768 -1.1484 -1.1663 -1.3387 1.0641 -0.9950 
δi
INT(-1) -1925.7870 -13700.5500 -3493.1140*** 0.8701 -9.6603** 0.0001 
 -0.2993 -0.4244 -5.1947 0.1375 -2.4610 0.0001 
δi
INT(0) 508.4052 2012.4600 3494.3600 -1.8169 7.8765 -0.0017 
 0.0456 0.0294 1.6200 -0.4368 0.6231 -0.0023 
δi
INT(1) -0.3929** -2.2326** -0.5336*** -0.0027 -0.0767*** -0.0005 
 -2.3984 -2.0571 -3.4399 -0.0005 -13.2670 -0.0011 
       
γi
CPI 0.4442* 0.4945*** 0.3762** 0.4381** 0.0126 0.3883*** 
 1.8339 2.7076 2.2949 2.2080 0.2829 5.3994 
δi
CPI(-1) 0.3252 0.6865** 0.2561 0.0070 0.0003 0.0002 
 1.0002 2.1567 1.2859 0.0062 0.0270 0.0017 
δi
CPI(0) -1.2411 -1.7872* -0.9761 -0.0071 0.0188** -0.0003 
 -1.5260 -1.8664 -1.2967 -0.0062 1.9838 -0.0020 
δi
CPI(1) 1.1117 1.7508 0.9833 0.0123 -0.0139*** 0.0003 
 1.3080 1.4175 1.1414 0.0119 -5.5505 0.0020 
       
γi
UNE -0.2865 -0.4408* -0.3465 -0.1064 0.0293 -0.0226 
 -1.2556 -1.7479 -1.1645 -0.4522 0.5130 -0.2107 
δi
UNE(-1) 0.4042 0.3727 0.2810 0.0029 -0.0084 -0.0002 
 0.9811 0.4843 0.5478 0.0015 -0.2172 -0.0010 
δi
UNE(0) -1.2100 -1.3868 -1.1808 -0.0216 0.0420 0.0004 
 -0.8531 -0.5837 -1.0130 -0.0075 0.9524 0.0019 
δi
UNE(1) 1.2026 2.4864 1.0421 0.0306 -0.0108 -0.0001 
 0.7369 0.8225 0.8600 0.0095 -0.8481 -0.0006 
       
γi
PAY 0.3462*** 0.3228 0.4507*** 0.1360 -0.1521*** 0.1090 
 3.0782 1.4725 2.6142 0.8879 -2.8543 1.2350 
δi
PAY(-1) 0.1318 0.1987 0.1017 -0.0011 0.0107 0.0001 
 0.6160 0.4591 0.4926 -0.0007 0.3517 0.0009 
δi
PAY(0) -0.2802 -0.7434 0.0456 0.0075 -0.0159 -0.0003 
 -0.3634 -0.6430 0.0803 0.0034 -0.4380 -0.0022 
δi
PAY(1) -0.1310 -0.1157 -0.4165 -0.0196 -0.0113 0.0000 
 -0.1452 -0.0778 -0.6476 -0.0091 -1.1726 0.0000 
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Table D.22: GARCH(1,1) for Japan  2011-2013 
 rt
c_s1 rt
is_s1 rt
c_s2 rt
is_s2 rt
c_corp1 rt
c_govt1 rt
c_govt2 
γi
UNE 0.4389*** 0.3931* 0.5828*** 0.3816* 0.0392*** 0.1207*** 0.1119*** 
 2.6282 1.8704 4.1754 1.8625 3.1062 7.7843 6.6720 
δi
UNE(-1) 0.2907 -0.0999 0.3473 0.0757 0.0347* 0.0422 0.0413 
 1.1011 -0.3194 1.2689 0.2661 1.6802 1.0737 1.2331 
δi
UNE(0) -0.2093 0.1376 -0.3036 -0.0031 -0.0002 -0.0665 -0.0481 
 -0.5277 0.2995 -0.9737 -0.0070 -0.4095 -1.2529 -0.5319 
δi
UNE(1) 0.0427 0.0030 -0.0630 0.1023 -0.0038*** -0.0515 -0.0934 
 0.0779 0.0066 -0.1327 0.2214 -6.3980 -0.8448 -0.9150 
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Table D.23: GARCH(1,1) for UK  2011-2013 
 
 rt
c_s1 rt
is_s1 rt
c_s2 rt
is_s2 rt
c_corp1 rt
c_corp2 rt
c_govt1 rt
c_govt2 
γi
INT -0.2855 -0.7433** -0.5497 -0.6418 -0.0295 0.0001 0.0740 0.1669 
 -0.3599 -2.0982 -0.9690 -1.4420 -0.0895 0.0006 0.3504 1.1814 
δi
INT(-1) 0.7363 0.6212*** 0.8706** 0.7952*** 0.3777** 0.0207 0.3832** 0.3879** 
 1.4605 2.7601 1.9926 2.9061 2.5726 0.8596 2.4913 2.1074 
δi
INT(0) -0.6371 -1.3502 -1.1784 -0.8505 -0.2323 -0.1102* -0.2130 -0.0430 
 -0.9239 -1.4277 -1.3491 -1.2020 -1.2114 -1.7592 -1.8825 -0.3178 
δi
INT(1) -0.3136 0.0900 0.1732 -0.3732 -0.1707 -0.0476 -0.3059** -0.3676*** 
 -0.5059 0.0876 0.1867 -0.4812 -0.9245 -0.6089 -2.2161 -3.3245 
         
γi
CPI 0.2695 0.3071 0.2334 0.2608 -0.0633 -0.1129 -0.0176 -0.0686* 
 1.0070 0.9879 0.8720 0.7954 -1.1610 -1.6422 -0.3176 -1.6635 
δi
CPI(-1) 0.5365 0.0770 0.6015 0.2708 0.1426** -0.0124 0.1858** 0.1557*** 
 1.2086 0.1328 1.3573 0.4028 2.4572 -0.4432 2.5265 2.9331 
δi
CPI(0) 0.4643 1.1327** 0.4128 1.1075 0.0432 0.0425* -0.0053 0.0047 
 0.9951 2.0058 0.8817 1.6253 0.5792 1.6605 -0.0776 0.0556 
δi
CPI(1) -0.4315 -0.6806*** -0.4291 -0.7503*** -0.1498** -0.0538*** -0.1773*** -0.1428 
 -1.3913 -3.8220 -1.3895 -3.0887 -2.3043 -4.8725 -2.9220 -1.6330 
         
γi
UNE 0.4372 0.6069 0.4181 0.5819* 0.2891 -0.0004 0.3798** 0.4335** 
 1.5922 1.4294 1.4342 1.7553 1.5266 -0.0052 2.0860 2.5765 
δi
UNE(-1) 1.4847*** 1.3114*** 1.6151*** 1.5389*** 0.1677 0.0979* 0.0262 0.0741 
 3.5152 3.0810 3.5894 3.4767 1.2927 1.8880 0.2262 0.6118 
δi
UNE(0) -0.1485 -0.2480 -0.2550 -0.1469 0.1793 -0.0087 0.1815 0.1549 
 -0.4393 -0.8244 -0.5415 -0.5047 1.4929 -0.1547 1.4816 1.2383 
δi
UNE(1) -0.5373 -0.2920 -0.4842 -0.4080 -0.2693*** -0.0726 -0.2727*** -0.2428*** 
 -1.5206 -1.1613 -1.0727 -1.3477 -4.9913 -1.5024 -4.3252 -3.8574 
         
γi
PAY 0.2002 0.2324 0.2256 0.2083 0.1538 0.1039 0.1498 0.1973 
 0.6651 0.7826 0.7416 0.7072 0.9884 1.3704 1.0494 1.4736 
δi
PAY(-1) -0.0046 0.3156 -0.1639 0.4237 -0.1309 -0.0408 -0.1475 -0.1847* 
 -0.0140 1.0048 -0.4633 1.3547 -1.1196 -1.0439 -1.5446 -1.9504 
δi
PAY(0) -0.0068 0.0564 0.0293 -0.1710 -0.0336 0.0211 -0.1098 -0.0647 
 -0.0160 0.1754 0.0594 -0.4651 -0.2439 0.3513 -0.9534 -0.5867 
δi
PAY(1) -0.2593 -0.5466** -0.2153 -0.5227 -0.0013 -0.0090 -0.0091 -0.0551 
 -0.7231 -2.0557 -0.5185 -1.5585 -0.0162 -0.1649 -0.1191 -0.7304 
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Table D.24: GARCH(1,1) for Turkey  2011-2013 
 
 rt
c_s1 rt
is_s1 rt
c_corp1 rt
c_corp2 rt
c_govt1 rt
c_govt2 
γi
INT -0.7008 -1.9635*** 0.0290 0.0057 0.0956 0.1020 
 -0.6778 -9.2634 0.1844 0.0518 0.5904 0.4536 
δi
INT(-1) 1.4912 4.2886** 0.4903 0.2249* 0.4449** 0.4231 
 0.6263 2.3227 1.5429 1.7712 1.9636 1.4996 
δi
INT(0) 2.3736 -2.8462 -0.0997** -0.0012 -0.0263 0.1316 
 1.5031 -1.3784 -2.0272 -0.0226 -0.2238 0.9070 
δi
INT(1) -2.1886*** 1.6331 -0.0432 -0.1089*** -0.2557** -0.2542*** 
 -2.7952 0.7389 -0.6798 -3.4966 -2.4824 -3.7340 
       
γi
CPI -0.0331 0.1480 -0.0839 -0.0358 -0.1128 -0.1405 
 -0.0620 0.2677 -0.7131 -0.3603 -0.7309 -1.0383 
δi
CPI(-1) -8.7104 -7.4639 0.1020* -0.0068 -0.3771* -0.2937* 
 -1.0977 -1.0394 1.8097 -0.0866 -1.6767 -1.8432 
δi
CPI(0) 9.8479 7.5579 -0.0961 0.0888 0.4813* 0.3468** 
 1.0689 0.9589 -1.4896 1.2205 1.9508 1.9911 
δi
CPI(1) -1.3192*** -0.4320 0.0079 -0.0627*** -0.1611*** -0.1307*** 
 -3.1927 -0.6632 0.1054 -9.9022 -7.9138 -5.8974 
       
γi
UNE -0.5559 -0.4296 0.1393*** -0.1231 -0.1357 -0.1498*** 
 -1.0901 -1.2090 3.0241 -1.3715 -1.6064 -2.8534 
δi
UNE(-1) 0.9010 -0.3792 -0.0178 0.0451* 0.0462 0.0449 
 1.1326 -0.4711 -0.6690 1.7201 0.7946 0.9715 
δi
UNE(0) -1.5770 -0.4399 -0.0327 -0.0936** -0.0769 -0.1090 
 -1.1270 -0.3819 -1.1427 -2.3206 -0.7099 -0.9510 
δi
UNE(1) 0.5756 0.4908 -0.0534 0.0099 0.0120 0.0721 
 0.7780 0.5697 -1.5712 0.2032 0.1121 0.5936 
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Table D.25: GARCH(1,1) for Indonesia  2011-2013 
 rt
c_s1 rt
is_s1 rt
is_s2 rt
c_corp1 rt
c_corp2 rt
c_corp3 rt
c_govt1 
γi
INT -0.0398 0.2097 0.2067 -0.1925 -0.1723 -0.0737 0.6079* 
 -0.0757 0.4008 0.5421 -1.1190 -0.9041 -0.7066 1.8390 
δi
INT(-1) 1.2671 0.1751 5.0813 -0.0801 -0.1335 0.1122 -0.7473 
 0.8206 0.1714 1.4116 -0.5758 -0.6419 1.1206 -1.1559 
δi
INT(0) 0.6269 1.2248* 0.0378 0.1755 0.3016 -0.4534 1.1560 
 0.5402 1.6759 0.0684 1.1037 1.2740 -0.9213 1.4367 
δi
INT(1) -1.0346*** -0.9597*** -0.7102*** -0.0370 -0.0679** 0.4551 0.0117 
 -3.1866 -6.5426 -2.6109 -1.2252 -2.1937 0.7544 0.0815 
        
γi
CPI -0.0887 0.1080 -0.1886 0.0227 -0.0365 0.0192 -0.1745*** 
 -0.4144 0.5806 -0.8402 0.4891 -1.0779 0.4591 -9.0175 
δi
CPI(-1) 0.0613 0.0911 -0.4083** 0.0047 -0.0033 -0.0088* 0.0567 
 0.4502 0.6478 -2.2745 0.4727 -0.5233 -1.7411 0.6859 
δi
CPI(0) -1.1138*** -1.0288* -0.6889 -0.0256 -0.0401 -0.3206 -0.1474*** 
 -2.5819 -1.8817 -1.3574 -1.4829 -1.3662 -1.1965 -2.7519 
δi
CPI(1) 0.1262 0.4293 -0.1765 -0.0184 -0.0174 0.3427 0.1134 
 0.2259 0.5869 -0.3332 -0.8721 -0.4801 1.0549 1.5167 
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Table D.26: GARCH(1,1) for Malaysia  2011-2013 
 rt
c_s1 rt
is_s1 rt
c_s2 rt
is_s2 rt
is_s3 rt
c_corp1 rt
c_corp2 rt
c_govt1 rt
c_govt2 
γi
INT 0.1552 -1.1384 0.7223 0.5562 -0.1109 -0.2476** 1.2407* -0.1661 -0.1661 
 0.1582 -0.7546 0.7672 0.5753 -0.1109 -2.2439 1.8091 -0.3178 -0.3178 
δi
INT(-1) 1.8551 2.1612 2.2074 2.2366 1.2122 -0.0126** 0.7215 0.1275 0.1275 
 0.8670 0.7387 1.4038 1.1176 0.6548 -2.2900 1.4358 0.3681 0.3681 
δi
INT(0) -0.5358 0.6637 0.4303 0.2411 0.9256*** -0.0126 -0.2186 0.3803** 0.3803** 
 -1.1133 0.5868 0.9775 0.6163 7.4348 -1.4091 -0.5223 2.1506 2.1506 
δi
INT(1) -1.1710** -1.6761*** -0.9055** -1.0908*** -1.4726*** -0.0240*** 0.0361 -0.2725*** -0.2725*** 
 -2.4350 -6.1104 -2.3409 -2.7892 -5.1924 -3.2024 0.4046 -5.4964 -5.4964 
          
γi
CPI 0.0552 -0.0077 0.0029 0.0753 -0.0114 -0.0376* -0.0823 -0.0743 -0.0743 
 0.3480 -0.0366 0.0226 0.4747 -0.0653 -1.7169 -0.8208 -0.8015 -0.8015 
δi
CPI(-1) -0.0163 0.0335 0.1268 0.0661 0.1117 -0.0041*** -0.1374 0.1170* 0.1170* 
 -0.0734 0.1283 0.8060 0.3847 0.6309 -4.4823 -1.3972 1.6829 1.6829 
δi
CPI(0) -0.4169*** -0.1632 -0.1574** -0.1469 -0.0771 -0.0057* 0.2910 -0.0182 -0.0182 
 -3.2549 -0.7541 -2.3784 -1.4308 -0.6824 -1.9419 1.5310 -0.2857 -0.2857 
δi
CPI(1) -0.6139*** -0.5038** -0.3921** -0.5088*** -0.5657*** -0.0053 -0.0307 -0.0422 -0.0422 
 -3.4178 -2.3585 -2.1687 -2.9421 -3.6602 -1.2885 -1.5535 -0.5900 -0.5900 
          
 rt
q_c_bonds rt
q_is_bonds rt
q_c_govt rt
q_is_govt rt
q_c_corp rt
q_is_corp rt
q_total_corp rt
q_total_corp  
γi
INT -0.3602 -0.4487 -0.5109 -0.4460 -0.4300 -0.2874 -0.3837 -0.5772  
 -0.6600 -1.1240 -1.2129 -1.0498 -1.0496 -0.7296 -0.8238 -1.2891  
δi
INT(-1) 0.0465 0.2632 0.3604 0.4408 0.3626 0.3200 0.1500 0.3671  
 0.1686 0.7017 0.9100 1.1660 0.9234 0.8993 0.4514 0.9542  
δi
INT(0) 0.2827** 0.0241 0.1442** 0.0363 0.1231 0.1196 0.1420 0.1274***  
 2.0252 0.2672 2.2252 0.6749 1.6382 1.3818 1.2395 2.9804  
δi
INT(1) -0.3670*** -0.3749*** -0.3026*** -0.2522*** -0.3036*** -0.2630*** -0.3730*** -0.2902***  
 -7.6159 -9.0934 -7.1668 -6.3154 -7.1968 -6.2906 -9.1619 -6.9972  
          
γi
CPI 0.0609 -0.0534 -0.0874 -0.0511 -0.0797 -0.0289 -0.0288 -0.0816  
 1.3454 -0.6241 -0.6799 -0.4280 -0.6374 -0.2885 -0.3373 -0.6455  
δi
CPI(-1) 0.0885 0.0599 0.0190 0.0287 0.0275 0.0787 0.0626 0.0196  
 1.5180 0.8711 0.1765 0.3132 0.2752 1.1124 0.9701 0.1881  
δi
CPI(0) -0.0151 -0.0377*** 0.1170 0.0926 0.0993 0.0233 -0.0206* 0.1136  
 -1.5918 -2.7460 1.0823 1.1387 1.0519 0.6451 -1.7269 1.1144  
δi
CPI(1) -0.1148*** -0.1412*** -0.0599 -0.0771*** -0.0691 -0.0978*** -0.1371*** -0.0654  
 -4.4114 -6.9723 -0.9913 -2.6027 -1.2753 -4.6912 -6.5718 -1.2557  
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APPENDIX E 
Table E.1: List of Data Sources for the Stock Indices in Chapter 4 
Country Name  Abbreviation Source and Period  
 
Australia, Bahrain, 
Canada, Egypt, 
France, Germany, 
Indonesia, Italy, 
Japan, Malaysia, 
Morocco, Pakistan, 
Qatar, Turkey, 
United Arab 
Emirates (UAE), 
United Kingdom 
(UK), United States 
(US) 
 
Bahrain, Qatar and 
UAE 
 
 
 
 
 
Canada 
 
 
 
 
Iran 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Japan 
 
 
 
 
Malaysia 
 
 
 
 
Saudi Arabia 
 
 
 
 
 
MSCI Standard Index 
and MSCI Standard 
Islamic Index 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
MSCI Domestic 
Standard Index and 
MSCI Domestic 
Standard Islamic 
Index 
 
 
Dow Jones Canada 
Titans 60,  Index and 
Dow Jones Islamic 
Canadian Index 
 
TEPIX [Tehran Price 
Index], TEDPIX 
[Tehran Dividend & 
Price Index], 
Industrial Index, and 
TSE-50 
 
Dow Jones Japan 
Titans 100 Index and 
Dow Jones Islamic 
Japan Index 
 
FTSE Bursa Malaysia 
EMAS Index, and 
FTSE Bursa Malaysia 
EMAS Shariah Index 
 
S&P Saudi Arabia 
Index and S&P Saudi 
Arabia Shariah Index 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
c_s1 for 
conventional MSCI 
indices and is_s1 
for Islamic MSCI 
indices 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
c_s2 and is_s2 
 
 
 
 
 
 
c_s2 and is_s2 
 
 
 
 
is_s1, is_s2, is_s3 
and is_s4 
 
 
 
 
 
c_s2 and is_s2 
 
 
 
 
c_s2 and is_s2 
 
 
 
 
c_s1 and is_s1 
 
 
 
 
 
10 August 2006 – 16 June 2014 for 
daily frequency and 31 May 2002 – 30 
June 2014 for monthly frequency of all 
countries except for Bahrain, Qatar and 
UAE [31 May 2005 – 30 June 2014], 
Egypt [31 May 2004 – 30 June 2014],  
MSCI Barra 
[www.mscibarra.com/products/indices] 
 
 
 
 
 
10 August 2006 – 16 June 2014 for 
daily frequency and 31 May 2005 – 30 
June 2014 for monthly frequency, 
MSCI Barra 
[www.mscibarra.com/products/indices] 
 
 
10 August 2006 – 16 June 2014 for 
daily frequency and 31 May 2002 – 30 
June 2014 for monthly frequency, 
Datastream 
 
12 August 2006 – 16 June 2014 for 
daily frequency and 31 July 2006 – 30 
June 2014 for monthly frequency, 
Tehran Stock Exchange 
[www.tse.ir/market/Shakhes.aspx] 
 
 
10 August 2006 – 16 June 2014 for 
daily frequency and 31 May 2002 – 30 
June 2014 for monthly frequency, 
Datastream 
 
28 February 2007 – 16 June 2014 for 
daily frequency and 31 October 2006 – 
30 June 2014, Datastream 
 
 
30 March 2007 – 16 June 2014 for 
daily frequency and 30 March 2007 – 
30 June 2014 for monthly frequency, 
Datastream 
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UK 
 
 
 
 
US 
 
 
 
 
 
Dow Jones UK Titans 
50 Index and Dow 
Jones Islamic UK 
Index  
 
Dow Jones US Total 
Stock Market and 
Dow Jones Islamic 
US Index  
c_s2 and is_s2 
 
 
 
 
c_s2 and is_s2 
10 August 2006 – 16 June 2014 for 
daily frequency and 31 May 2002 – 30 
June 2014 for monthly frequency, 
Datastream 
 
10 August 2006 – 16 June 2014 for 
daily frequency and 31 May 2002 – 30 
June 2014 for monthly frequency, 
Datastream 
 
 
 
 
Table E.2: List of Data Sources for the Bond Indices in Chapter 4 
Country Name  Abbreviation  Source and Period 
Australia 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Bahrain 
 
 
Canada 
 
 
 
 
Egypt 
 
 
France 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
AFMA Australian Corporate 
Index 
 
Macquarie BK Corporate 
Bond  
 
AFMA Australian 
Government Index  
 
UBS Treasury All Maturities  
 
FTSE Global Government 
All Maturities 
 
AU Total All Lives DS 
Government Index 
 
BOFA ML USD Emerging 
Sovereign Bahrain Index 
 
Barclays Multiverse Canada 
 
FTSE Global Government 
All Maturities 
 
JPM EMBI Global  
 
 
Barclays Multiverse France 
 
FTSE Global Government 
All Maturities 
 
FR Total All Lives DS 
Government Index 
 
 c_corp1  
 
 
c_corp2 
 
 
c_govt1  
 
 
c_govt2  
 
c_govt3 
 
 
c_govt4 
 
 
c_govt1 
 
 
c_corp1 
 
c_govt1 
 
 
c_corp1 
 
 
c_corp1 
 
c_govt1 
 
 
c_govt2 
 
 
 
 
31 May 2002 – 30 June 2014, 
Datastream [all Australian 
bonds] 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
31 May 2005 – 30 June 2014, 
Datastream  
 
31 August 2005 – 30 June 
2014, Datastream 
31 May 2002 – 30 June 2014, 
Datastream 
 
31 May 2005 – 30 June 2014, 
Datastream  
 
31 August 2005 – 30 June 
2014, Datastream 
31 May 2002 – 30 June 2014, 
Datastream 
 
31 May 2002 – 30 June 2014, 
Datastream 
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Germany 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Indonesia 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Italy 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Japan  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Malaysia 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Morocco 
 
 
Barclays Multiverse 
Germany 
 
FTSE Global Government 
All Maturities 
 
BD Total All Lives DS 
Government Index 
 
JPM EMBI Global 
 
JPM EMBI+ 
 
Barclays EM Asia 
 
JPM GBI-EM Global 
 
Banca Fideuram Euro Inv 
GDE Corporate Index 
 
Barclays Multiverse Italy 
 
FTSE Global Government 
All Maturities 
 
Italy Total All Lives DS 
Government Index 
 
Barclays Multiverse Japan  
 
FTSE Global Government 
Japan All Maturities 
 
Japan Total All Lives DS 
Government Index 
 
Barclays Multiverse 
Malaysia 
 
JPM EMBI Global Malaysia  
 
JPM GBI-EM 
 
JPM GBI – EM Global 
 
Malaysian Corporate 
Conventional Bond Index 
and Malaysian Corporate 
Islamic Bond Index 
 
 
JPM EURO EMBI Global 
Morocco 
 
c_corp1 
 
 
c_govt1 
 
 
c_govt2 
 
c_corp1 
 
 
c_corp2 
 
c_corp3 
 
c_govt1 
 
c_corp1 
 
 
c_corp2 
 
c_govt1 
 
 
c_govt2 
 
 
c_corp1 
 
c_govt1 
 
 
c_govt2 
 
 
c_corp1 
 
 
c_corp2 
 
c_govt1 
 
c_govt2 
 
q_c_corp, 
q_is_corp 
and 
q_total_corp 
 
 
c_corp1 
 
 
31 August 2005 – 30 June 
2014, Datastream 
 
31 May 2002 – 30 June 2014, 
Datastream 
 
31 May 2002 – 30 June 2014, 
Datastream 
 
31 May 2004 – 30 June 2014,  
Datastream 
31 October 2006 – 30 June 
2014, Datastream 
31 May 2002 – 30 June 2014, 
Datastream 
31 January 2003 – 30 June 
2014, Datastream 
30 June 2003 – 30 June 2014, 
Datastream 
 
31 August 2005 – 30 June 
2014, Datastream 
31 May 2002 – 30 June 2014, 
Datastream 
 
31 May 2002 – 30 June 2014, 
Datastream 
 
31 August 2005 – 30 June 
2014, Datastream 
31 May 2002 – 30 June 2014, 
Datastream 
 
31 May 2002 – 30 June 2014, 
Datastream 
 
17 August 2005 – 30 June 
2014, Datastream 
 
2 January 2004 – 30 June 
2014, Datastream 
2 January 2004 – 30 June 
2014, Datastream 
2 January 2004 – 30 June 
2014, Datastream 
10 August 2006 – 16 June 
2014 for daily frequency and 
30 August 2005 – 30 June 
2014 for monthly frequendy, 
provided by Quant Shop 
[www.quantshop.com] 
31 May 2002 – 30 June 2014, 
Datastream 
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Pakistan 
 
 
 
Qatar 
 
 
Turkey 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
UAE 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
UK 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
US 
 
 
 
JPM EMBI Global Pakistan 
 
Barclays EM Asia Pakistan 
 
Barclays Multiverse Qatar 
 
 
Barclays EM Middle East 
Turkey  
 
JPM EMBI Global Turkey 
 
JPM GBI-EM Turkey 
 
FTSE Global Government 
Turkey All Maturities 
 
UAE Middle Eastern 
Conventional Bond Index, 
and UAE Sukuk Index 
 
 
 
 
 
FTSE Sterling Corporate All 
Maturities 
 
Barclays Multiverse United 
Kingdom 
 
FTSE Global Government 
UK All Maturities 
 
UK Total All Lives DS 
Government Index 
 
Barclays US Aggregate 
 
Barclays Multiverse United 
States 
 
FTSE Global Government 
US All Maturities 
 
US Total All Lives DS 
Government Index 
 
Barclays US Aggregate 
Government 
 
Barclays US Treasury 
c_corp1 
 
c_corp2 
 
c_corp1 
 
 
c_corp1 
 
 
c_corp2 
 
c_govt1 
 
c_govt2 
 
 
c_bond and 
is_bond 
 
 
 
 
 
 
c_corp1 
 
 
c_corp2 
 
 
c_govt1 
 
 
c_govt2 
 
 
c_corp1 
 
c_corp2 
 
 
c_govt1 
 
 
c_govt2 
 
 
c_govt3 
 
 
c_govt4 
 
31 May 2002 – 30 June 2014, 
Datastream 
30 April 2004 – 30 June 2014, 
Datastream 
31 August 2005 – June 2014, 
Datastream 
 
31 May 2002 – 30 June 2014, 
Datastream 
 
31 May 2002 – 30 June 2014, 
Datastream 
31 March 2004 – 30 June 
2014, Datastream 
31 January 2003 – 30 June 
2014, Datastream 
 
10 August 2006 – 1 November 
2013 for daily frequency and 
31 December 2004 – 31 
December 2013 for monthly 
frequency, Dubai International 
Financial Exchange, 
[http://www.hsbc-
nasdaqdubai.com/Default.aspx] 
 
31 March 2004 – 30 June 
2014, Datastream 
 
31 August 2005 – 30 June 
2014, Datastream 
 
31 May 2002 – 30 June 2014, 
Datastream 
 
31 May 2002 – 30 June 2014, 
Datastream 
 
31 May 2002 – 30 June 2014, 
Datastream 
31 August 2005 – 30 June 
2014, Datastream 
 
31 May 2002 – 30 June 2014, 
Datastream 
 
31 May 2002 – 30 June 2014, 
Datastream 
31 May 2002 – 30 June 2014, 
Datastream 
 
31 May 2002 – 30 June 2014, 
Datastream 
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Table E.3: List of Data Sources for the Risk-Free Rates in Chapter 4 
Country Name Source and Period 
Australia 
 
 
Bahrain 
 
 
Canada 
 
 
Egypt 
 
 
France, 
Germany, 
Italy  
 
Indonesia 
 
 
Iran 
 
 
 
Japan  
 
 
Malaysia 
 
 
Morocco 
 
 
Pakistan 
 
 
Qatar 
 
Saudi 
Arabia 
 
Turkey 
 
 
UAE 
 
 
UK 
 
 
US 
TR Australian Dollar 3M Deposit 
– Middle Rate 
 
TR Bahraini Dinar 3M Deposit - 
Middle Rate 
 
Canada Alberta Treasury Bill 3M 
- Middle Rate 
 
Egypt 91 Day T-Bill - Middle 
Rate 
 
EBF EURIBOR 3M Delayed - 
Offered Rate 
 
 
Indonesian Interbank 3M - 
Middle Rate 
 
Term Investment Deposit Rates 
[Short-Term] 
 
 
Japan Interbank (Offshore) 3M - 
Offered Rate 
 
Malaysia Interbank 3 Month - 
Middle Rate 
 
TR Moroccan Dirham 3M 
Deposit - Middle Rate 
 
Pakistan KIBOR 3 Month - 
Middle Rate 
 
Qatar Deposit Rate - Middle Rate 
 
SAR Cash Deposit 3 Month (TP) 
- Middle Rate 
 
Turkey Overnight Lending Rate - 
Middle Rate 
 
AED Cash Deposit 3M (TP) 
'Disc' - Middle Rate 
 
Uk Treasury Bill Tender 3m - 
Middle Rate 
 
One-Month Treasury Bill Rate 
From Ibbotson Associates 
31 May 2002 – 30 June 2014, Datastream 
 
 
31 May 2005 – 30 June 2014, Datastream 
 
 
31 May 2002 – 30 June 2014, Datastream 
 
 
31 May 2004 – 30 June 2014, Datastream 
 
 
31 May 2002 – 30 June 2014, Datastream 
 
 
 
31 May 2002 – 30 June 2014, Datastream 
 
 
2006 – 2011 [yearly frequency], Central Bank of the Islamic 
Republic of Iran, [http://www.cbi.ir/page/1495.aspx] 
 
31 May 2002 – 30 June 2014, Datastream 
 
 
31 May 2002 – 30 June 2014, Datastream 
 
 
31 May 2002 – 30 June 2014, Datastream 
 
 
31 May 2002 – 30 June 2014, Datastream 
 
 
31 May 2005 – 30 June 2014, Datastream 
 
30 March 2007 – 30 June 2014, Datastream  
 
 
31 May 2002 – 30 June 2014, Datastream 
 
 
30 June 2006 – 30 June 2014, Datastream 
 
 
31 May 2002 – 30 June 2014, Datastream 
 
 
31 May 2002 – 30 June 2014, Kenneth French’s website 
[http://mba.tuck.dartmouth.edu/pages/faculty/ken.french/ 
Data_Library/f-f_factors.html ] 
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APPENDIX F 
Table F.1: Descriptive Statistics of Asset Returns in Australia 
 c_s1 is_s1 c_corp1 c_govt1 c_govt2 c_govt3 c_govt4 
Panel A: All, 2002 - 2014 
 Mean 0.0029 0.0034 -0.0021 -0.0010 0.0009 0.0009 0.0008 
 Median 0.0123 0.0125 0.0012 0.0012 0.0007 0.0001 0.0010 
 Maximum 0.0767 0.0892 0.0202 0.0291 0.0334 0.0318 0.0338 
 Minimum -0.1210 -0.1707 -0.3307 -0.3208 -0.0259 -0.0239 -0.0276 
 Std. Dev. 0.0384 0.0457 0.0302 0.0282 0.0101 0.0101 0.0110 
 Jarque-Bera 17.3797 37.5810 60237.7600 78765.3100 6.2261 3.6372 4.8272 
 Probability 0.0002 0 0 0 0.0445 0.1623 0.0895 
 Observations 145 145 145 145 145 145 145 
        
Panel B: Pre-Crisis, 2002 - Feb 2008 
 Mean 0.0059 0.0113 -0.0052 -0.0049 -0.0003 -0.0002 -0.0003 
 Median 0.0161 0.0179 0.0001 -0.0004 -0.0005 -0.0010 -0.0003 
 Maximum 0.0504 0.0892 0.0118 0.0206 0.0209 0.0233 0.0218 
 Minimum -0.1189 -0.1013 -0.3307 -0.3208 -0.0170 -0.0178 -0.0174 
 Std. Dev. 0.0320 0.0374 0.0401 0.0394 0.0083 0.0090 0.0089 
 Jarque-Bera 26.0187 3.8999 11707.8100 10617.6900 0.6922 0.8232 1.0754 
 Probability 0.0000 0.1423 0 0 0.7075 0.6626 0.5841 
 Observations 69 69 69 69 69 69 69 
        
Panel C: Crisis, Mar 2008 - Mar 2009     
 Mean -0.0317 -0.0277 0.0023 0.0063 0.0066 0.0068 0.0071 
 Median -0.0453 -0.0344 0.0018 0.0110 0.0084 0.0052 0.0090 
 Maximum 0.0767 0.0885 0.0202 0.0270 0.0305 0.0314 0.0332 
 Minimum -0.1210 -0.1707 -0.0155 -0.0178 -0.0153 -0.0165 -0.0169 
 Std. Dev. 0.0598 0.0841 0.0111 0.0123 0.0142 0.0142 0.0156 
 Jarque-Bera 0.6313 0.6437 0.6339 0.5266 0.5945 0.4471 0.5839 
 Probability 0.7293 0.7248 0.7284 0.7685 0.7429 0.7997 0.7468 
 Observations 13 13 13 13 13 13 13 
        
Panel D: Post-Crisis, Apr 2009 - 2014     
 Mean 0.0068 0.0011 0.0004 0.0019 0.0009 0.0008 0.0008 
 Median 0.0098 0.0023 0.0021 0.0010 0.0007 -0.0001 -0.0006 
 Maximum 0.0668 0.0781 0.0149 0.0291 0.0334 0.0318 0.0338 
 Minimum -0.0825 -0.1001 -0.1316 -0.0155 -0.0259 -0.0239 -0.0276 
 Std. Dev. 0.0364 0.0409 0.0174 0.0091 0.0106 0.0101 0.0116 
 Jarque-Bera 2.4762 2.1380 7344.7570 3.4328 4.0759 2.3149 2.1055 
 Probability 0.2899 0.3434 0 0.1797 0.1303 0.3143 0.3490 
 Observations 63 63 63 63 63 63 63 
 
 
320 
 
Table F.2: Descriptive Statistics of Asset Returns in Bahrain 
 
 c_s1 is_s1 c_s2 is_s2 c_govt1 
Panel A: All, 2005 - 2014    
 Mean -0.0162 -0.0181 -0.0169 -0.0190 0.0029 
 Median -0.0079 -0.0109 -0.0104 -0.0143 0.0016 
 Maximum 0.1606 0.1976 0.1903 0.2165 0.0406 
 Minimum -0.3251 -0.2836 -0.3064 -0.3373 -0.1058 
 Std. Dev. 0.0733 0.0778 0.0725 0.0789 0.0184 
 Jarque-Bera 111.3046 29.5753 89.6811 60.8882 671.1804 
 Probability 0 0 0 0 0 
 Observations 109 109 109 109 109 
      
Panel B: Pre-Crisis, 2005 - Feb 2008   
 Mean 0.0044 0.0041 0.0042 0.0037 0.0013 
 Median 0.0045 -0.0062 0.0045 -0.0062 0.0007 
 Maximum 0.1281 0.1558 0.1281 0.1558 0.0115 
 Minimum -0.1066 -0.1283 -0.1066 -0.1283 -0.0054 
 Std. Dev. 0.0581 0.0696 0.0581 0.0696 0.0034 
 Jarque-Bera 1.1572 1.3280 1.2563 1.4555 5.1215 
 Probability 0.5607 0.5148 0.5336 0.4830 0.0772 
 Observations 33 33 33 33 33 
      
Panel C: Crisis, Mar 2008 - Mar 2009   
 Mean -0.0875 -0.0933 -0.0944 -0.1024 -0.0005 
 Median -0.0625 -0.1015 -0.0556 -0.1193 -0.0005 
 Maximum 0.1349 0.1323 0.1095 0.1055 -0.0003 
 Minimum -0.3251 -0.2836 -0.3064 -0.3373 -0.0007 
 Std. Dev. 0.1320 0.1286 0.1316 0.1376 0.0001 
 Jarque-Bera 0.4110 0.6282 0.8316 0.6319 0.7440 
 Probability 0.8142 0.7304 0.6598 0.7291 0.6894 
 Observations 13 13 13 13 13 
      
Panel D: Post-Crisis, Apr 2009 - 2014   
 Mean -0.0122 -0.0142 -0.0120 -0.0136 0.0044 
 Median -0.0079 -0.0098 -0.0105 -0.0118 0.0067 
 Maximum 0.1606 0.1976 0.1903 0.2165 0.0406 
 Minimum -0.2488 -0.2488 -0.1776 -0.1776 -0.1058 
 Std. Dev. 0.0541 0.0581 0.0504 0.0539 0.0240 
 Jarque-Bera 91.9767 71.6839 48.7602 66.8410 136.6965 
 Probability 0 0 0 0 0 
 Observations 63 63 63 63 63 
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Table F.3: Descriptive Statistics of Asset Returns in Canada 
 
 c_s1 is_s1 c_s2 is_s2 c_corp1 c_govt1 
Panel A: All, 2002 - 2014     
 Mean 0.0050 0.0049 0.0031 0.0031 -0.0031 0.0028 
 Median 0.0122 0.0102 0.0099 0.0061 -0.0055 0.0029 
 Maximum 0.1117 0.1343 0.1130 0.1396 0.1035 0.0457 
 Minimum -0.1819 -0.2392 -0.1872 -0.2465 -0.0857 -0.0264 
 Std. Dev. 0.0405 0.0529 0.0400 0.0558 0.0315 0.0123 
 Jarque-Bera 112.1179 142.6112 121.8374 143.9051 8.0341 1.7813 
 Probability 0 0 0 0 0.0180 0.4104 
 Observations 145 145 145 145 106 145 
       
Panel B: Pre-Crisis, 2002 - Feb 2008    
 Mean 0.0076 0.0113 0.0064 0.0082 -0.0115 0.0027 
 Median 0.0132 0.0113 0.0125 0.0141 -0.0089 0.0040 
 Maximum 0.0597 0.1020 0.0565 0.1067 0.0569 0.0301 
 Minimum -0.0806 -0.1159 -0.0782 -0.1042 -0.0620 -0.0187 
 Std. Dev. 0.0334 0.0462 0.0322 0.0481 0.0274 0.0108 
 Jarque-Bera 7.4934 4.9675 7.4509 3.7201 0.0144 1.2635 
 Probability 0.0236 0.0834 0.0241 0.1557 0.9928 0.5317 
 Observations 69 69 69 69 30 69 
       
Panel C: Crisis, Mar 2008 - Mar 2009    
 Mean -0.0312 -0.0307 -0.0330 -0.0338 0.0156 0.0053 
 Median -0.0320 -0.0046 -0.0359 0.0001 0.0142 0.0017 
 Maximum 0.0813 0.0847 0.0796 0.0877 0.1035 0.0457 
 Minimum -0.1819 -0.2392 -0.1872 -0.2465 -0.0321 -0.0231 
 Std. Dev. 0.0757 0.1018 0.0754 0.1068 0.0366 0.0177 
 Jarque-Bera 0.6261 2.2535 0.5783 2.5151 1.7360 0.9739 
 Probability 0.7312 0.3241 0.7489 0.2843 0.4198 0.6145 
 Observations 13 13 13 13 13 13 
       
Panel D: Post-Crisis, Apr 2009 - 2014    
 Mean 0.0096 0.0051 0.0069 0.0051 -0.0030 0.0023 
 Median 0.0125 0.0102 0.0124 0.0060 -0.0059 -0.0003 
 Maximum 0.1117 0.1343 0.1130 0.1396 0.0774 0.0291 
 Minimum -0.0889 -0.1188 -0.0917 -0.1412 -0.0857 -0.0264 
 Std. Dev. 0.0343 0.0429 0.0344 0.0464 0.0310 0.0126 
 Jarque-Bera 3.3502 1.9264 3.9038 3.5836 2.3548 0.3188 
 Probability 0.1873 0.3817 0.1420 0.1667 0.3081 0.8526 
 Observations 63 63 63 63 63 63 
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Table F.4: Descriptive Statistics of Asset Returns in Egypt 
 
 
 c_s1 is_s1 c_corp1 
Panel A: All, 2004 - 2014  
 Mean 0.0077 0.0064 -0.0022 
 Median 0.0091 0.0027 -0.0019 
 Maximum 0.3079 0.3860 0.0823 
 Minimum -0.3839 -0.4147 -0.1303 
 Std. Dev. 0.1009 0.1010 0.0267 
 Jarque-Bera 15.8164 47.7157 175.2104 
 Probability 0.0004 0 0 
 Observations 121 121 121 
    
Panel B: Pre-Crisis, 2004 - Feb 2008 
 Mean 0.0404 0.0413 -0.0054 
 Median 0.0388 0.0289 -0.0035 
 Maximum 0.3079 0.3860 0.0149 
 Minimum -0.1931 -0.1758 -0.0414 
 Std. Dev. 0.0886 0.0948 0.0119 
 Jarque-Bera 3.9082 25.7244 5.1974 
 Probability 0.1417 0 0.0744 
 Observations 45 45 45 
    
Panel C: Crisis, Mar 2008 - Mar 2009 
 Mean -0.0783 -0.0746 -0.0004 
 Median -0.0805 -0.0764 -0.0020 
 Maximum 0.1493 0.1318 0.0297 
 Minimum -0.3839 -0.4147 -0.0217 
 Std. Dev. 0.1431 0.1398 0.0150 
 Jarque-Bera 0.1241 1.8957 0.6550 
 Probability 0.9398 0.3876 0.7207 
 Observations 13 13 13 
    
Panel D: Post-Crisis, Apr 2009 - 2014 
 Mean 0.0020 -0.0018 -0.0003 
 Median 0.0048 0.0017 -0.0004 
 Maximum 0.2422 0.2039 0.0823 
 Minimum -0.2333 -0.2335 -0.1303 
 Std. Dev. 0.0883 0.0853 0.0350 
 Jarque-Bera 0.6448 0.9118 30.4117 
 Probability 0.7244 0.6339 0 
 Observations 63 63 63 
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Table F.5: Descriptive Statistics of Asset Returns in France 
 
 c_s1 is_s1 c_corp1 c_govt1 c_govt2 
Panel A: All, 2002 - 2014    
 Mean 0.0016 0.0019 -0.0023 0.0023 0.0028 
 Median 0.0116 0.0083 -0.0018 0.0030 0.0035 
 Maximum 0.1259 0.0933 0.0985 0.0440 0.0390 
 Minimum -0.1769 -0.1534 -0.0851 -0.0309 -0.0277 
 Std. Dev. 0.0524 0.0467 0.0297 0.0138 0.0121 
 Jarque-Bera 22.8860 23.0760 32.8862 6.3795 3.1242 
 Probability 0 0 0 0.0412 0.2097 
 Observations 145 145 145 106 145 
      
Panel B: Pre-Crisis, 2002 - Feb 2008   
 Mean 0.0010 0.0012 -0.0067 -0.0016 0.0018 
 Median 0.0126 0.0086 -0.0018 -0.0019 0.0028 
 Maximum 0.1216 0.0905 0.0127 0.0196 0.0208 
 Minimum -0.1769 -0.1534 -0.0534 -0.0164 -0.0168 
 Std. Dev. 0.0509 0.0454 0.0132 0.0089 0.0094 
 Jarque-Bera 30.0095 26.8068 70.3719 0.6268 2.0500 
 Probability 0 0 0 0.7309 0.3588 
 Observations 69 69 69 30 69 
      
Panel C: Crisis, Mar 2008 - Mar 2009   
 Mean -0.0406 -0.0343 0.0070 0.0030 0.0030 
 Median -0.0218 -0.0409 0.0094 0.0049 0.0053 
 Maximum 0.0582 0.0672 0.0985 0.0396 0.0390 
 Minimum -0.1554 -0.1403 -0.0814 -0.0169 -0.0170 
 Std. Dev. 0.0670 0.0630 0.0524 0.0163 0.0162 
 Jarque-Bera 0.8238 0.4734 0.3745 0.6853 0.6741 
 Probability 0.6624 0.7892 0.8292 0.7099 0.7139 
 Observations 13 13 13 13 13 
      
      
Panel D: Post-Crisis, Apr 2009 - 2014   
 Mean 0.0109 0.0102 0.0005 0.0039 0.0038 
 Median 0.0210 0.0180 -0.0007 0.0056 0.0046 
 Maximum 0.1259 0.0933 0.0906 0.0440 0.0381 
 Minimum -0.1168 -0.1035 -0.0851 -0.0309 -0.0277 
 Std. Dev. 0.0469 0.0412 0.0357 0.0150 0.0138 
 Jarque-Bera 0.9938 1.2620 1.1708 1.1503 0.5341 
 Probability 0.6084 0.5321 0.5569 0.5626 0.7656 
 Observations 63 63 63 63 63 
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Table F.6: Descriptive Statistics of Asset Returns in Germany 
 
 
 c_s1 is_s1 c_corp1 c_govt1 c_govt2 
Panel A: All, 2002 - 2014    
 Mean 0.0032 0.0053 -0.0024 0.0025 0.0025 
 Median 0.0151 0.0146 -0.0044 0.0036 0.0033 
 Maximum 0.1880 0.1693 0.1052 0.0370 0.0372 
 Minimum -0.2895 -0.2534 -0.0833 -0.0271 -0.0253 
 Std. Dev. 0.0641 0.0628 0.0349 0.0118 0.0115 
 Jarque-Bera 111.7395 106.2473 8.1135 1.7281 2.4100 
 Probability 0 0 0.0173 0.4215 0.2997 
 Observations 145 145 106 145 145 
      
Panel B: Pre-Crisis, 2002 - Feb 2008   
 Mean 0.0030 0.0064 -0.0119 0.0018 0.0018 
 Median 0.0167 0.0167 -0.0095 0.0034 0.0029 
 Maximum 0.1880 0.1693 0.0140 0.0211 0.0213 
 Minimum -0.2895 -0.2534 -0.0522 -0.0162 -0.0163 
 Std. Dev. 0.0684 0.0651 0.0180 0.0095 0.0093 
 Jarque-Bera 86.1646 76.3933 2.1021 2.2639 1.9794 
 Probability 0 0 0.3496 0.3224 0.3717 
 Observations 69 69 30 69 69 
      
Panel C: Crisis, Mar 2008 - Mar 2009   
 Mean -0.0459 -0.0423 0.0086 0.0036 0.0038 
 Median -0.0359 -0.0364 0.0102 0.0087 0.0069 
 Maximum 0.0590 0.0840 0.1052 0.0344 0.0360 
 Minimum -0.1626 -0.2080 -0.0800 -0.0163 -0.0164 
 Std. Dev. 0.0749 0.0828 0.0535 0.0149 0.0153 
 Jarque-Bera 1.0961 0.3326 0.3582 0.4228 0.4825 
 Probability 0.5781 0.8468 0.8360 0.8095 0.7857 
 Observations 13 13 13 13 13 
      
Panel D: Post-Crisis, Apr 2009 - 2014   
 Mean 0.0136 0.0139 -0.0001 0.0031 0.0032 
 Median 0.0203 0.0146 -0.0028 0.0038 0.0033 
 Maximum 0.1593 0.1477 0.0896 0.0370 0.0372 
 Minimum -0.2088 -0.2012 -0.0833 -0.0271 -0.0253 
 Std. Dev. 0.0522 0.0514 0.0357 0.0133 0.0130 
 Jarque-Bera 56.6349 44.0788 1.2832 0.9660 1.1157 
 Probability 0 0 0.5264 0.6169 0.5724 
 Observations 63 63 63 63 63 
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Table F.7: Descriptive Statistics of Asset Returns in Indonesia 
 
 c_s1 is_s1 c_corp1 c_corp2 c_corp3 c_govt1 
Panel A: All, 2002 - 2014     
 Mean 0.0107 0.0103 0.0013 -0.0013 -0.0048 0.0025 
 Median 0.0231 0.0175 -0.0022 -0.0063 -0.0072 0.0021 
 Maximum 0.1847 0.2396 0.1081 0.1310 0.1080 0.1794 
 Minimum -0.3677 -0.3725 -0.1105 -0.1432 -0.2060 -0.2074 
 Std. Dev. 0.0751 0.0816 0.0269 0.0279 0.0322 0.0401 
 Jarque-Bera 119.2860 100.2842 66.3151 429.4037 703.6919 327.4130 
 Probability 0 0 0 0 0 0 
 Observations 145 145 145 145 145 145 
       
Panel B: Pre-Crisis, 2002 - Feb 2008    
 Mean 0.0210 0.0246 -0.0022 -0.0077 -0.0078 0.0020 
 Median 0.0283 0.0313 -0.0072 -0.0077 -0.0081 0.0015 
 Maximum 0.1495 0.2124 0.0613 0.0228 0.0460 0.0604 
 Minimum -0.1781 -0.1922 -0.0498 -0.0334 -0.0549 -0.1230 
 Std. Dev. 0.0691 0.0773 0.0201 0.0086 0.0220 0.0262 
 Jarque-Bera 3.5726 2.0919 17.0366 62.9266 1.2131 125.6065 
 Probability 0.1676 0.3514 0.0002 0 0.5452 0 
 Observations 69 69 69 69 69 69 
       
Panel C: Crisis, Mar 2008 - Mar 2009    
 Mean -0.0572 -0.0734 -0.0020 -0.0042 -0.0042 -0.0071 
 Median -0.0487 -0.0981 0.0104 0.0046 0.0016 -0.0100 
 Maximum 0.1466 0.1356 0.0783 0.1310 0.0916 0.1794 
 Minimum -0.3677 -0.3725 -0.1105 -0.1432 -0.2060 -0.2074 
 Std. Dev. 0.1310 0.1436 0.0523 0.0676 0.0754 0.1004 
 Jarque-Bera 1.6473 0.6923 0.7846 0.0972 6.2871 0.0201 
 Probability 0.4388 0.7074 0.6755 0.9526 0.0431 0.9900 
 Observations 13 13 13 13 13 13 
       
Panel D: Post-Crisis, Apr 2009 - 2014    
 Mean 0.0135 0.0119 0.0057 0.0064 -0.0016 0.0052 
 Median 0.0241 0.0162 0.0029 0.0052 -0.0050 0.0092 
 Maximum 0.1847 0.2396 0.1081 0.1081 0.1080 0.0718 
 Minimum -0.1112 -0.1022 -0.0506 -0.0528 -0.0642 -0.0823 
 Std. Dev. 0.0587 0.0567 0.0258 0.0271 0.0275 0.0316 
 Jarque-Bera 1.7729 31.7645 27.8570 15.2553 26.4780 4.7756 
 Probability 0.4121 0 0 0.0005 0.0000 0.0918 
 Observations 63 63 63 63 63 63 
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Table F.8: Descriptive Statistics of Asset Returns in Iran 
 
 is_s1 is_s2 is_s3 is_s4 
Panel A: All, 2006 - 2014   
 Mean 0.0157 0.0187 0.0163 0.0098 
 Median 0.0071 0.0164 0.0149 0.0013 
 Maximum 0.1841 0.1722 0.2055 0.2397 
 Minimum -0.1221 -0.1293 -0.1418 -0.1751 
 Std. Dev. 0.0626 0.0605 0.0629 0.0741 
 Jarque-Bera 4.2999 1.2367 3.0420 8.4123 
 Probability 0.1165 0.5388 0.2185 0.0149 
 Observations 95 95 95 95 
     
Panel B: Pre-Crisis, 2006 - Feb 2008  
 Mean -0.0008 0.0073 -0.0012 -0.0152 
 Median -0.0031 -0.0009 -0.0017 -0.0099 
 Maximum 0.0458 0.0648 0.0547 0.0629 
 Minimum -0.0623 -0.0485 -0.0590 -0.0997 
 Std. Dev. 0.0283 0.0348 0.0329 0.0356 
 Jarque-Bera 0.3257 0.8512 0.5223 0.3590 
 Probability 0.8497 0.6534 0.7702 0.8357 
 Observations 19 19 19 19 
     
Panel C: Crisis, Mar 2008 - Mar 2009  
 Mean -0.0234 -0.0173 -0.0266 -0.0579 
 Median -0.0350 -0.0318 -0.0398 -0.0345 
 Maximum 0.1368 0.1156 0.0859 0.0118 
 Minimum -0.1221 -0.1293 -0.1418 -0.1751 
 Std. Dev. 0.0731 0.0739 0.0669 0.0672 
 Jarque-Bera 1.6088 0.6953 0.3312 1.5161 
 Probability 0.4474 0.7064 0.8474 0.4686 
 Observations 13 13 13 13 
     
Panel D: Post-Crisis, Apr 2009 - 2014  
 Mean 0.0288 0.0296 0.0305 0.0314 
 Median 0.0152 0.0280 0.0296 0.0281 
 Maximum 0.1841 0.1722 0.2055 0.2397 
 Minimum -0.0782 -0.0809 -0.0847 -0.0959 
 Std. Dev. 0.0641 0.0609 0.0643 0.0738 
 Jarque-Bera 2.9372 1.4532 1.8650 4.9744 
 Probability 0.2302 0.4835 0.3936 0.0831 
 Observations 63 63 63 63 
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Table F.9: Descriptive Statistics of Asset Returns in Italy 
 
 c_s1 is_s1 c_corp1 c_corp2 c_govt1 c_govt2 
Panel A: All, 2002 - 2014     
 Mean -0.0005 0.0033 0.0009 -0.0025 0.0030 0.0032 
 Median 0.0078 0.0109 0.0007 0.0021 0.0038 0.0037 
 Maximum 0.1761 0.1774 0.0328 0.0880 0.0535 0.0595 
 Minimum -0.1709 -0.1454 -0.0422 -0.0900 -0.0592 -0.0553 
 Std. Dev. 0.0594 0.0519 0.0113 0.0315 0.0166 0.0166 
 Jarque-Bera 7.1113 16.1570 75.7740 2.6450 53.9004 48.9737 
 Probability 0.0286 0.0003 0 0.2665 0 0 
 Observations 145 145 132 106 145 145 
       
Panel B: Pre-Crisis, 2002 - Feb 2008    
 Mean 0.0026 0.0059 -0.0010 -0.0128 0.0018 0.0019 
 Median 0.0094 0.0156 -0.0013 -0.0102 0.0035 0.0035 
 Maximum 0.1036 0.0817 0.0078 0.0143 0.0211 0.0214 
 Minimum -0.1587 -0.1378 -0.0083 -0.0561 -0.0193 -0.0193 
 Std. Dev. 0.0451 0.0438 0.0042 0.0195 0.0099 0.0100 
 Jarque-Bera 24.7124 31.8718 2.3580 1.9119 3.2518 2.8878 
 Probability 0.0000 0 0.3076 0.3844 0.1967 0.2360 
 Observations 69 69 56 30 69 69 
       
Panel C: Crisis, Mar 2008 - Mar 2009    
 Mean -0.0548 -0.0406 -0.0113 0.0058 0.0008 0.0007 
 Median -0.0607 -0.0495 -0.0084 0.0058 -0.0019 -0.0017 
 Maximum 0.0742 0.0919 0.0027 0.0880 0.0265 0.0272 
 Minimum -0.1709 -0.1436 -0.0398 -0.0900 -0.0201 -0.0199 
 Std. Dev. 0.0718 0.0663 0.0140 0.0524 0.0135 0.0140 
 Jarque-Bera 0.4309 0.4216 2.3914 0.3716 0.3142 0.5135 
 Probability 0.8062 0.8099 0.3025 0.8304 0.8546 0.7736 
 Observations 13 13 13 13 13 13 
       
Panel D: Post-Crisis, Apr 2009 - 2014    
 Mean 0.0074 0.0096 0.0051 0.0006 0.0048 0.0052 
 Median 0.0154 0.0111 0.0057 0.0065 0.0057 0.0052 
 Maximum 0.1761 0.1774 0.0328 0.0773 0.0535 0.0595 
 Minimum -0.1622 -0.1454 -0.0422 -0.0803 -0.0592 -0.0553 
 Std. Dev. 0.0653 0.0534 0.0127 0.0300 0.0222 0.0220 
 Jarque-Bera 0.4564 7.5899 17.3388 1.8649 5.8507 4.6034 
 Probability 0.7960 0.0225 0.0002 0.3936 0.0536 0.1001 
 Observations 63 63 63 63 63 63 
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Table F.10: Descriptive Statistics of Asset Returns in Japan 
 
 c_s1 is_s1 c_s2 is_s2 c_corp1 c_govt1 c_govt2 
Panel A: All, 2002 - 2014      
 Mean 0.0018 0.0011 0.0013 0.0010 -0.0010 0.0012 0.0011 
 Median 0.0032 0.0029 0.0015 0.0039 -0.0025 0.0016 0.0016 
 Maximum 0.1193 0.1097 0.1365 0.1020 0.0857 0.0209 0.0163 
 Minimum -0.2372 -0.2511 -0.2468 -0.2194 -0.0744 -0.0216 -0.0217 
 Std. Dev. 0.0547 0.0555 0.0573 0.0509 0.0265 0.0057 0.0054 
 Jarque-Bera 27.5339 53.9621 27.3124 41.2542 7.3762 43.7922 47.7957 
 Probability 0 0 0 0 0.0250 0 0 
 Observations 145 145 145 145 106 145 145 
        
Panel B: Pre-Crisis, 2002 - Feb 2008     
 Mean 0.0034 0.0016 0.0034 0.0007 -0.0027 0.0011 0.0008 
 Median 0.0048 0.0029 0.0083 0.0027 -0.0020 0.0012 0.0011 
 Maximum 0.1182 0.0874 0.1256 0.0824 0.0397 0.0209 0.0156 
 Minimum -0.0969 -0.1113 -0.0967 -0.1127 -0.0469 -0.0216 -0.0217 
 Std. Dev. 0.0433 0.0430 0.0447 0.0410 0.0213 0.0061 0.0056 
 Jarque-Bera 0.1028 1.4319 0.0349 1.2233 0.3818 25.2646 32.4410 
 Probability 0.9499 0.4887 0.9827 0.5425 0.8262 0 0 
 Observations 69 69 69 69 30 69 69 
        
Panel C: Crisis, Mar 2008 - Mar 2009     
 Mean -0.0421 -0.0430 -0.0459 -0.0405 -0.0047 0.0008 0.0008 
 Median -0.0454 -0.0286 -0.0410 -0.0340 0.0003 0.0027 0.0025 
 Maximum 0.1182 0.1009 0.1365 0.0952 0.0857 0.0159 0.0163 
 Minimum -0.2372 -0.2511 -0.2468 -0.2194 -0.0744 -0.0174 -0.0172 
 Std. Dev. 0.0887 0.0949 0.0943 0.0849 0.0401 0.0085 0.0087 
 Jarque-Bera 0.4240 0.9385 0.1851 0.6666 0.5692 0.3372 0.2014 
 Probability 0.8090 0.6255 0.9116 0.7165 0.7523 0.8449 0.9042 
 Observations 13 13 13 13 13 13 13 
        
Panel D: Post-Crisis, Apr 2009 - 2014     
 Mean 0.0091 0.0098 0.0087 0.0099 0.0006 0.0014 0.0014 
 Median 0.0078 0.0104 0.0046 0.0101 -0.0026 0.0019 0.0021 
 Maximum 0.1193 0.1097 0.1238 0.1020 0.0771 0.0115 0.0107 
 Minimum -0.1168 -0.1219 -0.1211 -0.1207 -0.0436 -0.0115 -0.0119 
 Std. Dev. 0.0539 0.0538 0.0565 0.0483 0.0257 0.0045 0.0044 
 Jarque-Bera 0.4746 0.7163 0.2964 1.0107 4.4986 4.2504 5.3028 
 Probability 0.7888 0.6990 0.8622 0.6033 0.1055 0.1194 0.0706 
 Observations 63 63 63 63 63 63 63 
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Table F.11: Descriptive Statistics of Asset Returns in Malaysia 
 
 c_s1 is_s1 c_s2 is_s2 q_c_c q_c_is q_c_t c_corp1 c_corp2 c_govt1 c_govt2 
Panel A: All, 2002 - 2014          
 Mean 0.0061 0.0081 0.0076 0.0077 0.0023 0.0021 0.0022 -0.0050 0.0020 0.0008 0.0004 
 Median 0.0093 0.0120 0.0100 0.0125 0.0018 0.0027 0.0023 -0.0061 0.0012 0.0016 0.0016 
 Maximum 0.1237 0.1576 0.1372 0.1341 0.0235 0.0130 0.0161 0.0592 0.0981 0.0384 0.0880 
 Minimum -0.1640 -0.2094 -0.1766 -0.1691 -0.0172 -0.0171 -0.0172 -0.0438 -0.1120 -0.0334 -0.1284 
 Std. Dev. 0.0405 0.0450 0.0433 0.0446 0.0060 0.0048 0.0052 0.0186 0.0225 0.0090 0.0226 
 Jarque-Bera 41.9264 107.3289 52.7983 37.8456 12.3265 18.8660 10.8837 25.5813 194.8994 101.4944 461.4127 
 Probability 0 0 0 0 0.0021 0.0001 0.0043 0.0000 0 0 0 
 Observations 145 145 92 92 106 106 106 106 145 145 145 
            
Panel B: Pre-Crisis, 2002 - Feb 2008         
 Mean 0.0090 0.0130 0.0216 0.0255 0.0018 0.0021 0.0020 -0.0106 0.0013 0.0011 0.0004 
 Median 0.0110 0.0086 0.0225 0.0291 0.0005 -0.0001 0.0002 -0.0117 0.0034 0.0022 0.0047 
 Maximum 0.1203 0.1576 0.0886 0.0889 0.0149 0.0127 0.0142 0.0142 0.0445 0.0301 0.0880 
 Minimum -0.1100 -0.1115 -0.0798 -0.0808 -0.0081 -0.0084 -0.0081 -0.0339 -0.0493 -0.0264 -0.1284 
 Std. Dev. 0.0400 0.0451 0.0457 0.0466 0.0060 0.0058 0.0057 0.0126 0.0198 0.0094 0.0316 
 Jarque-Bera 1.7590 4.4154 0.7494 1.1853 1.1614 1.0038 1.0763 0.8847 0.6363 7.1919 41.1502 
 Probability 0.4150 0.1100 0.6875 0.5529 0.5595 0.6054 0.5838 0.6425 0.7275 0.0274 0 
 Observations 69 69 16 16 30 30 30 30 69 69 69 
            
Panel C: Crisis, Mar 2008 - Mar 2009         
 Mean -0.0349 -0.0362 -0.0367 -0.0385 0.0014 0.0010 0.0012 0.0060 0.0076 0.0009 0.0009 
 Median -0.0151 -0.0034 -0.0221 -0.0107 0.0033 0.0027 0.0030 -0.0031 0.0074 0.0016 0.0016 
 Maximum 0.0176 0.0486 0.0221 0.0261 0.0143 0.0119 0.0135 0.0502 0.0981 0.0384 0.0384 
 Minimum -0.1640 -0.2094 -0.1766 -0.1691 -0.0172 -0.0171 -0.0172 -0.0242 -0.1120 -0.0334 -0.0334 
 Std. Dev. 0.0555 0.0751 0.0569 0.0602 0.0083 0.0074 0.0079 0.0257 0.0471 0.0182 0.0182 
330 
 
 Jarque-Bera 2.1607 1.6177 3.1200 1.5708 0.8573 2.5771 1.3107 1.2129 3.6393 0.0953 0.0953 
 Probability 0.3395 0.4454 0.2101 0.4559 0.6514 0.2757 0.5193 0.5453 0.1621 0.9535 0.9535 
 Observations 13 13 13 13 13 13 13 13 13 13 13 
            
Panel D: Post-Crisis, Apr 2009 - 2014         
 Mean 0.0115 0.0119 0.0132 0.0127 0.0027 0.0024 0.0025 -0.0046 0.0016 0.0004 0.0004 
 Median 0.0118 0.0147 0.0111 0.0135 0.0018 0.0028 0.0024 -0.0038 -0.0009 0.0014 0.0014 
 Maximum 0.1237 0.1073 0.1372 0.1341 0.0235 0.0130 0.0161 0.0592 0.0454 0.0106 0.0106 
 Minimum -0.0775 -0.0669 -0.0746 -0.0775 -0.0075 -0.0051 -0.0057 -0.0438 -0.0466 -0.0184 -0.0184 
 Std. Dev. 0.0326 0.0304 0.0335 0.0337 0.0055 0.0035 0.0041 0.0186 0.0174 0.0052 0.0052 
 Jarque-Bera 13.2868 5.3952 21.8192 16.8588 31.3602 2.9041 14.6556 13.4426 1.9411 37.4194 37.4194 
 Probability 0.0013 0.0674 0.0000 0.0002 0 0.2341 0.0007 0.0012 0.3789 0 0 
 Observations 63 63 63 63 63 63 63 63 63 63 63 
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Table F.12: Descriptive Statistics of Asset Returns in Morocco 
 c_s1 is_s1 c_corp1 
Panel A: All, 2002 - 2014  
 Mean 0.0035 0.0010 -0.0005 
 Median 0.0035 -0.0003 -0.0032 
 Maximum 0.1826 0.1622 0.0759 
 Minimum -0.1883 -0.1740 -0.1945 
 Std. Dev. 0.0512 0.0512 0.0221 
 Jarque-Bera 18.5228 10.8566 10204.8300 
 Probability 0.0001 0.0044 0 
 Observations 145 145 145 
    
Panel B: Pre-Crisis, 2002 - Feb 2008 
 Mean 0.0174 0.0127 -0.0038 
 Median 0.0163 0.0138 -0.0042 
 Maximum 0.1826 0.1622 0.0147 
 Minimum -0.1883 -0.1740 -0.0120 
 Std. Dev. 0.0541 0.0595 0.0032 
 Jarque-Bera 31.7570 7.5708 895.4199 
 Probability 0 0.0227 0 
 Observations 69 69 69 
    
Panel C: Crisis, Mar 2008 - Mar 2009 
 Mean -0.0288 -0.0167 -0.0038 
 Median -0.0264 -0.0189 -0.0009 
 Maximum 0.1180 0.0693 0.0759 
 Minimum -0.1206 -0.0779 -0.1945 
 Std. Dev. 0.0625 0.0481 0.0666 
 Jarque-Bera 1.2400 0.9319 13.1595 
 Probability 0.5379 0.6275 0.0014 
 Observations 13 13 13 
    
Panel D: Post-Crisis, Apr 2009 - 2014 
 Mean -0.0052 -0.0083 0.0038 
 Median -0.0044 -0.0140 0.0049 
 Maximum 0.0933 0.0816 0.0312 
 Minimum -0.0893 -0.0934 -0.0499 
 Std. Dev. 0.0402 0.0381 0.0154 
 Jarque-Bera 0.2803 0.4966 17.2488 
 Probability 0.8692 0.7801 0.0002 
 Observations 63 63 63 
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Table F.13: Descriptive Statistics of Asset Returns in Pakistan 
 c_s1 is_s1 c_corp1 c_corp2 
Panel A: All, 2002 - 2014   
 Mean 0.0111 0.0125 -0.0001 -0.0040 
 Median 0.0109 0.0100 0.0006 -0.0050 
 Maximum 0.2350 0.2458 0.1538 0.1535 
 Minimum -0.7018 -0.6862 -0.4722 -0.2382 
 Std. Dev. 0.0945 0.0979 0.0617 0.0501 
 Jarque-Bera 2928.2290 1852.1430 4255.1370 201.9686 
 Probability 0 0 0 0 
 Observations 145 145 145 122 
     
Panel B: Pre-Crisis, 2002 - Feb 2008  
 Mean 0.0264 0.0219 -0.0066 -0.0072 
 Median 0.0271 0.0171 -0.0021 -0.0062 
 Maximum 0.2350 0.2308 0.0592 0.0410 
 Minimum -0.1808 -0.1941 -0.4722 -0.0825 
 Std. Dev. 0.0746 0.0850 0.0608 0.0190 
 Jarque-Bera 0.4777 0.8371 7246.0810 71.6602 
 Probability 0.7875 0.6580 0 0 
 Observations 69 69 69 46 
     
Panel C: Crisis, Mar 2008 - Mar 2009  
 Mean -0.0784 -0.0647 -0.0228 -0.0389 
 Median -0.0183 -0.0150 0.0010 -0.0161 
 Maximum 0.2073 0.2458 0.1538 0.1503 
 Minimum -0.7018 -0.6862 -0.2859 -0.2382 
 Std. Dev. 0.2238 0.2165 0.1140 0.1056 
 Jarque-Bera 10.0466 13.6579 1.3104 0.3597 
 Probability 0.0066 0.0011 0.5193 0.8354 
 Observations 13 13 13 13 
     
Panel D: Post-Crisis, Apr 2009 - 2014  
 Mean 0.0127 0.0182 0.0117 0.0055 
 Median 0.0104 0.0108 0.0088 0.0036 
 Maximum 0.1573 0.2174 0.1448 0.1535 
 Minimum -0.1293 -0.1075 -0.0820 -0.1375 
 Std. Dev. 0.0549 0.0621 0.0444 0.0461 
 Jarque-Bera 1.1403 6.2509 4.1307 8.2858 
 Probability 0.5654 0.0439 0.1268 0.0159 
 Observations 63 63 63 63 
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Table F.14: Descriptive Statistics of Asset Returns in Qatar 
 
 c_s1 is_s1 c_s2 is_s2 c_corp1 
Panel A: All, 2005 - 2014    
 Mean 0.0036 0.0037 0.0040 0.0035 -0.0028 
 Median 0.0077 0.0090 0.0054 0.0056 -0.0011 
 Maximum 0.2086 0.2688 0.2102 0.2486 0.0578 
 Minimum -0.3093 -0.3181 -0.3164 -0.3418 -0.1848 
 Std. Dev. 0.0895 0.0976 0.0880 0.0926 0.0253 
 Jarque-Bera 28.1987 29.5313 27.6177 37.3963 2733.4160 
 Probability 0 0 0 0 0 
 Observations 109 109 109 109 106 
      
Panel B: Pre-Crisis, 2005 - Feb 2008   
 Mean 0.0033 0.0018 0.0029 0.0002 -0.0077 
 Median -0.0051 -0.0170 -0.0057 -0.0066 -0.0045 
 Maximum 0.1996 0.2509 0.2102 0.2260 0.0146 
 Minimum -0.2099 -0.2127 -0.2034 -0.2003 -0.0346 
 Std. Dev. 0.1002 0.0993 0.0991 0.0911 0.0125 
 Jarque-Bera 0.0046 0.8225 0.0757 0.2370 1.0052 
 Probability 0.9977 0.6628 0.9629 0.8883 0.6050 
 Observations 33 33 33 33 30 
      
Panel C: Crisis, Mar 2008 - Mar 2009   
 Mean -0.0537 -0.0504 -0.0534 -0.0489 -0.0128 
 Median -0.0897 -0.1020 -0.0711 -0.0706 0.0011 
 Maximum 0.2086 0.2688 0.1889 0.2486 0.0518 
 Minimum -0.3093 -0.3181 -0.3164 -0.3418 -0.1848 
 Std. Dev. 0.1597 0.1875 0.1602 0.1817 0.0596 
 Jarque-Bera 0.4763 0.5924 0.5061 0.3619 14.4917 
 Probability 0.7881 0.7436 0.7764 0.8345 0.0007 
 Observations 13 13 13 13 13 
      
Panel D: Post-Crisis, Apr 2009 - 2014   
 Mean 0.0156 0.0159 0.0165 0.0159 0.0017 
 Median 0.0155 0.0116 0.0157 0.0202 0.0020 
 Maximum 0.1449 0.1905 0.1479 0.1815 0.0578 
 Minimum -0.2461 -0.2880 -0.1754 -0.2347 -0.0374 
 Std. Dev. 0.0548 0.0626 0.0510 0.0593 0.0164 
 Jarque-Bera 165.6588 204.5770 25.0949 71.5378 8.6016 
 Probability 0 0 0 0 0.0136 
 Observations 63 63 63 63 63 
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Table F.15: Descriptive Statistics of Asset Returns in Saudi Arabia 
 
 c_s1 is_s1 
Panel A: All, 2007 - 2014 
 Mean 0.0030 0.0047 
 Median 0.0147 0.0122 
 Maximum 0.1880 0.1815 
 Minimum -0.2923 -0.3255 
 Std. Dev. 0.0747 0.0730 
 Jarque-Bera 54.3446 88.0704 
 Probability 0 0 
 Observations 87 87 
   
Panel B: Pre-Crisis, 2007 - Feb 2008 
 Mean 0.0223 0.0227 
 Median 0.0521 0.0701 
 Maximum 0.1725 0.1747 
 Minimum -0.1561 -0.1524 
 Std. Dev. 0.0972 0.0979 
 Jarque-Bera 0.4919 0.5423 
 Probability 0.7820 0.7625 
 Observations 11 11 
   
Panel C: Crisis, Mar 2008 - Mar 2009 
 Mean -0.0616 -0.0599 
 Median -0.0527 -0.0367 
 Maximum 0.1134 0.1070 
 Minimum -0.2923 -0.3255 
 Std. Dev. 0.1212 0.1168 
 Jarque-Bera 0.6728 1.1403 
 Probability 0.7143 0.5654 
 Observations 13 13 
   
Panel D: Post-Crisis, Apr 2009 - 2014 
 Mean 0.0129 0.0149 
 Median 0.0180 0.0152 
 Maximum 0.1880 0.1815 
 Minimum -0.1134 -0.1137 
 Std. Dev. 0.0482 0.0465 
 Jarque-Bera 13.8548 10.6703 
 Probability 0.0010 0.0048 
 Observations 63 63 
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Table F.16: Descriptive Statistics of Asset Returns in Turkey 
 
 
 c_s1 is_s1 c_corp1 c_corp2 c_govt1 c_govt2 
Panel A: All, 2002 - 2014     
 Mean -0.0013 0.0002 -0.0131 -0.0050 -0.0005 0.0005 
 Median 0.0087 0.0118 -0.0123 -0.0057 0.0000 0.0001 
 Maximum 0.2147 0.3584 0.1194 0.1256 0.0619 0.0544 
 Minimum -0.2975 -0.3398 -0.1010 -0.0944 -0.0827 -0.0604 
 Std. Dev. 0.0955 0.0979 0.0361 0.0348 0.0212 0.0175 
 Jarque-Bera 5.1517 21.3926 12.6370 14.8014 32.7769 30.9228 
 Probability 0.0761 0 0.0018 0.0006 0 0 
 Observations 145 145 145 145 123 137 
       
Panel B: Pre-Crisis, 2002 - Feb 2008    
 Mean -0.0023 0.0007 -0.0254 -0.0160 -0.0029 0.0005 
 Median 0.0202 0.0119 -0.0259 -0.0164 -0.0024 0.0016 
 Maximum 0.2147 0.3584 0.1194 0.1256 0.0460 0.0544 
 Minimum -0.2975 -0.3398 -0.1010 -0.0944 -0.0568 -0.0568 
 Std. Dev. 0.1051 0.1087 0.0357 0.0355 0.0197 0.0178 
 Jarque-Bera 4.9420 10.0459 50.5504 52.6843 8.5949 19.4279 
 Probability 0.0845 0.0066 0 0 0.0136 0.0001 
 Observations 69 69 69 69 47 61 
       
Panel C: Crisis, Mar 2008 - Mar 2009    
 Mean -0.0553 -0.0711 0.0008 0.0089 0.0014 0.0017 
 Median -0.0939 -0.0236 0.0050 0.0010 -0.0076 -0.0076 
 Maximum 0.1746 0.0610 0.0860 0.0850 0.0619 0.0486 
 Minimum -0.2496 -0.2931 -0.0743 -0.0707 -0.0827 -0.0604 
 Std. Dev. 0.1140 0.1094 0.0555 0.0522 0.0406 0.0306 
 Jarque-Bera 0.5575 1.3180 0.8918 0.6652 0.1651 0.1420 
 Probability 0.7567 0.5174 0.6402 0.7171 0.9208 0.9315 
 Observations 13 13 13 13 13 13 
       
Panel D: Post-Crisis, Apr 2009 - 2014    
 Mean 0.0109 0.0144 -0.0025 0.0043 0.0010 0.0004 
 Median 0.0061 0.0205 -0.0004 0.0046 0.0013 -0.0001 
 Maximum 0.2008 0.1855 0.0532 0.0598 0.0379 0.0331 
 Minimum -0.1442 -0.1531 -0.0815 -0.0715 -0.0549 -0.0417 
 Std. Dev. 0.0760 0.0756 0.0266 0.0253 0.0164 0.0135 
 Jarque-Bera 0.9966 1.6071 1.9411 3.7134 7.3341 3.4893 
 Probability 0.6076 0.4477 0.3789 0.1562 0.0256 0.1747 
 Observations 63 63 63 63 63 63 
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Table F.17: Descriptive Statistics of Asset Returns in UAE 
 
 c_s1 is_s1 c_s2 is_s2 c_bond is_bond 
Panel A: All, 2005 - 2014     
 Mean -0.0029 -0.0092 -0.0022 -0.0084 0.0024 0.0027 
 Median -0.0019 -0.0091 -0.0054 -0.0082 0.0012 0.0012 
 Maximum 0.3051 0.4680 0.2336 0.2662 0.0402 0.0612 
 Minimum -0.4098 -0.5920 -0.3344 -0.5255 -0.1635 -0.1705 
 Std. Dev. 0.1131 0.1335 0.1002 0.1153 0.0231 0.0270 
 Jarque-Bera 16.5642 68.3732 14.4268 77.4018 2760.6480 1710.6820 
 Probability 0.0003 0 0.0007 0 0 0 
 Observations 109 109 109 109 106 106 
       
Panel B: Pre-Crisis, 2005 - Feb 2008    
 Mean -0.0053 0.0007 -0.0045 -0.0042 -0.0006 -0.0005 
 Median -0.0156 -0.0091 -0.0161 -0.0130 -0.0006 -0.0002 
 Maximum 0.3051 0.4680 0.2336 0.2662 0.0081 0.0098 
 Minimum -0.2175 -0.2548 -0.1780 -0.2104 -0.0128 -0.0207 
 Std. Dev. 0.1186 0.1452 0.0970 0.1129 0.0041 0.0044 
 Jarque-Bera 2.2453 8.8267 1.4387 0.9458 4.1094 237.9680 
 Probability 0.3254 0.0121 0.4871 0.6232 0.1281 0 
 Observations 33 33 33 33 38 38 
       
Panel C: Crisis, Mar 2008 - Mar 2009    
 Mean -0.1039 -0.1271 -0.0867 -0.1202 -0.0121 -0.0143 
 Median -0.0759 -0.0768 -0.0794 -0.0905 -0.0016 -0.0012 
 Maximum 0.0953 0.0865 0.0893 0.0787 0.0402 0.0489 
 Minimum -0.4098 -0.5920 -0.3344 -0.5255 -0.1635 -0.1705 
 Std. Dev. 0.1549 0.1968 0.1380 0.1773 0.0512 0.0530 
 Jarque-Bera 1.0303 2.5553 0.8251 2.6119 18.5254 18.1092 
 Probability 0.5974 0.2787 0.6620 0.2709 0.0001 0.0001 
 Observations 13 13 13 13 13 13 
       
Panel D: Post-Crisis, Apr 2009 - 2014    
 Mean 0.0192 0.0100 0.0164 0.0125 0.0080 0.0089 
 Median 0.0118 -0.0019 0.0073 0.0043 0.0116 0.0094 
 Maximum 0.2242 0.2404 0.1819 0.1955 0.0398 0.0612 
 Minimum -0.2759 -0.2506 -0.2864 -0.2321 -0.0485 -0.1212 
 Std. Dev. 0.0879 0.0966 0.0841 0.0861 0.0188 0.0258 
 Jarque-Bera 3.4226 0.0835 8.1443 0.1441 14.9037 289.4345 
 Probability 0.1806 0.9591 0.0170 0.9305 0.0006 0 
 Observations 63 63 63 63 55 55 
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Table F.18: Descriptive Statistics of Asset Returns in UK 
 
 c_s1 is_s1 c_s2 is_s2 c_corp1 c_corp2 c_govt1 c_govt2 
Panel A: All, 2002 - 2014       
 Mean 0.0027 0.0040 0.0026 0.0037 0.0032 -0.0012 0.0024 0.0023 
 Median 0.0081 0.0079 0.0092 0.0065 0.0027 -0.0063 0.0022 0.0029 
 Maximum 0.0850 0.0924 0.0935 0.0883 0.0428 0.0936 0.0502 0.0442 
 Minimum -0.1415 -0.1732 -0.1380 -0.1713 -0.0382 -0.0780 -0.0450 -0.0402 
 Std. Dev. 0.0426 0.0431 0.0426 0.0428 0.0117 0.0311 0.0152 0.0150 
 Jarque-Bera 21.9610 31.0344 22.6682 32.6983 20.4860 22.3102 6.3515 3.7900 
 Probability 0 0 0 0 0 0 0.0418 0.1503 
 Observations 145 145 145 145 123 106 145 145 
         
Panel B: Pre-Crisis, 2002 - Feb 2008      
 Mean 0.0010 0.0028 0.0011 0.0028 -0.0003 -0.0104 0.0007 0.0007 
 Median 0.0076 0.0117 0.0092 0.0065 0.0013 -0.0127 0.0017 0.0007 
 Maximum 0.0850 0.0696 0.0935 0.0684 0.0152 0.0338 0.0219 0.0205 
 Minimum -0.1289 -0.1049 -0.1380 -0.1126 -0.0151 -0.0658 -0.0254 -0.0266 
 Std. Dev. 0.0386 0.0368 0.0388 0.0367 0.0091 0.0208 0.0118 0.0114 
 Jarque-Bera 29.9309 21.1690 37.9108 22.0202 2.4605 0.4829 2.0416 1.9624 
 Probability 0 0 0 0 0.2922 0.7855 0.3603 0.3749 
 Observations 69 69 69 69 47 30 69 69 
         
Panel C: Crisis, Mar 2008 - Mar 2009      
 Mean -0.0302 -0.0194 -0.0303 -0.0183 0.0008 0.0199 0.0057 0.0057 
 Median -0.0249 -0.0448 -0.0267 -0.0325 0.0010 0.0057 0.0036 0.0037 
 Maximum 0.0621 0.0924 0.0644 0.0791 0.0109 0.0936 0.0502 0.0442 
 Minimum -0.1415 -0.1732 -0.1375 -0.1713 -0.0135 -0.0369 -0.0450 -0.0402 
 Std. Dev. 0.0633 0.0708 0.0623 0.0679 0.0067 0.0474 0.0262 0.0251 
 Jarque-Bera 0.6200 0.4817 0.6085 0.6777 0.4149 1.6577 0.0993 0.3432 
 Probability 0.7334 0.7859 0.7377 0.7126 0.8126 0.4366 0.9516 0.8423 
 Observations 13 13 13 13 13 13 13 13 
         
Panel D: Post-Crisis, Apr 2009 - 2014      
 Mean 0.0114 0.0102 0.0110 0.0091 0.0064 -0.0011 0.0035 0.0034 
 Median 0.0125 0.0065 0.0113 0.0075 0.0066 -0.0039 0.0039 0.0040 
 Maximum 0.0850 0.0866 0.0853 0.0883 0.0428 0.0831 0.0455 0.0432 
 Minimum -0.0685 -0.0876 -0.0718 -0.0948 -0.0382 -0.0780 -0.0281 -0.0273 
 Std. Dev. 0.0388 0.0413 0.0388 0.0420 0.0134 0.0293 0.0156 0.0158 
 Jarque-Bera 1.1668 1.1956 0.9775 2.0032 7.4587 2.7619 2.1964 1.7482 
 Probability 0.5580 0.5500 0.6134 0.3673 0.0240 0.2513 0.3335 0.4172 
 Observations 63 63 63 63 63 63 63 63 
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Table F.19: Descriptive Statistics of Asset Returns in US 
 
 c_s1 is_s1 c_s2 is_s2 c_corp1 c_corp2 c_govt1 c_govt2 c_govt3 c_govt4 
Panel A: All, 2002 - 2014         
 Mean 0.0048 0.0054 0.0053 0.0052 0.0032 -0.0010 0.0027 0.0026 0.0028 0.0029 
 Median 0.0113 0.0116 0.0133 0.0120 0.0037 -0.0014 0.0021 0.0027 0.0036 0.0035 
 Maximum 0.1042 0.1080 0.1091 0.1089 0.0394 0.0334 0.0423 0.0514 0.0490 0.0546 
 Minimum -0.1884 -0.1663 -0.1940 -0.1729 -0.0382 -0.0318 -0.0399 -0.0441 -0.0464 -0.0493 
 Std. Dev. 0.0443 0.0416 0.0451 0.0433 0.0111 0.0097 0.0132 0.0133 0.0129 0.0142 
 Jarque-Bera 52.0892 42.7783 51.9242 33.7915 20.3648 10.1834 2.4003 12.9899 19.6202 16.2685 
 Probability 0 0 0 0 0 0.0061 0.3011 0.0015 0.0001 0.0003 
 Observations 145 145 145 145 145 106 145 145 145 145 
           
Panel B: Pre-Crisis, 2002 - Feb 2008        
 Mean 0.0026 0.0035 0.0032 0.0033 0.0025 -0.0041 0.0025 0.0024 0.0027 0.0028 
 Median 0.0089 0.0081 0.0096 0.0109 0.0050 -0.0039 0.0031 0.0037 0.0038 0.0040 
 Maximum 0.0855 0.0911 0.0779 0.0982 0.0278 0.0089 0.0295 0.0284 0.0302 0.0314 
 Minimum -0.1211 -0.1157 -0.1071 -0.1128 -0.0382 -0.0170 -0.0399 -0.0441 -0.0464 -0.0493 
 Std. Dev. 0.0357 0.0359 0.0354 0.0375 0.0114 0.0077 0.0137 0.0135 0.0137 0.0149 
 Jarque-Bera 12.5280 14.2796 6.6340 7.9183 15.1699 1.3617 1.8889 7.1556 11.6986 8.6491 
 Probability 0.0019 0.0008 0.0363 0.0191 0.0005 0.5062 0.3889 0.0279 0.0029 0.0132 
 Observations 69 69 69 69 69 30 69 69 69 69 
           
Panel C: Crisis, Mar 2008 - Mar 2009        
 Mean -0.0380 -0.0294 -0.0382 -0.0300 0.0019 -0.0030 0.0054 0.0052 0.0051 0.0055 
 Median -0.0130 -0.0319 -0.0101 -0.0292 -0.0026 -0.0075 0.0066 0.0052 0.0033 0.0050 
 Maximum 0.0820 0.0705 0.0833 0.0743 0.0394 0.0334 0.0423 0.0514 0.0490 0.0546 
 Minimum -0.1884 -0.1663 -0.1940 -0.1729 -0.0266 -0.0318 -0.0223 -0.0307 -0.0267 -0.0314 
 Std. Dev. 0.0754 0.0660 0.0777 0.0694 0.0186 0.0181 0.0198 0.0218 0.0206 0.0228 
 Jarque-Bera 0.4194 0.5547 0.4606 0.4798 1.2651 1.0376 0.5873 0.5325 0.9531 0.6377 
 Probability 0.8108 0.7578 0.7943 0.7867 0.5312 0.5952 0.7455 0.7663 0.6209 0.7270 
 Observations 13 13 13 13 13 13 13 13 13 13 
           
Panel D: Post-Crisis, Apr 2009 - 2014        
 Mean 0.0161 0.0147 0.0165 0.0146 0.0043 0.0009 0.0023 0.0022 0.0024 0.0024 
 Median 0.0212 0.0175 0.0237 0.0215 0.0050 0.0011 0.0013 0.0016 0.0010 0.0010 
 Maximum 0.1042 0.1080 0.1091 0.1089 0.0170 0.0128 0.0302 0.0279 0.0264 0.0288 
 Minimum -0.0842 -0.0810 -0.0823 -0.0874 -0.0190 -0.0206 -0.0282 -0.0263 -0.0244 -0.0282 
 Std. Dev. 0.0393 0.0376 0.0406 0.0392 0.0085 0.0076 0.0111 0.0109 0.0101 0.0112 
 Jarque-Bera 1.7174 2.5924 1.5272 1.9069 4.5082 5.3401 0.3079 0.3464 0.3083 0.3099 
 Probability 0.4237 0.2736 0.4660 0.3854 0.1050 0.0692 0.8573 0.8410 0.8571 0.8565 
 Observations 63 63 63 63 63 63 63 63 63 63 
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APPENDIX G 
 
Table G.1: Stock Panel and GFC without AR(1) 
 
 Unbalanced Panel Balanced Panel 2007 Balanced Panel 2005 
Constant 0.8469*** 0.8481*** 0.9607** 0.9607** 0.8169*** 0.8169** 
 2.8767 2.8811 2.4477 2.4475 2.3674 2.3672 
GFC -6.0962*** -6.0962*** -6.2138*** -6.2138*** -6.1613*** -6.1613*** 
 -3.0075 -3.0073 -3.0212 -3.0209 -2.9806 -2.9803 
GFC * IS asset 0.1134 2.1383* 0.0989 2.1904* 0.0910 2.0215* 
 0.2780 2.0120 0.2412 2.0292 0.2136 1.8343 
GFC * IS asset * IS country  -3.6880*  -3.7646*  -3.8610* 
  -1.9990  -2.0256  -1.8351 
Fixed cross-section yes yes yes yes yes yes 
Adjusted R-Squared 0.0700 0.0731 0.0941 0.0984 0.0775 0.0812 
Observations 6933 6933 4611 4611 5232 5232 
 
Table G.2: Stock Panel and Crises 1 and 2 without AR(1) 
 
 Unbalanced Panel Balanced Panel 2007 Balanced Panel 2005 
Constant 0.8492*** 0.8502*** 1.0079** 1.0079** 0.8505** 0.8505** 
 2.8116 2.8144 2.4387 2.4381 2.3754 2.3750 
Crisis 1 -1.5171 -1.5171 -1.6806 -1.6806 -1.6159 -1.6159 
 -1.4531 -1.4529 -1.5430 -1.5427 -1.5346 -1.5343 
Crisis 1 * IS asset 0.7318*** 0.2008 0.6237** -0.0969 0.6646** -0.2279 
 2.7407 0.2927 2.3242 -0.1273 2.3467 -0.3092 
Crisis 1 * IS asset * IS country  0.9347  1.2972  1.7849 
  0.7037  0.9318  1.1786 
Crisis 2 -8.9274*** -8.9274*** -9.0910*** -9.0910*** -9.1433*** -9.1433*** 
 -2.8524 -2.8520 -2.8789 -2.8783 -2.8890 -2.8884 
Crisis 2 * IS asset 0.2381 3.0542* -0.0422 2.3689 0.0254 2.3551 
 0.4122 1.8346 -0.0788 1.4291 0.0431 1.3826 
Crisis 2 * IS asset * IS country  -5.0900*  -4.3400  -4.6594 
  -1.8247  -1.5508  -1.4406 
Fixed cross-section yes yes yes yes yes yes 
Adjusted R-Squared 0.0842 0.0878 0.1183 0.1224 0.0987 0.1029 
Observations 6933 6933 4611 4611 5232 5232 
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Table G.3: Stock Panel with Islamic and non-Islamic Countries and GFC without AR(1) 
 Unbalanced Panel Balanced Panel 2007 Balanced Panel 2005 
 Islamic Non-Islamic Islamic Non-Islamic Islamic Non-Islamic 
Constant 1.0012*** 0.6979** 1.1243** 0.7630* 0.7451* 0.8888** 
 2.7950 2.2308 2.5622 1.7668 1.7487 2.5043 
GFC -7.4657*** -4.5369** -7.5958*** -4.6016** -7.5858*** -4.7369** 
 -3.1589 -2.4120 -3.1782 -2.4088 -3.0308 -2.5055 
GFC * IS asset -0.1802 0.5790 -0.1923 0.5781 -0.4150 0.5970 
 -0.3498 0.9924 -0.3712 0.9796 -0.6888 1.0170 
Fixed cross-
section 
yes yes yes yes yes yes 
Adjusted R-
Squared 
0.0813 0.0550 0.1094 0.0760 0.0840 0.0760 
Observations 3453 3480 2523 2088 2616 2616 
 
Table G.4: Stock Panel with Islamic and non-Islamic Countries and Crises 1 and 2 
without AR(1) 
 
 Unbalanced Panel Balanced Panel 2007 Balanced Panel 2005 
 Islamic Non-Islamic Islamic Non-Islamic Islamic Non-Islamic 
Constant 0.8750** 0.8557*** 0.9560** 1.0706** 0.5694 1.1317*** 
 2.3842 2.6828 2.0998 2.3892 1.2975 3.1382 
Crisis 1 -0.8014 -2.3494** -0.8988 -2.5928** -0.5830 -2.6488** 
 -0.6015 -2.1553 -0.6588 -2.2752 -0.4239 -2.3998 
Crisis 1 * IS asset 0.4198 0.7582** 0.4184 0.8153** 0.5241* 0.8051** 
 1.4367 1.9669 1.4091 2.0675 1.6605 2.0621 
Crisis 2 -10.2915*** -7.3333*** -10.3889*** -7.5767*** -10.6539*** -7.6327*** 
 -2.7294 -2.7377 -2.7379 -2.8007 -2.6892 -2.8403 
Crisis 2 * IS asset -0.6718 0.7976 -0.6732 0.8547 -0.7937 0.8445 
 -0.9081 0.9653 -0.9041 1.0270 -0.8400 1.0181 
Fixed cross-
section 
yes yes yes yes yes yes 
Adjusted R-
Squared 
0.0902 0.0947 0.1214 0.1353 0.0955 0.1314 
Observations 3453 3480 2523 2088 2616 2616 
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Table G.5: Bond Panel and GFC, Crises 1 and 2 without AR(1) 
 
 Unbalanced Panel Balanced Panel 2005 
 GFC Crises 1 
and 2 
GFC Crises 1 and 
2 
Constant 0.3551 0.4035 0.4039*** 0.4632*** 
 3.8519 4.0389 4.0457 4.2482 
GFC -0.8779  -0.9244  
 -1.2581  -1.3223  
GFC * IS asset -0.1552  -0.1597  
 -0.5405  -0.5532  
Crisis 1  -0.5847  -0.6416*** 
  -4.2929  -4.5179 
Crisis 1 * IS asset  -0.0284  -0.0340 
  -0.2279  -0.2630 
Crisis 2  -1.0772  -1.1341 
  -0.8409  -0.8842 
Crisis 2 * IS asset  -0.2959  -0.3015 
  -0.5971  -0.6065 
Fixed cross-
section 
yes yes yes yes 
Adjusted R-
Squared 
0.0188 0.0218 0.0208 0.0250 
Observations 424 424 392 392 
 
  
342 
 
APPENDIX H 
 
Table H.1: Stock and Bond Indices in Australia 
 
Panel A: Impact of GFC      
 c_s1 is_s1 c_corp1 c_govt1 c_govt2 c_govt3 c_govt4 
Constant 0.6659** 0.6685* -0.2580 -0.1758 0.0208 0.0205 0.0143 
 2.0161 1.9216 -0.9424 -0.6769 0.2218 0.2203 0.1447 
GFC -3.7536** -3.4373 0.4841 0.8046* 0.6395 0.6559 0.6970 
 -2.0901 -1.5013 1.2005 1.9087 1.5791 1.6255 1.5813 
AR(1) 0.1002 0.0042 -0.0126 0.0067 0.1101 0.0974 0.0860 
 1.0915 0.0378 -0.3965 0.1303 1.2506 1.0995 0.9669 
Adjusted R-
Squared 
0.0797 0.0331 -0.0119 -0.0074 0.0312 0.0302 0.0268 
Observations 144 144 144 144 144 144 144 
        
Panel B: Impact of Crises 1 and 2     
 c_s1 is_s1 c_corp1 c_govt1 c_govt2 c_govt3 c_govt4 
Constant 0.8348*** 0.7156** -0.2395 -0.1677 0.0371 0.0384 0.0323 
 2.6230 2.0723 -0.8125 -0.6006 0.3877 0.4056 0.3198 
Crisis 1 -2.2830* -0.9317 0.0242 0.1376 -0.0332 -0.0416 -0.0351 
 -1.7176 -0.5847 0.0715 0.3845 -0.1114 -0.1362 -0.1089 
Crisis 2 -5.5649** -5.3572 0.4675 1.0324* 0.9242 0.9411 1.0012 
 -2.1939 -1.5951 0.7982 1.8000 1.5683 1.5805 1.5484 
AR(1) 0.0769 -0.0032 -0.0129 0.0054 0.0917 0.0789 0.0671 
 0.9052 -0.0322 -0.4027 0.1020 1.0122 0.8642 0.7356 
Adjusted R-
Squared 
0.1103 0.0453 -0.0202 -0.0150 0.0299 0.0287 0.0251 
Observations 144 144 144 144 144 144 144 
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Table H.2: Stock and Bond Indices in Bahrain 
 
Panel A: Impact of GFC    
 c_s1 is_s1 c_s2  is_s2 c_govt1 
Constant -0.6721 -0.8279 -0.6350 -0.7802 0.3396* 
 -0.7697 -0.8556 -0.6678 -0.7811 1.7164 
GFC -7.6924* -8.0876* -8.6153** -9.2245* -0.3869** 
 -1.7804 -1.8653 -1.9862 -1.9664 -1.9465 
AR(1) 0.3384*** 0.3260*** 0.4081*** 0.3628*** -0.0284 
 3.5207 3.3800 3.6088 3.4306 -0.3458 
Adjusted R-
Squared 
0.2148 0.2055 0.2839 0.2507 -0.0135 
Observations 108 108 108 108 108 
      
Panel B: Impact of Crises 1 and 2    
 c_s1 is_s1 c_s2  is_s2 c_govt1 
Constant -1.0072 -1.1538 -0.9506 -1.0976 0.3807* 
 -1.3135 -1.3097 -1.1871 -1.2902 1.7458 
Crisis 1 1.7560 1.4496 1.2267 1.3019 -0.4294* 
 0.9697 0.5672 0.5851 0.4892 -1.9272 
Crisis 2 -12.9350* -13.1232** -13.8290** -15.0592** -0.4322* 
 -1.9000 -2.1307 -2.0872 -2.3432 -1.9727 
AR(1) 0.2177 0.2360* 0.2822* 0.2415* -0.0332 
 1.5951 1.8252 1.8036 1.6721 -0.4069 
Adjusted R-
Squared 
0.2547 0.2375 0.3177 0.2905 -0.0186 
Observations 108 108 108 108 108 
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Table H.3: Stock and Bond Indices in Canada 
 
Panel A: Impact of GFC     
 c_s1 is_s1 c_s2 is_s2 c_corp1 c_govt1 
Constant 0.9173*** 0.8931** 0.7209** 0.7537* -0.5256* 0.2479** 
 2.6853 2.1289 2.1354 1.7594 -1.9589 2.4342 
GFC -3.9621* -3.9372 -3.9395* -4.1187 2.0047** 0.2776 
 -1.7590 -1.3705 -1.7610 -1.3912 2.2316 0.5739 
AR(1) 0.1466 0.0675 0.1488 0.0407 -0.1560 -0.0097 
 1.3090 0.5514 1.3489 0.3279 -1.2638 -0.0968 
Adjusted R-
Squared 
0.0904 0.0375 0.0922 0.0340 0.0540 -0.0097 
Observations 144 144 144 144 105 144 
       
Panel B: Impact of Crises 1 and 2    
 c_s1 is_s1 c_s2 is_s2 c_corp1 c_govt1 
Constant 1.0146*** 0.8840** 0.8092** 0.7600* -0.4610* 0.2284** 
 3.0189 2.0445 2.4257 1.7370 -1.6885 2.1231 
Crisis 1 -1.0632 0.0000 -0.9671 -0.3470 -0.0252 0.1250 
 -0.9139 0.0000 -0.8845 -0.2216 -0.0325 0.5454 
Crisis 2 -7.1478** -7.1456 -7.1288** -7.0573 2.8032** 0.6506 
 -2.1165 -1.6053 -2.1380 -1.5081 2.2484 0.8188 
AR(1) 0.1129 0.0570 0.1109 0.0318 -0.1832 -0.0187 
 1.1784 0.5691 1.1969 0.3081 -1.5160 -0.1871 
Adjusted R-
Squared 
0.1402 0.0672 0.1426 0.0556 0.0512 -0.0072 
Observations 144 144 144 144 105 144 
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Table H.4: Stock and Bond Indices in Egypt 
 
Panel A: Impact of GFC  
 c_s1 is_s1 c_corp1 
Constant 1.8012* 1.5700 -0.2457 
 1.8251 1.4831 -0.9251 
GFC -9.5810** -9.0323** 0.1952 
 -2.2174 -1.9889 0.4004 
AR(1) 0.1112 0.1732* -0.0346 
 1.1567 1.9029 -0.2424 
Adjusted R-
Squared 
0.0842 0.0898 -0.0153 
Observations 120 120 120 
    
Panel B: Impact of Crises 1 and 2 
 c_s1 is_s1 c_corp1 
Constant 1.6576 1.3702 -0.2243 
 1.5460 1.1906 -0.7847 
Crisis 1 -1.6715 -1.7202 -0.3249 
 -0.7402 -0.7173 -0.8201 
Crisis 2 -11.7579 -9.6724 0.6931 
 -1.5458 -1.2300 1.0819 
AR(1) 0.1225 0.1790* -0.0428 
 1.2918 1.8807 -0.2986 
Adjusted R-
Squared 
0.0672 0.0638 -0.0183 
Observations 120 120 120 
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Table H.5: Stock and Bond Indices in France 
 
Panel A: Impact of GFC    
 c_s1 is_s1 c_corp1 c_govt1 c_govt2 
Constant 0.6516 0.5996 -0.4037 0.2733** 0.2652** 
 1.3830 1.4100 -1.3366 2.6001 2.5691 
GFC -4.7181** -4.0439** 1.1713 0.0347 0.0364 
 -2.3353 -2.1427 0.8758 0.0784 0.0811 
AR(1) 0.0924 0.1036 -0.0992 -0.0384 0.0017 
 0.8435 1.0323 -1.0364 -0.3761 0.0180 
Adjusted R-
Squared 
0.0627 0.0586 0.0014 -0.0126 -0.0141 
Observations 144 144 105 144 144 
      
Panel B: Impact of Crises 1 and 2    
 c_s1 is_s1 c_corp1 c_govt1 c_govt2 
Constant 0.9174** 0.8005* -0.2778 0.2725** 0.2640** 
 1.9811 1.9266 -0.8653 2.5090 2.4900 
Crisis 1 -3.0503** -2.1962 -0.8352 -0.2967 -0.2838 
 -2.0540 -1.4889 -1.1217 -1.0321 -0.9496 
Crisis 2 -7.7336*** -6.9629*** 2.0808 0.7178 0.7025 
 -3.2177 -2.9403 1.0155 1.2439 1.2037 
AR(1) 0.0571 0.0736 -0.1283 -0.0647 -0.0260 
 0.4994 0.7112 -1.3580 -0.6574 -0.2816 
Adjusted R-
Squared 
0.1085 0.1006 0.0151 0.0034 0.0014 
Observations 144 144 105 144 144 
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Table H.6: Stock and Bond Indices in Germany 
 
Panel A: Impact of GFC    
 c_s1 is_s1 c_corp1 c_govt1 c_govt2 
Constant 0.8842 1.0549* -0.4151 0.2327** 0.2337** 
 1.5822 1.9187 -1.3353 2.2574 2.2613 
GFC -5.4797** -5.3083** 1.3163 0.1269 0.1404 
 -2.5344 -2.2301 0.9378 0.3037 0.3238 
AR(1) 0.0395 0.0566 -0.0672 0.0213 0.0475 
 0.3911 0.5663 -0.6902 0.2210 0.4981 
Adjusted R-
Squared 
0.0488 0.0482 -0.0005 -0.0127 -0.0106 
Observations 144 144 105 144 144 
      
Panel B: Impact of Crises 1 and 2    
 c_s1 is_s1 c_corp1 c_govt1 c_govt2 
Constant 1.0995* 1.2568** -0.3013 0.2261** 0.2279** 
 1.9539 2.2997 -0.9069 2.1399 2.1633 
Crisis 1 -2.8287* -2.2894 -0.7126 -0.2105 -0.2090 
 -1.8410 -1.3509 -0.9630 -0.7347 -0.6956 
Crisis 2 -8.5742*** -9.1312*** 2.2688 0.8248 0.8307 
 -2.8449 -2.9492 1.0293 1.5944 1.5430 
AR(1) 0.0153 0.0277 -0.0935 -0.0070 0.0181 
 0.1482 0.2760 -0.9616 -0.0758 0.1989 
Adjusted R-
Squared 
0.0767 0.0861 0.0105 0.0063 0.0083 
Observations 144 144 105 144 144 
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Table H.7: Stock and Bond Indices in Indonesia 
 
Panel A: Impact of GFC     
 c_s1 is_s1 c_corp1 c_corp2 c_corp3 c_govt1 
Constant 1.8224*** 1.9535*** 0.3377 0.3946 -0.4778** 0.3986 
 2.8344 2.9879 1.2113 1.1518 -2.1400 1.4215 
GFC -7.6016* -9.3558** -0.4690 -0.7162 0.0697 -1.1054 
 -1.9731 -2.3034 -0.3044 -0.3482 0.0340 -0.3892 
AR(1) 0.1265 0.0811 0.1254 0.1392 0.0120 0.0518 
 1.3745 0.8303 0.9248 0.7739 0.1004 0.3392 
Adjusted R-
Squared 
0.0854 0.1010 0.0028 0.0043 -0.0140 -0.0057 
Observations 144 144 120 91 144 136 
       
Panel B: Impact of Crises 1 and 2    
 c_s1 is_s1 c_corp1 c_corp2 c_corp3 c_govt1 
Constant 1.6371** 1.6339** 0.4032 0.5274 -0.4371* 0.4881* 
 2.3957 2.3704 1.3598 1.4215 -1.8575 1.6661 
Crisis 1 -0.9322 -0.1689 -0.7755 -1.0393 -0.6876 -1.4985 
 -0.4210 -0.0652 -1.1796 -1.3067 -1.1553 -1.4946 
Crisis 2 -8.2791 -10.4079 -0.3223 -0.8250 0.7644 -0.5735 
 -1.2146 -1.4692 -0.1187 -0.2289 0.2107 -0.1176 
AR(1) 0.1461* 0.1031 0.1156 0.1302 0.0046 0.0445 
 1.6772 1.0994 0.8196 0.7114 0.0408 0.2984 
Adjusted R-
Squared 
0.0574 0.0667 -0.0013 0.0003 -0.0138 -0.0066 
Observations 144 144 120 91 144 136 
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Table H.8: Stock Indices in Iran 
 
Panel A: Impact of GFC   
 is_s1 is_s2 is_s3 is_s4 
Constant 2.0907*** 2.3822** 2.2239** 2.0154* 
 2.2181 2.6889 2.3279 1.9091 
GFC -4.1651 -3.9802 -4.6698 -7.6163** 
 -1.3408 -1.6074 -1.5159 -2.5600 
AR(1) 0.3506*** 0.3069*** 0.3316*** 0.2721*** 
 4.1764 2.9967 3.3679 3.0579 
Adjusted R-
Squared 
0.1558 0.1241 0.1550 0.1797 
Observations 94 94 94 94 
     
Panel B: Impact of Crises 1 and 2   
 is_s1 is_s2 is_s3 is_s4 
Constant 2.3565** 2.5216*** 2.4939** 2.4758** 
 2.3645 2.9383 2.6084 2.3030 
Crisis 1 -1.5510 -0.1647 -1.4633 -3.2392** 
 -0.7515 -0.0911 -0.8528 -2.2253 
Crisis 2 -7.8349*** -8.6847*** -8.9748*** -13.2904*** 
 -3.5794 -4.0176 -4.0284 -5.0661 
AR(1) 0.3024*** 0.2169** 0.2640** 0.2244** 
 2.9350 2.1285 2.5433 2.3406 
Adjusted R-
Squared 
0.1771 0.1695 0.1882 0.2388 
Observations 94 94 94 94 
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Table H.9: Stock and Bond Indices in Italy 
 
Panel A: Impact of GFC     
 c_s1 is_s1 c_corp1 c_corp2 c_govt1 c_govt2 
Constant 0.5314 0.7840* 0.2422** -0.3908 0.3151* 0.3346* 
 1.0565 1.8472 2.0215 -1.3291 1.8503 1.9391 
GFC -6.0266*** -4.8434*** -1.4391*** 0.9711 -0.2355 -0.2620 
 -2.9418 -2.6516 -2.9767 0.6669 -0.5399 -0.5743 
AR(1) 0.0268 -0.0034 0.2254 0.0060 0.1301 0.1489 
 0.2821 -0.0372 1.4724 0.0547 0.8211 0.9690 
Adjusted R-
Squared 
0.0722 0.0586 0.1616 -0.0090 0.0047 0.0105 
Observations 144 144 131 105 144 144 
       
Panel B: Impact of Crises 1 and 2     
 c_s1 is_s1 c_corp1 c_corp2 c_govt1 c_govt2 
Constant 0.7850 0.9592** 0.2842** -0.2666 0.3229* 0.3449* 
 1.5414 2.2306 2.2173 -0.8586 1.7870 1.8867 
Crisis 1 -3.5405** -2.6230 -0.6050** -0.8275 -0.3778 -0.3934 
 -2.5455 -1.6008 -2.4851 -1.0393 -1.0045 -1.0019 
Crisis 2 -8.8409*** -6.9962*** -2.1597*** 1.7162 0.2102 0.1460 
 -3.6656 -4.7702 -2.8242 0.7621 0.4269 0.2693 
AR(1) -0.0038 -0.0201 0.2311 -0.0230 0.1230 0.1425 
 -0.0373 -0.2142 1.4847 -0.1985 0.7709 0.9205 
Adjusted R-
Squared 
0.1088 0.0835 0.1938 0.0003 0.0009 0.0063 
Observations 144 144 131 105 144 144 
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Table H.10: Stock and Bond Indices in Japan 
 
Panel A: Impact of GFC      
 c_s1 is_s1 c_s2 is_s2 c_corp1 c_govt1 c_govt2 
Constant 0.7232 0.6607 0.7112 0.5902 -0.0629 0.1221** 0.1078** 
 1.3522 1.2463 1.2606 1.2457 -0.2199 2.4919 2.3493 
GFC -5.0153* -5.0241* -5.4598* -4.6386* -0.4130 -0.0423 -0.0244 
 -1.7312 -1.6741 -1.7641 -1.7717 -0.3434 -0.1760 -0.0998 
AR(1) 0.2344** 0.2209*** 0.2432*** 0.1887** 0.1073 0.0350 0.0300 
 2.8778 2.3659 3.1038 2.0867 1.1248 0.4642 0.3784 
Adjusted R-
Squared 
0.1066 0.0998 0.1138 0.0897 -0.0052 -0.0125 -0.0131 
Observations 144 144 144 144 105 144 144 
        
Panel B: Impact of Crises 1 and 2     
 c_s1 is_s1 c_s2 is_s2 c_corp1 c_govt1 c_govt2 
Constant 0.9794* 0.8885* 0.9649* 0.8350* 0.0974 0.0944* 0.0931* 
 1.8666 1.7101 1.7417 1.8087 0.3306 1.9569 1.9405 
Crisis 1 -3.0729* -2.7226 -3.0766 -2.8536* -0.8052 0.1967 0.0835 
 -1.7336 -1.4915 -1.5670 -1.7683 -1.1096 0.8522 0.4290 
Crisis 2 -8.1348** -8.3049* -8.9046** -7.6345** -1.4411 0.0689 0.0780 
 -2.1250 -1.9461 -2.2999 -2.0990 -0.7694 0.2555 0.2814 
AR(1) 0.1904** 0.1829** 0.1994** 0.1449* 0.0833 0.0266 0.0273 
 2.3294 2.0058 2.4981 1.6784 0.8790 0.3356 0.3389 
Adjusted R-
Squared 
0.1384 0.1306 0.1463 0.1263 0.0053 -0.0091 -0.0177 
Observations 144 144 144 144 105 144 144 
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Table H.11: Stock and Bond Indices in Malaysia 
 
Panel A: Impact of GFC          
 c_s1 is_s1 c_s2 is_s2 c_corp1 c_corp2 c_govt1 c_govt2 q_c_c q_c_is q_c_t 
Constant 1.0437*** 1.2824*** 1.4034*** 1.4466*** -0.6438*** 0.1455 0.0512 0.0827 0.2325** 0.2156*** 0.2191*** 
 3.1022 3.6985 3.1218 3.1456 -3.8632 0.9891 0.6822 0.3550 2.5376 2.9058 2.7313 
GFC -4.5728*** -4.9141** -5.1731*** -5.4089*** 1.2437* 0.6073 0.0450 0.0141 -0.0394 -0.0503 -0.0297 
 -2.9074 -2.3783 -3.0414 -3.0056 1.8830 0.5515 0.0807 0.0237 -0.1386 -0.1933 -0.1067 
AR(1) 0.0404 0.0189 0.0863 0.0915 -0.0811 -0.1304 0.1572* 0.1513* 0.3941*** 0.4422*** 0.4347*** 
 0.4764 0.1724 0.7688 0.7611 -0.7580 -0.9484 1.7331 1.9625 4.4705 4.3045 4.3665 
Adjusted R-
Squared 
0.0919 0.0854 0.1623 0.1670 0.0364 0.0093 0.0129 0.0098 0.1392 0.1845 0.1751 
Observations 144 144 91 91 105 144 144 144 105 105 105 
            
Panel B: Impact of Crises 1 and 2          
 c_s1 is_s1 c_s2 is_s2 c_corp1 c_corp2 c_govt1 c_govt2 q_c_c q_c_is q_c_t 
Constant 1.1136*** 1.2832*** 1.5611*** 1.5508*** -0.5909*** 0.1584 0.0661 0.1899 0.2640*** 0.2483*** 0.2514*** 
 3.1731 3.6131 3.3348 3.2054 -3.3773 1.0335 0.8948 0.9122 3.0152 3.6488 3.4143 
Crisis 1 -2.6697** -2.2368 -2.9621** -2.9910* -0.1176 0.0566 -0.4042 -1.2759 -0.4508*** -0.4224** -0.4311** 
 -2.0792 -1.3051 -2.0875 -1.8566 -0.2543 0.1141 -1.2931 -1.2579 -2.2755 -2.2309 -2.2181 
Crisis 2 -4.2061* -4.3241 -5.3315* -5.0188* 1.7611* 0.7426 0.6658 0.5277 0.4110* 0.3264* 0.3863* 
 -1.6794 -1.2621 -1.9739 -1.8595 1.9183 0.3744 0.8777 0.6694 1.8386 1.8563 1.8721 
AR(1) 0.0549 0.0500 0.1014 0.1151 -0.1103 -0.1334 0.1155 0.1227 0.3140*** 0.3494*** 0.3407*** 
 0.6500 0.4534 0.8950 0.9696 -0.9867 -0.9239 1.4275 1.4146 3.2415 3.0613 3.1160 
Adjusted R-
Squared 
0.0647 0.0419 0.1296 0.1133 0.0363 0.0009 0.0464 0.0301 0.1863 0.2385 0.2295 
Observations 144 144 91 91 105 144 144 144 105 105 105 
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Table H.12: Stock and Bond Indices in Morocco 
 
Panel A: Impact of GFC  
 c_s1 is_s1 c_corp1 
Constant 0.6995 0.3051 0.3209 
 1.6451 0.7095 1.6013 
GFC -3.5630** -1.9374 -0.6607 
 -2.0740 -1.4834 -0.3622 
AR(1) -0.0198 -0.0552 0.0576 
 -0.2291 -0.6032 0.2573 
Adjusted R-
Squared 
0.0271 0.0014 -0.0142 
Observations 144 144 81 
    
Panel B: Impact of Crises 1 and 2 
 c_s1 is_s1 c_corp1 
Constant 0.5836 0.1757 0.3695* 
 1.3140 0.4013 1.7511 
Crisis 1 0.5245 1.0108 -0.8410** 
 0.4836 0.7968 -2.0047 
Crisis 2 -5.3566* -3.1019* -0.4745 
 -1.9032 -1.6900 -0.1400 
AR(1) -0.0182 -0.0658 0.0552 
 -0.2188 -0.7330 0.2503 
Adjusted R-
Squared 
0.0336 0.0057 -0.0240 
Observations 144 144 81 
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Table H.13: Stock and Bond Indices in Pakistan 
 
Panel A: Impact of GFC   
 c_s1 is_s1 c_corp1 c_corp2 
Constant 1.9519*** 1.9556*** 0.1448 -0.0545 
 3.3712 3.0027 0.2140 -0.1064 
GFC -9.8017 -8.4496 -2.0167 -3.3823 
 -1.5975 -1.4247 -0.5695 -0.8725 
AR(1) -0.0061 -0.0089 0.2976** 0.3503*** 
 -0.0659 -0.1088 2.3604 2.8241 
Adjusted R-
Squared 
0.0754 0.0479 0.0875 0.1586 
Observations 144 144 144 121 
     
Panel B: Impact of Crises 1 and 2  
 c_s1 is_s1 c_corp1 c_corp2 
Constant 2.0102*** 2.0368*** 0.2258 0.0607 
 3.2753 2.9875 0.3150 0.1145 
Crisis 1 -5.2390* -4.2868* -0.9882 -0.4626 
 -1.9360 -1.7854 -0.5114 -0.2800 
Crisis 2 -8.2001 -8.1820 -3.3023 -7.2807 
 -0.7294 -0.7393 -0.4630 -1.0072 
AR(1) 0.0180 -0.0007 0.3039** 0.3496** 
 0.1781 -0.0069 2.3218 2.2880 
Adjusted R-
Squared 
0.0397 0.0263 0.0845 0.1910 
Observations 144 144 144 121 
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Table H.14: Stock and Bond Indices in Qatar 
 
Panel A: Impact of GFC    
 c_s1 is_s1 c_s2 is_s2 c_corp1 
Constant 0.9335 0.9252 1.0072 0.9062 -0.1125 
 1.2619 1.2627 1.3720 1.2388 -0.6943 
GFC -6.3033 -5.9466 -6.3560 -5.7975 -1.1631 
 -1.4362 -1.2249 -1.4322 -1.1771 -0.7520 
AR(1) 0.0055 -0.0460 0.0161 0.0056 -0.0230 
 0.0430 -0.2905 0.1225 0.0352 -0.1215 
Adjusted R-
Squared 
0.0370 0.0246 0.0395 0.0243 0.0045 
Observations 108 108 108 108 105 
      
Panel B: Impact of Crises 1 and 2   
 c_s1 is_s1 c_s2 is_s2 c_corp1 
Constant 0.6350 0.5901 0.7608 0.6500 -0.0763 
 0.8878 0.8607 1.0500 0.9441 -0.4288 
Crisis 1 2.0098 2.7969 1.5577 2.3063 -0.3853 
 0.8822 1.0668 0.7565 0.9333 -1.3562 
Crisis 2 -10.8974* -11.2971* -10.9633* -11.2652 -1.8779 
 -1.7464 -1.7107 -1.6689 -1.6398 -0.6593 
AR(1) -0.0808 -0.1432 -0.0632 -0.0918 -0.0257 
 -0.6588 -1.1100 -0.5143 -0.7160 -0.1305 
Adjusted R-
Squared 
0.0798 0.0831 0.0790 0.0797 0.0076 
Observations 108 108 108 108 105 
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Table H.15: Stock Indices in Saudi Arabia 
 
Panel A: Impact of GFC 
 c_s1 is_s1 
Constant 1.5764** 1.7089** 
 2.2076 2.2658 
GFC -7.8155** -7.8260** 
 -2.2438 -2.2598 
AR(1) 0.0539 0.1141 
 0.3102 0.7544 
Adjusted R-
Squared 
0.1207 0.1335 
Observations 86 86 
   
Panel B: Impact of Crises 1 and 2 
 c_s1 is_s1 
Constant 1.2799** 1.4681** 
 2.0036 2.3271 
Crisis 1 -0.2914 -0.1165 
 -0.1058 -0.0413 
Crisis 2 -10.2486* -11.3325** 
 -1.9256 -2.1697 
AR(1) 0.0530 0.0902 
 0.3245 0.6098 
Adjusted R-
Squared 
0.1100 0.1540 
Observations 86 86 
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Table H.16: Stock and Bond Indices in Turkey 
 
Panel A: Impact of GFC     
 c_s1 is_s1 c_corp1 c_corp2 c_govt1 c_govt2 
Constant 0.5195 0.7535 -1.3951*** -0.5812* -0.0257 0.0399 
 0.7386 1.0964 -4.1462 -1.7784 -0.1341 0.2524 
GFC -5.9045** -7.6916*** 1.5361 1.5770 0.1284 0.1173 
 -2.1290 -2.6641 0.9214 1.0011 0.1031 0.1293 
AR(1) -0.1284 -0.1720* 0.1338 0.1388 0.1290 0.0931 
 -1.4975 -1.7076 1.4375 1.4620 0.8443 0.6431 
Adjusted R-
Squared 
0.0372 0.0686 0.0184 0.0208 0.0011 -0.0057 
Observations 144 144 144 144 122 136 
       
Panel B: Impact of Crises 1 and 2    
 c_s1 is_s1 c_corp1 c_corp2 c_govt1 c_govt2 
Constant 0.7480 0.9037 -1.2801*** -0.4560 0.0002 0.0667 
 1.0579 1.2777 -3.9105 -1.4468 0.0010 0.4029 
Crisis 1 -3.5867 -3.0724 -1.3981 -1.4254 -0.4547 -0.4502 
 -1.3682 -1.6247 -1.2834 -1.2670 -0.7720 -1.0644 
Crisis 2 -8.0112** -10.8150** 3.4033* 3.3128** 0.7499 0.6614 
 -2.3699 -2.4345 1.7359 2.1185 0.3861 0.4683 
AR(1) -0.1446 -0.1890* 0.0714 0.0701 0.1129 0.0759 
 -1.6314 -1.8935 0.8216 0.8026 0.7454 0.5297 
Adjusted R-
Squared 
0.0453 0.0775 0.0488 0.0521 0.0031 -0.0009 
Observations 144 144 144 144 122 136 
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Table H.17: Stock and Bond Indices in the United Arab Emirates 
 
Panel A: Impact of GFC     
 c_s1 is_s1 c_s2 is_s2 c_bond is_bond 
Constant 0.6256 0.0867 0.6153 0.2776 0.4502** 0.5072** 
 0.5841 0.0780 0.6200 0.2722 2.5831 2.3478 
GFC -10.8802* -12.7294* -9.1433* -12.1788* -1.6270 -1.8844 
 -1.8878 -1.8412 -1.7866 -1.9319 -1.2907 -1.2109 
AR(1) 0.1705 0.1168 0.1762 0.1706 0.0942 0.2087* 
 1.2073 0.7732 1.3346 1.1856 0.8810 1.8176 
Adjusted R-
Squared 
0.1204 0.1091 0.1062 0.1392 0.0460 0.0794 
Observations 108 108 108 108 105 105 
       
Panel B: Impact of Crises 1 and 2     
 c_s1 is_s1 c_s2 is_s2 c_bond is_bond 
Constant 0.6333 -0.0927 0.5078 0.1462 0.5147*** 0.5774* 
 0.5338 -0.0770 0.4654 0.1325 2.7094 1.9621 
Crisis 1 -1.2920 -0.0187 -0.6373 -0.7698 -0.6661** -0.6985 
 -0.4696 -0.0062 -0.2223 -0.2462 -2.4472 -1.6000 
Crisis 2 -16.9447** -20.0469** -13.5151** -18.2720** -2.5661 -3.0607 
 -2.4165 -2.2572 -2.1586 -2.2696 -0.9961 -1.0767 
AR(1) 0.1164 0.0529 0.1291 0.1004 0.0748 0.1910 
 0.9025 0.4049 1.1435 0.8361 0.3917 1.4776 
Adjusted R-
Squared 
0.1419 0.1386 0.1136 0.1559 0.0604 0.0920 
Observations 108 108 108 108 105 105 
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Table H.18: Stock and Bond Indices in the United Kingdom 
 
Panel A: Impact of GFC       
 c_s1 is_s1 c_s2 is_s2 c_corp1 c_corp2 c_govt1 c_govt2 
Constant 0.6649** 0.6868** 0.6460* 0.6294** 0.3640*** -0.4198 0.1867 0.1824 
 2.0017 2.2078 1.9540 1.9880 2.9436 -1.4249 1.4377 1.4043 
GFC -3.6816** -2.6204 -3.6782** -2.4542 -0.2770 2.4114* 0.4058 0.4179 
 -2.1293 -1.4650 -2.1800 -1.4156 -1.2231 1.8020 0.5209 0.5613 
AR(1) -0.0101 -0.0877 -0.0203 -0.0798 0.0541 0.0248 0.0727 0.0757 
 -0.0964 -0.9231 -0.1894 -0.8050 0.5523 0.2298 0.6355 0.7387 
Adjusted R-
Squared 
0.0501 0.0253 0.0502 0.0203 -0.0081 0.0477 -0.0035 -0.0028 
Observations 144 144 144 144 122 105 144 144 
         
Panel B: Impact of Crises 1 and 2      
 c_s1 is_s1 c_s2 is_s2 c_corp1 c_corp2 c_govt1 c_govt2 
Constant 0.8326** 0.7733** 0.7897** 0.7140** 0.3995*** -0.4071 0.1708 0.1664 
 2.4886 2.4235 2.3526 2.1775 3.0307 -1.3428 1.2756 1.2397 
Crisis 1 -2.1155* -1.3238 -1.8991* -1.1500 -0.4753** 0.3477 0.0298 0.0294 
 -1.8610 -1.0521 -1.7021 -1.0464 -2.2275 0.4178 0.0763 0.0743 
Crisis 2 -5.7704** -3.8115 -5.7299** -3.8363 -0.1161 3.5659** 1.0253 1.0487 
 -2.4082 -1.5547 -2.4452 -1.5136 -0.4365 2.0107 0.8502 0.9320 
AR(1) -0.0277 -0.0897 -0.0347 -0.0833 0.0409 -0.0281 0.0544 0.0584 
 -0.2669 -0.9645 -0.3255 -0.8721 0.4119 -0.2822 0.5285 0.6335 
Adjusted R-
Squared 
0.0869 0.0327 0.0822 0.0305 -0.0050 0.0522 0.0034 0.0051 
Observations 144 144 144 144 122 105 144 144 
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Table H.19: Stock and Bond Indices in the United States 
 
Panel A: Impact of GFC         
 c_s1 is_s1 c_s2 is_s2 c_corp1 c_corp2 c_govt1 c_govt2 c_govt3 c_govt4 
Constant 0.9683*** 0.9637*** 1.0202*** 0.9436*** 0.3301*** -0.0539 0.2300** 0.2240** 0.2476** 0.2525** 
 2.9667 3.3180 2.9941 3.0603 3.6134 -0.5246 2.1593 2.0814 2.3649 2.2018 
GFC -4.6777** -3.8727** -4.7457** -3.8971* -0.1347 -0.2209 0.3194 0.3087 0.2720 0.3107 
 -2.2016 -2.0366 -2.1608 -1.9151 -0.3318 -0.5276 0.6631 0.6009 0.5508 0.5759 
AR(1) 0.0853 0.0373 0.1008 0.0584 0.0808 0.1669* 0.0261 0.0596 0.0640 0.0576 
 1.1062 0.5048 1.3147 0.7860 1.2771 1.9346 0.3817 0.8935 0.9328 0.8547 
Adjusted R-
Squared 
0.0917 0.0633 0.0937 0.0602 -0.0061 0.0164 -0.0088 -0.0066 -0.0068 -0.0073 
Observations 144 144 144 144 144 105 144 144 144 144 
           
Panel B: Impact of Crises 1 and 2        
 c_s1 is_s1 c_s2 is_s2 c_corp1 c_corp2 c_govt1 c_govt2 c_govt3 c_govt4 
Constant 1.1667*** 1.0851*** 1.2272*** 1.0774*** 0.3132*** -0.0531 0.1788 0.1718 0.1974* 0.1961 
 3.3039 3.2815 3.3765 3.0407 3.0598 -0.5117 1.5474 1.4633 1.7052 1.5567 
Crisis 1 -2.3757** -1.5231* -2.4223** -1.5774 -0.0097 -0.1822 0.3463 0.3449 0.3157 0.3731 
 -2.3288 -1.6620 -2.3118 -1.5625 -0.0423 -0.7877 1.0431 1.0217 0.9875 1.0391 
Crisis 2 -7.7493** -6.4829** -7.9571** -6.6626** 0.1188 -0.0328 0.9076 0.9105 0.8651 0.9408 
 -2.3939 -2.3359 -2.3584 -2.2586 0.1228 -0.0324 1.0658 0.8975 0.8974 0.8879 
AR(1) 0.0424 0.0034 0.0561 0.0271 0.0811 0.1645 0.0115 0.0476 0.0509 0.0458 
 0.4039 0.0324 0.5393 0.2615 0.7123 0.9389 0.1243 0.5086 0.5348 0.4977 
Adjusted R-
Squared 
0.1471 0.1051 0.1502 0.1017 -0.0139 0.0056 0.0055 0.0066 0.0055 0.0053 
Observations 144 144 144 144 144 105 144 144 144 144 
 
